creation of the state of West Virginia. Those questions are not free from difficulty; and this court, before undertaking to pass upon them, must be satisfied that it has jurisdiction to do

So.

Knox v. Exchange Bank, 79 U. S. 12 Wall. 379, 383 [20: 414, 415].

The same doctrine was stated by Mr. Justice Harlan, speaking for this court, as follows: "The state court may erroneously determine The grounds relied on for invoking the ap-questions arising under a contract which conpellate jurisdiction of this court are, in sub-stitutes *the basis of the suit before it; it [111 stance, that, by the decision of the supreme may hold a contract void which, in our opincourt of appeals of West Virginia, without any ion, is valid; it may adjudge a contract to be legislative action, the obligation of the contract valid which, in our opinion, is void; or its incontained in the deed from Mr. and Mrs. Penny- terpretation of the contract may, in our opinbacker to Huntington, the grantor of the plain-ion, be radically wrong; but, in neither of such tiff in error, has been impaired, and the plain cases, would the judgment be reviewable by tiff in error has been deprived of its property this court under the clause of the Constitution without due process of law. protecting the obligation of contracts against impairment by state legislation, and under the existing statutes defining and regulating its jurisdiction, unless that judgment, in terms or by its necessary operation, gives effect to some In order to come within the provision of the provision of the state Constitution, or some legConstitution of the United States, which de-islative enactment of the state, which is claimed clares that no state shall pass any law impair ing the obligation of contracts, not only must the obligation of a contract have been impaired. but it must have been impaired by some act of the legislative power of the state, and not by a decision of its judicial department only.

Assuming, without deciding, that these grounds were sufficiently and seasonably taken in the courts of West Virginia, we are of opinion that they present no Federal question.

by the unsuccessful party to impair the obliga tion of the particular contract in question." Lehigh Water Co. v. Easton, 121 U. S. 388, 392 [30: 1059, 1060].

Many other decisions of this court to the same effect are cited in that case. See also New Orleans Waterworks Co. v. Louisiana Sugar Ref. Co. 125 U. S. 18, 30 [31: 607, 612]; St. Paul M. & M. R. Co. v. Todd County. 142 U. S. 282 [35: 1014]: Brown v. Smart, 145 U. S. 454 [36: 773]; Wood v. Brady, 150 U. S. 18 [37: 981].

The appellate jurisdiction of this court,upon 110] writ of error *to a state court, on the ground that the obligation of a contract has been impaired, can be invoked only when an act of the legislature alleged to be repugnant to the Constitution of the United States has been decided by the state court to be valid, and not The decisions cited by the plaintiff in error when an act admitted to be valid has been mis- to support the jurisdiction of this court in the construed by the court. The statute of West case at the bar were either cases in which Virginia is admitted to have been valid, whether the writ of error was upon a judgment of a it did or did not apply to the deed in question; state court, which gave effect to a statute aland it necessarily follows that the question leged to impair the obligation of a contract submitted to and decided by the state court was made before any such statute existed, as in one of construction only, and not of validity. | Louisiana v. Pilsbury, 105 U. S. 278 [26:1090], If this court were to assume jurisdiction of in Chicago L. Ins. Co. v. Needles, 113 U. S. 574 this case, the question submitted for its decision [28: 1084], and in Mobile & O. R. Co. v. Tenwould be not whether the statute was repug-nessee, 153 U. S. 486 [38: 793], or else the writ nant to the Constitution of the United States, but whether the highest court of the state has erred in its construction of the statute. As was said by this court, speaking by Mr. Justice Grier in such a case, as long ago as 1847. "It is the peculiar province and privilege of the state courts to construe their own statutes; and it is no part of the functions of this court to review their decisions, or assume jurisdiction over them on the pretense that their judgments have impaired the obligation of contracts. The power delegated to us is for the restraint of unconstitutional legislation by the states, and not for the correction of alleged errors committed by their judiciary." Commercial Bank of Cincinnati v. Buckingham, 46 U. S. 5 How. 317, 343 [12:169, 181]; Lawler v Walker, 55 U. S. 14 How. 149, 154 [14: 364, 3661.

