charge of habitual cruelty. Chaplin v. Chaplin, 218. ss. 74, 76, 82-Dissolution of marriage-Cross-petitions-Desertion -Adultery and cruelty-Petitioner's conduct contributing to desertionCruelty provoked by acts of violence of wife-Condonation-Onus of proof --Costs. Under the terms of a separation deed a husband and wife separated in January 1890, and the wife went to England. On her return in November 1890, her husband admitted having committed adultery in her absence, but cohabitation was resumed until February 1891, when the wife left her husband and refused to return. The husband was during three months guilty of cruelty to the wife on several occasions but such cruelty was provoked by acts of violence on her part. The husband having presented a petition for divorce in 1894 on the ground of desertion; the wife presented a cross-petition for divorce on the ground of cruelty and adultery, and prayed for the custody of the child of the marriage. Held (1) that the cruelty and adultery were contributory causes to the wife's desertion and that the husband's petition must be dismissed, but (2) that the cruelty having been provoked by the wife and the adultery condoned by subsequent cohabitation the wife's petition must fail also. The wife's petition, although unsuccessful, having occasioned no further costs than those of her successful defence, the husband was ordered to pay all the costs of suit. Belton v. Belton, 142. -s. 84-A party to a divorce suit in which a decree nisi for dissolution of marriage has been pronounced, cannot be allowed to intervene and show cause against the decree being made absolute under s. 84 of the Marriage Act 1890. Fitts v. Fitts, Robertson (co-respondent), 83. -s. 87-Husband and wifeDivorce-Alimony pendente lite Costs Where an application for alimony pendente lite is refused, the Court has a discretion as to costsWhere a bona fide unsuccessful application is made by the wife for alimony pendent lite she should be allowed her costs; but where she has suppressed and falsified facts in her affidavit in support of her application for the purpose of misleading the Court she should be disallowed such costs. Jonas v. Jonas, 201. ciled in Victoria, and remained so for some years. B afterwards became domiciled in New South Wales, and while so domiciled, brought a suit of nullity of marriage against A. At the time of the hearing B was still domi ciled in New South Wales. There was no evidence of the domicil of A. Held, that the Court had jurisdiction to grant a decree of nullity. Corbett v. Adamson, 17. -8. 111 Where the taxing officer has fixed a sum to be paid into Court by one of the parties under s. 111, and that sum has not been paid in, a judge of the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to order the defaulting party to pay that sum into Court. Bartlett v. Bartlett, 6. Marriage settlement- Marriage part of a trick to defraud creditors -See Insolvency. Michael v. Thompson, 124. Master, Appeal from-See Administration and Probate Act 1890. In re Black, 151. Match, Sparrow shooting-See Police Offences Act 1890. Dalley v. Harding, 175. A per Medical Act 1890 (No. 1118) s. 11 -Apothecary what is-Pretending to be an apothecary-Evidence. son who advises patients, compounds medicines for them, and sells to them those medicines, is an apothecary within the meaning of section 11 of the Medical Act 1890. Any person not being registered under the Medical Act who practises in any of the characters specified in section 11, is guilty of the offence of "pretending.” A, being asked by B for medical advice, gave him that advice, and also some pills. On a prosecution of A for pretending to be an apothecary. Held, that the pills must be taken to be pills in the ordinary acceptation, that is, some chemical compound intended to produce a beneficial effect on the person taking them; and also that the inference might be drawn that A compounded the pills. Gerlach v. Herman; Gerlach v. De Leon, 21. ss. 88 (1.), 92--Pharmaceutical chemist-Effect of declarations required by s. 92-Evidence. The declarations required by s. 92 of the Medical Act 1890 are not conclusive evidence that the applicant has complied with s. 88 (1.), of the Act. A. applied to the Medical Board of Victoria for a certificate that he was duly qualified for registration as