By a statute of Minnesota passed March 9th, 1874, it was provided that no railroad corporation or the lessees, purchasers, or managers thereof should consolidate the stock, property, or franchises of such corporation with, or lease or purchase the works or franchises of, or in any way control, any other railroad corporation owning or having under its control a parallel or competing line; nor should any officer of such corporation act as an officer of any other railroad corporation owning or having the control of a parallel or competing line; and the question whether railroads were parallel or competing lines should, when demanded by the party complainant, be decided by a jury as in other civil issues. Minn. Laws, 1874, p. 154. *Mr. Justice Harlan delivered the opinion the manufacture of any article [of] utility, of the court: or which regulates, limits, or controls or raises or tends to regulate, limit, control, or raise the market price of any article, commodity, or utility, or tends to limit or reg ulate the production of any such article, commodity, or utility, or in any manner destroys, limits, or interferes with open and free competition in either the production, purchase, or sale of any commodity, article, or utility, is hereby prohibited and declared to be unlawful. § 2. That when any corporation heretofore or hereafter created, organized, or existing under the laws of this state, whether general or special, hereafter unites in any manner with any other corporation wheresoever created, or with any individual, whereby such corporation surrenders or transfers, by sale or otherwise, in whole or in part, its franchise, rights, or privileges, or the control or management of its business to any other corporation or individual, or whereby the business, management, or control of the business of such corporation is limited, changed, or in any manner affected, and the purpose or effect of such union or A subsequent statute, passed March 3d, 1881, provided that any railroad corporation, either domestic or foreign, whether or ganized under a general law or by virtue of a special charter, might lease or purchase, or become owner of or control, or hold the stock of, any other railroad corporation, when the respective railroads could be law-combination is to limit, control, or destroy fully connected and operated togther "so as to constitute one continuous main line, with or without branches," § 1; and that any railroad corporation, whose lines of railroad within or without the state might be law fully connected and operated together to constitute one continuous main line, so as to admit of the passage of trains over them without break or interruption, "could consolidate their stock and franchises so as to become one corporation." § 2. But by the same statute it was provided that no railroad corporation should consolidate with, lease, or purchase, or in any way become owner of, or control, any other railroad corporation, or any stock, franchises, rights of property thereof, which owned or controlled "a parallel or competing line." 3. Minn. Laws, 1881, p. 109. * competition in the manufacture or sale of any article or commodity, or is to limit or control the production of any article or commodity, or is to control or fix the price or market value of any article or commodity, or the price or market value of the material entering into the production of any article or commodity, or in case the purpose or ef fect of such union or combination is to control or monopolize in any manner the trade or commerce, or any part thereof, of this state or of the several states, such union, combination, agreement, arrangement, or contract is hereby prohibited and declared to be unlawful. . . § 3. Any corpora tion heretofore or hereafter created, organized, or existing under the laws of this state, which shall hereafter, either directly or indirectly make any contract, agreement, or At a later date, 1899, the legislature of arrangement, or enter into any combination, Minnesota passed another statute relating conspiracy, or trust, as defined in § 1 of this principally to such restraints upon trade act, shall, in addition to the penalty preand commerce as interfered with competi- scribed in § 2 of this act, forfeit its charter, tion among those engaged therein. That rights, and franchises, and it shall thereafter statute contained these provisions: "§ 1. be unlawful for such corporation to engage Any contract, agreement, arrangement, or in business, either as a corporation or as a conspiracy, or any combination in the part of any combination, trust, or monopoly, form of a trust, or otherwise, here- except as to the final disposition of its propafter entered into which is in restraint erty under the laws of this state. . of trade or commerce within this state, § 6. That for the purpose of carrying out от in restraint of trade or commerce the provisions of this act any citizen of this between any of the people of this state and any of the people of any other state or country, or which limits or tends to limit or control the supply of any article, commodity, or utility, or the articles which enter into state may, and it is hereby declared to be the duty of the attorney general to, institute, in the name of the state, proceedings in any court of competent jurisdiction against any person, partnership, association, or corporation who may be guilty of vio- nesota and the people of other states and lating any of the provisions of § 1 of this countries; and that, if the Securities Comact, for the purpose of imposing the penal-pany was allowed to hold and control the ties imposed by this act, or securing the en- stocks of the constituent railway companies, forcement of § 3 hereof." Minn. Gen. Laws, and to carry out the purpose and object of 1899, chap. 357. its incorporators as well as its own, "full faith and credit will not be given to the public acts of this complainant, and it will be deprived of a further right guaranteed to it by the Constitution of