It was said by Mr. Justice Miller, in delivering a later judgment of this court: "We are not authorized by the Judiciary Act to review the judgments of the state courts because their judg. ments refuse to give effect to valid contracts, or because those judgments, in their effect, impair the obligation of contracts. If we did, every case decided in a state could be brought here, where the party setting up a contract alleged that the court had taken a different view of its obligation to that which he held.”

of error was to a circuit court of the United States, bringing to this court the whole case, including the question how far the courts of the United States should follow the decisions of the highest court of the state, as in Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 68 U. S. 1 Wall 175, 205 [17:520, 525]; Olcott v. Fond du Lac County Suprs. 83 U.S.16 Wall. 678, 690 [21: 382, 386]; Douglas v. Pike County. 101 U. S. 677, 686 [25: 968, 971]; Anderson v. Santa Anna Trop. 116 U.S.356,361 [29: 633, 634], and other cases cited in Louisiana v. Pilsbury, 105 U. S. 278, 295 [26: 1090, 1096].

The distinction as to the authority of this court between writs of error to a court of the United States and writs of error to the highest court of a state, is well illustrated by two *of the earliest cases relating to munici- [112 pal bonds, in both of which the opinion was delivered by Mr. Justice Swayne, and in each of which the question presented was whether the Constitution of the state of Iowa permitted the legislature to authorize municipal corporations to issue bonds in aid of the construction of a railroad. The supreme court of the state, by decisions made before the bonds in question were issued, had held that it did; but, by de cisions made after they had been issued, held that it did not. A judgment of the district

4.

tive, executive, or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or others who are under the protection of its laws. Appearance by a citizen of New York having his principal place of business in the city of New York and a storehouse and agent in Paris, where he purchased but did not sell goods, in a suit in a French court, and carrying it on to prevent bis property in Paris not in the custody of the court from being taken on judgment, give that court jurisdiction of his person.

court of the United States for the district of Iowa, following the later decisions of the state court, was reviewed on the merits, and reversed by this court, for misconstruction of the Constitution of Iowa. Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 68 U. S. 1 Wall. 175, 206 [17: 520, 525]. But a writ of error to review one of those decisions of the supreme court of Iowa was dismissed for want of jurisdiction, because admitting the Constitution of the state to be a law of the state, within the meaning of the provision of the Constitution of the United States forbid-5. Allowing plaintiff to testify without oath or ding a state to pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts, the only question was of its construction by the state court. Mississippi & M. R. Co. v. McClure, 77 U. S. 10 Wall, 511, 515 [19: 997, 998].

When the parties have been fully heard in the regular course of judicial proceedings, an erroneous decision of a state court does not deprive the unsuccessful party of his property without due process of law, within the 14th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U. S. 90 [23: 678]; Head v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co. 113 U. S. 9, 26 [28: 889, 895]; Morley v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. 146 U. S. 162, 171 [36: 925, 9301; Bergemann v. Backer, 157 U. S. 655 [39: 845]. This court, therefore, has no authority to decide the main questions, argued at the bar, whether the decision of the supreme court of appeals of West Virginia, in effect, and erroneously, overruled the prior decisions of that court, and of the supreme court of appeals of Virginia before West Virginia became a sepa rate state; and the writ of error must be dismisssed for want of jurisdiction.

Mr. Justice Field dissented.

113] HENRY HILTON ET AL., Piffs. in Err.,

D.

GUSTAVE BERTIN GUYOT as Official
Liquidator of the Late Firm of Charles
Fortin & Co. ET AL.

Same

v.

Same.

(See S. C. Reporter's ed. 113-235.) International law-how determined-comity of nations-action on foreign judgment-appearance-foreign practice-judgment, when prima facie evidence-foreign law-reciproci ty-evidence.

1. International law, including questions concerning the rights of persons within the dominion of one nation by reason of acts done within the dominion of another, is part of our law, and should be ascertained and administered by the courts as often as such questions are duly sub2. Where there is no written law upon the subject, such as treaty or statute, questions of international law must be determined by judicial decisions, the works of jurists, and the acts and usages of civilized nations.

mitted to their determination.

6.

7.

8.

cross-examination, or admitting papers in evidence, in France, according to the laws and practice of that country, is not sufficient ground for impeaching the foreign judgment in this country.

