But the preamble to this bill states that the purpose of the bill is to secure the building of the railroad described in chapter 556 of the Acts of the year 1907, as amended and extended by chapter 707 of the Acts of the year 1912, and in order to furnish new freight and passenger railroad lines for the State of Massachusetts and the city of Boston, to be operated in the interests of the people of said State and city, and to connect with existing lines at Providence, Fall River and other points. The bill itself, when read in connection with the statutes referred to, bears out the recital of the preamble.

Railroads are held to be built for the public use, whether the right to take land or the right to grant pecuniary aid to them is considered. The Legislature of this Commonwealth has granted aid to railroad corporations from the treasury of the Commonwealth. Prince v. Crocker, 166 Mass. 347.

Repeated instances of this are found in our legislation. For example, aid was extended to the Western Railroad Corporation (St. 1836, c. 131), to the Troy & Greenfield Railroad Corporation (St. 1854, c. 226), to the Williamsburg & North Adams (St. 1867, c. 321), and to the Lee & New Haven (St. 1868, c. 313). The Legislature has also in a number of instances authorized cities and towns to furnish aid to railroad companies by subscribing to stock or otherwise. The constitutionality of such legislation has not been brought into direct controversy before the Supreme Court, but indirectly has been recognized. Kittredge v. North Brookfield, 138 Mass. 286; Commonwealth v. Williamstown, 156 Mass. 70. And elsewhere it has been established by such a weight of judicial authority that it must be regarded as settled. Prince v. Crocker, 166 Mass. 347, 361. See, also, Olcott v. Supervisors, 16 Wall. 678; Railroad Co. v. Otoe, 16 Wall. 667; Pine Grove Township v. Talcott, 19 Wall. 666; Dillon on Municipal Corporations, 4th ed., §§ 153, 158, 508.

Thus the building of the subway in the city of Boston for the carriage of such passengers as paid the regular fare was held to be for a public use; and it was further held to be within the constitutional power of the Legislature to order or sanction taxation for it. Prince v. Crocker, 166 Mass. 347, 361.

It is my opinion that the railroad described in this bill, if built, must, like all other railroads, be regarded as constructed

for public use; that the Legislature has the right to extend to it the direct financial aid of the Commonwealth; and that the proposed bill, if enacted, will be constitutional.

The provisions of St. 1914, c. 474, regulating wages of employees on public works, do not apply to contracts made prior to the taking effect of the statute.

State Board of Labor and Industries.

GENTLEMEN:

JUNE 25, 1914.

You have requested my opinion upon the

following question:

Do the provisions of chapter 474 of the Acts of 1914 apply to contracts made before the fifth day of June, 1914, that being the date upon which that chapter went into effect?

This chapter reads as follows:

SECTION 1. Section twenty-one of chapter five hundred and fourteen of the acts of the year nineteen hundred and nine is hereby amended by inserting after the word "effect", in the eighth line, the words: — The wages for a day's work paid to mechanics employed in such construction of public works shall be not less than the customary and prevailing rate of wages for a day's work in the same trade or occupation in the locality, city or town where such public works are constructed, so as to read as follows: - Section 21. In the employment of mechanics and laborers in the construction of public works by the commonwealth, or by a county, city or town, or by persons contracting therewith, preference shall be given to citizens of the commonwealth, and, if they cannot be obtained in sufficient numbers, then to citizens of the United States; and every contract for such works shall contain a provision to this effect. The wages for a day's work paid to mechanics employed in such construction of public works shall be not less than the customary and prevailing rate of wages for a day's work in the same trade or occupation in the locality, city or town where such public works are constructed. Any contractor who knowingly and wilfully violates the provisions of this section shall be punished by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars for each offence.

SECTION 2. The board of labor and industries shall enforce the provisions of this act, and in case of any dispute that may arise upon

public works as to the customary and prevailing rate of wages the board of labor and industries shall investigate the wages in the trade or occupation in the locality, city or town where such public works are under construction and decide what rate of wages shall be paid upon such works.

This statute relates to the employment of mechanics and laborers in the construction of public works by the Commonwealth, and to the rate of wages to be paid by contractors doing such work.

The contracts of a State with individuals are to be construed in the same manner and have the same binding effect upon the parties thereto as the contracts of private parties. 36 Cyc. 880, par. G.

A State has no more right than an individual to modify or rescind a contract entered into by it unless such right has been reserved. 36 Cyc. 880, par. H.

In Boston Molasses Co. v. Commonwealth, 193 Mass. 389, Sheldon, J., says as follows:

The State, in all its contracts and dealings with individuals, must be adjudged and abide by the rules which govern in determining the rights of private citizens contracting and dealing with each other. There is not one law for the sovereign and another for the subject; but, when the sovereign engages in business and the conduct of business enterprises, and contracts with individuals, although an action may not lie against the sovereign for a breach of the contract, whenever the contract, in any form, comes before the courts, the rights and obligations of the contracting parties must be adjusted upon the same principles as if both contracting parties were private persons. Both stand upon equality before the law, and the sovereign is merged in the dealer, contractor and suitor.

