•161 (194 U. S. 141) W. S. KIRBY, Appt., The statute was construed not to import an However, in this case it is not necessary to invoke the statutes further than to show that, by the law in force since 1846, at least, such rights as the plaintiff claims, and which, as is shown by the evidence, he and his predecessors in title have been exercising for forty years, have been recognized as private property. Such is the view of the leading case, decided in 1858 and acquiesced in, we believe, ever since. Haalelea v. Montgomery, 2 Hawaiian R. 62, 66. In the present instance the plaintiff claims under a royal patent, admitted to have been effective as to whatever, by its true construction, it purported to convey. This patent describes the ahupuaa by metes and bounds, and then the granting clause goes on: "There is also attached to this land a fishing right in the adjoining sea, which is bounded as follows," again giving boundaries, and continuing: "The islands of Mokumoa, Mokuonini, and Mokuoco are a Appeal from circuit court jurisdiction of circuit court-amount in dispute. 1. 2. No pecuniary limit is imposed by the act of March 3, 1891 (26 Stat. at L. 827, chap. 517, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 549), upon the appellate jurisdiction over the Federal district or circuit courts, which is conferred by that act upon the Supreme Court of the United States and the circuit courts of ap peals. A matter in dispute exceeding the value of $2,000 is presented by a cross bill which seeks to recover a balance of $1,700 due on a contract for the exchange of soda fountain apparatus, where the original bill, which was dismissed on motion, complainant's own asked for the cancelation of his agreement to pay $2,025 in consideration of the exchange. 3. The jurisdiction of a Federal circuit court, once acquired on removal from a state court, cannot be devested by the dismissal of the bill on complainant's own motion after a cross bill has been filed, although the jurisdictional amount may no longer be in dispute. [No. 357.] A 25, 1904. PPEAL from the circuit court of the United States for the Northern District of Texas to review a decree granting the relief sought by a cross complaint after dismissal of the original bill on complainant's own motion. On motion to dismiss or af firm, Affirmed. part of Moanalua, and are included in the Submitted March 21, 1904. Decided April above area. ." The description of what is intended to be conveyed could not be plainer. But the habendum is "to have and to hold the above granted land," and it is said that, as the fishery of an overlord or konohiki, unlike the rights of tenants, did not pass as an incident of land, but must be distinctly granted, the fishery was not included in the patent. Haalelea v. Montgomery, 2 Hawaiian Rep. 62, 71. Again, we must avoid being deceived by a form of words. We assume that a mere grant of the ahupuaa without mention of the fishery would not convey the fishery. But it does not follow that any particular words are necessary to convey it when the intent is clear. When the description of the land granted says that there is incident to it a definite right of fishery, it does not matter whether the statement is techni cally accurate or not; it is enough that the grant is its own dictionary and explains that it means by "land" in the habendum, land and fishery as well. There is no possibility of mistaking the intent of the patent. It declares that intent plainly on its face. There is no technical rule which overrides the expressed intent, like that of the common law, which requires the mention of heirs in order to convey a fee. We are of opinion that the patent did what it was meant to do, and therefore that the plaintiff is entitled to prevail. Judgment reversed. Statement by Mr. Chief Justice Fuller: Kirby filed his first original amended pe tition in the district court of Dallas county, Texas, against the American Soda Fountain Company, averring that he was induced by false representations by defendant to agree to exchange his soda fountain apparatus for the soda fountain apparatus of defendant, and pay defendant $2,025 in addition, and signed a memorandum in relation thereto, which, however, plaintiff alleged did not con. tain all the terms of the contract; that the exchange was made, but defendant's soda fountain apparatus, instead of being superior in value by $2,025, was, as matter of fact, less by $2,500; and plaintiff prayed for the cancelation of the obligation to pay $2,025, for $2,500 damages, and for general relief. The original petition sought damages merely, and in the sum of $1,500. On application of defendant the cause was removed to the circuit court of the United States for the northern district of Texas. The case was entered in that court May 142 12, 1902, and on that day defendant filed its | therein, a decree pro confesso was rendered answer, denying all charges of fraud, and set- against him April 21. ting up the written contract between plain- On May 27, 1903, the court rendered a detiff and itself, which it alleged contained all cree on the cross bill, which recited the varithe terms of the