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the meaning of s. 77 of the Insolvency Act 1890 and therefore the insolvency of the defendant does not operate as a stay of such an action. Setter v. Bell, 5.

-ss. 131, 154-Rule of Court, r. 133-Release of insolvent estate-Notice to creditors-Service--Creditor out of jurisdiction-Composition Bona fides-Dividend of one farthing in the pound. The provisions of r. 133 of the rules under the Insolvency Act 1890 as to service of notice of an application for an order releasing an insolvent's estate from sequestration, must be strictly observed. Notice was sent by post to a creditor addressed to a place in Victoria, and the evidence did not show that the creditor was in Vicotria. Held, (assuming that service by post was sufficient service on a creditor in Victoria) that the service was bad and that the application was properly dismissed. Quare, whether a composition_with creditors under s. 154 of the Insolvency Act 1890, must be made bona fide for the benefit of the creditors generally. Be Blood, 4 A.L.T., 184, discussed. Re Charsley, 130.

-8. 132-Certificate- Dispensing with condition of payment of seven shillings in the pound-Investments in shares--Liability for uncalled capital. The insolvent, five years before his insolvency, held a large number of shares in certain companies on which there was a large liability for uncalled capital, but he owned other property, consisting chiefly of mortgages and cash sufficient to pay the whole of that liability. The companies went into liquidation and all the capital was called up, and by reason of the fall in price of land the mortgages became almost worthless.

When the insolvent filed his schedule almost the whole of his liabilities were represented by calls due to one of these companies, and his assets were practically nil.

On an application by the insolvent for a certificate of discharge and that the condition that he should pay seven shillings in the £ should be dispensed with. Held (reversing the decision of the Court of Insolvency) that the failure to pay the seven shillings in the £ arose from circumstances for which the insolvent could not justly be held responsible. Semble The fact that the debts of an insolvent have been incurred by investment in shares bearing a liability for uncalled capital, which liability the insolvent could not, if called upon to do so, at the time of the purchase, discharge, is a ground for refusing to dispense with the condition of payment of seven shillings in the £. In re Davies, 121. Inspector of Licensing Districts, Information by- See Licensing Act 1890. Webb v. Smith, 186. Instruments Act 1890, s. 92— Common Law Procedure Statute 1865,

s. 92-Action under the Instruments Interrogatories-See Practice. Act 1890-Substituted service-Leave Intervention-See Marriage Act to appear-Entry of appearance after 1890. Fitts v. Fetts, 83. time-Leave to proceed-A defendant - See Patents in an action under the Instruments Invention, Trial of Act 1890 must enter an appearance Act 1890. Errington v. Krone, 215. within the time limited for making Inventor, Prior User by-See Pathe application for leave to appear- tent. Merrilees v. Rhodes, 219. Where the plaintiff has obtained an order for substituted service on the Investment of moneys - See Contract. Craig v. Roberts, 2. Judgment, Final. See practice. Judicial Separation. See Marriage Act 1890.

defendant and the defendant does not

appear to an action under the Instruments Act 1890 the plaintiff may obtain an order for leave to proceed on materials such as would have entitled him to a similar order under s. 92 of the Common Law Procedure Statute 1865. The order for leave to proceed may be granted at the same time and by the same order as the order for substituted service, or it may be granted by a separate order. Noonan r. Townsend, 133.

s. 158--Schedule 9-Lien on crops - Consideration Where the consideration expressed in a lien on "in consideration of £182 crops was and further advances of bona fide value" which the lienor admitted to have received in goods from the lienee, and it appeared by the evidence that there was an arrangement that the lienee was to carry the lienor on until the harvest. Held, that the consideration may be read to mean in "consideration of an agreement to give further advances" and that the lien was given to the extent of those advances when ascertained. Bennett v. Baker; Cutts (Claimant), 149.