a registered pharmaceutical chemist. He furnished the affidavits required by s. 92 to the effect that prior to 1st January 1877 he had for more than two months carried on the business of a chemist and druggist in the keeping of an open shop for the compounding and dispensing of the prescriptions of legally qualified practitioners. The Board examined A., who was a Chinaman, and other wit nesses. It appeared that A. could not read English, that he had not made up any prescriptions, that he sold certain drugs, and carried on the business of a Chinese doctor. The Board refused to grant a certificate giving as a ground that the evidence did not in their judgment establish a claim to registration. Held by the Court (affirming the judgment of Hodges, J.), that the decision of the Board was right. In re Lamsey, 125. Meeting, Notice of See Companies Act 1890. Dalrymple v. Prince of Wales &c. Coy., 168. Member of Company, Agreement to become-See Companies Act 1890. In re the Mercantile Bank of Australia; Ex parte Bagley, 89, 105. Mental capacity - See Practice (Probate). In will of Matthews, 39. Misdescription in Notice to quit-See Landlord and Tenant Act 1890. Griffiths v. McDougall, 29. Misdescription- See Insolvency Act 1890. In re Cohen, 106. Mis-feasance-See Local Government Act 1890. Howlett v. Shire of Tambo, 223. Mortgage--See Real Property Act 1890. Blackburn v. Miller, 177. Mortgagees, Trust in favour of See Companies Act 1890. Mercantile Bank of Australia Limited v. Lewis and another, 93, 202. Negligence - Personal injury Apartments let out to tenants-Lift used by tenants-Invitation by owner to use-Injury to tenant-Negligence of person not in the employment of owner. The defendant was the owner of a building let out in apartments to tenants. The plaintiff was a tenant of a suite of rooms on the third floor. Access was gained by stairs and by a lift. The lift was in charge of a servant of the defendant up to 5 p.m., and afterwards of a servant of another tenant. The plaintiff with her husband entered the lift to descend after 5 p.m., when by reason of a defect of which the defendant knew, the lift became jammed. The plaintiff's hushand got out of the lift by means of a ladder and while the plaintiff was doing the same thing the lift suddenly ascended, and the plaintiff was injured. Held, that the plaintiff and other tenants used the lift by invitation of the owner at all times when the lift was running, whether under the control of the defendant's servant or of some other person, and that the plaintiff, having been placed in a position of peril by reason of the jamming of the lift which was due to the defendant's negligence, was entitled to recover damages from the defendant for injuries received in attempting to escape from that peril. Quære, whether this would apply to a member of the public using the lift under the like circumstances. De Alba v. The Freehold Investment and BankCo., Ltd. (in Liquidation), 136. Nightsoil, Carriage of-See Local Government Act 1890. Re Shire of Moorabbin; Ex. parte McLorinan 167. Non-feasance-See Local Government Act 1890. Howlett v. Shire of Tambo, 223. Notice of Appeal, Signature of — Nuisance, Suffering or permitting a-See Health Act 1890. Martin v. McGinnis, 96. Nullity of Marriage-See Marriage Act 1890. Corbett v. Adamson, 17. Numerous persons-See Prac- See Justices Act 1890. Gleeson v. Boardman, 153. Onus of Proof-See Beer Duty Act 1892. Mayberry v. McQuade, 40. -See Libel. Lange v. Bage, 181. Oral agreement-See Contract. Craig v. Roberts, 2. Order Nisi, Omission of Material Statement from-See Insolvency Act 1890. Re Field, 162. Order to Review-See Justices Act 1890. Other chattels, Meaning of term -See Instruments Act 1890. Anderson v. Carter, 49. Order-See Health Act 1890. Town of Port Melbourne v. Permanent Sav ings Building Society of Port Mel bourne, 64. Park, Delegation of Control of-See Boroughs Statute (No. 359). Barnes v. Bremner, 207. Parol agreement-See Transfer of Land Act 1890. Black v. Poole, 155. Parsonage See Local Government Act 1890. Shire of Borung v. Dunstan, 95. Partners-See Insolvency Act 1890. Re De Beere Monte and Co., 160. Partnership-Practice- Receiver -Leave of the Court to sue. Semble, per Hodges, J., that an application to the Court by the receiver of a firm for leave to commence an