g A certified copy of an order confirming a composition shall constitute evidence of the revesting of the title of his property in the bankrupt, and if recorded shall impart the same notice that a deed from the trustee to the bankrupt if recorded would impart.

SEC. 22. Reference of Cases after Adjudication.— a After a person has been adjudged a bankrupt the judge may cause the trustee to proceed with the administration of the estate, or refer it (1) generally to the referee or specially with only limited authority to act in the premises or to consider and report upon specified issues; or (2) to any referee within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, if the convenience of parties in interest will be served thereby, or for cause, or if the bankrupt does not do business, reside, or have his domicile in the district.

b The judge may, at any time, for the convenience of parties or for cause, transfer a case from one referee to another.

SEC. 23. Jurisdiction of United States and State Courts.-a The United States circuit courts shall have jurisdiction of all controversies at law and in equity, as distinguished from proceedings in bankruptcy, between trustees as such and adverse claimants' concerning the

1Attaching creditors do not occupy the position of adverse claimants in such sense as to deprive the bankruptcy court of jurisdiction and necessitate proceedings against them by bills in equity or other plenary process (Bear et al. v. Chase [C. Č. A.], 99 Fed. Rep. 920). A controversy between the trustee and adverse claimants must have (1) respect to some property or rights of property of the bankrupt transferable to or vested in the trustee, (2) the suit, whether in law or equity, must be in the name of one of the parties described in this section and (3) against the other. "All these three conditions must concur to give jurisdiction" (Morgan v. Thornhill, 11 Wall. 65; s. c. 5 B. R. 1; Knight v. Cheney, 5 B. R. 305). In view of these requirements, a landlord, whose rent is over-due, cannot bring ejectment proceedings in a State court against the bankrupt or his representative after adjudication when such proceedings will injure the general creditors. He must seek his remedy in the bankruptcy court (In re Chambers, Calder and Co. [D. C.], 98 Fed. Rep. 865). It has been said that one who is a debtor to the bankrupt's estate and resists the collection of a debt does not have an "adverse claim," an adverse party not necessarily being a party having an adverse claim (Bachman v. Packard, 7 B. R. 353; s. c. 2 Saw. 264), but the United States Supreme Court says he has (Eyster v. Gaff, 91 U. S. 521). The claim need not be to the absolute property;

property acquired or claimed by the trustees, in the same manner and to the same extent only as though bankruptcy proceedings had not been instituted and such controversies had been between the bankrupts and such adverse claim

ants.

b Suits by the trustee shall only be brought or prosecuted in the courts where the bankrupt, whose estate is being administered by such trustee, might have brought or prosecuted them if proceedings in bankruptcy had not

it is sufficient if it relates to a mere lien, the controversy being one for possession (Marshall v. Knox, 16 Wall. 551; s. c. 8 B. R. 97), or a fund, title to which is claimed by the trustee and adverse party (Smith v. Mason, 14 Wall. 419; s. c. 6 B. R. 1; Burbank v. Bigelow, 92 U. S. 179). The object of the provision under consideration is to prevent the bankruptcy court summarily determining disputes touching the title and possession of property by making strangers parties to the bankrupt proceedings. In view of this, the trustee cannot take possession of mortgaged goods in the hands of the mortgagees before bankruptcy proceedings were begun, for to do so would be to summarily bring strangers before the court of bankruptcy and determine rights which they are entitled to have settled in other courts (In re Buntrock Clothing Co. [D. C.], 1 N. B. News, 291; s. C. 92 Fed. Rep. 886, citing Yestman v. Savings Inst., 95 U. S. 764). Nor can he take possession of property in the hands of strangers however they became possessed of it, if held adversely, on summary process (In re Cohn [D. C.], 98 Fed. Rep. 75). It does not, however, prevent the bankruptcy court summarily enjoining strangers from interfering with or selling the property of the bankrupt till the dispute is settled (In re Ulrich, 6 Ben. 483; s. c. 8 B. R. 15), though to warrant the bankruptcy court to intervene with its restraining power, the strangers must be made parties to the proceedings (In re Ogles [D. C.], 1 N. B. News, 326; s. c. 93 Fed. Rep. 426), which can only be done in involuntary proceedings. When a State law provides that the surplus of an income accruing to the beneficiary under a will shall be liable to claims of creditors, the same will constitute assets of a bankrupt's estate, and may be reduced to the possession of the trustee by summary proceedings in the court of bankruptcy (In re Baudouine [D. C.] 96 Fed. Rep. 536). Yet, if the property in dispute is exempt, and has been set apart by the trustee, the bankruptcy court can exercise no further jurisdiction thereover either to defend such property from adverse claims or enforce liens upon it (In re Grimes [D. C.], 96 Fed. Rep. 529). See §2(6) and note as to jurisdiction over parties and strangers.