A foreign judgment for money in favor of a citizen of the foreign country against a citizen of this country, rendered by a competent court having jurisdiction of the cause and of the parties, upon due allegations and proofs and oppor. tunity to defend according to the course of a civilized jurisprudence, whose record is clear and formal, is prima facie evidence, at least, in a suit upon it in this country, and is conclusive on the merits, unless impeached on special ground, or shown by international law or the comity of this country not entitled to full faith and credit.

Judgments rendered in a foreign country, by the laws of which our judgments are reviewable on the merits, are not entitled to full credit and conclusive effect when sued upon in this country, but are only prima facie evidence of the justice of the plaintiff's claim.

In the absence of statute or treaty, the comity of this country does not require that judgments of a foreign country be recognized as conclusive in this country, where such foreign country does not give like effect to our own judgments. 9. In an action on a French judgment, evidence by defendant that the French courts give no force and effect to the judgments of this country against French citizens, and that they are there re-examined on the merits, although rendered after proper personal service of process made in this country, is admissible.

[Nos, 130, 34.]

Argued January 19, 22, 23, 1894. Ordered for reargument before the full bench February 5, 1894. Reargued April 10, 1894. Decided June 3, 1895.

HE first of the above cases, No. 130, is in

THEM

error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York to review a judgment of that court in favor of the plaintiffs, Gustave Bertin Guyot as official liquidator of the late firm of Charles Fortin & Co. et al., against Henry Hilton et al., defendants, for the amount of a French judgment recovered by the firm of Charles Fortin & Co. against said defendants.

The second of the above cases, No. 34, is an appeal from a decree of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York dismissing a suit in equity brought by said defendants against the plaintiff for an injunction against the prosecution of the first action, etc.

The two cases were argued together in this court. In the first cause, being the action at law, the judgment is reversed and cause re3. Comity of nations is the recognition which one manded with directions for a new trial. In nation allows within its territory to the legisla-the second action, being the suit in equity, the

The first of these two cases was an action at law brought December 18, 1885, in the circuit court of the United States for the southern district of New York, by Gustave Bertin Guyot, as official liquidator of the firm of Charles For- The complaint further alleged that Guyot tin & Co., and by the surviving members of had been duly appointed by the tribunal of that firm, all aliens and citizens of the Repub-commerce of the department of the Seine, oflic of France, against Henry Hilton and Will- ficial liquidator of the firm of Fortin & Co., iam Libbey, citizens of the United States and with full powers according to law and comof the state of New York, and trading as co-mercial usage for the verification and realizapartners in the cities of New York and Paris tion of its property, both real and personal, and elsewhere, under the firm name of A. T. and to collect and cause to be executed the Stewart & Co. The action was upon a judg- judgments aforesaid. ment recovered in a French court at Paris in the Republic of France by the firm of Charles Fortin & Co. all whose members were French citizens, against Hilton and Libbey, trading as copartners as aforesaid, and citizens of the United States and of the state of New York.

domiciled within, the jurisdiction of that tri-be competent or admissible in any court or bunal, or owed any allegiance to France; but tribunal of the United States in any suit be117] that they were the owners of property tween the same parties involving the same subsituated in that country, which would by the law ject matter; and it is contrary to natural jusof France have been liable to seizure if they did tice and public policy that the said judgment not appear in that tribunal; and that they un- should be enforced against a citizen of the United willingly, and solely for the purpose of pro- States, and that, if there had been a full and tecting that property, authorized and caused fair trial upon the merits of the controversies an agent to appear for them in those proceed- so pending before said tribunals, no judg ings: and that the suits brought by them ment would have been obtained against said against Fortin & Co. were brought for the Stewart & Co. same purpose, and in order to make a proper defense and to establish counterclaims arising out of the transaction between the parties, and to compel the production and inspection of Fortin & Co.'s books; and that they sought no other affirmative relief in that tribunal.

The answer further alleged that pending that litigation the defendants discovered gross frauds in the accounts of Fortin & Co.: that the arbitrator and the tribunal declined to compel Fortin & Co. to produce their books and papers for inspection; and that, if they had been produced, the judgment would not have been obtained against the defendants.