action, may be made ex parte. Dyson v. Jack, 363. Part performance-See Transfer of Land Act 1890. Black v. Poole, 155. Patent-Publication-Publication in foreign specification deposited in public library--Specification, Interpretation of Combination of well known parts Sufficiency of disclaimer-Prior user by inventorConfidential user. The only publication of an invention was by deposit in the Public Library in Melbourne of a specification of an English patent granted for and describing a similar invention. Held, a sufficient publication. Harris v. Rothwell, 35 Ch. D. 416 followed. A specification dealing with the subject of a combination is to be interpreted by reference to the character of the parts constituting the combination. Although, where some of these are unfamiliar and ingenious contrivances, it may be necessary expressly to negative any claim to originality with respect to them, the law does not require this to be done, where the specification deals with things in common use, combined in an exceptional way. Semble, that an inventor by public user of his invention before obtaining protection for it destroys its novelty, first, because by so doing, and keeping the discovery to himself he virtually extends the period of his monopoly; secondly, because by making his invention part of the stock of general knowledge, he has, in effect, dedicated it to the public. The plaintiff gave to the defendant or her subordinates instructions under which a corset and belt afterwards patented were made for her. She did not carry on the business of staymaking until after she had obtained the patent, and before doing so she had experimented not only on herself, but on two ladies who went to the defendant on her introduction to have made for them what had previously been made for the plaintiff. She did not derive any profit from these sales, one of which she treated and paid for as sold to herself. Held, that this did not constitute such prior user as to invalidate a patent subsequently granted to the plaintiff in respect of the corset and Patents Act 1890 (No. 1123), s. 53 belt. Merrilees v. Rhodes, 219. Patent-Infringement-Injunction to restrain threats-Trial of invention. An injunction will not be granted under s. 53 of the Patents Act 1890, to restrain threats of legal proceedings unless there is some actual manufacture, use, sale or purchase of the invention by the person threatened. A was the patentee of an invention for starting horse-races; B invented a machine for the same purpose and had obtained a provisional protection for it. B wished to make trial of his machine and obtained the leave of the Victorian Racing Club to make the trial on their racecourse. A then wrote and published threats that he would take legal proceedings against B, in respect of his invention. On a motion by B for an injunction to restrain A from continuing such threats. Held, that no injunction should be granted as there was no actual manufacture, use, sale, or purchase of B's machine. Challender v. Royle, 36 Ch. D. 425, followed. Errington v. Krone, 215. --s. 72-Selling as patented an article not patented Defence Article not patented in Victoria-Indictable offence-Justices Act 1990 (No. 1105) s. 113. To an information under section 72 of the Patents Act 1890, for putting to sale as patented in Victoria an article not patented in Victoria for the purpose of deceiving the public, it is no defence that no article of the kind is not patented in Victoria. Semble: The offence created by that section is indictable and therefore the justices have no jurisdiction to deal with it summarily. Duncan v. Gibson, 120. Peace, Disqualification of Justice of See Practice. In re Pharmaceutical chemist See Medical Act 1890. In re Lamsey, 125. Pleading-See Practice. Police Offences Act 1890, s. 37-Lottery-Disposing of land by lottery-Land not that of promoters -Company formed in another colony -Distribution of Victorian land among shareholders. It is an offence within sec. 37 of the Police Offences Act 1890, by means of any device to endeavour to sell by means of a game of chance any lands whether belonging to the person so endeavouring or not. The Court having found that there was an endeavour in Victoria, to dispose in Victoria of land in Victoria. Held, that the fact that the lottery was to be drawn