As between the trustee and adverse claimants, the State courts retain jurisdiction as fully as though no bankruptcy law existed, except, perhaps, as to actions of replevin when brought to divest the trustee of possession of property in his hands (In re Russell et al. [C. C. A.], 101 Fed. Rep. 248). "The debtor of a bankrupt, or the man who contests the right to real or personal property with him, loses none of his rights by the bankruptcy of his adversary. The same courts remain open to him in such contests, and the statute has not divested those courts of jurisdiction in such actions" (Chattanooga Nat. Bank v. Rome Iron Co. et al. [C. C.], 99 Fed. Rep. 82; Eyster v. Gaff [Supreme Court], 91 U. S. 521, citing Smith v. Mason, 14 Wall. 419; s. c 6 B. R. 1; Marshall v. Knox, 16 Wall. 551; s. c. 8 B. R. 97; Mays v. Fritton, 20 Wall. 414; Doe v. Childress, 21 Wall. 642). It has been held, however, under the present act, that where one brings an action

been instituted, unless by consent of the proposed defend

ant.'

in a State court, without leave of the bankruptcy court, to contest the ownership of property which has been taken possession of by the bankruptcy court, the latter court will enjoin such proceedings in the former (Keegan v. King [D. C.], 96 Fed. Rep. 758), though it will not interfere when the action regarding such property is trespass or trover (In re Russell et al. [C. C. A.], 101 Fed. Rep. 248).

When a State and a bankruptcy court have concurrent jurisdiction, that court which first acquires jurisdiction should retain it; and if it has in its possession, through its officers, by virtue of an attachment, replevin, execution or other process, property which under the bankruptcy act passes to the trustee, the latter should apply to the court having originally acquired jurisdiction for its possession (Johnson v. Bishop, 8 B. R. 533; s. c. Wool. 324; Hayne v. Lucas, 10 Pet. 400; Peck v. Jenness, 7 How. 612; Pullman v. Osborne, 17 How. 471; Taylor v. Carryl, 20 How. 583; The Oliver Jordan, 2 Curt. C. C. 414; in re Fulton, 1 Paine's C. C. 620; Freeman v. Howe, 24 How. 450; ex p. Robinson, 6 McLean, 355; ex p. Dorr, 3 How. 103; Buck v. Colbath, 3 Wall. 334), or for leave to be made a party to such suit and the possession of the bankrupt's share, if any, after the termination of the same (In re Gerdes [D. C.], 102 Fed. Rep. 318). The trustee is bound by the determination of the court after having been made a party and entered his appearance (In re Van Alstyne [D. C.], 100 Fed. Rep. 929. See also §116 and notes). Should a decree be fraudulently entered in a State court, the bankruptcy court will restrain proceedings thereunder, even after the bankruptcy proceedings have been terminated (Southern Loan and Trust Co. v. Benbow [D. C.], 96 Fed. Rep. 514).

