OPINION OF COURT. the meantime have accepted and registered numerous other indentures of apprenticeship, thereby giving such last named apprentices seniority over the relator in the right to become a duly licensed pilot under the laws of this State, and postponing his right thereto from November seventh, 1898, to May fourth, 1902. The board justifies its action, upon the ground that the relator had not complied with the rules of the board, in this; that the said William S. Edwards never obtained permission from the board to take the said William S. Edwards, Junior, as a pilot's apprentice; nor did the said apprentice name the pilot boat to which he was to be attached; the said rule limiting the number of pilots to thirty-three, and allowing each pilot boat to take two apprentices only. The relator contends that these rules are without warrant of law and therefore void. The right of the Board to adopt these rules is admitted on both sides to be the single issue in this case. Under Section 1, Chapter 449, Volume 16, Delaware Laws, of the act creating the Board of Pilot Commissioners, the board is clothed "with full power and authority, under the limitations hereinafter prescribed, to grant license to persons to act as pilots on the Bay and River Delaware, and to make rules for their government, while employed in that service; to decide all differences, which may arise between masters, owners and consignees of ships or vessels and pilots, except in cases hereinafter excepted." This authority of the board, in terms applies only to pilots when employed in that service. The law assumes the existence of the relation of master and apprentice, entirely outside of its provisions, and refers to such apprenticeships as then rightfully subsisting. Thus it is provided in section 3 of the act, "That no license of the first or second class shall be granted to any person or persons, except such persons as have heretofore held, or do now hold such license under the laws of this State, or shall have served a reg OPINION OF COURT. ular apprenticeship of at least six years to a licensed pilot of this State on board of a Delaware Bay or River pilot boat." "Nor shall any license be granted to any person, except such as may have been apprenticed, prior to the first day of March, A. D. 1889, until the principal number of pilots licensed under the laws of this State, shall have been reduced to forty; and thereafter such number of forty shall not be exceeded." "Whenever and as often as a vacancy shall occur by reason of the number of pilots, being reduced to less than forty, a license shall be granted to the senior apprentice who has served six years, and is otherwise duly qualified under the laws of this State: provided, that no person shall be entitled to a license as pilot for any branch, without first having, under the immediate inspection of his master, or a pilot of the first branch, conducted a square rigged vessel, (or at least brig rigged), twenty times up, and twenty times down the river and bay." To the extent named in the above citations, only, does the law deal with the relation of master and apprentice. Nowhere otherwise, does it assume to control that relation, which it there treats as a then subsisting condition outside of and independent of the act itself. If the Legislature intended that the power of the board to make rules should control the relation of master and apprentice, it is reasonable to suppose that such intent would have been in some manner expressed; but it has expressly limited the power of the board to make rules, to the government of pilots while in that service. Under the well settled rules for the interpretation of statutes, the expression of one, is the exclusion of the other. This rule is emphasized in this particular statute; because, in it, the relation of master and servant is not ignored; it does deal with apprentices by name, and sets forth to what extent the law controls them, in the extracts quoted above. These negative any suggestion that might arise of implied power to make such rules, growing out of OPINION OF COURT. the contract of the apprentice, with the master, while the master is actually engaged in service as a pilot. We think, therefore, that the rules set up by the respondents, as a justification for their refusal to accept and register the indenture of apprenticeship of the relator, were adopted without warrant of law, and are void; inasmuch as they impose conditions and limitations with respect to apprentices other than those named in the statute, and are inconsistent with the rights and privileges of master and apprentice, properly growing out of that relation. Manifestly, therefore, the relator is entitled to the relief prayed for in this action; which seems to be his only adequate remedy. It is ordered that a writ of peremptory mandamus issue in pursuance of the prayer of the relator. SYLLABUS. THE STATE OF DELAWARE, upon the relation of DANIEL P. HAMILTON, v8. HIRAM GRAND LODGE OF FREE AND AcCEPTED MASONS OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE, a corporation under the laws of the State of Delaware. Mandamus-Legal Effect of Motion to Quash Return-Analogy to Demurrer-Sufficiency of Return. 1. In mandamus proceedings, the motion to quash the return to the alternative writ has not the effect and scope of a demurrer in reaching back to the first defective pleading on either side, but is restricted in its operation to the return; and under such motion advantage cannot be taken of any material or substantial defect in the alternative writ. 2. The ancient rule as to the degree of certainty required in the return has been somewhat relaxed, and it is now the generally received doctrine that the same degree of certainty required in declarations and other pleadings at law is sufficient. An argumentative return, like any other argumentative pleading is bad. A return is faulty which states mere conclusions of law; and upon a mandamus to correct an improper amotion from an office, the return should set out all the facts necessary to show the court that the relator was removed in a legal and proper manner and for a legal cause. 3. When the respondent justifies his removal or expulsion of the relator, by the authority of the rules of Masonic government, and of the charter, constitution and by-laws of the corporation, such authority must be set out in his return in order that the Court may properly determine whether the removal was proper and legal. (March 28, 1899.) LORE, C. J., and PENNEWILL and BOYCE, J. J., sitting. The facts of the case and the contentions in the arguments of OPINION OF COURT. the respective counsel sufficiently appear in the opinion of the Court. PENNEWILL, J.:-On April 1, 1897, there was filed in this Court a petition of the State of Delaware upon the relation of Daniel P. Hamilton, praying that a writ of mandamus might issue, directed to the Hiram Grand Lodge of Free and Accepted Masons of the State of Delaware, commanding the respondent to restore the relator to the exercise of his rights as a member and corporator of said corporation, of and from which he alleged he had been unjustly and illegally deprived. Thereupon a rule was awarded by the Court on the respondent, to show cause why a writ of mandamus should not be issued as prayed for. On the return of said rule April 2, 1897, a writ of alternative mandamus was issued, To this writ the respondent on May 17, 1897, filed an answer or return; and on November 7, 1898, the relator filed a motion to quash said return for insufficiency, argumentativeness and ambiguity. It is this motion that has been argued before us, and which we are now to determine. In order to intelligently pass upon this question it is necessary for us to consider (1) the contention made by counsel for the respondent, as to the legal effect of such a motion; and (2) what particularity is required in the return to a writ of alternative mandamus. It was urged with much force by the counsel for respondent, that even if the return is invalid for the reasons assigned, it cannot avail the relator because his alternative writ is equally bad. His contention is that a motion to quash a return to the alternative writ has the same effect as a demurrer, and reaches back to the first fault committed by either party. That on the motion to quash, it is competent for the respondent to avail himself of any material defect in the alternative writ, or in the petition on which it was granted, because the motion is carried back to the first defective pleading. The respondent therefore insists that even though the return be fatally defective for insufficiency or argumentativeness, the alternative writ is equally so, and must fall under this motion. The authorities cited by the respondent on this point do not seem |