wit, a dog the property of the complainant and also did kill a certain other dog the property of the complainant under circumstances that amounted to cruelty to animals, contrary to the Animals Protection Act 1890, and the complainant further claimed £30 as compensation for the mutilation and death of the said animals. At the hearing before the justices the defendant's solicitor objected that the information was bad for duplicity under the Justices Act 1890, s. 73, as it charged not one offence only, but two offences. The justices took this view of the law, and struck the case out with costs. An order was obtained to review their decision on this point. By the Animals Protection Act (No. 1064): Volves cruelty." Section 9 describes certain acts which shall be deemed to involve cruelty, and amongst these are beating, wounding, mutilating or killing under circumstances such as those described in the information. When the case came on the defendant's solicitor objected that the information was bad under section 73 as it was not for one offence only, but for two offences. The justices yielded to this objection, and struck the case out. The informant obtained an order to review. First, on the ground that the justices were in error in striking out the complaint on the ground of duplicity, and on a second ground with which I need not deal. In support of the order to review counsel referred to several authorities on the subject of duplicity, and in particular to Regina v. Giddens, 1 Car. & Marsh 634. There the indictment consisted only of one count, and charged four prisoners with assaulting G. P. and H. P., and stealing from G. P. 2 shillings, and from H. P. one shilling and a hat on the 14th of May, 1842 at Old Swinford. Counsel for the prisoner submitted that counsel for the prosecution should be put to elect which he would go upon as the assaulting and robbing G. P., and the assaulting and robbing H. P. were distinct felonies. Tindel, C.J., held that he should not be put to elect. It is all one act, and one entire If there had been an interval of time transaction. of between the assaulting and robbing of the one, and the assaulting and robbing of the other the felonies would have been distinct, but that did not appear to 3. The term "cruelty in the Act shall mean the intentional infliction upon any animal of any pain that in its kind or degree or its object or its circumstances is unreasonable. 4. No person shall do any act or observe any forbearance (a) Over-riding, over-driving, or over-working; or (d) Ill-treating or injuring or tormenting or torturing; or or trol. Provided that the acts specified in the section shall be deemed to be mentioned by way of example only and shall not be construed to restrict in any way the generality of any prohibition herein contained, or to limit the same to cases resembling all or any of the cases specially mentioned. By the Justices Act 1890 (No. 1105): S. 73. (1) Every information shall be for one offence only, and not for two or more offences; except where the contrary is expressly provided by some Act of Parliament. Mr. Leon shewed cause and cited R. v. Mollison, 2 V.L.R. (L.) 51; R. v. Carey, 13 V.L.R. 310 (decided on Act No. 265); Cotterrill v. Lempriere, 24 Q.B.D. 634; R. v. Waterhouse, L.R. 7 Q.B. 545. Mr. Johnston in support of the order. Cur. adv. vult. A'BECKETT, J.-The defendant was informed against under the Animals Protection Act 1890, that he did at Lara, on the 5th day of April, 1895, beat, wound and mutilate a certain dog, the property of the complainant, and also did kill a certain other dog the property of the complainant under circumstances that amount to cruelty to animals under the Animals Protection Act 1890, and the complainant also claimed £30 as compensation for the mutilation and death of the said animals. Section 4 of the Act creates the offence for which the information was laid providing that "No person shall do any act towards any animal which in be so. That case shows the information here to be prima facie good, and lays down the law consistently with reason and convenience. Where in one outburst of anger or malice, an offender cruelly injures two animals on the same occasion, it would be absurd to insist on a separate information as to each animal, although an offence might be committed as to each. The information in the present case suggests one transaction as it is called. If on the hearing it appeared that though on the same day the occasions were