or whim, but I have a mortal aversion to funeral pomp, and I wish my body to be converted into purposes useful to mankind." The testator was shown to have conducted his affairs with great shrewdness and ability, that so far from being imbecile, he had always been regarded by his associates through life, as a person of indisputable capacity. Sir Herbert Jenner Fust regarded the proof as not sufficient to establish insanity, it amounting to nothing more than eccentricity,18 in his judg

ment.

15. In another case, where the probate of a will was resisted on the ground of insanity, and defended on the plea of eccentricity, Sir H. J. Fust said, "It is the prolonged departure, without an adequate external cause, from the state of feeling and modes of thinking usual to the individual when in health, that is the true feature of disorder in the mind." And in another case, where the will was declared invalid by the Prerogative Court of Canterbury, the decree was reversed on appeal by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. The testator was a native of England, but had lived in the East, and was familiar with eastern habits, and superstitions, and professed his belief in the Mahometan religion. He died in England, leaving a will, which after various legacies, gave the residue to the

13

This must be regarded as a most charitable view of the testator's mental capacity, and one which an American jury would not readily be induced to adopt. We do not insist that the mere absurdity and irreverence of the mode of bestowing his own body, as a sacrifice, to the interests of science and art, in so bald and awful a mode, was to be regarded as plenary evidence of mental aberration. But we have no hesitation in saying, that a jury would be likely always to regard it in this light, in the case of an unnatural, or unofficious testament. And we are not prepared to say it should not be so. The common sense instincts of a jury are very likely to lead them right in cases of this character. The man who has no more respect for himself, or for Christian burial, than this will indicates, has no just claim to the regard or respect of others. v. Croft, 3 Curteis, 678; Taylor, 658.

"Mudway

" Austen v. Graham, 29 Eng. L. & Eq. 38.

poor of Constantinople, and also toward erecting a cenotaph in that city, inscribed with his name, and bearing a light continually burning therein. The Prerogative Court pronounced the testator to be of unsound mind, principally upon the ground of this extraordinary bequest, which sounded to folly, together with the wild and extravagant language of the testator, proved by parol. But on appeal it was held, that, as the insanity attributed to the testator was not monomania, but general insanity, or mental derangement, the proper mode of testing its existence was to review the life, habits, and opinions of the testator, and on such a review there was nothing absurd or unnatural in the bequest, or any thing in his conduct, at the date of the will, indicating derangement, and it was therefore admitted to pro

bate.

16. Some wills, in the English ecclesiastical courts, have been refused probate, upon the ground of a disgusting fondness for brute animals, evinced by the testators during their lives, or in the testamentary act. In one case the testator, being a female unmarried, kept fourteen dogs of both sexes, which were provided with kennels in her drawing-room.16 In another case, a female, who lived by herself, kept a multitude of cats, which were provided with regular meals, and furnished with plates and napkins.1 This strange fondness for animals, in solitary females, is not altogether unusual, nor is it to be regarded as any certain indication of insanity.18

17. The marked distinction between eccentricity and insanity, in the testamentary act, is, that the will of an eccentric man,

16

Yglesias v. Dyke, Prerog. Court, May, 1852; Taylor, 658.. "Taylor, Med. Jur. 658.

18 It would seem that these last cases of eccentricity, or unnatural fondness for animals, might be far more readily reconciled with mental soundness and testamentary capacity, than that of Morgan v. Boys, since experience shows that such harmless fondness for brute animals is not uncommon with solitary females, while that awful degree of irreverence towards one's own body is altogether without parallel in the history of ordinary life.

1

however strange and unaccountable it may seem, upon the ordinary grounds of human judgment and experience, it is nevertheless such an instrument, as those acquainted with the character and conduct of the testator in former years, would be prepared, in some sense, to expect. While on the other hand, the will of an insane man, especially where it is tinged with the peculiar coloring of the testator's fancies, or delusions, is often strangely at variance with all the leading characteristics of the testator, in his former healthy and sound condition. Eccentric habits, suddenly acquired, are properly regarded as evidence of insanity.19