-8s. 169, 170-Stock mortgage -Meaning of words "other chattels" -After acquired property-Equitable claims The words "other chattels" in ss. 169 and 170 cover everything which might be reasonably necessary for working such a station as that on which the mortgaged stock are depasturing-Furniture reasonably necessary for the house of the person who has charge of the station is reasonably necessary for the working of the station and would therefore come within the words "other chattels. Where a mortgagor assigned all after-acquired property that might be brought on the premises, the after-acquired property is treated in equity as the property of the mortgagee as soon as it is brought upon the premises. The Court in interpleader proceedings can determine equitable claims and can restrain the sheriff, who has seized without notice of an assignment of afteracquired property, from selling under an execution. Anderson v. Carter, 49.

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-s. 208-See Transfer of Land Act 1890. Black v. Poole, 155.

-s. 209-See Practice. Henderson v Horne, 193.

Intention, Contrary-See real Property Act 1890. Blackburn v. Miller, 177.

Jurisdiction, Service out of theSee Justices Act 1890. Dunn v. Roberts, 217.

Justice of the Peace

Dis

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qualification - Suspicion of bias Time for taking objection. Semble, a justice is disqualified from adjudicating if the circumstances be such that ordinary persons would suspect bias, and would regard him as a partial judge, even though he clearly be not biassed or interested. A party, knowing that there may be some objection to the constitution of a bench of justices, must take that objection at once, and it is too late to raise that objection on an order to review. McCrory v. Rivett, 174.

Justices Act 1890 (No. 1105) s. 18-Police Offences Act 1890 (No. 1126) s. 57 and Second Schedule-Information-Complaint on oath-Common gaming house-Information in writing lodged with clerk of CourtObjection, Time for taking-Waiver. Semble, that an objection to proceedings before justices on the ground that there is no information in writing within the Justices Act 1890 s. 18, is one which can be waived. The defendants were arrested on a warrant under the Police Offences Act 1890, s. 57, and brought before justices. The warrant had been issued on a complaint made on oath that there was reason to suspect that certain premises were used as a common gaming house, but no further charge was preferred against the defendants in the manner indicated in the Justices Act 1890, s. 18. At the hearing before the justices and after the evidence of one witness had been taken, the solicitor for the defendants became aware for the first time of this fact, and he at once took objecHeld (1) tion to the proceedings. that the justices had no jurisdiction to convict the defendants; (2) that the objection was made in time. Gleeson v. Boardman, 153.

-ss. 36 (4), 141, 148-Practice -Order to review-Costs-Contempt -Power of justices to imprison witness absenting himself" Person in-' terested in maintaining the order." Judgment having been recovered in Petty Sessions against the defendant, he was summoned before the bench under the Imprisonment of Fraudulent

Debtors Act 1890. He did not appear and the matter was adjourned, the justices at the same time, of their own motion, fining him twenty shillings, to be recovered by distress, and, in default of distress, imprisoning him for three days. On the return of an order nisi to review this decision on the ground that the justices had no jurisdiction to make such an order, counsel for the complainant conceded that the order of the bench could not be supported. Held, that the rule should be made absolute, but without costs against the complainant. Miller v. Lennie, 208.

-s. 73- Animals Protection Act 1890 (No. 1064) ss. 3-9-Duplicity"Two or more offences." M. was charged at Petty Sessions for that he did at L. on the 5th April, 1895, "beat, wound and mutilate a certain animal, to wit, a dog, the property of this complainant, and also did kill a certain other dog the property of the complainant, under circumstances that amount to cruelty to animals, contrary to the Animals Protection Act 1990," and the complainant in the information claimed £30 as compensation for the mutilation and death of the said animals. Held, that the information was bad for duplicity. R. v. Giddens, 1 C. & M. 634, followed. Duggan v. Martin,

226.

-s. 77 (5)-Evidence in replyThe word "witnesses" includes complainant. Under section 77 (5) of the Justices Act 1890, which provides that the justices shall in certain circumstances proceed to hear such witnesses as the plaintiff may examine in reply, the plaintiff himself may give evidence in reply. Deasy v. Wilson

37.

-s. 89 (1) (2)—Justices Rules r. 4-Summons-Issued and served, but not filed with Clerk of Court-Jurisdiction of Justices-Costs. A summons was issued by S. against C., and served on her, but on the return day was not filed with the clerk of the Court of Petty Sessions. Held that the justices had jurisdiction to deal with the matter and to award costs. Sweetnam v. Clark, 37.