the United States." That the said scheme had been consum These statutes being in force, the state of Minnesota instituted this suit in one of its own courts against the Northern Securities Company, a corporation of New Jersey; the Great Northern Railway Company, a corporation of Minnesota; the Northern Pa-mated, and said two* railway systems were cific Railway Company, a corporation of Wisconsin, which, having filed its articles of incorporation with the secretary of state of Minnesota, became subject to the laws of that state relating to railroad corporations; and James J. Hill, as president of the Northern Securities Company, and individually. What is the nature of the case as disclosed by the complaint filed in the state court? The complaint alleged That the Great Northern Railway Company and the Northern Pacific Railway Company each owned or controlled and maintained a system of railways connecting the Great Lakes and the Pacific ocean, their main roads constituting, substantially, parallel and competing lines; now under the absolute management and con- That the carrying out the above agreements and plan of consolidation and monopThat pursuant to an agreement between oly, and in every step taken to consummate the defendant Hill and other stockholders it, the officers and directors of each of said of the Great Northern Railway Company railway companies were severally fully ad(representing a controlling interest in the vised and consented thereto, and, unless restock of that company) and J. Pierpont strained by this court, the Securities ComMorgan and other stockholders of the pany would continue to manage and control Northern Pacific Railway Company (repre- the business and affairs of Great Northsenting a controlling interest in the stock of ern and Northern Pacific Railway Comthat company) the Northern Securities Companies, and to suppress all competition pany was incorporated solely as an instru- between them for freight and passenger mentality through which the stock, prop- traffic, as well as to monopolize railerty, and franchises of the Great Northern way traffic in that state, to the irreparaand Northern Pacific Railway Companies ble damage of the state and the people thereshould be consolidated in effect, if not in of. form, and the management and control of their business affairs, respectively, including the fixing of rates and charges for the transportation of passengers and freight over any and all of the lines of railway of cach of those companies, as well within as without the state, be vested in and controlled by the Securities Company, and all competition in freight and passenger traffic between the two systems of railway, within and without the state, to be suppressed and removed; that by means of such arrangement it was sought and intended to ignore, evade, and violate the laws of the state prohibiting as well the consolidation of the stock, property, or franchise of parallel or competing lines of railway therein, and the control or management thereof, as all combinations in restraint of trade or commerce within the state, and between the people of Min The substantial relief asked was a decree declaring, among other things, the alleged agreement and combination to be unlawful, and all acts done and to be done in pursuance thereof contrary to, and in violation of, the laws of Minnesota and of the United States; prohibiting the Securities Company, its agents and officers, from acquiring, receiving, holding, voting, or in any manner acting as the owner of any of the shares of the capital stock of either the Northern Pacific or the Great Northern Railway Company, or from exercising any management, direction, or control over the constituent companies; and enjoining those railway companies from recognizing or accepting the Northern Securities Company as the holder or owner of any shares of the capital stock of either of those companies, or from effect- @ ing any combination or agreement that 09. We proceed, therefore, to inquire whether the circuit court could take cognizance of this case upon removal from the state court, and make a final decree upon the merits. would disturb their independent integrity, | ante, p. 54, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 54; Defiance management, and control, respectively, or Water Co. v. Defiance, 191 U. S. 184, 194, that would, directly or indirectly, destroy ante, p. 63, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 63. free and unlimited competition between them by interchange of traffic, poolings of earnings, division of property, or otherwise. The Securities Company, appearing spe cially for that purpose, filed its petition for the removal of the case into the circuit court of the United States upon the ground that the suit was of a civil nature, in equity, involved, exclusive of costs, the sum of $2,000, and was one arising under the Constitution|tion or the acts of Congress. Postal Teleg. and laws of the United States. The state court approved the required statutory bond for removal, and made an order reciting that the case was removed to the Federal court. The Northern Securities Company, appearing specially for that purpose, gave notice of a motion to have the service of summons upon it vacated. Notice was also given of a like motion as to the service of summons upon defendant Hill in his capacity as president of that company. Subsequently, the company, and defendant Hill as its president, gave notice that the above notices were withdrawn, and they accordingly entered their appearance in the cause. At a later date the defendants severally answered, and the state filed its replication to each answer. Proofs were taken, and, the cause having been heard, the bill was dismissed upon the merits. 