we apprehend, is a transposition of words allowable in a will, where it apparently changes the intention of the testator, as indicated by the natural import of the words, as arranged in the will, and there is nothing to show that such was not the intent, but only where the meaning is obscure, upon the face of the instrument, and is rendered clear, or more obvious, by such transposition. Here Sir William Grant, M. R., said: "In a will it is not important in what order the clauses are arranged." Thus, in a devise of "all his messuage with all lands, &c., thereto belonging, situated in Blithebury, &c., in the occupation of T. W., except Floodgate Meadow," where it appeared the testator had a dwelling-house in Blithebury, with nineteen acres of land adjoining, but only two acres of land in the occupation of T. W., and it was held, that the words "now in the occupation of T. W." might be read, as if immediately following the description of the dwelling-house, to which they were evidently intended to apply. 2. In the case of Doe d. v. Allcock,5 the testator devised all his hereditaments to his sister A. T. and her two daughters, and their heirs and assigns, equally to be divided between them, in common, for and during the life of A. T., and after her death he devised the third part, so devised to his sister for life, to her 8 Blamire . Geldart, 16 Vesey, 316; Tilly v. Smith, 1 Coll. 434; 1 Jarman, 467 and note. Marshall v. Hopkins, 15 East, 309. 1 B. & Ald. 137. Mr. Jarman criticizes this case and the opinion of Lord Ellenborough, as departing from the natural meaning of the words, too far. But it is questionable, whether any other construction could have been adopted, which would not have left an intestacy, as to the largest portion of the estate, and rendered the disposition, as far as it went, absurd. The purpose was to give the three a fee-simple in the whole estate, except that the interest of the mother should be limited to her life, and the three devises were combined, to save words, and the ordinary result followed, of confusion and uncertainty. It seems to. us a very just illustration of the power of an experienced and selfrelying judge, to extract light out of obscurity, and certainty out of confusion. two daughters in fee. It was held to give the two daughters a fee-simple in two-thirds, and a remainder in fee of the other third part, after the decease of their mother. Lord Ellenborough said, "The testator has thrown together a heap of words, the sense and meaning of which he did not clearly apprehend; but although the language of this will is confused, and the words are scattered, in such a way, as if taken in the order in which they stand, they do not convey any meaning, yet in favor of common sense, we may take the liberty of transposing them, according to that order which we may fairly suppose the testator would wish to have adopted, and by which we can best effectuate his intention. The labor of the argument has been to make the testator dispose of only one-third of his estate, and thereby to compel an intestacy as to the remainder; whereas his meaning evidently was, to dispose of the whole." 3. But in the construction of a will, it is not sufficient to avoid the will for uncertainty, if plainly expressed, that the dispositions are so absurd and irrational, that it is difficult to believe they should have been the real intention of the testator. To produce that result, they must be so uncertain, as to be incapable of any clear meaning. Where the dispositions of a will are clearly expressed, it matters not how irrational or inconsistent with the general purposes of the will they may be, they must prevail, if there be no other objection.6 4. Where the testator misdescribes his estates, as being in different localities from the fact, putting one estate in the locality of another, and vice versa; it was held, that where sufficient appeared, upon the face of the will, as applied to the subject-matter, to show that such misdescription was a mere mistake, either in the testator, or the person who drew up the will, • Sir John Leach, V. C., in Mason v. Robinson, 2 Sim. & Stu. 295. See also, Doe d. v. Huthwaite, 8 Taunt. 306; s. c. 3 B. & Ald. 632. This last case wehave examined elsewhere; see post, Extrinsic Evidence. See Wootton v.. Redd, 12 Grattan, 196. that it would not have the effect to defeat the obvious intention of the testator.7 5. The transposition of the sentences in a will is allowable, when necessary to express the intention of the testator.8 And the words of a will may be transposed, in order to make a limitation sensible, or to effectuate the general intention of the testator. And it is here said, that where it is apparent that the real intention of the testator is incorrectly expressed, the court will carry the clear intent into effect, by supplying the proper words. But it seems to be admitted, on all hands, by the most experienced and judicious writers, and judges, that no liberty of transposition, or supplying, of words, is allowable, unless in furtherance of the most unquestionable purpose of the testator. If a doubt arises in regard to any such change advancing the real intent of the testator, it cannot be made.10 A construction which will render the instrument legal, is preferred." And the whole will must be made to stand together, if possible.12 Every portion of the will must have its effect, without rejection or change, when it can be done consistently with the obvious general intent.13 But if requisite, to carry out such obvious general intent, words, or sentences, may be transposed.14 'Mosley v. Massey, 8 East, 149. This may be regarded, as coming within the principle of the class of cases, where a false description is rejected upon the maxim falsa demonstratio non nocet. But it in fact applies one local description to another devise. See Den v. Kemeys, 9 East, 366; post, § 35. Baker v. Pender, 5 Jones, Law, 351. Covenhoven v. Shuler, 2 Paige, 122. See also, Linstead v. Green, 2 Md. 82; Walker v. Walker, 17 Ala. 396. 