really distinct, one for instance in the morning, and the other in the evening under different conditions of provocation or excuse, if the defendant objected the justices could properly decline to proceed with the trial of two offences at the same time, and might put the prosecutor to elect, as to which he would proceed with, but as it did not appear by the information alone that the occasions were properly separable the justices should not have declined to proceed. The information did not necessarily involve any irregularity, although in proceeding under it the statement of the case, or the evidence might disclose the objection under section 73. The defendant having raised this technical objection to the hearing, must pay the costs of the order to review. I make the rule absolute with costs to be paid by him, and remit the case to be heard. Solicitors, for complainant, T. N. Whyte, Geelong; for respondent, W. Bruce for James Wighton, Geelong. END OF VOLUME XVI. Administration and Probate Act 1890 (No. 1060) ss. 15, 16, 40, 43-Probate-Practice- Administra. tion Bond-Foreign Letters of Administration-Dispensing with one of the sureties. A. died domiciled in South Australia, leaving property in that province and in Victoria. He had no debts in Victoria; and those in South Australia amounted to £25. By his will he left £500 and his jewellery to trustees for the benefit of his infant son, and the bulk of his property to his widow. Letters of administration with the will annexed were granted to the widow by the Supreme Court of South Australia, and she paid the £500 to the trustees named for the benefit of the infant. Upon applying to have the letters of administration sealed with the seal of the Supreme Court of Victoria. Held, that under the circumstances the Supreme Court of this colony would dispense with one of the sureties to the administration bond. In Will of Ross, 160. -s. 26 Supreme Court Act 1890, ss. 20, 21-The Court has no jurisdiction unders. 21 of the Supreme Court Act 1896 to make a summary order that a trustee, as distinguished from an executor or administrator, may pass his accounts and be allowed commission under sec. 26 of the Ad. ministration and Probate Act 1890. In re Clements, 51. -ss. 26, 40, 44-Commission to executor-Attorney under power of foreign executor. A testator died in England and his executors, to whom a legacy was left for their trouble, took out probate there. A person duly authorised by them obtained the sealing of that probate in Victoria. Held, that that person was entitled, on passing his accounts, to be allowed a commission. Re Welch, 95. -s. 97-Statement to be filed in the Master's office-Value of personal estate Deposit receipts - Present value-Shares not fully paid upHow value should be estimated-Liability for calls-Debt due by testator. A testator died owning deposit receipts in a reconstructed bank, and shares in reconstructed banks bearing liabilities in respect of calls which by the deeds of arrangement under which the several banks were reconstructed, were agreed to be made on certain fixed dates. Held, that for the purposes of sec. 97 of the Administration and Probate Act 1890 the value of the deposit receipts was to be taken as their market value at the time of the testator's death, and that the liabilities for calls on the shares were debts within the meaning of that section. In re Pearson, 115. -s. 99-In an appeal from the Master under s. 99 of the Administration and Probate Act 1890 it was ordered that the appeal be put in the list before a judge without a jury, and that it be heard in the ordinary way. In re Black, 151. Administrators - See Practice (Probate). See Adverse Possession Instruments Act 1890. Anderson v. Agent-See Landlord and Tenant Act 1890. Cleverdon v. Townsend, 69. -Answering Interrogatories by -See Practice. Stibbard r. Dominion Banking &c., Corporation Limited, 222. See -Signature to writ by Practice. Harris v. Gleeson, 129. Agent and Principal-See Sale of Land. Groom v. Kindellan, 20. Agreement-See Contract. Alimony Pendente Lite-See Jonas v. Jonas, Marriage Act 1890. 