agreement between them, ous proceedings; found the allegations of the whereby defendant agreed to manufacture cross complaint and exhibits to be true; that and ship to plaintiff, and plaintiff purchased | Kirby was justly indebted to the American of defendant, a certain soda fountain machine at the price of $3,219; and defendant agreed to take plaintiff's machine in part payment, at the sum of $1,194, leaving a balance of $2,025, which plaintiff agreed to pay, and which was secured by a mortgage lien on the property. That defendant manufactured and shipped the machine to plaintiff and set it up in his store, and fully complied with the contract, but plaintiff, after paying $325 on account of the $2,025, failed and refused to further comply with the contract or to pay anything more thereon. Soda Fountain Company in the sum of $1,700, with interest; and that a valid mortgage lien to secure that sum existed; and decreed payment of the amount within sixty days, and that, if not paid, the property should be sold and the proceeds applied, with judgment for deficiency, if any. An appeal from this decree was prayed and allowed, and the question of jurisdiction was certified. The case came on in this court on motions to dismiss or affirm. Mr. Joseph M. McCormick for appellant. Mr. John J. Weed for appellee. *Mr. Chief Justice Fuller delivered the opinion of the court: Defendant said plaintiff ought to take nothing by his suit, and prayed judgment for the sum of $1,700 and for foreclosure of its mortgage lien. Together with its answer defendant filed its cross complaint, setting up the facts in detail and praying for judg. ment in the sum of $1,700, and interest, and for a decree establishing its mortgage lien on the property, and for foreclosure and sale, and such further relief as equity might re-1901, p. 549] and might, therefore, have been quire. This case was brought directly to this court on a certificate of jurisdiction under § 5 of the judiciary act of March 3, 1891 [26 Stat. at L. 827, chap. 517, U. S. Comp. Stat. advanced under rule 32. The motions to dis Subpoena on the cross complaint was is- miss or affirın may be treated as equivalent sued and served May 13, 1902. June 20, 1902, plaintiff moved to transfer the cause to the law docket; and on that date the following order was entered of record: | "Complainant coming and asking that the original bill of complaint be dismissed without prejudice, and it appearing to the court that said request should be granted, it is therefore ordered that the original bill of complaint herein be and the same is hereby dismissed without prejudice to the right of the plaintiff to proceed further on the cause of action set forth in said bill hereafter as he may be advised. It is further ordered that the costs of the original bill and proceedings thereon herein be adjudged against complainant, for which execution may issue." July 24, 1902, plaintiff, as defendant in the cross complaint, filed his plea thereto, in which he averred that the original bill filed by him had been dismissed, and that the cross bill was not within the jurisdiction of the court because the amount sought to be recovered did not exceed $2,000, exclusive of interest and costs. February 13, 1903, the plea to the jurisdiction of the court was argued and overruled, and plaintiff, defendant in the cross bill, was ordered to file an answer to said cross bill on or before the rule day of the court occurring in April, 1903. No further answer or plea to the cross bill having been interposed by the defendant to submission under that rule, but as the motions were made, and the motion to dismiss was chiefly rested on the ground that the value of the matter in dispute was not suf ficient to give this court jurisdiction, we think it proper to say that "the act of 1891 nowhere imposes a pecuniary limit upon the appellate jurisdiction, either of this court or the circuit court of appeals, from a district or circuit court of the United States." The Paquete Habana, 175 U. S. 677, 683, 44 L ed. 320, 322, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 290, 293. On this appeal no question of error in matter of equity procedure in the retaining of the cross bill after the dismissal of the bill is open for consideration, but we do not intimate in the slightest degree that any error in that particular was committed. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Third Nat. Bank, 134 U. S. 276, 33 L. ed. 900, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 550; Dan. Ch. Pr. 5th ed. 1553, note; Bates Eq. Proc. § 386. The contention is that the circuit court had no jurisdiction as a court of the United States to proceed on the cross bill because of the lack of the prescribed jurisdictional amount. But we think the circuit court was right in rejecting this contention and in overruling the plea. In the first place, the whole record being considered, the value of the matter in dispute might well have been held to exceed $2. *144 000, exclusive of interest and costs. Stinson | conditions. Morgan v. Morgan, 2 Wheat. ▼. Dousman, 20 How. 461, 466, 15 L. ed. 966, 290, 4 L. ed. 242; Clarke v. Mathewson, 12 969; New England Mortg. Security Co. v. Pet. 165, 9 L. ed. 1041; Kanouse v. Martin, Gay, 145 U. S. 123, 131, 36 L. ed. 646, 649, 15 How. 198, 208, 14 L. ed. 660, 664; Rob12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 815; Shappirio v. Goldberg, erts v. Nelson, 8 Blatchf. 