-s. 113-See Patents Act 1890. Duncan v. Gibson, 120.

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-s. 116-Attachment of debtGarnishee order-Trust fund in hands of garnishee-Assignment for benefit of creditors-Power of assignor to rescind Escrow - Stamp Admissibility of unstamped document for collateral purpose-Receipt-Settlement-Stamps Act 1890 (No. 1140) ss. 69, 89-Stamps Act 1892 (No. 1274) schedule, heading VIII. (2). Where money has been paid over by a debtor to a trustee for the benefit of his creditors, and he has taken no steps to revoke the trust so created, a judgment creditor has no right to treat money in the hands of the trus

tee as a debt due to the debtor, and to proceed to attach it. Roberts v. Jones, 40 W.R. 573 followed. Whether an assignment for the benefit of creditors requires a stamp either as being a receipt or a settlement, quare. The Foster Brewing Co. Ltd. v. Youl; Warne, garnishee, 183.

-s. 141-Order to review-Nonservice of complaint - Affidavit of service-Error or mistake. Shamrock Brewing and Malting Coy, v. Schomann, 5.

ss. 141-148-Process-Service out of jurisdiction-Order to review -Costs. The complainant recovered judgment against the defendant in Petty Sessions. An order to review this decision was served on the complainant in New South Wales. Before shewing cause against this order the complainant moved to set the order aside. Held (1) that the service was good; (2) that the costs solely attributable to the motion should be allowed to the defendant, independently of the twenty pounds rule. Dunn v. Roberts, 217.

s. 148-Review of taxationAppeal-Costs of appeal and of the Court below-The proviso in sec. 148 gives the Court a discretion as to the whole of the costs both of the Court below, and of the proceedings before it, and it cannot in any case allow the successful party to receive more than £20 as costs of the whole of the

proceedings. Strong v. Taylor, 11 A.L.T. 189, followed. Ross v. Heil, 113.

Justification-See Libel. Speight v. Syme, 71.

Land, Injury to-Discharge of drainage-Measure of damages. The defendants wrongfully discharged water and sewage on to the plaintiff's land causing certain injuries which were not permanent. An injunction was granted to restrain the defendants from sending any more water or sewage on to the land. Held, that the measure of damages was the cost of putting the land in as good a condition as it was before the defendants injured it, and a sum which would compensate the plaintiff for other grievances of which he complained, viz., loss of profits which would have been made by using the land for coursing, injury to buildings from floods caused by the drains, cleaning up the place after these floods, and foul smells caused by the sewage. Cox v. Mayor &c., of Essendon, 7.

-Injury to land-Cutting down road-Measure of damages-Benefit conferred on land--Consent by predecessor in title to work being done -How far consent is binding. A. and B. each owned a piece of land abutting on a certain public road. The municipality having the care and management of the road proposed to cut it down, and a petition signed by

A. and B., amongst others, was presented to the municipality asking it to proceed with the work. A. then on behalf of a syndicate purchased B's land and another piece fronting the same road, forming with B.'s a rectangular block. The municipality then began the work of cutting down the road and completed it, the result being that the land of the syndicate fronting the road was left about 4 feet above the level of the road. In an action by the syndicate against the municipality for damages for wrongfully cutting down the road whereby the land of the syndicate was injured : Held, that the measure of damages was the sum required to restore the land to the same position with regard to the road as it occupied before the road was cut down. Held, further, that any benefit conferred on the land by the wrongful act could not be taken into account in assessing damages. Held, further, that the consent of A., then owning one piece of land to the work being done, could not bind him as to another piece afterwards bought by him, and that the consent of B. could not bind those who afterwards bought the land from him if the work was not carried out until after that sale. Adam and others v. Mayor, &c., of the Town of Brunswick and others,

66.

-Disposing of, by Lottery-See Police Offences Act 1890. Cawsey v. Andrews, 3.