1A district court in which bankruptcy proceedings have been commenced and are pending has no jurisdiction to entertain a suit by the trustee in bankruptcy against a person holding, and claiming as his own, property alleged to have been conveyed to him by the bankrupt in fraud of his creditors, unless the proposed defendant consents to such jurisdiction (Bardes v. F. N. Bank of Hawarden [U. S. Sup. Ct.], 20 Sup. Ct. Reporter, 1000; Mitchell v. McClure et al. [U. S. Sup. Ct.], 20 Sup. Ct. Reporter, 1000; s. c. [D. C.], 91 Fed. Rep. 621; Heath v. Shaffer [D. C.], 93 Fed. Rep. 647; Burnett v. Mercantile Co. [D. C.], 91 Fed. Rep. 365; Camp v. Zellars [C. C. A.], 94 Fed. Rep. 799; s. c. 36 C. C. A., 501; Goodier v. Barnes [C. C.], 94 Fed. Rep. 798; Hicks v. Knost [D. C.], 94 Fed. Rep. 625; in re Baudouine [C. C. A.], 101 Fed Rep. 574; Hill v. Kincell et al. [C. C. A.], 102 Fed. Rep. 301; in re San Gabriel Sanitorium Co. [C. C. A.], 102 Fed. Rep. 310). A number of courts have held the contrary of the rule just stated (in re Woodbury et al. [D. C.], 98 Fed. Rep. 833; Carter v. Hobb [D. C.], 92 Fed. Rep. 594; Perkins v. McCauley [D. C.], 98 Fed. Rep. 286; Shutts v. F. N. Bank [D. C.], 98 Fed. Rep. 705; in re Hammond [D C.], 98 Fed. Rep. 845; Pepperdine v. Headley et al. [D. C.], 98 Fed. Rep. 863; Norcross v. Nathan et al. [D. C.], 99 Fed. Rep. 414; Lehman v. Crosby et al. [D. C.], 99 Fed. Rep. 502; Cox v. Wall et al. [D. C.], 99 Fed. Rep. 546; s. c. [C. C. A.], 101 Fed. Rep. 403; in re Sievers [D. C.], 91 Fed. Rep. 366; in re Smith [D. C.], 92 Fed. Rep. 135; in re Richard [D. C.], 94 Fed. Rep. 633; in re Newberry [D. C.], 97 Fed. Rep. 24; Robinson v. White [D. C.], 97 Fed. Rep. 33). These decisions were before the opinion of the Supreme Court in Bardes v. F. N. Bank of Hawarden, the holding in which settles the pointon which the courts had been at such variance. A few courts also held that the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy, the circuit and the State courts was concurrent (Louisville Trust Co. v. Marx et al. [D. C.], 98 Fed. Rep 456; Robinson v. White [D. C.], 97 Fed Rep. 33), but these decisions, as those last cited, lose their force as authority by the holding of

c The United States circuit court shall have concurrent jurisdiction with the courts of bankruptcy, within their respective territorial limits, of the offenses enumerated in this act.1

SEC. 24. Jurisdiction of Appellate Courts.—a The Supreme Court of the United States, the circuit courts of appeals of the United States, and the supreme courts of the Territories, in vacation in chambers and during their respective terms, as now or as they may be hereafter held, are hereby invested with appellate jurisdiction of controversies arising in bankruptcy proceedings from the courts of bankruptcy from which they have appellate jurisdiction in other cases. The Supreme Court of the United States shall exercise a like jurisdiction from courts of bankruptcy not within any organized circuit of the United States and from the supreme court of the District of Columbia.

b The several circuit courts of appeal shall have jurisdiction in equity, either interlocutory or final, to superintend and revise in matter of law the proceedings of the several inferior courts of bankruptcy within their jurisdiction." Such power shall be exercised on due

the supreme court in the above cases. The consent of the proposed defendant as referred to in the supreme court decisions and as specified in the paragraph of the act under discussion, will be presumed to have been given by one who submits without objection to the jurisdiction of a court in which he could not properly be sued (In re Connolly [D. C.], 100 Fed. Rep. 620).

1The United States circuit court has no jurisdiction to set aside a fraudulent transfer by the bankrupt at the suit of the trustee, the "offenses enumerated in this act" refering to the "crimes" described in §29 (Goodier v. Barnes et al. [D. C.], I N. B. News, 383; s. c. 94 Fed. Rep. 798).