in another colony did not oust the jurisdiction of the justices. Cawsey v. Andrews, 3. -s. 51-- Using house for betting purposes-Isolated acts of bettingClub. Evidence that A. made two bets on the 22nd December, 1894, and the 4th February 1895, respectively at a private club, will not support an information against him for unlawfully using the club for betting purposes under the Police Offences Act 1890, s. 51, Duncan v. Healey, 218. -Part IV., ss. 54, 72-Police Offences Statute 1865 (No. 265), s. 51 -Police Offences Statute Amendment Act 872 (No. 424), s. 9-Acts Interpretation Act 1890 (No. 1058) g. 32-Act of Parliament-Consolidating Acts--Alteration of law--Applic ation to similar circumstances of provisions of repealed Acts-Wagering contract-Nullity" Lawful sport or exercise"-Stakeholder-Right to recover deposit. The operation of section 72 of the Police Offences Act 1890 is not to be taken as limited by section 54. The effect of the Acts Interpretation Act 1890 s. 32 is to limit the saving effect of section 54 to such of the provisions only of Part IV. of the Police Offences Act 1890 as re-enact sections of the Police Offences Statute Amendment Act 1872. An agreement to contest a sparrow shooting match for so much aside, the money being deposited with a stakeholder, is a wager, and null and void under the Police Offences Act 1890 s. 72. The deposit of the money is not a subscription or contribution for a sum of money within the proviso, to that section, nor is the validity of the agreement saved by section 54. The complainant and B agreed to shoot off a match for so much aside, and deposited the stakes with the defendant to be paid to the winner. The match never came off, and the complainant demanded the sum deposited by him from the defendant. Held, that the complainant was entitled to recover his share of the wager from the defendant. Diggle v. Higgs, 2 Ex. D. 422, and Trimble v. Hill, 5 App. Cas. 342, followed, 175. -s. 57 and Second Schedule-See Justices Act 1890. Gleeson v. Boardman, 153. Policy Moneys on Life Assurance See Companies Act 1890. Mercantile Bank v. Lewis and another, 93, 202. Possession, Refusal to deliver up, by sub-tenant See Landlord and Tenant Act 1890. Trustees Executors &c. Coy. v. De Faro, 21. Power of Attorney, Agent appointed by-See Landlord and Tenant Act 1890. Cleverdon v. Towsend, 69. Practice Order -Jurisdiction of single judge to set aside an order made exparte by himself-Where an order has been made exparte by a single judge, that judge has jurisdiction to hear a summons taken out by another party to the action to set the order aside. 161. Mulholland v. Smith, -Rules of Supreme Court 1884, Order III., r. 6-Order XIV., r. 1– Specially endorsed writ - Use and Occupation-Particulars claiming rent -Where in the prefatory part of a writ the claim purports to be for "use and occupation," while the particulars point to the action being one for "rent," the action will be treated as one for "use and occupation. Rock Freehold Land Coy. v. Cunliffe, 33. -Order III., r. 6-Order IV., r. 1-Order XIV., r. 1-Order XIX., r. 4-Specially endorsed writ--Signature-Agent. Where a writ pur porting to be specially endorsed is issued by an agent for his principal, the endorsement should be signed by the agent, and not by the principal. Harris v. Gleeson, 129. -Order XIV., r. 1-Final jndgment, Application for-Application not made till defence delivered. There is jurisdiction to entertain an application for final judgment under Order XIV, r. 1, after a defence has been delivered but where the delivery of a defence has not been unduly hurried, the plaintiff must show by affidavit sufficient reasons for his delay. Deegan v. Remington, 2. -Order XVI., r. 9-Representative order Numerous persons Originating summons--A representative order was made in proceedings commenced by originating summons when it was shown that there were five defendants whose interests were identical. Trustees Executors and Agency Company Limited v. Sparling and others, 34. -Order XVI., rr. 49, 50-Third party-Principal and surety-Execu tion against surety. A. and B. gave the defendants a guarantee under the terms of which they were liable to pay the defendants up to £1000, whatever the defendants paid to the plaintiffs under a certain contract. The defendants (before