Land Act 1869 (No. 360) ss. 6, 108 -See Boroughs Statute (No. 359). Barnes v. Bremner, 207.

ment

Landlord and Tenant Act 1890, ss. 89, 92-Warrant of ejectDetermination of tenarcy Re-entry--Notice to quit-Agent appointed by Power of Attorney. Under a mortgage from A. to B. to secure payment of certain promissory notes and interest thereon A. attorned and became tenant to B. at a yearly rent equal in amount to the yearly interest on the promissory notes. The mortgage deed provided that upon default in payment of the promissory notes B. might, without previous notice, enter and take possession, and thereupon the tenancy should determine. Default was made in payment of a promissory note and notice was given by B. to A. that unless, on or before a certain day, A. should give up possession, B. would apply to justices for a Warrant of Ejectment. On that day B. went to the premises and found them locked up, and on the same day he served on A. a seven days' notice of intention to apply for a Warrant of Ejectment. Held, that what B. did amounted to a re-entry, that the lease was then determined, and that B. was justified in immediately serving the seven days' notice, and in acting upon it. Held, further, that a power of attorney from B. to C. was a sufficient authority to constitute C. the "agent" of B. within

the meaning of s. 89 of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1890. Cleverdon v. Towsend, 69.

-ss. 92, 93-Ejectment-Subtenant-Tenant not in actual occupation of the premises-Refusal to deliver up possession. A., the tenant of a house, had sub-let part thereof to B. During the currency of the sub-lease, A's. interest in the house had been duly determined by notice to quit, and he had gone out of actual occupation, but B., who, as against A. was still entitled to possession of his part of the house, refused to give up possession. On proceedings for ejectment under Part V. of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1890, brought by the superior landlord against A. and B.-Held, that B's. remaining in was equivalent to a refusal by A. to quit and deliver up possession within s. 92, and that a warrant of ejectment must issue against both A. and B. Trustees Executors and Agency Co. Ltd. v. De Faro and Gandiol, 21.

-ss. 92, 93-Warrant wrongly issued-Order to review-Action of trespass Jurisdiction-Re-entry Notice to quit - Second noticeWaiver Notice of intention to apply Misdescription in notice. Notwithstanding ss. 98, 103, of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1890, an order may be granted to review a decision of justices in petty sessions improperly issuing a warrant of ejectment under s. 93. Whether a power of re-entry reserved by a lease is sufficiently exercised so as to determine the term by bringing proceedings in ejectment, quære. A lease of a hotel was granted for 7 years from the 7th July 1891, subject to the payment of rent on the 7th day of every month. The lessee covenanted to apply in due course, and from time to time for the renewal of the license, and a power of re-entry was reserved to the lessor on breach by the lessee of any covenant, or after the rent was 14 days in arrear. The lessee paid rent up to and on the 7th November, 1893, on the 1st December, 1893, the lessor gave notice of determination of the term, and notice to quit by reason of the lessee not having applied for a renewal of the license. Subsequently the lessee obtained a renewal. the 11th April, 1894, the lessor gave a second notice of determination of the term, and notice to quit on the ground that the rent was unpaid on the 7th December, 1893, and continued unpaid 14 days thereafter. On the 19th April 1894, the lessor served on the person occupying the premises a notice of intention to apply to justices for a warrant of ejectment describing the tenancy as one for 7 years from the 2nd July, 1891. Held (1) that a previous notice to quit and of re-entry having been given in relation to the same tenancy, the notice of the 11th April 1894, was bad; (2) that the notice of intention to apply

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to justices was bad for misdescription. Griffiths v. McDonald and Carroll, 29.

-s. 93-Notice to quit-Warrant of ejectment "Reasonable cause why possession should not be given." On an application by A. for a warrant of ejectment under sec. 93 of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1890, against B., A. alleged that he was lessee of C., and that B. was his sub-tenant at will, while B. set up that A. was his agent to obtain the lease from C. Held, that the justices might go behind the lease from C. to A., and if they found that A. was the agent of B., and held the lease as B's. trustee, that would be " reasonable cause " within sec. 93. Mackett v. Shields, 38.

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Law, Alteration of See Police Dalley v. Hard

Offences Act 1890. ing, 175.

Lease, Assignment of-See Transfer of Land Act 1890. L. Stevenson and Sons Ltd. v. Brind, 166.

