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Q. Allowing that his reply to you was only one rate, was anything said by him as to the different kinds of contracts you could get?— A. No, sir; he never said anything to me at all.

Q. Were you, or not, informed that you could get a contract under which the company would be liable as insurer, practically, and another kind of contract, under which they would not be liable for loss in case of fire?-A. No, sir.

Q. Did you have any information, or did you know that if you wanted to make a choice between these two, that you could do it? A. No, sir.

Messrs. Charles P. Cocke, William Wirt Howe, Walker B. Spencer, and John F. Dillon for defendant in error.

Mr. Justice McKenna, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court: It is well settled that the carrier may limit his common-law liability. York Mfg. Co. v. Illinois C. R. Co. 3 Wall. 107, 18 L. ed. 170. But it is urged that the contract must be upon a consideration other than the mere transportation of the property, and an "option*and opportunity must be given to the shipper to select under which, the commonlaw or limited liability, he will ship his goods."

If this means that a carrier must take no advantage of the shipper, or practice no deceit upon him, we agree. If it means that The cotton was in the possession of the the alternative must be actually presented Union Compress Company when destroyed, to the shipper by the carrier, we cannot to which company it had been delivered by agree. From the standpoint of the law the defendant to be compressed, and that com- relation between carrier and shipper is simpany had obtained insurance on it for the de- ple. Primarily the carrier's responsibility fendant, it being the custom of that company is that expressed in the common law, and to effect insurance for the benefit, and in the the shipper may insist upon the responsibil name of, each particular railroad compressity. But he may consent to a limitation of ing cotton at their press. The testimony of it, and this is the "option and opportunity" the destruction of the cotton is that the Un- which is offered to him. What other can be ion Compress Company's building and plat- necessary? There can be no limitation of forms in Texarkana, Texas, were destroyed liability without the assent of the shipper by fire September 19, 1900, in which the cot- (New Jersey Steam Nav. Co. v. Merchants' ton was destroyed with other cotton. Bank, 6 How. 344, 12 L. ed. 465), and there can be no stipulation for any exemption by a carrier which is not just and reasonable in the eye of the law. New York C. R. Co. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357, 21 L. ed. 627; Bank of Kentucky v. Adams, 93 U. S. 174, 23 L. ed. 872.

Plaintiff requested instructions of the court which embodied the following propositions:

1. A carrier cannot limit his common-law liability without consent of the shipper, for consideration given.

Inside of that limitation, the carrier may

2 The mere contract of shipment is not modify his responsibility by special contract such a consideration.

3. The condition usually, though not necessarily, is a reduced rate; but in such case both rates must be offered shipper, and be reasonable, and the shipper given a genuine freedom of choice in making his selection; and if the evidence satisfied the jury "there was no fair alternative or choice offered to

plaintiff by defendant as between two rates, under one of which defendant would be liable for the loss of said cotton by fire, and under the other of which he would not be so liable," the fire clause was not binding upon plaintiff, and the jury might "deal with such bill of lading as though it did not contain such clause or stipulation."

4. The burden of proving the reasonableness of the fire clause, and that plaintiff had a fair opportunity to refuse or accept it, rested upon the defendant.

with a shipper. A bill of lading limiting liability constitutes such a contract, and knowledge of the contents by the shipper will be presumed.

(2) It is again urged that there was no independent consideration for the exemption expressed in the bill of lading. This point was made in York Mfg. Co. v. Illinois C. R. Co. 3 Wall. 107, 18 L. ed. 170. In response it was said: "The second position is answered by the fact that there is no evidence that a consideration was not given for the stipulation. The company, probably, had rates of charges proportioned to the risks they assumed from the nature of the goods carried, and the exception of losses by fire must necessarily have affected the compensation demanded. Be this as it may, the consideration expressed was sufficient to support the entire contract made.”

In other words, the consideration expressed Messrs. W. S. Parkerson and B. K. Mil- in the bill of lading was sufficient to support ler for plaintiff in error. its stipulations. This effect is not averted

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Argued and submitted April 7, 8, 1904. De- Other Purposes,' approved March 3, 1891

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Stat. 1901, p. 547), authorizes a review by a circuit court of appeals of a judgment or order of a circuit court of the United States, finding a person, not a party to the suit, guilty of contempt for violation of an order of that court, made in such suit, and imposing a fine for such contempt. *"Third. Whether, if such review be sanctioned by law, a person so adjudged in contempt, and fined therefor, who is not a par-istration of justice. The moment the courts ty to the suit, can bring the matter to the circuit court of appeals by appeal.