paying anything) were sued by the plaintiffs on the contract and brought in A. and B. as third parties. Held, that the defendants were entitled to a declaration that the third parties were liable to indemnify them to the amount of £1,000, and that they should be bound by the judgment against the defendants, but that execution was not to be issued against the third parties, except for such sums as the defendants might have paid to the plaintiffs. Bank of Australasia v. Mercantile Finance Trustees and Agency Co. of Australia Limited, 57. -Order XIX. rr. 16, 27-Instruments Act 1890, s. 203-Statute of Frauds-Sale of land- PleadingDeparture Demurrer Where a plaintiff sets up a verbal contract for the sale of land and the defendant raises the Statute of Frauds in the defence, the plaintiff, in his reply, can set up a memorandum in writing sufficient to satisfy the statuteWhere the Statute of Frauds is intended to be raised, it must be done by a denial of the fact that the statute has been complied with, and it must not be raised in the form of a simple demurrer. Henderson v. Thorne, 193. -Order XIX., r. 27-Local Government Act 1890, s. 344-General demurrer. A general demurrer is bad pleading. Sweetnam v. Jacobs, 13 A.L.T., 169, explained. AttorneyGeneral v. Blackwell, 150. Order XXVIII., r. 1--Amendment of reply. Where, in an action to set aside certain composition proceedings on the grounds that they were obtained by fraud and were irregular; the Court of Insolvency set aside such proceedings after the pleadings in the action had closed ; leave was given the plaintiff to amend his reply by setting up the decision of the Court of Insolvency as an answer to the allegations contained in the defence. The Delta, 1 P.D., 393, discussed. Real Estate Mortgage and Deposit Bank Limited v. Cromie, 41. -Order XXXI, rr. 5, 6, 7Interrogatories-Setting aside order -Varying order-- Answering by agent Jurisdiction - Stay of proceedings. A judge has no power to set aside interrogatories on the ground that the pleadings on which such interrogatories are based disclose no valid ground of relief unless such pleadings are clearly bad in law. A judge has no power to allow an agent to answer for a party when such party does not come within the terms of Order XXXI., r. 5-Where plaintiff resident in England was ordered to answer interrogatories a stay of proceedings for 80 days was allowed. Stibbard v. The Dominion Banking and Investment Corporation Limited, 222. -Order XXXVI., r. 1-Order LXV., r. 27 (41)-Review of taxation Where of costs-Change of venue. in an action judgment is ordered to be entered for the defendant on the statement of claim without costs, and for the defendant on the counterclaim with costs, the defendant on the taxation of his costs of the counterclaim, is entitled to all such costs as were necessarily incurred for establishing the counterclaim, even if part of them went to and established the defence. Costs incurred in connection with an application to change the venue of an action may be said to be costs incidental to the counterclaim. Lloyd v. Looker, 97. -Order XLII., r. 23 (a). Per Hood, J.: In applications under Order XLII., r. 23 (a), the proper course to pursue is to give notice of the application to the person against whom execution is sought. Hammon v. Kampfhenteel, 135. -Order XLII., r. 32-Applicacations under this rule should be made on summons and not exparte. Gottor v. Sheppard, 151. -Order XLII., r. 32- Insolvency of judgment debtor-An order will not be made under this rule where the judgment debtor is insolSetter v. Bell, 157. vent. -Order XLV. r. 1—Attachment of debts-Debt sought to be attached less than £5-A judge will not grant an order nisi to attach a debt where such debt is less than £5. Cotter v. Moran; Collis (Garnishee); 157. -Order LXIV., r. 4-Order LXX., r. 1-Supreme Court Act 1890, s. 3-Petition in Divorce-Service in long vacation-Pleadings-A petition in divorce does not come within the provisions of Order LAIV., r. 4, and can therefore be served in the long vacation. Nolan v. Nolan, 134. -Order LXV. r. 1-TrialJudgment-Costs-Several issues Verdict for plaintiff on one count, and for defendant on others "Good cause" - Set off Higher and lower scale. The plaintiff brought an action for libel against the proprietor of a newspaper, alleg. ing 