CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.-See EVIDENCE.

CODICIL.-See WILL.

COLLECTOR OF TAXES.

When the law provides that no tax shall be collected after the expiration of
one year from the date of the warrant for its collection, and it appears to the
Court that the tax, for the enforcement of the collection of which the writ is
sought, has been levied and assessed, and the warrant for the collection of the
same delivered to the collector, more than a year, the petition for the writ
of mandamus will be dismissed, because it is not in the power of the collector
to collect the tax. The law will not attempt to enforce a person to do a thing
which by law it is impossible for him to do. Road Com. vs. New Castle, 466.
COMITY.

1. Where receivers of a corporation have been appointed by a court in
another State, it is to be presumed that the court had jurisdiction of the cause,
and that the appointment was valid. Kerwin Mfg. Co. vs. Truxton, 48.

2. The powers conferred by the laws of one State can have no operation in
another State except by comity, and therefore a corporation cannot as of right sue
in any other jurisdiction than that from which it derived its corporate powers.
The practice, however, is now universal in this country to permit by comity cor-
porations of one State, having the right to sue there, to sue in the courts of
another State unless the exercise of that privilege is repugnant to the interests or
policy of such State. Ibid.

3. By comity receivers are now generally permitted to maintain suits in other
states for the the protection of the interests, and the enforcement of the claims, of
the corporations for which they were appointed, provided it would not be contrary
to the policy of such states, or detrimental to the interests of their citizens, or of
others who have acquired rights there. Ibid.

4. When the laws of the State in which receivers of a corporation are ap-
pointed provide that such receivers shall be vested with all the estate and assets
of every kind belonging to the corporation, and that suits may be brought and
carried on by them, either in their own names and capacities as such receivers,
or in the name of the corporation for which they shall have been appointed, such
corporation will not be permitted to sue in this State in its own name unless it
appears that the suit is brought by the authority of the receivers. To permit it to
do so would be an unwarranted disregard of the laws of a sister State, instead
of an act of comity.

4. When by the laws of the State creating the corporation it has been deprived
of the right to the possession or control of its assets, and the right to sue in
the courts of such State for the recovery of any of its debts or rights of action, it
would be unreasonable to ask the courts of another State, upon grounds of
comity, to permit such corporation to sue there, or to exercise any of the powers
of which it had been deprived by the laws of the State of its creation. Ibid.
COMMON BAIL.-See BAIL.

COMMON LAW.

1. Bribery of the kind charged in the indictment in this case is a crime not de-
fined upon the statute books of this State, and under a general provision of our
statute, resort must be had to the common law, not only for the definition of the
crime, but also for the punishment. State vs. Davis, 139.

2. Bribery at common law defined. Ibid.

3. The common-law right of securing damages by impounding cattle running

COMMON LAW-Continued.

at large on uninclosed lands is abrogated by the statute of this State, passed March 2, 1895.-Rev. Code, 482. Hill vs. Ginn, 174.

4. A married woman in this State is still under such common-law disabilities as have not been removed by statute. Vincent vs. Ireland, 580.

CONCEALED FRAUD.-See also FRAUD.

1. In cases of official bonds, concealed fraud on the part of the principal will deprive both principal and surety of the benefit of the statute of limitations; the statute does not begin to run until the fraud is discovered. Lieberman vs. First Nat'l Bank, 411.

2. It is true that equity will not relieve against the bar of the statute in favor of the party who has been in laches in not using the means in his power to discern the fraud, but the rule is that it is good faith and not diligence which is required of the creditor as a condition of his right to hold the surety; the creditor or obligee in a bond is not obliged, for the benefit of sureties, to watch the principal.—Ibid.

CONCLUSIVENESS OF RECORDS OF JUSTICE OF PEACE.-See JUSTICE OF PEACE.

CONDITIONAL OR ABSOLUTE CONTRACTS.--See CONTRACT.

CONDITIONAL SALES.-See SALES.

CONFLICTING TESTIMONY. See also EVIDENCE.

I. In cases of doubt, good character avails. If the case is clearly and satisfactorily proved, good character avails nothing. If there be a doubt of guilt, arising out of conflict of testimony or other cause, then the fact that the accused has lived in a community for years, and in all of those years has consistently built up for himself a character for integrity, honesty and fair dealing, should clothe him with the presumption of innocence; where the scales of justice hang in balance, good character comes to solve the difficulty, tips the balance, and inures to acquittal. State vs. Davis, 139.

2. The rule stated that should guide the jury when the testimony is conflicting. Smith vs. Smith's Adm., 245; Ray vs. D. S. Steel Co., 525. CONSIDERATION.

A naked promise to accept a less sum than the amount of an award in full payment thereof, if made gratuitously, is void for want of consideration. Wood vs. Bangs, 435.