123 Fed. 692. Of course, the circuit court could not take cognizance of the case as one presenting a controversy between citizens of different states, for the state of Minnesota is not a citizen within the meaning of the Constitu Cable Co. v. Alabama, 155 U. S. 487, 39 L. ed. 232, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 192. But the 1st section of the judiciary act of 1887-8 (24 Stat. at L. 552, chap. 373, 25 Stat. at L. 433, chap. 866, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 508), provides, among other things, that the circuit courts of the United States may take original cognizance of all suits of a civil nature at law or in equity, arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States, where the matter in dispute, exclusive of costs, exceeds in value the sum of $2,000. And the 2d section provides for the removal from a state court of “any suit of a civil nature, at law or in equity, arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States of which the circuit courts of the United States are given original jurisdiction by the preceding section." "But the cor In Tennessee v. Union & Planters' Bank, 152 U. S. 454, 461, 38 L. ed. 511, 514, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 654, 657, which involved the scope and meaning of the acts of 1887-8, in respect of cases arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States, this court, after referring to § 1 said: responding clause in § 2 allows removals from a state court to be made only by defendants, and of suits 'of which the circuit courts of the United States are given original jurisdiction by the preceding sec tion,' thus limiting the jurisdiction of a circuit court of the United States on removal by the defendant under this section to such suits as might have been brought in that court by the plaintiff under the first section. 24 Stat. at L. 553, chap. 373; 25 Stat. at L. 434, chap. 866 (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 508). The change is in accordance with the general policy of these acts, manifest upon their face, and often recognized by this court, to contract the jurisdiction of the circuit courts of the United States." Mexican Nat. R. Co. v. Davidson, 157 U. S. 201, 208, 39 L. ed. 672, 675, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 563; Metcalf v. Watertown, 128 U. S. 586, 32 L. ed. 543, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 173. And in Chap After the cause was argued here the parties were invited to submit briefs upon the question whether the circuit court of the United States could take cognizance of the case upon removal from the state court. From the briefs filed in response to that invitation it appeared that both sides deemed the case a removable one, and insist that this court should consider the merits as disclosed by the pleadings and evidence. But consent of parties can never confer jurisdiction upon a Federal court. If the record does not affirmatively show jurisdiction in the circuit court, we must, upon our own motion, so declare, and make such order as will prevent that court from exercising an authority not conferred upon it by statute. Mansfield, C. & L. M. R. Co. v. Swan, 111 U. S. 379, 382, 28 L. ed. 462, 464, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 510; Robertson v. Cease, 97 U. S. 646, 24 L. ed. 1057; King Bridge Co. v. Otoe County, 120 U. S. 225, 30 L. ed. 623, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 552; Parker v. Ormsby, 141 U. S. 83, 35 L. ed. 655, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 912; Mattingly v. Northwestern Virginia R. Co. 158 U. S. 53, 57, 39 L. ed. 894, 895, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 725; Great Southern Fire-Proof pell v. Waterworth, 155 U. S. 102, 107, 39 Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177 U. S. 449, 453, 44 L. | L. ed. 85, 87, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 34, 36, the ed. 842, 844, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 690; Conti court, referring to Tennessee v. Union & nental Nat. Bank v. Buford, 191 U. S. 120,' Planters' Bank, said that it was there ad *65 have been one between citizens of different states, nor could such a suit have been deemed one arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States. The contention, however, is that a case arising under the laws of the United States was presented by the allegation in the complaint that the combination and consolidation between the Great Northern and Northern Pacific Railway Companies and the control of their affairs and operations by the judged, upon full consideration, that, under | could not have taken cognizance of the case; the act of 1887-8, "a case (not depending on for confessedly such a controversy would not the citizenship of the parties nor otherwise specially provided for) cannot be removed from a state court into the circuit court of the United States, as one arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, unless that appears by the plaintiff's statement of his own claim; and that, if it does not so appear, the want cannot be supplied by any statement in the petition for removal, or in the subsequent pleadings." To the same effect are Postal Teleg. Cable Co. v. Alabama, 155 U. S. 487, 39 L. ed. 232, 15 | Northern Securities Company were also in Sup. Ct. Rep. 192; United States v. American Bell. Teleph. Co. 159 U. S. 548, 553, 40 L. ed. 255, 257, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 69; Oregon Short Line & U. N. R. Co. v. Skottowe, 162 U. S. 490, 494, 40 L. ed. 1048, 1050, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 869; Texas & P. R. Co. v. Cody, 166 U. S. 606, 608, 41 L. ed. 1132, 1134, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 703; Pratt v. Paris Gaslight & Coke Co. 168 U. S. 255, 258, 42 L. ed. 458, 459, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 62; Walker v. Collins, 167 U. S. 57, 59, 42 L. ed. 76, 77, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 738; Arkansas v. Kansas & T. Coal Co. 183 U. S. 185, 46 L. ed. 144, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 47; Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Ann Arbor R. Co. 178 U. S. 239, 44 L. ed. 1052, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 