11 distinct causes of action, in Il counts, and claimed £25,000 damages. The defendant pleaded (1), that the matter complained of was not libellous, (2), justification, and (3), fair comment. At the first trial the plaintiff obtained a verdict on the 8th count, for £100, the jury disagreeing as to the remainder, and he obtained judgment for the amount with costs. At the second trial he obtained a verdict on the 6th count for one farthing, the defendant obtaining a verdict on the remaining nine, on the plea of fair comment. The subject matter of the 6th and 8th counts was substantially the same. The most serious counts in the opinion of the presiding judge, were the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 11th, and in these the defendant succeeded. The great, bulk of the costs was occasioned by the counts on which the defendant succeeded. Held (1) that "good cause" had been shown for making an order depriving the plaintiff of the general costs of the action; (2) that judgment must be entered for the plaintiff on the 6th count for a farthing damages with the costs of the issue relating to that count, and that judgment must be entered for the defendant on the remaining nine counts with costs, less such costs as were exclusively attributable to the issues of libel or no libel and justification-which costs must be allowed to the plaintiff; (3) that the costs where allowed, should under the circumstance of the case be on the higher scale; (4) that, on taxation, the costs allowed to one party should be set-off against the costs and the damages allowed to the other party. Pringle v. Gloag, 10 Ch. D. 676; 48 L.J. Ch. 380, followed on the fourth point. Speight v. Syme, 85. sion of Hood, J.), that this was a "trial." A "trial" is a hearing of an action where there is a real dispute as to the facts and witnesses are examined. It does not matter whether the action is begun by writ or by originating summons. Marwick v, Orton, 14. -Order LXXIII* r. 1-Appendix O*-Costs-Judgment - Certificate or allocatur-The words "not being a judgment in Appendix O.* under the heading Taxation of Costs do not mean "not being in pursuance of a judgment," but "not being included in a judgment." An order was made on an originating summons dismissing the plaintiff's application, and ordering him to pay the costs of certain of the defendants when taxed. The Chief Clerk who taxed under this order refused to sign the certificate at the foot of the bill of costs, "I have taxed and do allow this bill of costs at the sum of £," without payment of a fee of ten shillings. Held, that this fee of ten shillings was rightly demanded, such certificate being a "certificate for allocatur of the result, not being a judg ment " within Appendix O* of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1884. Duff v. Perpetual Executors and Trustees Association of Australia, Limited, 90. mons. -Regula Generales 23rd June 1873-Executor of unsound mindCreditor's summons-Form of sumIn will of Barthold, 157. -Testamentary capacity-Partial unsoundness of mind-Mental delusions. If the delusions of a testator are such as cannot reasonably be supposed to affect his testamentary dispositions, or if the Court is satisfied that the testator was not subject to them when he made his will such will may be valid notwithstanding that the testator is of unsound mind. Banks v. Goodfellow, L.R., 5 Q.B., 549, followed. In will of Matthews, 39. trustees invested part of the money by depositing it in two building societies -Held, by a'Beckett, J., that the investment was unauthorised. Allen v. Hills, 84. -Will-Signature placed among words of Attestation Clause. In will of Lennox, 19. -Will-Trust for children on youngest attaining majority-Death of one before that period-Period of vesting-Gold mine-Proceeds of tribute agreement, Investment ofRight of Crown to gold - Fixture in land partly belonging to tesCompensation under Mining tator on Private Property Act. A. by his will gave his real and personal estate to trustees for his children in equal shares on the youngest attaining the age of 21 years, and " during such suspense of absolute vesting" he empowered the trustees to sell and invest. Held, that no child acquired a vested interest who died before the youngest attained 21. By a codicil to his will A. gave