74, Fed. Cas. No. 192 U. S. 232, ante, p. 259, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 11,907; Cooke v. United States, 2 Wall. 218, 259; Lovell v. Cragin, 136 U. S. 130, 34 L. 17 L. ed. 755. ed. 372, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1024. In Morgan v. Morgan it was laid down by Chief Justice Marshall that the jurisdiction of the circuit court, having once vested between citizens of different states, could not be devested by a change of domicil of one of the parties, and his removal into the same state as the adverse party pendente lite. This was so ruled in Clarke v. Mathewson and other cases there cited. In Stinson v. Dousman, the suit was brought to recover something less than $500 as rent of a parcel of land under a written contract for the purchase of the land at $8,000, which provided that the covenantee should pay rent on failure to comply with sundry conditions prescribed, and defendant not only set up in his answer a defense to the claim for rent, but also sought a decree af- In Kanouse v. Martin, after petition to refirming the contract as outstanding. It was move had been filed and bond tendered, the objected in this court that the matter in dis-state court allowed the plaintiff to reduce pute was not of the value of $1,000, and that the matter in dispute to less than the juristherefore there was no jurisdiction. Mr. dictional amount, and went on with the case. Justice Campbell said: "The objection might be well founded, if this was to be regarded merely as an action at common law. But the equitable as well as the legal considerations involved in the cause are to be considered. The effect of the judgment is to adjust the legal and equitable claims of the parties to the subject of the suit. The subject of the suit is not merely the amount of rent claimed, but the title of the respective parties to the land under the contract. The contract shows that the matter in dispute was valued by the parties at $8,000. This was necessarily held to be erroneous, but the observations of Mr. Justice Curtis show that, in his opinion, the general rule to which we have referred also applied, and he cites Morgan v. Morgan and Clarke v. Mathewson. In Roberts v. Nelson the amount claimed was reduced after the case had been removed, and Mr. Justice Blatchford, then district judge, held that the jurisdiction of the court having once attached, no subsequent event could devest it. This action, when brought in the state ages for deceit. Defendant demurred to and answered the original petition. Plaintiff subsequently filed his amended petition seeking to be relieved of the obligation to pay $2,025, and damages in the sum of $2,500. The matter in dispute having thus been made to exceed the sum or value of $2,000, exclusive of interest and costs, defendant presented his petition and bond for removal, and the cause was thereupon removed. The jurisdiction thus acquired by the circuit court was not devested by plaintiff's subsequent action. In Cooke v. United States, Mr. Chief Jus We think this court has jurisdiction." The tice Chase said that "jurisdiction once accase is cited and considered in New England quired cannot be taken away by any change Mortg. Security Co. v. Gay and in Shap-in the value of the subject of controversy." pirio v. Goldberg. In Lowell v. Cragin, it was held as cor- court, was an action to recover $1,500 damrectly stated in the head notes: "When the matter set up in a cross bill is directly responsive to the averments in the bill, and is directly connected with the transactions which are set up in the bill as the gravamen of the plaintiff's case, the amount claimed in the cross bill may be taken into consideration in determining the jurisdiction of this court on appeal from a decree on the bill." In the present case the circuit court in its decree referred to the plaintiff's bill and the relief thereby sought, in connection with the cross bill, and, we think, was justified in doing this, as the record had not passed from under its control, and it was apparent that the decree on the cross bill disposed of the contention of plaintiff in respect of the cancelation of the contract. Taking the bill, defendant's answer, and the cross bill together, the jurisdictional amount was made out. In the second place, it is the general rule that when the jurisdiction of a circuit court of the United States has once attached it will not be ousted by subsequent change in the Decree affirmed. (194 U. S. 161) UNITED STATES, Petitioner, v. SING TUCK or King Do and Thirty-One Habeas corpus in Chinese exclusion cases. corpus with the refusal of the right of entry •146 166 States under any law or treaty now existing or hereafter made, the decision of the appropriate immigration or customs officers, if adverse to the admission of such alien, shall be final, unless *reversed