In an opinion by the Attorney-General, given June 28, 1911, to the Metropolitan Water and Sewerage Board, where a contract was made prior to the act of the Legislature limiting the employment of men to eight hours a day, it was held by the Attorney-General that the contractor had the right to employ men according to the terms of the contract, and that the terms of this contract will not be changed by the passage of the act in question. The statute would be unconstitutional if construed to abrogate or interfere with the terms of this contract.

There is nothing in chapter 474 of the Acts of 1914 indicating any intention that it should apply to contracts made

before that chapter would take effect, and such a provision, if made, would undoubtedly constitute a violation of that provision of the Federal Constitution which prohibits any State from enacting a law impairing the obligation of con

tracts.

It is my opinion that this chapter does not apply to the class of contracts referred to in your inquiry.

Where a public commission, in advertising for bids on a proposed contract, reserves the right to reject any and all bids, no liability attaches in case any of the lowest bids are rejected.

State House Building Commission.

JUNE 26, 1914.

GENTLEMEN: In your communication of recent date, you state in substance that in advertising for bids for contracts for the State House extension you reserved the right to reject any and all bids, and you request my opinion upon the following question: "If the Board shall now reject any of the lowest bidders will such rejected bidders have any recourse at law?"

This question received judicial consideration in the case of Colorado Paving Co. v. Murphy, 37 L. R. A. 630. In this case Murphy brought a bill in equity seeking to enjoin the Colorado Paving Company and the mayor and certain other officials of the city of Denver from entering into a contract for the paving of a certain street in Denver. The city authorities had advertised for bids for a contract for this work, and had reserved the right to reject any and all bids. Murphy was the lowest bidder and his bid was rejected. The court said:

"Wherever an action is brought for a breach of duty imposed by statute, the party bringing it must show that he had an interest in the performance of the duty, and that the duty was imposed for his benefit. But where the duty was created or imposed for the benefit of another, and the advantage to be derived to the party prosecuting, by its performance, is merely incidental and no part of the design of the statute, no such right is created as forms the subject of an action."

It is upon this principle that it is now settled by the great weight of authority that the lowest bidder cannot compel the issue of a writ of mandamus to force the officers of a municipality to enter into a

contract with him. (Citing High, Extr. Legal Rem. § 92, and other authorities.) And the courts hold that he cannot maintain an action at law for damages for their refusal to enter into the contract. Talbot Paving Co. v. Detroit (Mich.), 3 Det. L. N. 268; East River Gaslight Co. v. Donnelly, 93 N. Y. 557. This principle is as fatal to a suit in equity as to an action at law. It goes not to defeat any particular cause of action, but to defeat the right to any relief. Nor is this an unjust or inequitable result. One who offers to contract to do work for a city which he knows has the right to reject his bid ought not to have the power to compel that city to enter into a contract with him simply because it decides to make a contract for the same work with his rival. He knowingly puts the labor and expense of preparing his bid at the hazard of the city's action. It is admitted that, if the city rejects all bids, he has no rights, no equities; and we fail to see how its acceptance of another's bid can give to the unsuccessful bidder any greater right than he would have had if all bids had been rejected. (Colorado Paving Co. v. Murphy, 37 L. R. A. 630, 635.)

In a case involving the same principle the Supreme Court of Missouri said:

In the case in hand the advertisement has the following caption: "Proposals for the erection of the new high school building on Grand Avenue." But the opening lines of the official statement, which follows, show that the caption refers to the proposals to be received, and is not intended to describe the effect of the advertisement as a whole. If there was otherwise any doubt on this point, it is set at rest by the last sentence, viz., "The board reserves the right to reject any or all bids." That language demonstrates the nature of the advertisement as a mere invitation for offers for a contract. As such it did not lay the foundation of a completed contract. It was merely the opening of negotiations for a contract. . . . No claim is advanced in the petition looking to a recovery for fraud or deceit in making the proposals for bids. It is, indeed, asserted that the defendant rejected the plaintiffs' bid "without cause, arbitrarily and capriciously, through favoritism and bias." But, if the defendant had the absolute right to reject any and all bids, no cause of action would arise to plaintiffs because of the motive which led to the rejection of their bid. The right to reject the bids was unconditional. Defendant was entitled to exercise that right for any cause it might deem satisfactory, or even without any assignable cause. Whatever its rules or practice as to the acceptance of bids may have been, plaintiffs' rights cannot be justly held to be greater than those conferred by the published advertisement on which their bid was made. (Anderson v. Board of President and Directors of Public Schools, 26 L. R. A. 707, 712.)