CONSOLIDATION OF INDICTMENTS.-See INDICTMENT.

CONSTITUTION.-See CONSTITUTIONAL Law.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

1. There is no principle of constitutional law which prohibits the Legislature from granting to a city special privileges and immunities not enjoyed by all other cities in the State. Mayor and Council vs. Ewing, 66.

2. The act of April 24, 1889, is valid and constitutional in so far as it relieves the city of liability, even though that part of the act should be unconstitutional which purports to make property owners responsible for damages resulting from the defective condition of footways. Ibid.

3. The constitutional requirement that the subject of a bill should be expressed in its title, has the effect to make the title a part of the enactment. Foster vs. State, 111.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Continued.

4. The Municipal Court of the City of Wilmington, its Judge and its jurisdiction of assaults and batteries, and other offenses specifically enumerated in Section 15, Article 6 of the late, and in Section 30, Article 4, of the present Constitution, are continued and still exist under and by virtue of the provisions of the present Constitution. Forbes and Hartman vs. State, 197.

5. Section 32, Article 4, of the present Constitution does not require that the Judge of said Municipal Court who was lawfully holding his office when said Constitution took effect, should thereupon have been reappointed by the Governor, and confirmed by the Senate before he could lawfully continue in the exercise of the Court's aforesaid jurisdiction. Ibid.

6. The Court cannot charge the jury "that there is no evidence at all before them connecting the defendant with the larceny," because they are not permitted to charge upon the facts. State vs. Spencer, 225.

7. Section 1 of Article 9 of the Constitution does not prevent the AttorneyGeneral from instituting in this Court proceedings to oust individuals from the exercise of corporate powers. State vs. Hancock, 252.

8. Two companies whose charters were granted by the Legislature prior to the adoption of the Constitution, but which did not organize till after, had the power to merge: Held that the creation of a new company, after the adoption of the Constitution, by the merger of said companies, is not within the inhibition of Section I of Article 9 of the Constitution, which provides that "No corporation shall hereafter be created, renewed or revived by special act, but only by or under general law." Ibid.

9. A prosecution by information and trial by the Court without the intervention of a jury, is due process of law under the 14th amendment to the Constitution of the United States. State vs. Moore, 299.

10. In the prosecution of offenses mentioned in Section 7, Article 5 of the Constitution of this State, it must appear by the bail bond that the defendant was held to bail for the offense charged in the information. Ibid.

11. The act entitled "An Act to Exempt Wages from Attachment Process" Chap. 542, Vol. 16, Laws of Delaware, Rev. Code, 841), held to be constitutional and valid. P., W. & B. R. R. vs. Sharpe, 407.

12. The act of 1893, known as the lien law, Revised Code, 814, held to be constitutional, a reasonable time having been given by the terms of the act to judgment creditors in which to renew and continue their liens. Such statute merely affects the remedy for the enforcement of the judgment; that is, it shortens the time for the existence of the lien, without impairing the obligation of the contract. Maxwell vs. Devalinger, 504.

13. Titles to land can be acquired and lost only in the manner prescribed by the law of the place where such land is situated. The provision of the United States Constitution, which requires full faith and credit to be given in each State to the records and judicial proceedings of every other State, applies only to the records and proceedings of courts, so far as they have jurisdiction. The courts of a State being without jurisdiction as to the title to lands in another State, this provision of the Constitution does not make conclusive the probate proceedings in one State in respect to a will devising lands in another State. Pritchard vs. Henderson, 553.

14. The right of a State to prescribe the laws which shall regulate and control titles to real estate within its borders necessarily requires that such State shall have full power to determine whether those laws have been observed and obeyed.

CONSTITUTION OF UNITED STATES.-See also CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

1. A prosecution by information and trial by the Court without the intervention
of a jury, is due process of law under the 14th Amendment to the Constitu-
tion of the United States. State vs. Moore, 299.

2. Titles to land can be acquired and lost only in the manner prescribed by the
law of the place where such land is situated. The provision of the United
States Constitution, which requires full faith and credit to be given in each State
to the records and judicial proceedings of every other State, applies only to the
records and proceedings of courts, so far as they have jurisdiction. The courts
of a State being without jurisdiction as to the title to lands in another State, this
provision of the Constitution does not make conclusive the probate proceedings
in one State in respect to a will devising lands in another State. Pritchard vs.
Henderson, 553.

CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS.-See Contract.
CONSTRUCTION OF WRITTEN AGREEMENTS.-See AGREEMENT.
CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES.-See also STATutes Construed.

