denying a discharge; and (3) from a judgment allowing' or rejecting a debt or claim of five hundred dollars or over. Such appeal shall be taken within ten days after the judgment appealed from has been rendered, and may be heard and determined by the appellate court in term or vacation, as the case may be.

1Under the former act, it was held that only the trustee could take an appeal from a decision allowing a claim (In re Troy Woolen Co., 9 Blatch. 191; s. c. 6 B. R. 16). That decision, however, was under a statute which expressly provided that only the trustee [there called assignee] could take such appeal (Act 1867, 28). The present Act does not so limit the appeal, and while it is silent on the subject, a fair inference would be that any party to the proceeding, whose interests have been injuriously affected by the decision. may appeal therefrom. This view has one decision in its support (In re Roche [C. C. A.], 101 Fed. Rep. 956), though another is opposed to it (Chatfield et al. v. Õ'Dwyer et al. [C. C. A.], 101 Fed. Rep. 797). In another decision, though involving the right of an intervening creditor to appeal from an adjudication, the court used language to the effect that any creditor affected by any order or decree was entitled to appeal (In re Meyer [C. C. A.], 98 Fed. Rep. 976).

The appeal is not confined to the allowance or rejection of creditor's claims. It lies from the allowance of a fee allowed the attorney for the petitioning creditors, when it amounts to $500 or more (In re Curtis et al. [C. C. A.], 100 Fed. Rep. 784), and from the allowance or rejection of a lien, asserted in proving a claim (Courier-Journal Job-Printing Co. v. Schaefer-Meyer Brewing Co. [C. C. A.], 101 Fed. Rep. 699).

"The appeal must be taken within ten days after the decree of the district court. It is not enough that it be allowed, but the prayer for the appeal, its allowance, the citation and service thereon as well as the bond must be filed within the time in the district court (Norcross v. Nare & McCoral Mercantile Co. et al. [C. C. A.], 101 Fed. Rep. 796). The time prescribed is jurisdictional, and unless the appeal is taken within it, the appellate court acquires no jurisdiction (Sedgwick v. Fridenberg, 11 Blatch. 77; Hawkins v. Hastings, 1 Dill. 453; Wood v. Bailey, 21 Wall. 640; s. c. 12 B. R. 132; York v. Hoover, 4 B. R. 479; s. c. 1 Abb. C. C. 503). The district court, however, may in its discretion, review the decree, thereby enabling an appeal to be taken within the statutory time (Stickney v. Wilt, II B. R. 97; s. C. 23 Wall. 150). The review on appeal contemplates a consideration of issues of fact and law (Simonson v. Sinsheimer et al. [C C. A], 100 Fed. Rep. 426; Courier-Journal Job-Printing Co. v. Schaefer-Meyer Brewing Co. [C. C. A.], 101 Fed. Rep. 699).

Where an appeal was taken on an interlocutory order, not falling within the classes of this section, it was treated as a petition for review pursuant to 2246, the court remarking that its treatment was not intended as a future precedent (In re Russell et al. [C. C. A.], 101 Fed Rep. 248). Ordinarily, the appeal would fall to the lot of the trustee, he being the representative of the creditors. He is not the representative of any particular creditor, however, and if he refused to act, the interest of the creditor injuriously affected by the decision would be jeopardized unless he was at liberty to take the appeal. There is no reason why a creditor should not have this privilege for he is as much a party to the proceedings as the trustee (Marsh v. Armstrong, 20 Minn. 81; s. c. 11 B. R. 125).

b From any final decision of a court of appeals, allowing or rejecting a claim' under this act, an appeal may be had under such rules and within such time as may be prescribed by the Supreme Court of the United States, in the following cases and no other :

1. Where the amount in controversy exceeds the sum of two thousand dollars, and the question involved is one which might have been taken on appeal or writ of error from the highest court of a State to the Supreme Court of the United States; or

2. Where some Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States shall certify that in his opinion the determination of the question or questions involved in the allowance or rejection of such claim is essential to a uniform construction of this act throughout the United States.

c Trustees shall not be required to give bond when they take appeals or sue out writs of error.