Legal Profession Practice Act 1895 (No. 1387), s. 8-Legal Profession Practice Act 1891 (No. 1216) -Admission to practice as barrister and solicitor-English barrister or solicitor-Coming to Victoria with intention of being called as barrister or solicitor Time of arrival in Victoria. Section 8 of the Legal Profession Practice Act 1895, only applies to persons who arrived in Victoria after the passing of the Legal Profession Practice Act 1891. A solicitor of the Supreme Court of Judicature in England arrived in Victoria in 1884. When he left England he intended to apply to be admitted as a solicitor of the Supreme Court of Victoria, but did not make his application until after the passing of the Legal Profession Practice Act 1895. Held, that the application must be refused. In re Whittle, 180.

Libel-Justification-Fair commentAttack upon public acts of public men-Chairman of Railways Commissioners The Victorian Railways Commissioners Act 1983, (No. 767), ss. 4, 8, 14-Railways Act 1890, (No. 1135), ss. 40, 44, 50-Railways Act 1891, (No. 1250), s. 41. The Chairman of the Victorian Railways Commissioners, appointed under the provisions of the Act No. 767, s. 8, is a "public man" within the rule of law which protects the right of every person in the community to comment fairly upon and criticise the public acts of public men. Such criticism may be exaggerated, harsh, severe, stinging, and absolutely untrue, and yet under the circumstances protected; but the actions which are criticised must be shewn to have had existence, and no comment can be fair which assumes an untrue groundwork of fact. The limits of the protection given by law to fair comment

examined. Speight v. Syme, 71.

-Privileged communication Onus probandi. A distinction exists between that immunity from actions of defamation which is presumed to exist by reason of the mere relationship of the parties, and that which depends upon other circumstances. Where the existence of the privilege depends solely on the relationship between the parties, the Court will not assume as a matter of course that the defamatory statements have been made by the defendant in the belief founded on reasonable grounds that they were true, and that it was his duty to make them. The defendant was the son-in-law of the plaintiff, and during her absence in England lasting for five years had the sole management of her affairs. On her return he wrote libellous letters reflecting on her mental condition to her sister and daughter. In an action of libel, the defendant pleading privilege and justification, the publication of the libels was proved, but the plaintiff closed her case without giving any evidence in the first instance of express malice: Held, that the

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Court was not bound at that stage to assume in the defendant's favour by reason of the relationship between the parties that the letters were privileged and that they had been written without malice and under the belief founded on reasonable grounds that the statements contained in them were true and that it was the defendant's duty to make them. Jenours v. Delmege, (1891), A.C., 73 distinguished. Lange v. Bage, 181.

License by Corporation to cleanse Earth Closets-See Health Act 1890. Gomm v. Bennett, 223.

Licensing Act 1890, (No. 1111), ss. 76, 83, 128, 182, 197-Sale of spirits by holder of colonial wine license-Sale of liquor "without a license authorising such sale"-Information by Inspector of Licensing Districts. An information was laid by the Inspector of Licensing Districts of the licensing district of W, against S, charging that "he did on the premises for which he was the holder of a colonial wine license sell liquor, to wit, whisky, without a license authorising such sale." Held. that S was properly convicted, the offence being one within s. 182 of the Licensing Act 1890, and not within s. 128. Held, further, that the information was properly laid by the Inspector of Licensing Districts, he being authorised so to do by s. 197 of the Licens ing Act 1890. Quære, whether the Inspector of Licensing Districts was the only person who could lay the information, and whether where the defendant appears to answer a charge any information is necessary. Webb v. Smith, 186.

-s. 92--Colonial Wine License -License not required in the neighbourhood-Evidence. On an application for a colonial wine license statements by persons residing in the neighbourhood that the license is not required are sufficient to support a finding by the Licensing Court that the license is not required in the neighbourhood. By a'Beckett, J., dissenting, the fact that there is a hotel in the vicinity is not evidence that a colonial wine license is not required in the neighbourhood. Re Drew, 25.