on appeal to the Secretary of the Treasury." The jurisdiction of the Treasury Department was transferred to the Department of Commerce and Labor by the act of February 14, 1903 (32 Stat. at L. 825, chap. 552). It was held by the circuit court of appeals that the act of 1894 should Argued April 7, 1904. Decided April 25, not be construed to submit the right of a ON 1904. native-born citizen of the United States to return hither to the final determination of executive officers, and the conclusion was assumed to follow that these cases should have been tried on their merits. Before us it was argued that, by the construction of the N WRIT of Certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit to review a judgment which reversed a judgment of the circuit court for the Northern District of New York dismiss-statute, the fact of citizenship went to the ing a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into a detention of Chinese persons seeking to enter the United States, and claiming citizenship therein. Reversed. The facts are stated in the opinion. Assistant Attorney General McReynolds for petitioner. jurisdiction of the immigration officers (see Gonzales v. Williams, 192 U. S. 1, 7, ante, p. 177, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 177; Miller v. Horton, 152 Mass. 540, 548, 10 L. R. A. 116, 23 Am. St. Rep. 850, 26 N. E. 100), and therefore that the statute did not purport to apply to one who was a citizen in fact. We are of opinion, however, that the words quoted apply to a decision on the question of citizenship, and that, even if it be true *Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion that the statute could not make that deciof the court: Messrs. Robert M. Moore and W. W. Cantwell for respondents. sion final, the consequence drawn by the circuit court of appeals does not follow, and is not correct. We shall not argue the meaning of the words of the act. That must be taken to be Moon Sing v. United V. This is a writ of habeas corpus against a Chinese inspector and inspector of immigration. It appears from his return that the Chinese persons concerned came from China by way of Canada, and were seeking admis- established. Lem sion into the United States. On examina-States, 158 U. S. 538, 546, 547, 39 L. ed. tion by an inspector five gave their names, 1082, 1085, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 967. As to stated that they were born in the United whether or not the act could make the deciStates (United States v. Wong Kim Ark, sion of an executive officer final upon the 169 U. S. 649, 42 L. ed. 890, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. fact of citizenship, we leave the question 456), and answered no further questions. where we find it. The Japanese Immigrant The rest gave their names and then stood Case, 189 U. S. 86, 97, 47 L. ed. 721, mute, not even alleging citizenship. The in- 724, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 611; Fok Young spector decided against their right to enter Yo United States, 185 U. S. 296, the country, and informed them of their 304, 305, 46 L. ed. 917, 921, 22 Sup. Ct. right to appeal to the Secretary of Com- Rep. 686. See Chin Bak Kan v. United merce and Labor. No appeal was taken, and States, 186 U. S. 193, 200, 46 L. ed. while they were detained at a properly des- 1121, 1126, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 891. Whatignated detention house for return to China, ever may be the law on that point, the dea petition was filed by a lawyer purporting cisions just cited are enough to show that to act on their behalf, alleging that they alì it is too late to contend that the act of 1894 were citizens of the United States, and this is void as a whole. But if the act is valid, writ was obtained. In the circuit court the even if ineffectual on this single point, then detention was adjudged to be lawful, and it points out a mode of procedure which the writ was dismissed without a trial on must be followed before there can be a rethe merits. This decision was reversed by sort to the courts. In order to act at all the circuit court of appeals on the ground the executive officer must decide upon the that the parties concerned were entitled to a question of citizenship. If his jurisdiction judicial investigation of their status. is subject to being upset, still it is necessary that he should proceed if he decides that it exists. An appeal is provided by the*statute. The first mode of attacking his deci sion is by taking that appeal. If the appeal By the act of August 18, 1894, 28 Stat. at L. 390. chap. 301 (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 1303), "In every case where an alien is excluded from admission into the United 168 167 fails, it then is time enough to consider | ful, even if all these parties were citizens of whether, upon a petition showing reasonable the United States, and were not attempting cause, there ought to be a further trial upon to upset the inspection machinery by a habeas corpus. transparent device. Wong Wing v. United We perfectly appreciate, while we neither States, 163 U. S. 228, 235, 41 L. ed. 140, 16 