I. The Board of Pilot Commissioners, under the statute creating the said
board, is clothed with full power to make rules for the government of pilots
while employed in that service, to decide all differences which may arise between
masters, owners and consignees of ships or vessels and pilots, except in certain
cases; but this authority of the board in terms applies only to pilots when
employed in that service. State ex. rel. Edwards vs. Bd. of Pilot Com., 16.
2. The statute assumes the existence of the relation of master and appren-
tice, entirely outside of its provisions, and refers to such apprenticeships as then
rightfully subsisting. Ibid.

3. If the Legislature intended that the power of the board to make rules
should control the relation of master and apprentice, it is reasonable to suppose
that such intent would have been in some manner expressed; but it has expressly
limited the power of the board to make rules, to the government of pilots while
in that service. Under the well settled rules for the interpretation of statutes,
the expression of one is the exclusion of the other. Ibid.

4. The rules set up by the board as a justification for their refusal to accept
and register the indenture of apprenticeship of the relator, viz: that the master
never obtained permission of the board to take the relator as a pilot's apprentice,
nor did the said apprentice name the pilot boat to which he wished to be
attached; were adopted without warrant of law, and are void, inasmuch as they
impose conditions and limitations with respect to apprentices other than those
named in the statute, and are inconsistent with the rights and privileges of master
and apprentice, properly growing out of that relation. Ibid.

5. Foreign attachment is only to compel appearance, and where the defend-
ant appears by putting in special bail, under the express terms of the statute, the
case proceeds as in cases commenced by summons, and the plaintiff will be
allowed to amend his original process. Bellah vs. Hilles, 34.

6. In general, but not uniformly, it has been held that where the duty of con-
trol over the streets is imposed upon a municipal corporation, there is an implied
liability arising from default in the performance of such duty. Such has been
the construction given by the courts of this State to the charter of the City of Wil-
mington prior to the act of April 24, 1889. But if the statute either expressly or
by necessary intendment, enacts that the corporation shall not be subject to
liability, there is an end of the matter. The power to alter, modify or take away
the liability of municipal corporations for injuries sustained from defective streets
sidewalks has been frequently exercised by State legislatures and sustained by
courts. Mayor and Council vs. Ewing, 67.

CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES-Continued.

7. The act of April 24, 1889, is valid and constitutional in so far as it relieves the city of liability, even though that part of the act should be unconstitutional which purports to make property owners responsible for damages resulting from the defective condition of footways. Ibid.

8. Embezzlement is a purely statutory offense, unknown to the common law, and is the wrongful conversion of property where the taking and possession are lawful, the person of the wrongdoer and the property converted being within the terms of the statute. Foster vs. State, 111.

9. Chap. 153, Vol. 16 Laws of Delaware, as amended, dispenses with the necessity for authority from the master to the servant to receive the money or property, being the subject of embezzlement, to bring the wrongdoer within the terms of the statute. Ibid.

10. Length of employment is immaterial, and as a casual as well as a continuous employment of one as servant or agent falls within the contemplation of the statute.

11. The word "others," in the title of the act, construed. Ibid.

12. The constitutional requirement that the subject of a bill should be expressed in its title has the effect to make the title a part of the enactment. Ibid.

13. The rule requiring a penal statute to be construed strictly, does not prevent the ascertainment of the legislative will, that being the primary consideration, and is not violated in giving the words of the statute a reasonable meaning, according to the sense in which they were intended. Ibid.

14. The gist of the offense of embezzlement is the breach of the trust reposed in the class of persons enumerated in the statute. Ibid.

15. A dog registered under the charter of the Town of Dover is not the subject of larceny; but would be if registered with the Clerk of the Peace for Kent County, under the act of February 25, 1897 (Rev. Code, 397), which expressly makes any dog so registered personal property and the subject of larceny. State vs. Butler, 127.

16. Courts take judicial notice of the general, public statutes of the State. An act creating a municipal corporation is such a statute. Downs vs. Com. of Smyrna, 132.

17. The statute dispensing with the proof of the incorporation and existence of a corporation plaintiff or defendant in the absence of an affidavit denying the existence of such corporation, is applicable alike to public and private corporations. Ibid.

18. At common law the intent to defraud is a necessary averment, and must be in the indictment. It is also unquestionably the law, where an indictment is framed under a statute, that if the intent to defraud is expressed in the statute, such intent must be averred in the indictment. State vs. Hegeman, 143.

19. It is a well settled rule that penal statutes are to be construed strictly. The statute must be examined to find out whether the offense charged is within its terms. State vs. Hegeman, 147.

20. Endorsements placed on the back of a bill of the character specified in the indictment are the minutes of the stage of its progress through the Legislature, usually made for convenience and identification, and are not parts of the bill. The presence or absence of such endorsements, their truth or falsity, do not make the bill in any respect different from what it was when it was first presented to the Legislature. They are not offenses enumerated in the act under which the indictment was framed. Ibid.