17. In a recent case in Pennsylvania, it is said, that the rule which sacrifices the former of several contradictory clauses in a will, is never applied, but on the failure of every attempt to give the whole such a construction as renders every part of it effective; the will is to be construed as a whole; and one part is not to be treated as repugnant to another, if it is possible for both to stand. In the attainment of this object, the local order of the limitations is to be disregarded, if it be possible, by transposing them, to deduce a consistent disposition from the entire will.36 SECTION VII. SUPPLYING WORDS. 1. Words omitted in will may be supplied by intendment. 2. But this not done where there is ground for doubt in regard to the words. n. 1. Review of the cases upon this point. 3. Words omitted may be supplied by reference to the correlative part of the will." 4. The name of devisee may be supplied by clear intendment. 5. Even the name of the devisee, and the devise itself, may be supplied. 6. Conflicting decisions stated in reference to similar cases. 7. General statement, how far particular circumstances are to be considered. 8. Lord Mansfield in Right v. Sidebotham. 9. Terms of one devise cannot be drawn into the construction of another, wholly distinct. 10. The correspondence must amount to identity. 11. Where the defining of the estate is reserved to the end of the clause. 12. The clear intent of the testator gathered from the whole will must prevail. 13. The court will not cut down a devise, in a codicil, by resort to the will. 36 Mütter's estate, 38 Penn. St. 314. This rule is enforced with great strictness in New York, and, as we believe, in most of the American states. So that it is now becoming very uncommon, with us, to hear a court declare a will, or any of its provisions, wholly inoperative, by reason of repugnancy, or uncertainty. Covenhoven v. Shuler, 2 Paige, 122; Parks v. Parks, 9 id. 107; Sweet v. Chase, 2 N. Y. App. 73. 14. Where the sections of the will are numerically arranged; each distinct. 15. Recapitulation of the rules deducible from the cases. 16. "Die without issue" construed "without issue living." 17. Almost any latitude of construction allowed, to meet clear intent. 18. Cases where "or" construed "and" too numerous to be quoted. 19. What appears a life-estate may be construed a remainder in fee. § 33. 1. It is an established rule in the construction of wills, that where it is evident the testator has not expressed himself as he intended to have done, and supposed he had done, and the defect is produced by the omission of some word, or words; and where it is certain, beyond reasonable doubt, what particular words were thus omitted, they may be supplied by intendment, and the will read, and construed, as if those words had been written in the place, or places, where they were intended to have been. 2. But no word can be thus supplied, so long as there is any fair ground to question what particular words were intended to have been used, which were not. And by this it is meant, that so long as different persons may be supposed to entertain different opinions, in regard to the particular words intended to have been used, or, at least, as to the import of those words, the will must be read as it appears, and the meaning extracted, as it best can be, from what is written. But the fact, that different persons may entertain different opinions, in regard to which of two or more words, of nearly the same import, was omitted in the will, forms no objection to supplying the omission.1 1 1 Jarman, 456; Anony. 1 And. 33; Hope v. Potter, 3 Kay. & J. 206. See also, Atkins v. Atkins, Cro. Eliz. 248. In some cases the terms, “without issue" have been supplied, so as to make a devise for life, read the same as if it had been an estate tail, where it is apparent such was the intention. And in others, "without issue," has been read the same as if it had been written, "without leaving issue," in order to bring the remainder within the limitation as to remoteness. Sheppard v. Lessingham, Amb. 122. So also, the words "under twenty-one," will be supplied in a second clause in the will, where these words are contained in the former clause, defining a 3. And where it is necessary, in order to render an alterative sentence complete, and sensible, and to give effect to the apparent intent of the testator, to add certain words, found in the correlative portion of the will, it should be done. And where an estate is limited to take effect over, upon a condition which similar limitation of the same property. Kirkpatrick v. Kilpatrick, 13 Vesey, 476; Wheable v. Withers, 16 Simons, 505. But the court will look into all the testamentary papers, and not supply words, fixing a limitation within the prescribed limits, or for any other purpose, where it is apparent such was not the intention of the testator. And to determine this intention, the codicil must be regarded as part of the will, and all their provisions carefully scrutinized. Radley v. Lees, 3 Man. & Gran. 827. See also, Radford v. Radford, 1 Keen, 486. So also," on marriage,” was read "on marriage before twenty-one." Lang v. Pugh, 1 Yo. & Coll. C. C. 718; King v. Cullen, 2 De G. & S. 252; Woodburne v. Woodburne, 3 id. 643. And in Abbott v. Middleton, 21 Beav. 143, where a gift over was made by the testator, in the event of his son dying before his mother, it was held, by the Master of the Rolls, that the words, "without leaving a child," should be supplied, as that was the obvious intention of the testator, and this opinion was affirmed, in the House of Lords, Lords Cranworth and Wensleydale dissenting. 