2Under the provisions of this paragraph, all questions of law are summarily reviewable irrespective of whether they arose in actions at law or in equity (In re York & Hoover, 1 Abb. C. C., 503; s. c. 4 B. R. 479), though they must have arisen in the cause and relate to some action taken or order made in the course of a proceeding in bankruptcy (In re Jacobs [C. C. A.], 99 Fed. Rep. 539). In a review under this paragraph, questions of fact will not be considered (In re Rosser [C. C. A.], 101 Fed. Rep. 562; Courier-Journal Job- Printing Co. v. SchaeferMeyer Brewing Co. [C. C. A.], 101 Fed Rep. 699; in re Eggert [C. C. A.], 102 Fed. Rep. 735), though the review of questions of law, while summary, is as extensive as may be had by a formal appeal under $25a in so far as the question of law arising in strictly bankrupt proceedings is concerned; but questions of fact or questions of law arising in other than strictly bankrupt proceedings will not be considered (In re Purvine [C. C. A.], 96 Fed. Rep. 192; in re Richards [C. C. A.], 96 Fed.

notice' and petition2 by any party aggrieved.

SEC. 25. Appeals and Writs of Error.3—a That appeals, as in equity cases, may be taken in bankruptcy proceedings from the courts of bankruptcy to the circuit court of appeals of the United States, and to the supreme court of the Territories, in the following cases, to wit, (1) from a judgment adjudging or refusing to adjudge the defendant a bankrupt; (2) from a judgment granting or

Rep. 935; in re Good [C. C. A.], 99 Fed. Rep. 389; in re Jacobs [C. C. A.], 99 Fed. Rep 539). If doubt exists as to whether one's remedy is under this or the next section, he may appeal and file a petition for review, and the matter complained of may be determined in either or both proceedings (In re Derby [C. C. A.], 102 Fed. Rep. 808). When a case has been once before the appellate court and reviewed, under the provisions of this section, the decision becomes the law of the case, and the same question will not be again reviewed on a subsequent appeal or writ of error under §25 (Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n v. Beatty [C. C. A.], 93 Fed. Rep 747). An order of the district court will not be disturbed if an abuse of discretion does not appear. Such abuse is not present in an order fining the president of a corporation, not a party to the bankrupt proceedings, for refusing to produce the books of the corporation for examination, the legitimate objects of an examination being to discover assets or grounds for opposing a discharge (In re Horgan [C. C. A.], 98 Fed. Rep. 414).

Where a petition for review is filed during the term at which the order sought to be reviewed is made, the circuit or district court retains jurisdiction to act upon such petition at a succeeding term, and the time for appeal does not begin to run until such action is taken, any time within six months after which the petition for review may be filed in the circuit court of appeals (In re Derby [C. C. A.], 102 Fed. Rep 808).

For the purpose of review, the notice may be served on the attorney who appears of record in the proceedings (Ala. & Chat. R. R. Co. v. Jones, 5 B. R 97). If such notice is not followed up by a prosecution of the appeal, it will be dismissed (In re Hawry & Co. [D. C.], 1 N. B. News, 398).

"The petition should be filed without unreasonable delay and within the period within which an appeal may be taken (Bank v. Cooper, 20 Wall. 171; Littlefield v. Del. & H. Canal Co., 4 B R. 257), though it has been considered as within due time when filed before the order complained of has been carried into execution (In re Casey, 10 Blatch. 376; s c 8 B. R. 71). It should set out the alleged error and enough of the facts to enable the appellate court to fully understand the questions of law (In re Casey, supra). The filing of the petition does not operate as a stay of proceedings, so that if this is desired, application therefor should be made to the circuit court, when a stay will be granted if it appears from the showing that applicant would otherwise suffer further material injury (In re Oregon Bulletin Co., 3 Saw. 529; s. c. 14 B. R. 394).

Relating to appeals, see Rule XXXVI, and as to review by the judge, Rule XXVII. The appeal provided for in this section is open to all parties to the bankruptcy proceedings (In re Meyer et al. [C. C. A.], 98 Fed. Rep. 976), and all questions of law, whether arising in strictly bankrupt proceedings or not, as well as all questions of fact, will be reviewed (In re Richards [C. C. A.], 96 Fed. Rep. 935; in re Good [C. C. A.], 99 Fed. Rep. 389; in re Jacobs [C. C. A.], 99 Fed. Rep. 539).