18. The learned author of the treatise on Medical Jurisprudence to which we have so often referred, thus states the rule in regard to pronouncing on an instrument void by, reason of delusion in the deed. "Delusion in the deed. The validity of deeds executed by persons affected with monomania, often becomes a subject of dispute. The practice of the law here indicates, that the mere existence of a delusion in the mind of a person does not necessarily vitiate a deed, unless the delusion. form the groundwork of it, or unless the most decisive evidence be given, that at the time of executing the deed, the testator's mind was influenced by it. Strong evidence is often derivable from the act itself, more especially where a testator has drawn it up of his own accord. In the case of Barton (July, 1840), the Ecclesiastical Court was chiefly guided in its decision by the nature of the instrument. The testator, it appeared, labored under the extraordinary delusion that he could dispose of his own property to himself and make himself his own legatee and executor! This he had accordingly done. The instrument was pronounced to be invalid. But a will may be manifestly unjust to the surviving relatives of a testator, and it may display some of the extraordinary opinions of the individual, yet it will not necessarily be void, unless the testamentary dispositions clearly

VOL. I.

19 Taylor, Med. Jur. 632, 656, 6th ed.

8

:

Some

indicate that they have been formed under a delusion. injustice may possibly be done by the rigorous adoption of this principle, since delusion may certainly enter into a man's act, .whether civil or criminal, without our being always able to discover it; but after all, it is perhaps the most equitable way of construing the last wishes of the dead." 20

19. The American courts have had this subject before them, in various forms. The case of Lucas v. Parsons,21 very closely resembles Greenwood's case, in its characteristic features. The testator, during an attack of insanity, was most unfavorably impressed, and without any adequate cause, against his eldest son; and being, subsequently, in all respects restored to his reason, except in regard to this impression against his son, which he still retained, made his will, disinheriting his son, as the result of that impression, and it was held the instrument ought not to stand.

20. And where an insane delusion existed in the mind of the testator, in regard to the principal legatee being his son, the will being the offspring of this insane delusion, it was held invalid.22 And where the testator is proved to have entertained an insane delusion toward one member of his family, sometime before the making of his will, he must be shown to have recovered therefrom, before the date of the will, if the will be obnoxious to the presumption of having been produced or affected, by any such delusion, or it will be held invalid.23 Where a man is insane in respect to his nearest relations and the disposition of his estate, he is incapable of making a will, notwithstanding he may be of sound mind in other respects.24

20 Taylor, Med. Jur. 656.

21 24 Ga. 640.

22 Florey v. Florey, 24 Alabama, 241.

23 Jenckes v. Smithfield, 2 R. I. 255. See Townshend v. Townshend, 7 Gill. 10; post, § 12, pl. 4.

24 Johnson v. Moore, 1 Litt. 371.

21. The case of Stanton v. Wetherax,25 contains a careful and well-chosen definition of insane delusion. Whenever the person conceives something extravagant to exist, which has in fact no existence whatever, and he is incapable of being reasoned out of this false belief, it constitutes insanity, and if this delusion regard his property he is incapable of making his

will.25

A person is held competent to make his will in Kentucky, although irrational upon some points not touching the disposition of his property.26 In Tennessee, it was held, that a person who believed, in reference to a future state of existence, that there were degrees of happiness there, and that in whatever circle a man lived, on earth, he would move in the same sphere in the future life; and that his preeminence there depended materially upon the amount of property he acquired here, and the charitable purposes to which he might have appropriated it, might make his will, and such opinions were no evidence of insanity.27 It was further determined here, that no

25 16 Barb. 259.

"James v. Langdon, 7 B. Mon. 193.

(*) Gass v. Gass, 3 Humph. 278. As this is a point upon which questions of sanity often arise, we insert the very judicious comments of Mr. Justice Turley upon the question. "There is proof in the record," said the learned judge, "tending to show that the testator held opinions somewhat peculiar in relation to futurity, to wit, that there were degrees in heaven; that whatever circle of life a man lived in on this earth, would be enjoyed by him in heaven; that his preeminence there depended materially upon the amount of property he acquired here, and the charitable purposes to which he might have appropriated it. This it is contended is delusion, and the court was asked to charge, that it was evidence of insanity sufficient to avoid the will. The court said, if a testator acts under a delusion which is the result of a disordered mind amounting to insanity, and the delusion influences the testator in the execution of his will, it will be sufficient to avoid his will; whether any particular delusion amounts to such an alienation of mind as will be esteemed insanity, is a question of fact for the jury to determine; if they believed that John Gass was under the belief that the doing some great charitable deed would advance him to a high state in