This is the only instance under this statute in which an appeal to the supreme court will lie-allowance or rejection of a claim. It has been said that it is within the power of Congress to place such limitations upon appeals as it may deem proper (Ex p. Christy, 3 How. U. S. 292) Ordinarily that is true; but as a general proposition, it does not seem to be sound. A bankruptcy law is an extraordinary one so much so that the privilege of enacting such laws is denied every State in the Union, and is only conferred upon Congress under certain definite constitutional limitations. To be valid every law enacted upon the subject of bankruptcy must be uniform throughout the United States (U. S. Const., Art. 1, 88). This means that the law must be established and put into force in every State and Territory of the Union (Sturges v. Friedlander, 11 B. R. 21), and in every State and Territory it must operate the same (In re Silverman, 4 B. R. 523; in re Reiman & Friedlander, 11 B. R. 21; Leidigh Carriage Co. v. Stengel [C. C. A.], 1 N. B. News, 296 387; s. c. 95 Fed. Rep. 637). A petitioner who in one State or Territory is adjudged a bankrupt, discharged from his debts, or refused a discharge, under the same state of facts, in any other State or Territory should be respectively adjudged a bankrupt, discharged from his debts, or refused a discharge. That would be a uniform operation. If such condition cannot be realized, the law would not be uniform for the reason that it did not operate uniformly. The various judicial circuits may be divided in conclusions upon the same state of facts. They have been so divided under every former act and there is no reason to expect entire harmony under the present statute, for the justices of the different circuits are much like the members of a jury-if they reach different conclusions they will entertain them until brought into harmony by the opinion of a court uniformly construing the act, with which each circuit must abide. This end is not possible under the present statute, since there is no such court to which the litigants of the various districts may resort, except in the one instance of the allowance or rejection of a claim, and then only in special cases.

d Controversies may be certified to the Supreme Court of the United States from other courts of the United States, and the former court may exercise jurisdiction thereof and issue writs of certiorari pursuant to the provisions of the United States laws now in force or such as may be hereafter enacted.

SEC. 26. Arbitration of Controversies.-a The trustee may, pursuant to the direction of the court, submit to arbitration any controversy arising in the settlement of the estate.

b Three arbitrators shall be chosen by mutual consent, or one by the trustee, one by the other party to the controversy, and the third by the two so chosen, or if they fail to agree in five days after their appointment the court shall appoint the third arbitrator.

c The written finding of the arbitrators, or a majority of them, as to the issues presented, may be filed in court and shall have like force and effect as the verdict of a jury.2

SEC. 27. Compromises.—a The trustee may, with the approval of the court, compromise any controversy arising in the administration of the estate upon such terms as he may deem for the best interests of the estate.

SEC. 28. Designation of Newspapers.-a Courts of bankruptcy shall by order designate a newspaper published within their respective territorial districts, and in the county in which the bankrupt resides or the major part of his property is situated, in which notices required to be published by this act and orders which the court may direct to be published shall be inserted. Any court may in a par

1See Rule XXXIII as to arbitrations.

"The finding under this paragraph may be set aside or adjudged upon by the court in like manner as a verdict would be. If the arbitrators are not chosen in strict conformity with the provisions of the preceding paragraph, the finding will be set aside, it being irregular for one of the arbitrators to be chosen by the trustee, one by the other party and the third agreed upon by the two contending parties (In re McLam [D. C.], 97 Fed. Rep. 922).

The approval of the court must be obtained in each case, the creditors not having authority to direct the trustee in the matter (In re Dibblee, 3 Ben. 354).

ticular case, for the convenience of parties in interest, designate some additional newspaper in which notices and orders in such case shall be published.

SEC. 29. Offenses.-a A person shall be punished by imprisonment for a period not to exceed five years, upon conviction of the offense of having knowingly and fraudulently appropriated to his own use, embezzled, spent, or unlawfully transferred any property or secreted or destroyed any document' belonging to a bankrupt estate which came into his charge as trustee.

b A person shall be punished by imprisonment for a period not to exceed two years, upon conviction of the offense of having knowingly and fraudulently (1) concealed while a bankrupt, or after his discharge, from his trustee any of the property belonging to his estate in bankruptcy; or (2) made a false oath3 or account in, or in relation to,

1A document under the definition in this act is any book, deed, or instrument in writing (1 [13]).