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chiefly in interest in their conduct and particular act as belonging to either one of prosecution are the individuals whose these two classes. It may partake of the private rights and remedies they were insti- characteristics of both. A significant and tuted to protect or enforce. Thompson v. generally determinative feature is that the Pennsylvania R. Co. 48 N. J. Eq. 105, 108, act is by one party to a suit in disobedience 21 Atl. 182; Hendryx v. Fitzpatrick, 19 Fed. of a special order made in behalf of the 810; Ex parte Culliford, 8 Barn. & C. 220; other. Yet sometimes the disobedience may Rex v. Edwards, 9 Barn. & C. 652; People be of such a character and in such a manner ex rel. Munsell v. Oyer & Terminer Ct. 101 as to indicate a contempt of the court rathN. Y. 245, 247, 54 Am. Rep. 691, 4 N. E. er than a disregard of the rights of the ad259; Phillips v. Welch, 11 Nev. 187, 190; verse party. State v. Knight, 3 S. D. 509, 513, 44 Am. St. Rep. 809, 54 N. W. 412; People ex rel. Gaynor v. McKane, 78 Hun, 154, 160, 28 N. Y. Supp. 981; 4 Bl. Com. 285, 7 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 68. A criminal contempt involves no element of personal injury. It is directed against the power and dignity of the court, and private parties have little, if any, interest in the proceedings for its punishment. But if the contempt consists in the refusal of a party or a person to do an act which the court has ordered him to do for the benefit or the advantage of a party to a suit or action pending before it, and he is committed until he complies with the order, the commitment is in the nature of an exccution to enforce the judgment of the court, and the party in whose favor that judgment was rendered is the real party in interest in the proceedings." See also Rapalje, Contempts, § 21.

Doubtless the distinction referred to in this quotation is the cause of the difference in the rulings of various state courts as to the right of review. Manifestly, if one inside of a court room disturbs the order of proceedings, or is guilty of personal misconduct in the presence of the court, such action may properly be regarded as a contempt of court; yet it is not misconduct in which any individual suitor is specially interested. It is more like an ordinary crime which affects the public at large, and the criminal nature of the act is the dominant feature.

His

In the case at bar the controversy between the parties to the suit was settled by final decree, and from that decree, so far as appears, no appeal was taken. An appeal from it would not have brought up the proceeding against the petitioner, for he was not a party to the suit. Yet, being no party to the suit he was found guilty of an act in resistance of the order of the court. case, therefore, comes more fully within the punitive than the remedial class. It should be regarded like misconduct in a court room or disobedience of a subpoena, as among those acts primarily directed against the power of the court, and in that view of the case we pass to a consideration of the questions presented.

In Re Debs, 158 U. S. 564, 39 L. ed. 1092, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 900, a case of habeas corpus brought to review an order of the circuit court imprisoning for contempt, we said (p. 596, L. ed. p. 1106, Sup. Ct. Rep. p. 911):

"In brief, a court enforcing obedience to its orders by proceedings for contempt is not executing the criminal laws of the land, but only securing to suitors the rights which it has adjudged them entitled to."

And again, in summing up our conclusions (p. 599, L. ed. p. 1108, Sup. Ct. Rep. p. 912):

"That the proceeding by injunction is of a civil character, and may be enforced by proceedings in contempt; that such proceedings are not in execution of the criminal laws of the land; that the penalty for a violation of injunction is no substitute criminal offenses committed in the course of for, and no defense to, a prosecution for any

such violation."

On the other hand, if, in the progress of a suit, a party is ordered by the court to abstain from some action which is injurious to the rights of the adverse party, and he disobeys that order, he may also be guilty of contempt, but the personal injury to the party in whose favor the court has made the order gives a remedial character to the contempt proceeding. The punishment 13 to secure to the adverse party the right which the court has awarded to him. He is the one primarily interested, and if it should turn out, on appeal from the final decree in the case, that the original order was erroneous, there would, in most cases, be great propriety in setting aside the punishment which was imposed for disobeying an order to In the case of Ex parte Yates, 4 Johns. which the adverse party was not entitled. 318, 369, Chief Justice Kent, after review

At common law it was undoubted that no court reviewed the proceedings of another court in contempt matters. In Crosby's Case, 3 Wils. 188, Mr. Justice Blackstone said:

"The sole adjudication of contempts, and the punishment thereof, in any manner, belongs exclusively, and without interfering, to each respective court."