"Defendants further answering allege that it is contrary to natural justice that the judg ment herein before mentioned should be enforced without an examination of the merits thereof; that by the laws of the Republic of France, to wit, article 181 [121] of the Royal Ordinance of June 15, 1629, it is provided, namely: Judgments rendered, contracts or obligations recognized, in foreign kingdoms and sovereignties, for any cause whatever, shall give rise to no lien or execution in our kingdom. Thus the contracts shall stand for simple promises, and not withstanding such judgments our subjects against whom they have been rendered may contest their rights anew before our own judges.'

"And it is further provided by the laws of France, by article 546 of the Code de Procedure Civile, as follows: Judgments rendered by foreign tribunals shall be capable of execution *in France, only in the manner and in [119 the cases set forth by articles 2123 and 2128 of the Civil Code.'

The answer further alleged that, without any fault or negligence on the part of the defendants, there was not a full and fair trial of the controversies before the arbitrator, in that no witness was sworn or affirmed; in that Charles Fortin was permitted to make, and did make, statements not under oath, containing many falsehoods; in that the privilege of crossexamination of Fortin and other persons who made statements before the arbitrator was denied to the defendants; and in that extracts from printed newspapers, the knowledge of which was not brought home to the defendants, and letters and other communications in writing between Fortin & Co. and third persons, to which the defendants were neither privy nor party, were received by the arbitrator; that without such improper evidence the judgment would not have been obtained; and that the arbitrator was deceived and misled by the false and fraudulent accounts introduced by Fortin & Co. and by the bearsay testimony given without the solemnity of an oath and without cross-examination, and by the fraudu-utes by the judicial tribunals of France is such lent suppression of the books and papers.

The answer further alleged that Fortin & Co. made up their statements and accounts false118] ly and fraudulently, and with *intent to deceive the defendants and the arbitrator and the said courts of France, and those courts were deceived and misled thereby; that, owing to the fraudulent suppression of the books and papers of Fortin & Co., upon the trial, and the false statements of Fortin regarding matters involved in the controversy, the arbitrator and the courts of France" were deceived and misled in regard to the merits of the controversies pending before them and wrongfully decided against said Stewart & Co. as herein before stated; that said judgment herein before mentioned is fraudulent, and based upon false and fraudulent accounts and statements, and is erroneous in fact and in law, and is void; that the trial herein before mentioned was not conducted according to the usages and practice of the common law, and the allegations and proofs given by said Fortin & Co. upon which said judgment is founded would not

"And it is further provided by the laws of France, by article 2128 [2123] of the Code de Procedure Civile [Civil Code]: A lien cannot, in like manner, arise from judgments rendered in any foreign country, save only as they have been declared in force by a French tribunal, without prejudice, however, to provisions to the contrary, contained in public laws and treaties' [and by article 2128 of that Code: 'Contracts entered into in a foreign country cannot give a lien upon property in France, if there are no provisions contrary to this principle in public laws or in treaties'].

"That the construction given to said stat

that no comity is displayed toward the judgments of tribunals of foreign countries against the citizens of France, when sued upon in said courts of France, and the merits of the controversies upon which the said judgments are based are examined anew, unless a treaty to the contrary effect exists between the said Republic of France and the country in which such judgment is obtained; that no treaty exists between the said Republic of France and the United States, by the terms or effect of which the judgments of either country are prevented from being examined anew upon the merits, when sued upon in the courts of the country other than that in which it is obtained; that the tribunals of the Republic of France give no force and effect, within the jurisdiction of the said country, to the duly rendered judg ments of courts of competent jurisdiction of the United States against citizens of France after proper personal service of the process of said courts is made thereon in this country."

The answer further set up, by way of counterclaim and in detail, various matters arising

out of the dealings between the parties; and al-had been, within four years prior to the com. leged that none of the plaintiffs had since 1881 mencement of those suits, domiciled or resibeen residents of the state of New York, or dent within the jurisdiction of those courts; within the jurisdiction of that state, but the that they had a purchasing agent and a storedefendants were and always had been resi-house in Paris, but only as a means or facility dents of that state.

The answer concluded by demanding that 120]the plaintiffs' *complaint be dismissed, and that the defendants have judgment against them upon the counterclaims amounting to $102,942.91.

The plaintiffs filed a replication to so much of the answer as made counterclaims, deny ing its allegations, and setting up in bar thereof the judgment sued on.