-8. 131-Permitting portion of premises to be used as a dancing saloon-" Place of public resort "Private dances given by licensee. Section 131 of the Licensing Act 1890 does not prohibit a licensee from holding on the licensed premises a dance to which only his friends are admitted. The word "dancing saloon" must be interpreted in its ordinary signification as a place to which persons are admitted on payment of money or on the understanding that they will purchase liquor. The proviso in the section is only to show what the legislature did not intend to prohibit, and does not explain the positive enactment in the first part of the section. Walshe v. Bedwell, 35.

-s. 134-Liquor drunk on licensed premises on Sunday--No sale of liquor. To sustain a conviction of a licensee, under section 134 of the Licensing Act, for that liquor was drunk on his licensed premises on Sunday by others than lodgers or bona fide travellers, it is not necessary that there should have been a sale or barter of the liquor which was drunk. Irwin v. Poyntz, 18.

Licensing Districts, Information by Inspector of-See Licensing Act 1890. Webb v. Smith, 186. Lien for private debt-See Companies Act 1890. McLaughlin r. Bank of Victoria, 54.

on Crops, ConsiderationSee Instruments Act 1890. Bennett v. Baker, 149.

Life Assurance-See Companies Act 1890. Mercantile Bank v. Lewis

and another, 93, 202. Lift used by tenants-See Negligence. De Alba v. Freehold Investment and Banking Coy., 136.

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Liquor, Sale of, on Sunday-See Licensing Act 1890. Irwin v. Poyntz, 18.

Litigation, Fomenting - See Solicitor. In re Kerang Times Publishing Coy., 163.

Local Government Act 1990, (No. 1112) ss. 9, 522-Insolvency Act 1890, (No. 1102), s. 21-Insolvency-Petitioning creditor-Municipal corporation--A debtor may be made insolvent on the petition of a municipal corporation. In re Pitson; Exparte President, Councillors and Ratepayers of the Shire of Huntly, 9.

s. 191 (XIX)-By Law-Carriage of nightsoil through the ShireBy Law-Unreasonable-A munici pality made a by-law by which it prohibited any persons from carting any nightsoil into or within the boundaries of the Shire, without the written consent of the council, except between the hours of 10 p.m. and 2 a. m. Held, that such by-law was unreasonable; and further that if the hours had been fixed at between 12 p.m. and 4 a.m. such a restriction might be considered a reasonable one. Re President, Sc., of the Shire of Moorabbin : Exparte McLorinan, 167.

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-s. 276-Appeal against rates— Time limited for appealing-" Seven days' notice "Notice of appealSignature-Signature by attorney or agent. A notice of appeal against a municipal rate valuation was given on the 15th March. It stated the intention of the appellant, a limited company, to appeal to the petty sessions on the 22nd March, no hour being specified. The notice was signed by the solicitor to the company. The appeal came on for hearing on the 22nd March. Held that seven days' notice had been given, and that the notice, though signed only by the aggrieved party's solicitor, was good. Australian Freehold Land and Produce Company v. Shire of Goulburn, 225.

—s. 272, 277-Appeal from rate -Meaning of the word "rate" in s. 277. Where a person has a number of pieces of land in a municipality which are included in the one rate, and feels aggrieved by the valuations placed on the whole or any of such pieces of land, that person is entitled to have the whole matter concerning which he feels aggrieved determined by one appeal, one notice of appeal and no more. James v. Town of

Northcote, 185.

--s. 288 Rates - Demand for less than is due-Arrears not separated from rates. A written demand for payment of rates demanded payment of £24 8s. 6d. for "a general rate of one shilling and sixpence in the pound." The proper amount due was £25 5s. 6d. made up of £4 14s. 6d. for the current rate and £20 11s. for arrears. Held a good demand. Mayor &c. of Queenscliff v. Robinson, 140.