201. Alteration of Law-See Police Offences Act 1890. Dalley v. Harding, 175. Amendment of Reply See Practice. Real Estate &c. Bank v. Cromie, 41. Animals Protection Act 1890 (No. 1094), ss. 3, 9. See Justices Act 1890. Duggan v. Martin, 226. Antecedent Debt - See Insolvency Act 1890. Wootton v. Stoffers, 10. Ante-Nuptial Settlement See Insolvency. Michael v. Thompson, 124. Apothecary See Medical Act 1890. Gerlach v. Herman--Gerlach v. De Leon, 22. Appear, Leave to. See Instruments Act 1890. Noonan v. Townsend, 133. Appeal to Privy CouncilRegula Generales of 15th August 1876, r. 14-Appeal to Privy Council -Time for delivering transcript of judgment-Jurisdiction to extendJurisdiction of single judge to set aside an order made erparte by himself. Where an order has been made exparte by a single judge, that judge has jurisdiction to hear a summons taken out by another party to the action to set the order aside. Where an appeal is being taken to the Privy Council the Supreme Court has juris. Idiction under the 14th rule of the Regula Generales of 15th August 1876, to extend more than once the time for delivering to the prothonotary the transcript of the evidence and judg ment in the Supreme Court. Mulholland v. Smith, 161. -See Supreme Court Act 1890. Mulholland v. Smith, 130. Appeal from Master-See Administration and Probate Act 1890. In re Black, 151. Appeal against Rates-Signature of Notice of-See Local Government Act 1890. Australian Freehold Land &c., Coy. v. Shire of Goulburn, 225. -from Rate See Local Government Act 1890. James v. Town of Northcote, 185. Appearance, Entry of, after time -See Instruments Act 1890. Noonan v. Townsend, 133. A sonably claimed by contractor. contract between the Board of Land and Works and H, provided that all claims and demands of the contractor against the Board or of the Board against the contractor under or arising out of the contract should be settled by the Inspector-General, but that if either party should be dissatisfied with his decision "respecting any extras, additions, enlargements, deviations and alterations to, from, or in the works of the said contract or for any work reasonably claimed by the contractor for an extra, addition, enlargement, deviation or alteration to, from or in such works" the party dissatisfied might require that the claims and demands "respecting any such extras, additions, enlargements, deviations and alterations to, or from the said works" shall be submitted to arbitration. Held that the clause entitled the contractor, if dissatisfied with the decision of the InspectorGeneral respecting any work reasonably claimed by the contractor for an extra, addition, &c., to have that claim submitted to arbitration. The contract was for reclaiming a swamp by raising the ground within a certain area to certain specified levels by the deposit of material thereon to be brought thereon by H, who was to be paid according to the number of cubic yards of materials deposited. Certain material was deposited above the specified levels, and in respect of this H claimed payment. Held, that this was work which H might reasonably claim as an extra addition and was referable to arbitration. Higgins v. The Board of Land and Works, 158. Arrears not separated from rates-See Local Government Act 1890. Borough of Queenscliff v. Robinson, 140. Assets, Insufficiency of-See Companies Act 1890. Mercantile Bank r. Lewis and another, 93, 202. Assignee of Debt, Application of administration by-See Practice (Probate). Re Milne 68. Assignment for benefit of creditors-See Justices Act 1890. Foster Brewing Coy. Ltd.v. Youl, 183. See Assignment of Lease Transfer of Land Act 1890. L. Stevenson aud Sons Ltd. v. Brind, 166. Attachment of Debt-See Justices Act 1890. Foster Brewing Co. Ltd. v. Youl, 183. -See Practice. Attestation clause, Signature of Will placed in-See Wills Act 1890. In the will of Lennox, 19. Attorney under Power of Foreign Executor, Commission to-See Ad ministration and Probate Act 1890. Re Welch, 95. -under Power-See Companies Act 1890. Bundoora Park Estate Coy. v. Fisher, 107. Award-See Arbitration. Higgins v. Board of Land and Works, 158. Banker and Customer-See Guarantee. Mercantile Bank v. Weig all, 192. Barrister and Solicitor, Admission of See Legal Profession Practice Act 1895. In re Whittle, 180. Bastardy-See Marriage Act 1890. Stokes v. Roughan, 34. Beer Duty Act 1892, ss. 16, 33 (3) -Where an information is laid under this Act, the informant has to prove that an offence against the Act has been committed, and when he does so, the ONUS is then cast upon the defen-. dant of proving that he is not the guilty party. Mayberry v. McQuade, 40. Benefit conferred on Land -See Land. Adam v. Town of Brunswick, 66. Betting, Using house for-See Police Offences Act 1890. Duncan v. Healy, 218. Bias, Suspicion of--See Justices of the Peace. McCrory