certain land to the same trustees in trust for all his children equally until the youngest should attain the age of 21 years, when, if living, the whole of the land should go to one of the children, B., if B. or any of the children should die then on the youngest surviving child attain. ing the age of 21 years to be divided between the survivors equally. One child died before the youngest attained the age of 21 years. Held that B. took the whole of the land. On the land specifically bequeathed by the codicil were gold mines open at the time of the testator's death, which were afterwards let on tribute and a large sum was thereby realized which the trustees invested. Held, that the Crown, not having intervened, the ordinary rule applicable to open mines should apply, and that all the proceeds obtained before the youngest child came of age belonged to all the children who survived the testator, in equal shares. On the same land were certain fixtures in which the testator had an undivided share. Held that this share passed with the gift of the land. A lease from the Crown having been obtained by a company under the provisions of the Mining on Private Property Act a certain sum was paid to the trustees as compensation for surface damages. Held, that so much of this as represented the currency of the lease before the youngest child came of age, belonged to all the children who survived the testator in equal shares. Cook v. Charlton, 45. Principal and Agent-Signature to writ. See Practice. Harris v. Gleeson, 129. -See Sale of Land. Groom v. Kindellan, 20. and Surety-See Practice. Bank of Australasia v. Mercantile Finance &c. Coy., 57. Priority-See Companies Act 1890. Mercantile Bank v. Lewis and another, 93, 202. -See Insolvency Act 1890. In re Stiles, 209. Prior User by Inventor-See Patent. Merrilees v. Rhodes, 219. Privileged CommunicationSee Libel. Lange v. Bage, 181. Privy Council, Appeal to-See Supreme Court Act 1890. Mulholland v. Smith, 130. -Appeal to See Appeal to Privy Council. Mulholland v. Smith, 161. Probate-See Practice (Probate). Proceed, Leave to-See Instruments Act 1890. Noonan v. Townsend, 133. Proceedings, Stay of-See Practice. Stibbard v. Dominion Banking &c., Corporation, Ltd., 222. Proclaimed Highway See Local Government Act 1890. Hodgson v. Henderson, 9. Promissory Note-See Stamps Act 1890. Preacher v. Edgerton, 28. Publication-See Patent. Merrilees v. Rhodes, 219. Public Man-See Libel. Speight v. Syme, 71. Officers' Retirement Act 1893 (No. 1329) s. 2 (2). See Public Service Act 1890. Bristow r. The Queen, 147, 171. Resort, Place of See Licensing Act 1890. Walshe v. Bedwell, 35. Public Service Act 1890 (No. 1133) ss. 24, 107, 108, 136-Act No. 160, s. 44-Public Officers' Retirement Act 1893 (No. 1329) s. 2 (2)— Public service-Superannuation allowance Mode of computation Pecuniary emoluments received " Officer residing in Government building. The petitioner was officer in the Public Service, appointed before the passing of the Act No. 710. In January 1885 his salary was fixed at £570 a year, of which £486 was actually paid to him yearly, the balance of £84 being yearly deducted for rent under section 136 of the Public Service Act 1890. an The salary voted annually by the Appropriation Act was £486. In June 1894 the petitioner retired from the service under the provisions of the Public Officers' Retirement Act 1893 (No. 1329), s. 2 (2). In computing the superannuation allowance to which he was entitled under Act No. 160, s. 44: Held, that the "pecuniary emoluments received" by him, within the meaning of the Public Service Act 1890, s. 108, were £570. Bristow v. The Queen, 14 7,171. -ss. 27, 121-Act No. 160, s. 27 -Public Service-Education depart. Reduction of number of ment officers in department-Certificate of Public Service Board Order in Council -Notice to officer affectedWrongful dismissal-Damages. The provisions of the Public Service Act 1890 (No. 1133), ss. 27, 121, extend to officers in the Education department. An officer in the Civil Service holds his office at the will and pleasure of Her Majesty, and the expression of that will and pleasure may terminate the office without notice being given to the officer affected. A certificate of the Public Service Board under s. 121 of the Public Service Act 1890, approved by the