2Conceal" includes secrete, falsify and mutilate (1 [22]). Before a bankrupt can be convicted of concealing assets, it must first be shown by competent evidence that he was possessed of the property, or that it existed in trust for his use at the time of filing the petition, the burden being on those preferring the charge, and the bankrupt being at liberty to prove, in denial, any facts tending to show that if property was concealed within the meaning of the act, it was without fault on his part and inadvertently and not intentionally done (In re Cornell [D. C.], 97 Fed. Rep. 29; in re Skinner [D. C.], 97 Fed. Rep. 190; in re Hyman [D. C.], 97 Fed. Rep. 195; in re Hirsch et al. [D. C.], 97 Fed. Rep. 571; in re Morrow [D. C.], 97 Fed. Rep. 574; in re O'Gara [D. C.], 97 Fed. Rep. 932; in re Freund [D. ̊C.], 98 Fed. Rep. 81; in re DeLeeuw [D. C.], 98 Fed. Rep. 408; in re McAdam [D. C.], 98 Fed. Rep. 409; in re Wood [D. C.], 98 Fed. Rep. 972; in re Ablowich et al. [D. C.], 99 Fed. Rep. 81), but when a large unaccountable shrinkage appears, together with a fraudulent failure to keep books, the offense will be considered as established (In re Cashman [D. C.], 103 Fed. Rep. 67).

The schedule required by 27(8) must be sworn to, and if one wilfully and fraudulently omits from it any material asset or debt, he may be subject to punishment therefor under this section (See U. S. v. Nichols, 4 McLean, 23). A bankrupt who omits items from his schedule under the advice of his attorney after fully and fairly submitting all the facts touching his property, is not guilty of perjury in so doing, there being no fraudulent intent (U. S. v. Conner, 3 McLean, 573). And this may be true even though he does not so submit the facts, for the oath, to be false, must be such as to amount to a knowing and fraudulent concealment of property from the trustee (In re Hirsch [D. C.], 96 Fed. Rep. 468; in re Dews [D. C.], 101 Fed. Rep. 549). A concealment arises if a bankrupt, in his schedule, falsely states that he is unable to find the books of account used in his business, and that he does not know where they are when in fact they are in the custody of

any proceeding in bankruptcy; (3) presented under oath any false claim for proof against the estate of a bankrupt, or used any such claim in composition personally or by agent, proxy, or attorney, or as agent, proxy, or attorney; or (4) received any material amount of property from a bankrupt after the filing of the petition, with intent to defeat this act; or (5) extorted or attempted to extort any money or property from any person as a consideration for acting or forbearing to act in bankruptcy proceedings.

c A person shall be punished by fine, not to exceed five hundred dollars, and forfeit his office, and the same shall thereupon become vacant, upon conviction of the offense of having knowingly (1) acted as a referee in a case in which he is directly or indirectly interested; or (2) purchased, while a referee, directly or indirectly, any property of the estate in bankruptcy of which he is referee; or (3) refused, while a referee or trustee, to permit a reasonable opportunity for the inspection of the accounts relating to the affairs of, and the papers and records of, estates in his charge by parties in interest when directed by the court so to do.

one of his creditors, where he knows them to be and where he has access to them (In re Kamsler [D. C.], 97 Fed. Rep. 194). One is not guilty of making a false oath who makes an affidavit that he cannot obtain the sum required for filing fees, though friends would have advanced the amount if requested, the bankrupt not being required to solicit gifts or loans from his friends for the purpose of paying the filing fees, to pay the same out of his exemptions, or out of money earned by him after the filing of the petition (Sellers v. Bell [C. C. A.], 94 Fed. Rep. 801), nor for false testimony given in a State court under an insolvency proceeding, such testimony having been transcribed and filed with the referee by stipulation of the attorneys in lieu of an examination, the bankrupt not being a party to the agreement that it should be treated as evidence in the bankruptcy proceedings (In re Goldsmith [D. C.] 101 Fed. Rep. 570). Nor is one who transfers property to his wife, more than four months before filing his petition, guilty of making a false oath in swearing to a schedule in which he states that he has no property, the transfer being valid as to the bankrupt (In re Crenshaw [D. C.], 95 Fed. Rep. 632). A bankrupt, however, who has in his possession, at the time of filing his petition, money paid to him under a policy of accident insurance, is guilty of making a false oath in stating that he has no cash in hand (In re Roy [D. C.], 96 Fed. Rep. 400). But to charge one with a false oath, the opposing creditor must set out a full and clear statement of the facts, such general charges as "withheld property from his creditors" not being sufficient (In re Hirsch [D. C.], 96 Fed. Rep. 468). See also 7(9) and notes thereto relative to false swearing by persons being examined in bankruptcy cases.