On the other hand, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island has recently held that in the absence of language indicating a different intent, an amendment should not be regarded as a legislative construction of the prior statute, but as a change in the law. Manning v. Board of Tax Commissioners, 127 Atl. 865. "When the Legislature amends or enacts a new statute, it will be assumed that it had full knowledge of all the judicial decisions theretofore made interpreting the statute as then existing and, that being so, the new enactment must be read in the light of such previous interpretation." Matter of Cole, 235 N. Y. 48; 138 N. E. 733. The words "Acts amendatory thereof" were construed to apply only to "live" statutes, and not revive a statute theretofore repealed; hence a brother's and sister's succession is taxed under the present Tennessee statute. State v. Shepardson, 141 Tenn. 474; 212 S. W. 101. An amendment creating exemptions will not be given a retroactive effect. Connell v. Crosby, 210 Ill. 380; 71 N. E. 350. And an amendment extending exemptions has no such effect unless the act expressly so declares. Provident Hospital v. People, 198 Ill. 95; 64 N. E. 1031. Matter of Ryan, 3 Supp. 136. Matter of Thompson, 14 St. Rep. (N. Y.) 487. Matter of Wolfe, 66 Hun, 389; 21 Supp. 515. An amendment without repeal continues the former statute, and, as we have seen, the estates of persons dying prior to the statute are taxed under the law as it then stood. Re Howard, 80 Vt. 489; 68 Atl. 513. Re Bowen (Cal.), 94 Pac. 1055. Matter of Jones, 54 Misc. 202; 105 Supp. 932. 12. Repeal. The absolute repeal of an inheritance tax statute without any saving clause may leave the State with vested rights to its accrued tax without any machinery for enforcing them. This situation occurred in California and the court said: "The Legislature might perhaps abolish all laws for the collection of debts; this, however, would not have the effect of paying or discharging the debts or in the least impair the obligation to pay them." Estate of Stanford, 126 Cal. 112; 54 Pac. 259; 58 Pac. 462. So, where the California statute repealed or rendered inapplicable provisions in other statutes as to limitations the court gave this provision a retroactive effect in so far as it made inheritance taxes accruing prior thereto collectible. Riley v. Havens (Cal.), 225 Pac. 275. So, when the testator died while the tax act was in force, but no steps had been taken for collection and the repealing act saved no rights of appraisal; in an action in equity to quiet title held: "If there be a valid claim against such property the plaintiff cannot in this equitable proceeding quiet his title against such claim, even though the same be unenforceable by legal proceedings, without paying the claim.” Trippet v. State, 149 Cal. 521; 86 Pac. 1084. a. SAVING CLAUSES. There may be such a clause in another statute, as in New York, where the rights of the State were held to be saved by such a clause in the General Construction Law. Matter of Wright, 214 N. Y. 714; 108 N. E. 1112. In the above cited case the testator had died a non-resident in 1909. By the will of his mother a life interest in a fund was given to his brother and in default of issue of the brother to the testator. The brother lived until 1912, when he died without issue. The remainder then passed under the will of testator. The trust fund consisted of stock in a New York corporation. In 1911 the statute taxing intangible personal property of non-residents was repealed. It was contended that the remainder interest, being defeasible by the birth of issue to the brother, could not be ascertained on the death of the remainderman in 1909, and was not taxable until 1912, when the life tenant died; and, as the statute was then repealed, no tax was due and the Appellate Division so held, two justices dissenting. The Court of Appeals held that the tax accrued on the death of the remainderman in 1909, although the life tenant survived him, and, being vested in the State, was not defeated by the repealing act of 1911. So the United States courts hold that a saving clause preserves all taxes due prior to the repeal. Kertz v. Woodman, 218 U. S. 205; 30 S. Ct. Rep. 621. The Federal courts also hold that a saving clause in a repealing act does not preserve the tax as to remainders after life estates. where the life tenant still survives. Clapp v. Mason, 94 U. S. 589. Mason v. Sargent, 104 U. S. 689. United States v. Hazard, 8 Fed. 380. United States v. N. Y. Ins. and Trust Co., Fed. Cas. 15,837. Sturgis v. U. S., 117 U. S. 363; 6 S. Ct. Rep. 767. United States v. Kelley, 28 Fed. 845. As we have seen, this doctrine is inapplicable under statutes providing for the immediate taxation of the remainder. Matter of Wright, 214 N. Y. 714; 108 N. E. 1112. A saving clause which repealed the act "except as to estates in which the inventory has been filed" is arbitrary, unequal, and, therefore, unconstitutional. Friends v. Levy, 76 Ohio St. 26; 80 N. E. 1036. A vested but defeasible estate in remainder created by deed