-ss. 388, 390, 404, 535, 539Road through private land-Obligation on council to fence-" Fenced land" Dedication of road-Mis-feasance- -Non-feasance-Remedy-Land enclosed partly by a fence and partly by a river is fenced land within the meaning of s. 404 of the Local Government Act 1890, even though portion of the land is Crown land or is the property of some person other than him who seeks to enforce the fencing of the road made through the land. A road may be dedicated to the public by a municipal council by other means than those mentioned in ss. 388 and 390 of the Local Government Act 1890. Where a council opens a new road under s. 404 of the Local Government Act 1890, and neglects to fence that road, the whole act is a mis-feasance for which the council is liable in damages as well as being liable to a penalty under s. 535. Howlett v. The President &c. of the Shire of Tambo, 223.

ss. 388, 427-Disturbing soil of road-Proclaimed highway. A place may be a road within the meaning of s. 427 of the Local Government Act 1890, although it has not been proclaimed a public highway under s. 388. Hodgson v. Henderson, 9. Local Government Act 1891, (No. 1243), s. 129-Rates-Recovery from owner of legal estate. Semble, the meaning of section 129 of the Local Government Act 1891 is that a municipal council may recover rates from the person entitled to the legal estate in any land in respect of which the rates are due, but that if it is proved during the hearing of a complaint to recover the rates from that person that there is an equity of redemption in another person the order of the justices will be made against the land. Shire of Moorabbin v. County of Bourke Permanent Building and Investment Society, 139.

-s. 136-Rates-Sale of property before rate struck-Recovery of rate from vendor. The effect of s. 136 of the Local Government Act 1891 is that a land owner does not become freed from liability to a municipality merely by selling or conveying his property, but that he remains answerable for all moneys and other liabilities, including rates, which may accrue due by, or be imposed upon the owner of the property as such, until notice has been given to the

municipal clerk. Shire of Benalla v. Hughen, 151.

Locke King's Act-See Real Property Act 1890. Blackburn v. Miller, 177.

Lottery, Disposing of Land by—See Police Offences Act 1890. Cawsey v. Andrews, 3.

Managing Clerk, Fee of-See Practice. Marwick v. Orton, 14.

Man of Straw-See Transfer of Land Act 1890. L. Stevenson & Sons Ltd. v. Brind, 166. Marine Act 1890 (No. 1165), s. 13 -Removal of wreck, Expenses of"Owner of the ship"-Removal by destruction-Cost of lighting wreck, Where a wreck is removed by a Port Officer under the authority of s. 13 of the Marine Act 1890, the expenses are recoverable from the registered owner of the ship at the time she became a wreck. So held, following Ramsden v. Payne, I V.L.R., (L.), 250; “The Crystal," (1894), A.C., 508, distinguished. The destruction of a wreck by blowing it up with dynamite is a "removal of the wreck " within sec. 13. The cost of lighting the wreck as a warning to mariners before the work of removal is begun, is not chargeable to the owner of the ship Wilas part of the costs of removal. son v. Howard Smith and Sons Ltd., 188.

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-(No. 1165), ss. 103, 144-Ship Seaworthiness, Reasonable efforts to Evidence Certificate of Marine Board-Liability of shipAn action was brought by the personal representative of A deceased seeking to recover damages from B the owner of a ship, on the ground that B did not as was his duty under section 103 of the Marine Act 1890, use all reasonable means to ensure the seaworthiness of the ship for a certain voyage at the time when the voyage began and did not keep her in a seaworthy condition during that voyage, whereby the ship was wrecked and A was drowned. The jury having given a verdict for A's representative:-Held, that as there was no obvious defect rendering the ship unseaworthy, and as the Marine Board of Victoria had given their certificate that the ship was worthy for such a voyage as that during which the ship was lost, evidence that the ship was unseaworthy was not sufficient to support a finding that the owner had not taken reasonable means to secure the seaworthiness of the ship, and that a new trial should be had. By Madden, C.J.-The certificate of the Marine Board is, as to the seaworthiness of a ship at the time the certificate is granted, conclusive evidence of the seaworthiness of the ship, unless there be some fraudulent concealment by the owner or his agent of a defect in the ship, or unless there be collusion between the Board or its surveyor and the owner

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or his agent, or unless there be an obvious defect calculated to endanger the ship. By Hood, J.-The owner, having before the voyage commenced, done all that he was required to do by the Marine Act 1890, and there being no evidence or suggestion that the owner had omitted to do anything which he might reasonably be expected to do to secure the seaworthiness of the ship, a finding that the owner had not taken all reasonable means to secure the seaworthiness of of the ship was bad. Kilpatrick v. Huddart Parker and Coy. Ltd.. 210.

