The difficulty is that the legislatures of the several states having the power insist upon imposing it,— and the decisions confirm that power. A few will illustrate: "It has before this been pointed out (Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U. S. 189) that our state imposes a succession tax upon the theory or the fiction that the situs of the personal estate is the domicile of the owner while another state imposes it upon the ground that the actual situs is within the state and the same state may assume either position as the domicile of the decedent or the presence of the property within the state requires it." Stanton's Estate, 142 Mich. 491; 105 N. W. 1122. Though Pennsylvania consistently adheres to the taxation of intangibles at domicile of owner and not within the state under ancillary administration; McKeen v. Northampton County, 49 Pa. St. 519. When the distribution and administration are to be made by the Pennsylvania courts held taxable. Lewis' Estate, 203 Pa. St. 211, 217; 52 A. 205. "The fact that two states dealing each with its own law of succession, both of which the plaintiff in error has to invoke for her rights have taxed the right which they respectively confer, gives no cause for complaint on constitutional grounds. Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U. S. 189, 206, 207; 23 S. Ct. Rep. 277. The fact that the property may be subject to a similar burden in another state does not deprive this state of its power to impose the tax here upon the property which passes by inheritance or by will under our laws." Mann v. Carter, 74 N. H. 345, 352; 68 A. 130. "The great weight of authority favors the principle adopted by the New York Court of Appeals holding that the tax imposed is on the right of succession under a will or by devolution in case of intestacy, and that as to personal property its situs, for the purpose of a legacy or succession tax, is the domicile of the decedent, and the right to its imposition is not affected by the statute of a foreign state, which subjects to similar taxation such portion of the personal estate of any non-resident testator or intestate as he may take and leave there for safe keeping or until it should suit his convenience to carry it away. Hartmann's Appeal, 70 N. J. Eq. 664, 667; 62 A. 560. The leading case is Matter of Blackstone which arose in New York, was decided by the Appellate Division, 69 App. Div. 127; 74 Supp. 508, was affirmed by the Court of Appeals without opinion 171 N. Y. 682; 64 N. E. 1118, on the authority of Matter of Houdayer, 150 N. Y. 37; 44 N. E. 718. It then went to the United States Supreme Court. The testator, a resident of Illinois, had $4,840,000 on deposit with New York bankers and both states imposed inheritance taxes. The appeal was from the tax sought to be collected by the New York state comptroller. The United States Supreme Court said, in sustaining the tax: "No doubt this power on the part of two states to tax on different and more or less inconsistent principles leads to some hardship. It may be regretted also that one and the same state should be seen taxing on the one hand according to the fact of power and on the other, at the same time, according to the fiction that in successions after death mobilia sequuntur personam and domicile governs the whole but these inconsistencies infringe no rule of constitutional law. If the transfer of the deposit necessarily depends upon and involves the law of New York for its exercise or, in other words, if the transfer is subject to the power of the state of New York, then New York may subject the transfer to a tax. But it is plain that the transfer does depend upon the law of New York not because of any theoretical speculation concerning the whereabouts of the debt but because of the practical fact of its power over the person of the debtor. What gives the debt validity? Nothing but the fact that the law of the place where the debtor is will make him pay." Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U. S. 189, 205; 23 S. Ct. Rep. 277. B THE TRANSFER TAKES PLACE AT DEATH. This rule is almost equally important in the law of inheritance taxation as is the rule that the tax is on the transfer of property and not on property itself. It is not a transfer between the living that is taxed, but a transfer from the dead hand to the living hand; and therefore it is the doctrine, subject to certain limitations and exceptions, that the transfer which is the subject of the tax takes place at death. The right of the state to the tax is coincident with the devolution of title or interest, and the right of the state to exact a tax, as well as the obligations of the transferee to pay it, depend not upon a formal, complete, and immediate change of title or possession, but upon the instant right to a beneficial share or interest subject only to the due administration of the estate. Matter of Ramsdill, 190 N. Y. 492; 83 N. E. 584. This same rule was recently enunciated by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in construing a similar statute where that court said: "The rights of all parties, including the right of the commonwealth to its tax, vest at the death of the testator. It is true that the interest of a legatee is subject to an accounting, but it is an interest in the existing fund, and it is analogous to that of a cestui que trust." Kingsbury v. Chapin, 196 Mass. 533; 82 N. E. 700. "The transfers take place necessarily at the moment of death, for the will on the one hand and the intestate laws on the other operate and speak from that date." Matter of Seaman, 147 N. Y. 69; 41 N. E. 401. Matter of Abraham, 151 App. Div. 441; 135 Supp. 891. The effect of the rule has been strikingly illustrated in two cases in New York. In Matter of Dreyfous, 18 Supp. 767, 28 Abb. N. C. 27, the decedent died on the same day that the amendment of 1891, chapter 215, was signed by the governor, but death occurred a few hours before the signature. It was held that the amendment did not apply. On the other hand, where it was stipulated that death occurred on the same day the amendment was signed by the governor, but a few hours after the signature, it was held that the amendment applied. Matter of Lane, 157 App. Div. 694; 142 Supp. 788. It is therefore important that the governor or his secretary make a memorandum of the hour the act was signed and it is the practice of New York executives to do so. 1. Vested Right of the State. The legislature of California sought to exempt a bequest to Leland Stanford university by the will of its founder; but the court held that the right of the state to the tax vested at Stanford's death and could not be given away. It said: "It is only by virtue of the statute that an heir is entitled to receive any of his ancestor's estate; and the legislature can provide that the whole or only a portion shall go to the heirs or other beneficiaries upon the death of the ancestor. This being so, and the legislature in this case having determined that 95 per cent of the decedent's estate may go to his heirs, and that 5 per cent be retained by the state, it is too clear for argument that this 5 per cent vested in the state at the same time that the other 95 per cent vested in the heirs." Stanford's Estate, 126 Cal. 112; 54 Pac. 259; 58 Pac. 462. Its The result of this doctrine was strikingly illustrated in the recent case of National Safe Deposit Co. v. Stead, 250 Ill. 284; 95 N. E. 973, where the right of the state to inspect the contents of a decedent's safe deposit box was challenged. In sustaining the right the court reasoned thus: The relation between a safe deposit company and the lessee of one of its boxes is that of bailor and bailee. duty is to deliver the property on the death of the lessee. The right to succeed to the property is purely statutory. The inheritance tax is on the right to succeed to property and not on the property. Therefore under the tax, the state has a vested financial right in the estate of the decedent, and therefore it has a right to know what property is in the safe deposit box. Another apt illustration is afforded by Matter of White, 208 N. Y. 64; 101 N. E. 793. Here the testator died in March, 1908, leaving a life estate to a grandson with remainder to an exempt charity. The grandson died in November, 1908, before the estate was distributed, and the Appellate Division held that the actual duration of the life tenant's life was the measure of its value. But the Court of Appeals applied the doctrine that the tax was on the transfer and that the transfer took place at the death of the testator. At the date of that death the grandson's expectation of life was about 35 years, and the court held that the value of the life estate was to be determined, not by the actual duration, but the theoretical expectation of life. The court said at page 67: "The true test by which the tax is to be measured is the value of the interest or estate transferred at the time of the transfer thereof. The interest of the life beneficiary accrued on the death of the |