railroad transportation network. By virtue of manner the freight traffic they are offered. Locks and Dam 26 is recognized as the key critical intersection on the inland waterway system. All traffic from the Upper Mississippi and Illinois rivers bound for the Missouri, the Ohio, or the Lower Mississippi rivers must pass through Locks and Dam 26. Conversely, all traffic from the Missouri, the Ohio, or the Lower Mississippi bound for the Upper Mississippi or Illinois rivers must pass through the facility. It is not an overstatement to say that Locks and Dam 26 is the gateway for all water commerce into and out of America's "breadbasket" and into and out of the Mississippi Basin industrial heartland. In the transportation of bulk commodities, the waterways have inherent advantages over rail transport, the principal advantage being that most bulk commodities over most distances can be moved on the water at rates substantially Less than by rail. Waterway transportation also has advantages over rail in that it is safer, more energy efficient, and causes less ollution. . In a study done in 1974, the Arthur D. Little Company analyzed the shipment of ten hazardous materials by rail and by barge and concluded that, for a majority of the ten commodities analyzed, rail shipments resulted in the highest relative hazard to both life and to property. A National Transportation Safety Board Report (No. NTSB-STS-71-4) dated 18 August 1971 concluded that the fatality rates between 1963 and 1968 were approximately eight times greater in rail transportation than in barge transportation. In studies of comparative energy efficiency of the two modes, most analysts have concluded that barge transportation is more energy efficient. In studies which compute annual system-wide energy efficiency, the waterway mode is shown as being approximately fifty percent more energy efficient than rail. Rail traffic generates considerably higher noise and air pollution than does waterway traffic, and this is environmentally damaging because rail lines go through areas of high population density. The need to replace Locks and Dam 26 with a facility of larger capacity was recognized by Congress itself as long ago as 1970, when Congress appropriated money for designing a replacement. Extensive prior studies and reports by the Army Corps of Engineers dating back to 1968 provided a justification for these early Congressional appropriations. After hearings additional sums were appropriated between 1971 and 1973 for further design and engineering. After further hearings before both the House and Senate Public Works Subcommittees of the Committees on Appropriations, Congress, in 1974, appropriated over $22 million to begin construction on a new facility with two 1200-foot locks. Because, however, a preliminary injunction was issued by the District Court for the District of Columbia on 6 September 1974, construction on the project was halted before it even began. Since then, the matter has been before the Congress several times in one form or another, culminating last year in extensive hearings before this Subcommittee, but resulting finally in the waning days of the last Congress in no action being taken because the replacement proposal had been coupled with the imposition of "user charges" and time did not permit the issues to be uncoupled and voted on separately. Three irretrievable years have thus been lost. Since it will take at least 8 years before traffic could use the replacement facility, the crisis of delay and congestion that we foresee occurring at Locks and Dam 26 in the early to mid-1980s cannot now be avoided. Catastrophic economic and transportation crises in the mid- to late-1980s can be averted, however, if Congress acts now. All of this analysis, study and consideration of Locks and Dam 26 has now consumed almost ten years, and has produced a vast amount of data and information relating to the economic, environmental and engineering aspects of the problem. A look at only a partial list of the written materials on Locks and Dam 26 generated in the last two years will illustrate the extent to which the project has been subjected to in-depth analysis, review and critique: (1) Final Environmental Statement, Locks and Dam 26, Advisory Report of the Department of Transportation (3) Alton Locks and Dam: A Review of the Evidence, (4) (5) (6) (7) Staff Working Paper, Congressional Budget Office, Locks and Dam 26, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Water Resources of the Committee on Public Works, United States Senate, June 17, 22, 24, 28, and July 22, 1976. Evaluation of Proposals for Rehabilitation of Locks and Dam 26, prepared for the U.S. General Accounting Office, November 1976. The Replacement of Alton Locks and Dam 26 (Single 1200' Lock Proposal), An Interim Report of the U.S. Department of Transportation to the Subcommittee on Water Resources of the Senate Public Works Committee, March 1977. Evaluation of Operational Improvements at Locks (8) Locks and Dam No. 26, A Summary Analysis of Sverdrup & Parcel and Associates, Inc., Engineers-Architects-Planners, St. Louis, It would appear then that the time has come to reach a decision on replacing Locks and Dam 26. |