Board, Certificate of-See Marine Act 1890. Kilpatrick v. Huddart Parker and Coy. Ltd., 210. Marriage Act 1890 (No. 1166) Part IV., ss. 42, 43, 48--Bastardy -Evidence- Corroboration. At the hearing of a complaint against the putative father for the maintenance of two illegitimate children, the mother swore that the defendant was the father of two children born in February 1890, and June 1892, respectively. The only other evidence adduced was that of the complainant's sister, who deposed that on the 29th May, 1892, the defendant admitted to her that he was responsible for the complainant being in the state in which she then was, but that he had no means to marry her. That, being pressed as to what he would do, he said he must consult his sister, but would meet the witness's husband that night. The defendant failed to keep the appointment. Held, that the mother's testimony was sufficiently corroborated under s. 48 of the Marriage Act 1890, and that the defendant was rightly adjudged to be the father of both children. Stokes v. Roughan, 34.

-8. 74(a) -Divorce-DesertionReality of desertion-Acquiescence of petitioner in desertion by respondent. If a husband is shown deliberately and without just cause or excuse to have left his wife for the statutory period, desertion is established. The fact that the wife has no real desire for the husband to return to her is not such cause or excuse, and does not affect the reality of the desertion. So held by Holroyd, a'Beckett and Hodges, J.J. reversing the decision of Madden, C.J. Langlands v. Langlands, 44.

-s. 74 (a)—Dissolution of marriage-Desertion during three years and upwards-Deed of separationConsent. A petition for the dissolution of a marriage will not be heard in camera, unless some exceptional circumstances have been shown to warrant [such a course being taken. By a deed of separation between the husband, the wife, and two trustees, it was provided that the wife should thereafter be free from the power, demand or control of the petitioner, and that he would not at any time thenceforth require or by any means

whatever compel her to cohabit with him, or institute any legal proceedings or take any other legal steps whatever for that purpose. By a contemporaneous indenture made between the same parties the husband settled a sum of £10,000 on the wife and children she thereout suitably to maintain the only child of the marriage. At the time of the execution of these deeds the husband and wife were living apart. The husband after this presented a petition for the dissolution of the marriage on the ground of desertion, and the wife pleaded the separation deed. Held, that the deed of separation prevented the offence of desertion from being committed by the wife. Semble, that the deed did not preclude the husband from enforcing any right she might have on the committal by the wife of any other matrimonial offence. Synnot v. Synnot, 127.

-s. 74 (a)-Divorce-Desertion -Reality of desertion-Acquiescence of petitioner in desertion by respondent-Delay. Desertion is the deliberately and voluntarily bringing to an end an existing state of cohabitation against the will of the other party. It is not desertion if the petitioner consents to it, connives at it, or in any way assists it, and the petitioner must show not only desertion at the moment, but that the desertion has been continuous for three years and upwards. In a petition by a husband for a divorce on the ground of desertion since February, 1888, it ap peared that his wife had left him without the slightest reason, and that he made no inquiry to find out why she went or whither she had gone. He had no cause of complainst against her nor she against him. The wife afterwards wrote an affectionate letter to her husband's daughter by a former marriage, in which she asked kindly after their welfare. The petitioner knew of that letter, but made no attempt to find his wife, or induce her to return. Held, that the petitioner had connived at his wife's absence, that desertion had not been proved, and that a decree must be refused. Held, further, that the suit would have been dismissed on the ground of delay. Langlands v. Langlands, (ante, p. 44), distinguished. Taylor v. Taylor, 148.

-s. 74 (b)-Divorce-Habitual drunkenness -Habitual cruelty-Isolated acts of drunkenness and cruelty -Reclaimable drunkard. Semble, per Williams, J., that to support a charge of habitual drunkenness under the Marriage Act 1890, s. 74 (b) it must be shewn that the respondent is a confirmed and irreclaimable drunkard. Evidence of isolated acts of drunkenness, though periodically occurring, is insufficient. Semble, also, that evidence that the respondent, during those drunken fits, ill-treated his wife will not by itself sustain a

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