10 Annable v. Patch, 3 Pick. 360. 11 Ante, § 30 c, n. 24. 4; 12 Hunt v. Johnson, 10 B. Mon. 342; Bowly v. Lammot, 3 Har. & J. Moore v. Dudley, 2 Stewart, 170; Williams v. Veach, 17 Ohio, 171; Hall v. Chaffee, 14 N. H. 215. 13 Pue v. Pue, 1 Md. Decis. Ch. 382. 14 Linstead v. Green, 2 Md. 82. CHANGING WORDS. SECTION IX. THE CONSTRUCTION OF PARTICULAR WORDS. 1. No word in a will rejected, or changed, except upon the clearest certainty. 2. A mere doubt will not justify such construction. 3. The necessity for such change of words, occurs more commonly in familiar terms. 4. Thus conjunctive words are often read disjunctively, and vice versa. n. 6. Cases reviewed upon this subject. 5. The same rule extends equally to personalty. 6. And the addition of more terms to the condition, will make no difference. 7. Insuperable difficulty, in classifying the cases upon the point. 8. The grammatical construction explained. 9. The later cases incline to follow the natural import of the words. Cases reviewed. 10. Illustrations of the use of particles in different relations. 11. The latest decision of the court of last resort in England on that point. 12. Statement of the rule as there declared. 13. Further illustration of the subject. 14. Mr. Jarman's rule is that the construction depends upon the preceding gift. 15. Review of Lord Mansfield's commentary upon the question. 16. In bequests to persons or their children, "or" construed "and.” 17. Devises to one or his heirs, forever, or in tail; proper construction. 18. Devise to one, his heirs, or assigns, creates a fee-simple. 19. Devise to a class, with power of selection, not made, effect of. 20. “And” construed "or" to prevent the divesting of a legacy. 21. The word "and" used disjunctively, by the repetition of the verb. 22. How the words "die unmarried," are to be construed under different circum stances. 23. "Unmarried," designatio personæ. married. "Still unmarried," is never having been 24. Death in the lifetime of A and B, means during their joint lives. 25. The American cases allow of the change of words to carry out the clear intent. § 35. 1. It is obvious that no word in a will can be rejected, and another substituted in its place, without the clearest certainty that such was the intention of the testator. If the change is required, to render the act rational and sensible, and there is no proof of want of these qualities in the testator, except the lan guage of the will, and that is easily remedied, by a slight change in the words, which may be readily and clearly shown to be what was intended; and in regard to which there is no ground for difference of opinion, or for argument, it may be done, by way of construction.' As where the testator's intention evidently appeared to be, to divide his property equally amongst his seven children, and for that purpose he had arranged it upon seven schedules, and subjected it to mortgage debts in such manner, that if in a particular clause the words "fourth schedule" were read literally, the entire plan of the will would be frustrated, and the payment of the debts in the manner provided would become impossible, but if "fourth" were read "fifth," the whole would be rendered consistent and rational; the Court of Appeal in Chancery, did not hesitate to adopt that construction.2 2. And where the testator, after giving legacies to his relations, in the former part of his will, made other dispositions, and then gave the residue of his estate, excepting £4,100, which he directed to be divided among his relations to whom he had given legacies in the forepart of his will, "in proportion to the legacies left above, which will just make their legacies double the first bequest." The first legacies amounted to £6,100; and the question was, whether the sum could be so read. The Court of Appeal in Chancery held that it could not.3 Lord Jus 1 Doe d. v. Gallini, 3 Ad. & Ellis, 340; s. c. 5 B. & Ad. 621. It was here held, that the terms "without issue," must be understood "leaving issue," and the word "all" must be read "each," or "any." But the necessity of this change was clearly shown by the language of other portions of the will, as read with reference to the general intent shown upon the face of the whole instru ment. Hart v. Tulk, 2 De G., M. & G. 300. See also, Phillips v. Chamberlaine, 4 Vesey, 50; Bengough v. Edridge, 1 Sim. 173; Pasmore v. Huggins, 21 Beav. 103. 3 Thompson v. Whitelock, 5 Jur. N. s. 991. The cases were here examined, and the decision placed upon the ground, that there was but a doubt, and no |