Governor-in-Council becomes a public document, and is thereby published to the world. The petitioner was a state school teacher in the Educatfon department. On the 28th February, 1894, she was informed by the Minister of Public Instruction that her services would not be required after the 31st March, 1894. On the 1st May 1894, the Public Service Board passed a certificate approved on the same day by the Governor in Council, reducing the number of officers in the Education department by sixty-seven, and dispensing with the services of the petitioner and others. No notice of this proceeding was communicated to the petitioner until the 14th November, 1894, the date of the delivery of the answer to the petition. On the 17th October, 1894, the petitioner took proceedings under the Crown Remedies and Liability Act 1890, for reinstatement and salary accrued since 31st March 1894, or in the alternative for pension pro ratu. Held, that the petitioner was legally removed from her position on the 1st May 1894, by the certificate of the Public Service Board approved by the Governor-inCouncil. Held, further, (reversing the decision of a'Beckett, J.), that the petitioner was not, by reason of notice of the legal removal not having been given to her until the 17th October 1894, entitled in respect of the wrongful dismissal of the 28th February 1894, to any damages beyond the amount of her salary for the period between the 28th February and the 1st May. Mattingley v. The Public Worship, Place used exQueen, 143, 171. clusively for-See Local Government Act 1890. Shire of Borung v. Dunstan, 95. Purchaser, Introduction of, by Agent-See Sale of Land. Groom v. Kindellan, 20. v. Quit, Notice to See Landlord and Tenant Act 1890. Griffiths McDougall, 29; Mackett v. Shields, 38; Cleverdon v. Tousend, 69. Rate, Appeal from See Local James v. Government Act 1890. Town of Northcote, 185. Rates, Demand for less than dueSee Local Government Act 1890. -Recovery of, from Owner of Legal Estate -See Local Government Act 1891. Shire of Moorabbin c. County of Bourke Permanent Building &c. Society, 139. -Sale of Land before rate struck -See Local Government Act 1891. Shire of Benalla v. Hughen, 151. Ratification by Personal Representative See Companies Act 1890. Bundoora Park Estate Coy. v. Fisher, 107. Real Property Act 1890, (No. 1136), s. 137-"Locke King's Act”Will-Mortgage-Exoneration-Contrary or other intention. A made a specific devise of certain allotments. His will continued: "I bequeath all the rest, residue and remainder of the personal estate whatsoever and wheresoever which I shall die possessed of or be entitled to or have power to dispose of at the time of my death unto my trustees upon trust as soon as conveniently may be after my death to sell, dispose of, realize, call in and convert into money all such parts thereof as shall not consist of money and thereout to pay satisfy and discharge all my just debts and funeral and testamentary expenses save and except probate or legacy duty, which I direct and declare shall be borne and paid by the respective devisees and legatees under this my will out of their respective shares or properties. I direct and declare that my trustees shall hold and stand possessed of my said residuary personal estate subject to charged and chargeable with the payment thereout of all my debts and funeral and testamentary expenses as aforesaid and all just claims upon me or my estate save and except as aforesaid upon trust for my said wife absolutely.' He subsequently mortgaged the allotments in question. Held that a sufficient " contrary intention" appeared within the meaning of the Real Property Act 1890, s. 137, and that the mortgages were not primarily to be discharged by the property subject to the mortgage, but must be discharged by the residuary estate. Rowan v. Harrison, 31 Beav. 207, was over-ruled by Moore v. Moore, 1 D. J. & S., 602 ; Isaacs v. Moss, 13 V.L. R., 85, dissented from. Blackburn v. Miller, 177. Reasonable Cause-See Landlord and Tenant Act 1890. Mackett Receipt - See Justices Act 1890. v- Shields, 39. Foster Brewing Co. Ltd. v. Youl, 183. Receiver of Firm-See Partnership. Dyson v. Jack, 1. Receiver-See Crimes Act 1890. Reg. v. Angus, 205. Re-entry-See Landlord and Tenant Act 1890. Griffiths v. McDougall, 29; Cleverdon v. Towsend, 69. |