countenance nor discountenance, the argu- Sup. Ct. Rep. 977. They were offered a way ment drawn from the alleged want of juris- to prove their alleged citizenship and to be diction. But while the consequence of that set at large, which would be sufficient for argument, if sound, is that both executive most people who had a case, and which officers and Secretary of Commerce and La- would relieve the courts. If they saw fit to bor are acting without authority, it is one refuse that way, they properly were held of the necessities of the administration of down strictly to their technical rights. justice that even fundamental questions But it is said that if, under any circumshould be determined in an orderly way. If stances, the question of citizenship could be the allegations of a petition for habeas cor- left to the final decision of an executive ofpus setting up want of jurisdiction, wheth-ficer, the Chinese regulations made under er of an executive officer or of an ordinary the statutes by the Department of Commerce court, are true, the petitioner theoretically and Labor are such that they do not allow a is entitled to his liberty at once. Yet a citizen due process of law, and the same arsummary interruption of the regular order gument is urged in favor of the right to deof proceedings, by means of the writ, is cline to take any part in such proceedings not always a matter of right. A familiar from the outset. The rules objected to reillustration is that of a person imprisoned quire the officer to prevent communication upon criminal process by a state court, un- with the parties other than by officials under a state law alleged to be unconstitu- der his control, and to have them examined tional. If the law is unconstitutional the promptly touching their right to admission. prisoner is wrongfully held. Yet, except un- The examination is to be apart from the der exceptional circumstances, the courts of public, in the presence of the government ofthe United States do not interfere by habeas ficials and such witnesses only as the examcorpus. The prisoner must, in the first ining officer shall designate. This last is place, take his case to the highest court of the provision especially stigmatized. It is the state to which he can go, and after that said that the parties are allowed to produce he generally is left to the remedy by writ only such witnesses as are designated by the of error if he wishes to bring the case here. officer. But that is a plain perversion of Minnesota v. Brundage, 189 U. S. 499, 45 L. the meaning of the words. If the witnesses ed. 639, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 455; Baker v. referred to are not merely witnesses to the Grice, 169 U. S. 284, 42 L. ed. 748, 18 Sup. examination, if they are witnesses in the Ct. Rep. 323. In Gonzales v. Williams, 192 cause, still the provision only excludes such U. S. 1, ante, p. 177, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. witnesses at the discretion of the officer 177, there was no use in delaying the issue pending the examination of the party conof the writ until an appeal had been taken, | cerned,- -a natural precaution in this class because in that case there was no dispute of cases, the reasonableness of which does about the facts, but merely a question of not need to be explained. It is common in law. Here the issue, if there is one, is pure ordinary trials. No right is given to the of matter of fact,—a claim of citizenship un-ficer to exercise any control or choice as to der circumstances and in a form naturally raising a suspicion of fraud. the witnesses to be heard, and no such choice was attempted in fact. On the contrary, the Considerations similar to those which we parties were told that if they could produce have suggested lead to a further conclusion. two witnesses who knew that they had the Whatever may be the ultimate rights of a right to enter, their testimony would be person seeking to enter the country, and al- taken and carefully considered; and various leging that he is a citizen, it is within the other attempts were made to induce the sugpower of Congress to provide, at least, for a gestion of any evidence or help to establish preliminary investigation by an inspector, the parties' case, but they stood mute. The and for a detention of the person until he separate examination is another reasonable has established his citizenship in some rea- precaution, and it is required to take place sonable way. If the person satisfies the in- promptly, to avoid the hardship of a long spector, he is allowed to enter the country detention. In case of appeal counsel are without further trial. Now, when these permitted to examine the evidence, Rule 7, Chinese, having that opportunity, saw fit to and it is implied that new evidence, briefs, refuse it, we think an additional reason was affidavits, and statements may be submitted, given for not allowing a habeas corpus at all of which can be forwarded with the apthat stage. The detention during the time peal. Rule 9. The whole scheme is intended necessary for investigation was not unlaw-to give as fair a chance to prove a right to *169 |