It may not be always easy to classify a'ing the English cases, and referring to the

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Case of Shaftsbury, 1 Mod. 144, concluded | sion of certain premises. Pending this suit as follows:

"The court, in that case, seem to have laid down a principle from which they never have departed, and which is essential to the due administration of justice. This principle, that every court, at least of the superior kind, in which great confidence is placed, must be the sole judge, in the last resort, of contempts arising therein, is more explicitly defined and more emphatically enforced in the two subsequent cases of Reg. v. Paty [2 Ld. Raym. 1105], and of Brass v. Crosby [3 Wils. 188]."

Without stopping to notice the decisions of the courts of the several states, whose decisions are more or less influenced by the statutes of those states, we turn to an examination of the rulings of this court in respect to the finality of contempt proceedings.

In Ex parte Kearney, 7 Wheat. 38, 5 L. ed. 391, a writ of habeas corpus was issued by this court in behalf of a party committed to jail by the circuit court of the district of Columbia for contempt in refusing to answer a question put to him on a trial. The application for a discharge was refused. The reasons therefor are disclosed by the following quotations from the opinion delivered by Mr. Justice Story (p. 42, L. ed. p. 392):

or.

the mayor of the city applied to a state court for an injunction restraining the company from rebuilding an inclosure of the premises which the city had destroyed, and the injunction was granted. At this time the city was the only party defendant in the circuit court, although service upon it had been made by delivering process to the maySubsequently the mayor was made a party defendant by a supplemental bill. A final decree was entered against the defendants, and, as a part thereof, was an order adjudging the mayor guilty of contempt in suing out the injunction in the state court, and imposing a fine therefor. Thereupon the case was brought to this court, and, among other things, the validity of the punishment for contempt was challenged, in respect to which we said (p. 392, L. ed. p. 357):

"The fine of $300 imposed upon the mayor is beyond our jurisdiction. Contempt of court is a specific criminal offense. The imposition of the fine was a judgment in a criminal case. That part of the decree is as distinct from the residue as if it were a judgment upon an indictment for perjury committed in a deposition read at the hearing. This court can take cognizance of a criminal case only upon a certificate of division in opinion."

"It is to be considered that this court Hayes v. Fischer, 102 U. S. 121, 26 L. ed. has no appellate jurisdiction confided to it 95, was a suit in equity to restrain the use in criminal cases, by the laws of the United of a patented device. An interlocutory inStates. It cannot entertain a writ of er- junction was granted. The defendant was ror, to revise the judgment of the circuit fined for contempt in violating this injunecourt, in any case where a party has been tion, and the entire amount of the fine orconvicted of a public offence. If, dered to be paid over to the plaintiff in rethen, this court cannot directly revise a imbursement. To reverse this order defendjudgment of the circuit court in a criminal ant sued out a writ of error. A motion to case, what reason is there to suppose that dismiss was sustained, Mr. Chief Justice it was intended to vest it with the author- Waite saying for the court (p. 122, L. ed. ity to do it indirectly? . . If this p. 96): were an application for a habeas corpus, after judgment on an indictment for an offense within the jurisdiction of the circuit court, it could hardly be maintained that this court could revise such a judgment, or the proceedings which led to it, or set it aside and discharge the prisoner. There is, in principle, no distinction be tween that case and the present; for when a court commits a party for a contempt, their adjudication is a conviction, and their commitment, in consequence, is execution; and so the law was settled, upon full deliberation, in the case of Brass Crosby, Lord Mayor of London, 3 Wils. 188."

New Orleans v. New York Mail 8. S. Co. 20 Wall. 387, 22 L. ed. 354, was a suit by the company in the circuit court of the United States for an injunction restraining the city from interfering with its *posses

"If the order complained of is to be treated as part of what was done in the original suit, it cannot be brought here for review by writ of error. Errors in equity suits can only be corrected in this court on appeal, and that after a final decree. order, if part of the proceedings in the suit, was interlocutory only.

This

"If the proceeding below, being for contempt, was independent of and separate from, the original suit, it cannot be re-examined here, either by writ of error or appeal. This was decided more than fifty years ago in Ex parte Kearney, 7 Wheat. 38, 5 L. ed. 391, and the rule then estab lished was followed as late as New Orleans v. New York Mail S. 8. Co. 20 Wall. 387, 22 L. ed. 354). It follows that we have no jurisdiction."

In Ex parte Fisk, a case of habeas corpus,

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