The defendants, on June 22, 1888, filed a bill in equity against the plaintiffs, setting forth the same matters as in their answer to the action at law, and praying for a discov ery, and for an injunction against the prosecution of the action. To that bill a plea was filed, setting up the French judgments; and upon a hearing the bill was dismissed. 42 Fed. Rep. 249. From the decree dismissing the bill an appeal was taken, which was the second case now before this court.

The action at law afterwards came on for trial by a jury; and the plaintiffs put in the records of the proceedings and judgments in the French courts; and evidence that the juris diction of those courts was as alleged in the complaint and that the practice followed and the method of examining the witnesses were according to the French law; and also proved the title of Guyot as liquidator.

to aid in the transaction of their principal business, which was in New York, and they were never otherwise engaged in business in France; that neither of them owed allegiance to France, but they were the owners of property there, which would, according to the laws of France, have been liable to seizure if they had not appeared to answer in those suits; that they unwillingly, and solely for the purpose of protecting their property within the jurisdiction of the French tribunal, authorized an agent to appear, and he did appear in the proceedings before it; and that their motion to compel an inspection of the plaintiff's books, as well as the suits brought by the defendants in France, was necessary by way of defense or counterclaim to the suits there brought by the plaintiffs against them.

Among the matters which the defendants alleged and offered to prove in order to show that the French judgments were procured by fraud were that Fortin & Co., with intent to deceive and defraud the defendants and the arbitrator, and the courts of France, entered in their books, and presented to the defend. ants, and to the French courts, accounts, bear. ing upon the transactions in controversy, which were false and fraudulent, and contained excessive and fraudulent charges against the defend. ants, in various particulars specified; that the de fendants *made due application to the tri-[122 bunal of commerce to compel Fortin & Co. to allow their account books and letter books to be

It was admitted by both parties that, for several years prior to 1876, the firm of Alexander T. Stewart & Co. composed of Stewart and Libbey, conducted their business as mer-inspected by the defendants, and the application chants in the city of New York, with branches in other cities of America and Europe; that both parties were citizens and residents of the city and state of New York during the entire period mentioned in the complaint; and that in April, 1876, Stewart died, and Hilton and Libbey formed a partnership to continue the business under the same firm name, and became the owners of all the property and rights of the old firm.

was opposed by Fortin & Co., and denied by the tribunal; that the discovery and inspection of those books were necessary to determine the truth of the controversies between the parties; that, before the tribunal of commerce, Charles Fortin was permitted to and did give in evidence statements not under oath, relating to the merits of the controversies there pending; and falsely represented that a certain written contract, made in 1873, between Stewart & The defendants made numerous offers of ev- Co. and Fortin & Co. concerning their dealidence in support of all the specific allegations ings, was not intended by the parties to be opof fact in their answer, including the allega. erative according to its terms; and, in support tions as to the law and comity of France. The of that false representation, made statements plaintiffs, in their brief filed in this court, ad- as to admissions by Stewart in a private_conmitted that most of these offers "were offers versation with him; and that the defendants to prove matters in support of the defenses, and could not deny those statements, because counterclaims set up by the defendants in the Stewart was dead, and they were not protected cases tried before the French courts, and which from the effect of Fortin's statements by the 121] or most of which would have been rele-privilege of cross-examining him under oath; vant and competent if the plaintiffs in error are not concluded by the result of those litigations, and have now the right to try those issues, either on the ground that the French judgments are only prima facie evidence of the correctness of those judgments, or on the ground that the case is within the exception of a judgment ob tained by fraud."

The defendants, in order to show that they should not be concluded by having appeared and litigated in the suits brought against them by the plaintiff in the French courts, offered to prove that they were residents and citizens of the state of New York, and neither of them

and that the French judgments were based upon false and fraudulent accounts presented and statements made by Fortin & Co. before the tribunal of commerce during the trial before it.

The records of the judgments of the French courts, put in evidence by the plaintiffs, showed that all the matters now relied on to show fraud were contested in and considered by those courts.

The plaintiffs objected to all the evidence offered by the defendants, on the grounds that the matters offered to be proved were irrelevant, immaterial, and incompetent; that, in re