7 Ho. Lds. Cas. 68. See also, Brotherton v. Bury, 18 Beav. 65. The American cases maintain similar views. In Covenhoven v. Shulen, 2 Paige, 122, it was held, that where the clear intention of the testator is incorrectly expressed, the court will carry it into effect, by supplying words, or by transposing them. See also, Deakins v. Hollis, 7 Gill & Johns. 311; Pickering v. Langden, 22 Maine, 429. A bequest to the testator's wife, of certain enumerated articles of personalty," during her natural," was held to create only a life interest, the word "life" being clearly omitted. Geiger v. Brown, 4 McCord, 418. The proper rule in supplying words of the testator, is to supply only those which he obviously intended to use, and not such as it may be conjectured will carry out his intention. Lynch v. Hill, 6 Munf. 114; Hamilton v. Boyles, 1 Brevard, 414. As to supplying words in a devise over, after the decease of the first devisee, without leaving issue, or without issue; see Newton v. Griffith, 1 Har. & Gill, 111; Lynch v. Hill, supra. Doe d. v. Micklem, 6 East, 486. See also, Webb v. Hearing, Cro. Jac. 415, where it is said, "and the intention being collected, by the will, the law shall adjudge accordingly." never happens in the terms specified, yet, if the substance of the condition occur, the estate over shall take effect.3 4. And where the will, after two bequests to the same person, continues," I give, further, my yard, stables, cowhouse, and all the other outhouses in the said yard, my sister M. W. to have the interests and profits during her life," although the name of the devisee was wholly omitted, it was readily and clearly supplied by the context, and it was held to create a life-estate in M. W., and a remainder to the devisee next preceding, it being considered, that the word "further," sufficiently indicated, that it was intended merely as an addition to the former devise.4 5. And where the testator gave estates in tail male successively to the second, and other younger sons of A. B., and on failure of sons, to the daughters of A. B., and provided, that if A. B. should have any children, besides an eldest, or only son, he might raise portions for younger sons, or daughters, the question arose, whether the eldest son of A. B. could take. The question was referred, first to the judges of the King's Bench, who certified their opinion, that the eldest son took nothing under the will. The question was then referred to the judges of the Common Pleas, who certified that the eldest son "took an estate tale male, under the said will, expectant upon the decease of his father." The question was then argued before Sir John Leach, M. R., who said, in giving judgment: "The whole will must be looked through, in order to discover the sense of the testator; and the question is, whether the testator, or the drawer of the will, did not, by mere mistake, omit the word first.' I am of opinion it was omitted, by mistake. How is the provision for the daughters, in case there should be no issue male, consistent with no limitation to the first son? It is manifest * Pearsall v. Simpson, 15 Vesey, 29; Malim v. Kighley, 2 Ves. Jr. 333; Meadows v. Parry, 1 Ves. & Beam. 125; Murrey v. Jones, 2 Ves. & Beam. 318, 320. Doe d. v. Turner, 2 D. & Ry. 398. the testator did not intend to exclude the first son." 5 And where a devise was made to the eldest and other sons, successively, and the limitation over contains the words, " and likewise the several and respective heirs male of the body and bodies of such second, third, or other son, or sons, it was held, nevertheless, that it was so obvious, that the testator must have intended his eldest son to take an estate tail, that the provision in regard to heirs, which was in terms confined to the second and other sons, should, by construction, be extended also to the eldest son.6 Lord Mansfield, in giving judgment here, said: "In the construction of wills it is necessary to avoid two extremes. The first is that of arbitrary conjecture, for the court cannot make a will; the second, that of strictness, which, in consequence of a slip in technical, or positive expression, may prevent a meaning evident, and such as no man can doubt, from taking effect." His 5 66 Langston v. Pole, 1 Tamlyn, 119. This case was carried by appeal to the House of Lords, and, upon solemn argument, the judgment affirmed upon substantially the same ground. Langston v. Langston, 8 Bligh, 167, 2 Cl. & Fin. 194. Lord Brougham seems to have been of opinion that the expression, “ other sons," included the eldest son, and there was, therefore, no occasion to supply any words, but other cases of similar character do not seem to have favored this construction of his lordship. 6 Clements v. Paske, 3 Doug. 384. applied to the construction of deeds. J., here said, the case contained "demonstration plain on the face of the feoffment, that it was the intent of the parties that an estate tail should" be created in the eldest son. And still his lordship adds, that the words used with reference to his eldest son were not sufficient for that purpose, but considers the words "every such son," used evidently with reference to the second and younger sons, as capable of including all the sons named before. "But no man can read this deed," says his lordship, "without seeing the intent I have mentioned, though by some strange blunder the usual words are omitted." "I, for one, adhere to the rule which forbids the raising estates, by implications, in deeds, and think that we ought not to grant the same indulgence to inaccuracy in the construction of deeds, as we do in wills. See also, Doe d. v. Martin, 4 T. R. 39. And the same rule, substantially, has been |