A construction which leads to an absurdity should be avoided. Howard's Estate, 80 Vt. 489; 68 A. 513. Effect must be given to all the words so that none are construed as void or superfluous. Stevens v. Bradford, 185 Mass. 439; 70 N. E. 425. And, in any event, the constitutionality of an act cannot be assailed by one who is not affected adversely. Damon's Estate, 10 Cal. App. 542; 102 Pac. 684. Where a particular subject is within the scope of the law and an exemption from taxation is claimed on the ground that the legislature has not provided proper machinery for accomplishing the legislative purpose in a particular instance a liberal rather than a strict construction should be applied, and if by fair and reasonable construction of its provisions the purpose of the statute can be carried out, that interpretation ought to be given to effectuate the legislative intent. Matter of Stewart, 131 N. Y. 274, 282; 30 N. E. 184. And a statute may be declared void in part and yet sustained as to the rest, if severable. Union Trust Co. v. Durfee, 125 Mich. 487; 84 N. W. 1101. 2. Exemptions. The general rule is that exemptions should be strictly construed against the exemption and in favor of the tax. Re Bull, 153 Cal. 715; 96 Pac. 366. State v. N. Y. Meeting of Friends, 61 N. J. Eq. 620; 48 A. 227. The exempting clause should not be enlarged at the expense of the enacting clause. McDowell v. Addams, 51 Pa. St. 438. All grants in derogation of taxation must be strictly construed. Packer's Estate, 246 Pa. St. 133; 92 A. 75. An exemption to local but not to foreign charities is valid. Board of Education v. Illinois, 203 U. S. 553; 27 S. Ct. Rep. 171. A few decisions take the opposite view. It is held that an exemption to a public library should be liberally construed. Curtis' Estate, 88 Vt. 445; 92 A. 965. Matter of Moore, 66 Misc. 116; 122 Supp. 828. And the New York Appellate Division has recently adopted a similar view in regard to charitable corporations generally. Matter of Rockefeller, 177 App. Div. 786; 165 Supp. 154. But the U. S. Supreme Court holds that reasonable doubt should be resolved in favor of the taxing power. 66 Exemptions from taxation are not favored by law, and will not be sustained unless such clearly appear to have been the intent of the Legislature. Public policy in all the States has almost necessarily exempted from the scope of the taxing power large amounts of property used for religious, educational, and municipal purposes; but this list ought not to be extended except for very substantial reason; and while as we have held in many cases Legislatures may, in the interest of the public, contract for the exemption of other property, such contract should receive a strict interpretation and every reasonable doubt be resolved in favor of the taxing power." Yazoo & Miss. V. Ry. Co. v. Adams, 180 U. S. 1; 21 S. Ct. Rep. 240. 3. Retroactive or Prospective. Statutes are construed as prospective unless declared specifically to be retroactive. Gilbertson v. Ballard, 125 Ia. 420; 101 N. W. 108. Lacy v. State Treasurer, 152 Ia. 477; 132 N. W. 843. Provident Hospital v. People, 198 Ill. 495; 64 N. E. 1031. Matter of Miller, 110 N. Y. 216; 18 N. E. 139. Matter of Van Kleeck, 121 N. Y. 701; 25 N. E. 50. Matter of Pettit, 65 App. Div. 30; 72 Supp. 469. Aff. 171 N. Y. 654; 63 N. E. 1121. As we have seen, vested rights cannot be affected retroactively. Matter of McKelway, 221 N. Y. 15, 116 N. E. 348. On the other hand no one has a vested right to a given form of procedure, and where a statute failed to provide for due notice and a hearing the defect can be cured retroactively. Where the original act did not provide for notice of appraisal but notice was provided for by an amendment which was given a retroactive effect the court said: "There was no valid objection to the levy of such a tax. That is to say, it is not an illegal or unauthorized tax. It is invalid simply because the legislature did not provide for notice of the proceedings by which the amount of the tax is to be ascertained." Ferry v. Campbell, 110 Ia. 290, 299; 81 N. W. 604. And it is held that a repeal of the statute of limitations may be construed retroactively. Matter of Moenich, 39 Misc. 480; 80 Supp. 222. But exemptions will not be so construed. Sherrill v. Christ Church, 121 N. Y. 701; 25 N. E. 50. "That the legislature may cure such defects is fundamental. Appellant's counsel say, however, that the estate vested at the death of the testator and that any change made thereon by the legislature after his death is unconstitutional and void. As to the real estate this is true, perhaps, although it is best that we do not decide the point on the arguments before us. As to the personal estate the rule seems to be different however. While the distributive share is a vested interest,— that is, vests in point of right at the time of the death of the intestate,-yet the persons who take and the amount to be received must be ascertained and determined by the Probate court. So long as the entire estate remains unsettled the legislature may cure any defects in the law creating a lien thereon and the act may be retroactive." Where the distribution is delayed by the provisions of the will for many years and an inheritance tax law is enacted in the meantime the shares of the heirs at law are subject to said tax. Hostetter v. State, 26 Ohio Circuit, 702. 4. Notice and a Hearing Essential. A statute that does not provide for it is unconstitutional. Matter of McPherson, 104 N. Y. 306; 10 N. E. 685. Ferry v. Campbell, 110 Ia. 290; 81 N. W. 604. Where the act provides for a review of all matters before the Probate court and also for an appeal, there is a "day in court" for all who consider themselves aggrieved and an act which does not provide for a notice of appraisal but gives these remedies is constitutional. Hostetter v. State, 26 Ohio Circuit, 702. Union Trust Co. v. Probate Judge, 125 Mich. 487; 84 N. W. 1101. 5. Copied or Adopted Statutes. When a statute is copied or adopted from another state the construction put upon it by courts of that state is also adopted. People v. Carpenter, 264 Ill. 400; 106 N. E. 302. Mann v. Carter, 74 N. H. 345; 68 A. 130. Neilson v. Russell, 76 N. J. L. 655; 71 A. 286. Black v. State, 113 Wis. 205; 89 N. W. 522. Miller v. McLaughlin, 141 Mich. 425; 104 N. W. 777. In view of the general similarity of the statutes and the frequency with which they are adopted or copied this rule is of wide application and of manifest importance. 6. Practical Construction. Where the language of the act is doubtful and a practical construction has been given it by the collection officers and has long been acquiesced in the courts will recognize it; but only under these circumstances. "It is immaterial what the practice of the administrative officers of the Commonwealth charged with the duty of collecting legacy and succession taxes may have been in regard to considering property within and without the Commonwealth. It is only when a statute is of doubtful import and the practice has been long continued and acquiesced in by all parties interested that it can be resorted to in aid of the construction of the statute. In the present case we discover no such ambiguity in the meaning of the statute as to justify as an aid to construction a resort to the practice of the officers charged with its execution, even if we assume that the practice had been sufficiently long continued to render it otherwise admissible." Attorney-General v. Barney, 211 Mass. 134; 97 N. E. 750. |