made before act of 1909, reserving income to the grantor for life, is not subject to the tax under saving clause in the taxing statute or saving clause of general law concerning statutes, where death of the grantor occurred after the act of 1909 became operative, since at the time the act went into effect the State had no right to claim a tax thereon under the provisions of the act of 1895, as under that act the tax would not have become due until the death of the grantor. People v. Carpenter, 274 Ill. 102. b. BY IMPLICATION. In the case of statutes alleged to be inconsistent with each other in whole or in part, the rule is well established that effect must be given to both, if by any reasonable interpretation that can be done; that there must be a positive repugnancy between the provisions of the new laws and those of the old; and even then the old law is repealed by implication only pro tanto, to the extent of the repug nancy," and that "if harmony is impossible, and only in that event, the former is repealed in part or wholly, as the case may be." Frost v. Wenie, 157 U. S. 46. Wood v. U. S., 16 Pet. 342. Where the repealing act is in part the same as the prior statute or in similar language to the same effect it will be construed as continuing the former statute to that extent. Re Howard, 80 Vt. 489; 68 Atl. 513. But a statute covering the whole subject of inheritance taxation and complete in itself impliedly repeals the prior statute. Succession of Frigalo, 123 La. Ann. 71; 48 So. 652. San Diego County v. Schwartz, 145 Cal. 49; 78 Pac. 231. A statute repeals by implication the repugnant provisions of another statute passed the same day but at an earlier hour. State v. District Court, 41 Mont. 357; 109 Pac. 438. Bailey v. Drane, 96 Tenn. 16; 33 S. W. 573. The court said: "It is of no consequence, in legal contemplation, that the two enactments were made at the same session of the Legislature and on the same day. The repugnance and conflict are no less on that account but are the same that they would have been if the two acts had been passed and approved at different sessions far apart. The reason and necessity for the rule recognizing repeals by implication is the same in one case as in the other. The two provisions referred to cannot coexist. They cannot stand together. This being so the latter one must prevail." So it is held that the passage of a general revenue act without reference to the inheritance tax repeals that tax by implication. Fox v. Commonwealth, 16 Gratt. 1. Succession of Frigalo, 123 La. 71; 48 So. 652. Bailey v. Drane, 96 Tenn. 16; 33 S. W. 573. Zickler v. Union Bank and Trust Co., 104 Tenn. 277; 57 S. W. 341. C. INCIDENTAL EFFECTS. A repeal cannot ordinarily affect the rights of parties in pending litigations; nor can it oust the United States Supreme Court of jurisdiction. Campbell v. California, 200 U. S. 87; 26 S. Ct. Rep. 182. The Texas statute authorized the Comptroller to make a contract with persons appointed as collectors of inheritance taxes. Pursuant to such authority he entered into contracts of this sort, but this portion of the act was repealed before the contracts expired. Held, that the collector was entitled to his fees under this contract, even though they accrued after the repeal of this portion of the statute. Johnson v. Smith, 112 Texas, 222; 246 S. W. 1013. While procedure may be altered to affect existing rights under ordinary circumstances, the Supreme Court of California has held that the repeal of a statute of limitations is inoperative where twelve years had elapsed since the final decree of distribution. Chambers v. Gallagher, 177 Cal. 704; 171 Pac. 931. The Iowa act of 1913 repealed the former statute and made the new statute applicable to all estates where the tax had not been collected; held to apply to the remedy merely and not to impose a new tax at an additional rate. State ex rel. Hoyt v. Wyman, 190 Iowa, 1280; 181 N. W. 472. A case illustrating some of the complications that may arise from the repeal of an inheritance tax recently came before the courts of Kansas. The statute of that State imposed the tax upon the transfer of stock in foreign corporations within the State. The act was repealed in 1913. The testator died in 1912, before the statute, and the transfer was effected in 1916, after the repeal. The court held that while the State's right to the tax survived the repeal, its right to penalize the corporation making the transfer of the stock no longer existed. State v. A., T. & St. Fe R. R. Co., 99 Kan. 831; 163 Pac. 157. 13. Unconstitutional statutes. An unconstitutional statute is void and a tax paid thereunder may be recovered. Matter of Brenner, 170 N. Y. 185; 63 N. E. 133. And no tax can be collected under the unconstitutional act even though a constitutional statute is subsequently adopted. Tozer v. Probate Court, 102 Minn. 268; 113 N. W. 888. But the same tax may be revived eliminating the unconstitutional features of the former statute and moneys already collected applied to the newly created obligation. State v. Kings County, 125 N. Y. 312. |