v. Rivett, 174. Boroughs Statute (No. 359) ss. 168, 171, 385-Land Act 1869 (No. 360), ss. 6, 108-Borough councilRegulation of Board of Land and Works-Ultra vires-Criminal offence -Management of gardens-Delegation of control of park. A borough council had made a by-law under s. 168 of the Boroughs Statute adopting the second subdivision of Part IV., and the whole of Part 9 of the 12th schedule to that statute. Subsequently the Board of Land and Works passed a regulation purporting to place the control of a park within the borough under the control of the borough council as a committee of management thereof :- Held, that the Board had no powers to delegate its functions, and that the regulation was invalid. Barnes v. Bremner, 207. By-law-See Health Act 1899. Gomm v. Bennett, 223. -Unreasonableness of. See Local Government Act 1890. Re Shire of Moorabbin, Exparte McLorinan, 167. Camera, Hearing of Petition in-See Marriage Act 1890. Synnot v. Synnot, 127. Certificate, Dispensing with condition of payment of Seven Shillings in the Pound. See Insolvency Act 1890. In re Davies, 121. -of Marine Board- See Marine Act 1890. Kilpatrick v. Huddart Parker and Coy., Limited, 210. Chemist Pharmaceutical. See Medical Act 1890. In re Lamsey, 125. Child-Abandonment of -- See Crimes Act 1890. Reg. v. Koebcke, 27. Client-Gift by, to Solicitor. See Solicitor and Client. O'Hea v. Black, 119. Club-See Police Offences Act 1890. -See Licensing Act 1890. Re See Patent. Merrilees v. Rhodes, 219. Combination in Restraint of Trade-See Conspiracy. Taffs v. Beesley, 59. Comment-Fair. See Libel. Speight v. Syme, 71. Commission to Attorney under Power of Foreign Executor · See Administration and Probate Act 1890. Re Welch, 95. -on Sale of Land-See Sale of Land. Groom v. Kindellan, 20. -See Administration and Probate Act 1890. In re Clements, 51. --See Executors Company's Act Amendment Act (No. 842). Trustees Executors &c., Coy. v. Hicks, 52. Company See Companies Act, 1890. 1074), sec. 24-Contributory-Agree ment to become member - Shares purchased by broker for a clientShares transferred to broker in order to be transferred by him to other persons. A sharebroker bought shares in a company for his client, who desired that they should be transferred in three lots to three different persons. The broker was informed by an officer of the company that as there was only one transfer the shares would have to be transferred to one person first. The broker thereupon had the shares transferred to himself, and then to the three persons. The com pany having gone into liquidation, the broker was put upon the B. list of contributories. Held, that the broker had agreed to become a member of the company and was properly put upon the B. list of contributories. In re the Mercantile Bank of Australia Limited (In liquidation); Ex parte Bagley, 89, 105. - -S. 24-Principal and agentAgent exceeding authority-Ratification--Estoppel-Ratification by personal representative Company, member of-Memorandum of Association-Subscriber of Memorandum. Where a contract is made for a testator in his lifetime by an agent who has no authority to do so, the contract being one which the testator himself could have ratified in his lifetime, but did not in fact ratify, his executor or administrator cannot after his death in law ratify it so as to make it binding on the estate of the testator. The executor or administrator of a dead man takes the estate as it stands at the date of the death, and has no power to enter into any a contract or do anything which will involve a fresh obligation, except at his personal risk. A. executed power of attorney in favour of B., and thereby empowered B., (inter alia), "to compound compromise and accept part in lieu of or satisfaction for the payment of the whole of any debt or sum of money owing or pay. able to me or grant an extension of time for the payment of the same either with or without taking security or otherwise to act therein and in respect thereof in such manner as to my said attorney shall appear to be expedient or proper, and 1 hereby authorise and empower my said attorney from time to time to invest at the discretion of my said attorney any moneys that my said attorney may have belonging to me on mortgage upon real security or in the purchase of real estate or of shares in any incorporated banking or insurance or financial or land or general company of Victorian or New South Wales Government debentures or inscribed stock or upon deposit