A

ACTION.

See MILITARY ORDER, 2.

ADMIRALTY.

1. Where, in a suit in rem, in Admiralty, in the District Court, the claimant, after a decree for the libellant, appeals to this Court, and this Court decrees for the libellant for a sum sufficient to allow of an appeal by the claimant to the Supreme Court, which may be a supersedeas, no summary judgment can be rendered by this Court against the sureties in the appeal bond executed on the appeal to this Court, until after the expiration of ten days after the rendering of the decree by this Court. The New Orleans,

216

2. Where, in a suit in rem, in Admiralty, in the District Court, the libellant, after a decree dismissing the libel, appeals to this Court, and this Court dismisses the libel, and the sum claimed in the libel is sufficient to allow of an appeal by the libellant to the Supreme Court, which may be a supersedeas, no summary judgment can be rendered by this Court against the sureties in the appeal bond executed on the appeal to this Court, until after the expiration of ten days after the rendering of the decree by this Court. The Jesse Williamson, Jr., 220

3. Where, in a suit in rem, in Admiralty, in the District Court, the claimant, after a decree for the libellant, appeals to this Court, and this Court decrees for the libellant for a sum not

4. A collision occurred between a steamboat and a schooner, caused by negligence on the part of the former, without any design, neglect, privity or knowledge of her owners. She immediately took fire, and burned and sank in deep water, the fire being caused by the collision. She had a cargo, being carried on freight, which was totally lost. None of her pending freight was earned or received. She was raised and repaired. After that she was libelled, in Admiralty, in the District Court, by owners of part of the lost cargo. On a claim to her, she was appraised at $70,000, as her value after being raised and repaired, and she was released on a stipulation for that amount, purporting to be for the benefit of all persons having liens on her for losses by the collision. After decrees for the libellants, her owners petitioned the same District Court, for the benefit of a limitation of liability under the Act of March 3d, 1851, (9 U. S. Stat. at Large, 635.) That Court appraised her value, as she lay immediately after the collision and fire and before she was raised, at $2,500, and ordered that amount to be paid into Court. That was the value of the interest of the petitioners in her as she was immediately after the disaster. The value of that interest immediately before the collision was $70,000. At the time of the collision she was insured against fire, and her owners received, on such in

surance, over $49,000. She was not
surrendered or transferred to a
trustee: Held,

(1.) The value of the interest of
the owner of the steamboat, to be
taken, under said Act, is not the value
of her and her freight before the col-
lision;

(2.) The valuation of $70,000 is
not to be taken as the measure of the
liability of such owner;

(3.) Such measure is the value of
the steamboat in the condition in
which she was immediately after the
disaster, and not her value after she
was raised and repaired;

(4.) Such value in this case was
$2,500, with nothing added for
freight;

(5.) After the collision, the value
of the steamboat was not greater
before the fire than after it;

(6.) The proceeds of the fire in-
surance ought not to be added to the
appraised value of the steamboat;

(7.) It was proper for the District

Court to restrain the libellants in the
suits in rem from further prosecuting
those suits or suits against the stip-
ulators for the $70,000. In re Nor-
wich and New York Transportation
Co.

AFFREIGHTMENT.

See VESSEL.

ANSWER.

See PRACTICE, 1.

APPEAL.

See ADMIRALTY, 1 to 3.

ASSIGNEE.

See PROMISSORY NOTE, 1, 2.
TOWN BOND, 4.

ASSIGNMENT.

See DRAFT.

221

3. An assignee in bankruptcy brought
a suit in equity against the volun-
tary assignee of the bankrupt to set
aside a conveyance made by the bank-
rupt, within three months before the
filing of the petition in bankruptcy,
to the defendant, in trust for the ben-
efit of all the creditors of the assignor,
without any preferences: Held, that,
as the direct effect of the conveyance,
if upheld, would be to keep the prop-
erty away from the operation of the
bankruptcy law and from distribution
by the Courts and officers of the Un-
ited States, and to give it and its ad-
ministration to a trustee selected by
the debtor, the plaintiff was entitled,
under § 5,129 of the Revised Stat-
utes, as amended by the Act of June
22d, 1874, (18 U. S. Stat. at Large,

Crosby,

348

id.

5. A. and U. were partners. L. had a
partnership debt against them. A.
transferred his interest in the part-
nership assets to U., and U. became
his debtor therefor. U. became in-
solvent and assigned his property to
M., for the benefit of his creditors.
Afterwards, U. was adjudged a bank-
rupt and M. became his assignee in
bankruptcy, and, as such, recovered
the property. L. assigned his debt
against U. to Q., and Q. and A.
proved their claims against U., in
bankruptcy. M., as assignee, had in
his hands a dividend on the claim of
A. Q. claimed to have attached such
dividend by an execution on a judg-
ment in a State Court against A. G.
afterwards proceeded in the same
manner with a debt of his against
A. individually. G. then brought
this suit to restrain the application
of such dividend to the debt to Q.
and to have it applied on the debt to
G.: Held,

(1.) The dividend was not attach-
able on process from a State Court,
and no Court but the Bankruptcy
Court could order it to be paid to any
one but A.;

(2.) If the dividend was attachable,
this Court could not, by injunction,
restrain the proceedings;

(3.) The jurisdiction given to the
Circuit Court in bankruptcy matters
does not warrant this suit;

(4.) The bill shows no ground for
equitable relief;

(5.) If it did, A. should be a party
to the suit. Gilbert v. Lynch,

402

6. K., having no funds in the hands of
B., drew three drafts on B., and nego-
tiated them to the plaintiffs.
Be-
fore they were accepted by B., K.
delivered to M., the agent of B.,
funds towards meeting the drafts,
which M transmitted to B. B. then
accepted two of the drafts, and paid
them, but did not accept the third.
The remainder of the funds was not
enough to pay the third. The plaint-
iffs claimed the funds in the hands of
B., while B. had them. Afterwards, |
VOL. XVII.—37

1.

(1.) The money baving been placed
in the hands of B. expressly to pro-
vide for the drafts, and having been
claimed by the plaintiffs, while it
was in the hands of B., and before the
bankruptcy proceedings, the plaint-
iffs were entitled to it;

2.

(2.) The defendants acquired no
greater right to the money than B.
had to it. Seligman v. Wells,

1.

BILL OF LADING.
See CARRIER, 7.

BOND.

410

By

Bonds were executed and issued in
Canada, by a railway company, for
the payment of money and interest
thereon, secured by mortgage.
their terms, they were payable at the
city of New York. Subsequently, an
Act was passed by the Parliament of
the Dominion of Canada, authorizing
the company to issue new bonds, in
substitution, bearing a lower rate of
interest, and declaring that the assent
of the holders of the old bonds should
be deemed to have been given to the
substitution. The plaintiff did not,
in fact, assent, and sued the company
to recover the interest on the old
bonds held by him: Held, that he was
entitled to judgment. Gebhard v.
Canada Southern R. R. Co., 416

Such Act is repugnant to the funda-
mental principles of justice.
id.