at interest with any incorporated banking company carrying on business in the colony of Victoria and to withdraw any such deposit already or hereafter to be made. And to vote at meetings of the shareholders of any company or companies in respect of any shares now held or hereafter to be acquired by me therein. And also all shares I do now or may from time to time hold in any joint stock or other company from time to time to sell and dispose of as my said attorney shall think expedient and that by public or private sale and to receive the consideration money for the sale thereof and for me and in my name to execute such deeds or instruments as shall be necessary and requisite for the purpose of assigning any shares so purchased to me or for assigning my said shares or debentures or stock to the purchaser or purchasers thereof and to pay any calls which may be made on any shares held by me. . . . And also as and when my said attorney shall think fit to sell my said lands and hereditaments stock and effects in the said colonies or any of them (either together or in parcels) by auction or private contract and to convey assign transfer or make over the same respectively unto the purchaser or purchasers thereof and to permit the same to remain unpaid for whatever time and upon whatever security real or personal (either comprehending the purchased property or not) my said attorney shall think safe and proper And generally in and about the premises to execute and do every deed and thing requisite for all or any of the purposes aforesaid as fully and effectually as I myself could do if personally present. A. held 500 shares in the X. company. By an agreement among themselves some of the shareholders sold their shares in that company and became share holders in a new company, the Y. company. The total contingent liability of the shareholders in the Y. company was the same as that which had formerly attached to them as shareholders in the X. company. B. signed this agreement and memorandum of association of the Y. company as agent for A. and in A.'s name. A. was at that time absent from the colony, and died in Europe without ever having heard of the transaction or of the Y. company. Administration with the will of A. annexed was granted to B. as attorney under power of A.'s executrix, and in that capacity B. paid calls as for A. on his shares in the Y. company. The executrix subsequently revoked the power of attorney and repudiated the shares in the Y. company. In an action by the Y. company against the executrix for further calls. Held (1) that the former power of attorney conferred on B. no authority to sign the memorandum of association, and that therefore A. did not become a shareholder by reason of that signature, that the Companies Act 1890, s. 24, did not apply, and that the position was the same as if A.'s name had never been appended to the document at all. (2) That the action of B. as administrator in paying calls on the shares did not amount to a ratification so as to bind the estate and that the executrix was not estopped from disputing the liability of the estate to further calls. Savery v. King, 5 H.L.C., 627; 25 L.J., (Čh.), 482, followed. Bundoora Park Estate Coy. v. Fisher, 107. -s. 31-Company-Shares held in a representative capacity-Lien for private debt - Refusal to register transfer. A bank was incorporated by private Act of Parliament. By its deed of settlement it was provided that the bank should not be bound by any trust or equitable interest affecting its shares or to take notice of them. In 1889 the bank was registered under the Companies Statute 1864. Its articles of association provided that a person accepting shares and being entered on the register, and no other person, should be deemed to be a member, that no notice of any trust, express, implied or constructive should be entered on the register, nor should the company be in any manner bound thereby, and that the company should have a first and paramount lien upon all shares registered in the name of such member for his indebtedness to the company. S, who died in 1866, was the holder of shares in the bank which in 1884 were transferred from his name to that of his administrator de bonis non, H, which appeared on the register as "H., administrator of the estate of S., deceased." On the registration of the bank in 1889, the name of H. was placed on the register in respect of the shares, and the description was omitted. From 1887 until 1893 when |