867. These cases establish, beyond further question in this court, the rule that, under existing statutes regulating the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States, a case cannot be removed from a state court as one arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States, unless the plaintiff's complaint, bill, or declaration shows it to be a case of that character. "If it does not appear at the outset," this court has quite recently said, "that the suit is one of which the circuit court at the time its jurisdiction is invoked could properly take cognizance, the suit must be dismissed." Third Street & Subur ban R. Co. v. Lewis, 173 U. S. 457, 460, 43 L. ed. 766, 767, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 451. We must, then, inquire whether the complaint presents a case arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States, in respect of which the original jurisdiction of the circuit court could have been invoked by the state. The real purpose of the suit was to annul the agreement and suppress the combination alleged to exist between the defendant corporations, upon the ground that such agreement and combination were in violation, first, of the laws of Minnesota, and, second, of the anti-trust act of Congress. If relief had been asked upon the ground alone that what the defendant corporations had done and would, unless restrained, continue to do, was forbidden by the statutes of Minnesota, the circuit court of the United States violation of the anti-trust act of Congress of July 2d, 1890. An allegation in a complaint filed in a circuit court of the United States may, indeed, in a sense, confer jurisdiction to determine whether the case is of the class of which the court may properly take cognizance for purposes of a final decree on the merits. Newburyport Water Co. v. Newburyport, 193 U. S. 561, ante. 553, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 553, and Pacific E. R. Co. v. Los Angeles (decided at present term) 193 U. S. —, ante, 586, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 586. But if, notwithstanding such an allegation, the court finds, at any time, that the case does not really and substantially involve a dispute or controversy within its jurisdiction, then, by the express command of the act of 1875, its duty is to proceed no further. That is manifest from the 5th section of that act, which provides: "That if, in any suit commenced in a circuit court or removed from a state court to a circuit court of the United States, it shall appear, to the satisfaction of said circuit court, at any time after such suit has been brought or removed thereto, that such suit does not really and substantially involve a dispute or controversy properly within the jurisdiction of said circuit court, or that the parties to said suit have been improperly or collusively made or joined, either as plaintiffs or defendants, for the purpose of creating a case cognizable or removable under this act, the said circuit court shall proceed no further therein, but shall dismiss the suit or remand it to the court from which it was removed, as justice may require, and shall make such order as to costs as shall be just." 18 Stat. at L. 470, chap. 137 (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 508). That provision has not been superseded by any subsequent legislation. Does the present suit really and substantially involve a dispute, or controversy properly within the jurisdiction of the circuit court? That is to say, could the suit, as disclosed by the complaint, have been brought by the state originally in that court? If it could not, then, under the act of 1887-8 and the adjudged cases, it should not have been removed from the state court, | may be seized and condemned by like proand should be remanded. ceedings as those provided by law for the forfeiture, seizure, and condemnation of property imported into the United States contrary to law. 7. Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by any other person or corporation by reason of anything forbidden or declared to be unlawful by this act may sue therefor in any circuit court of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the costs of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee. By the 1st section of the anti-trust act every contract, combination in the form of a trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states, is declared to be illegal. The 2d section condemns the monopolizing or attempting to monopolize, or combining or conspiring to monopolize, any part of such trade or commerce. By the 3d section, every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of commerce in any territory of the United States or the District of Columbia, or in restraint of trade or commerce between any such territory and another, or between any "§ 8. That the word 'person,' or 'persons," such territory or territories and any state wherever used in this act, shall be deemed or states or the District of Columbia, or to include corporations and associations exwith any foreign states, or between the Dis-isting under, or authorized by, the laws of trict of Columbia and any state or states or either the United States, the laws of any of foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. A the territories, the laws of any state, or the violation of the provisions of each section is laws of any foreign country.' 26 Stat. at made a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine L. 209, chap. 647 (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, not exceeding $5,000 or by imprisonment not p. 3200). exceeding one year, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court. Of course, a criminal prosecution under the act must be in the name of the United States and in a court of the United States,—the district attorney who conducts the prosecution being subject to the direction of the Attorney General as to the manner in which his duties shall be discharged. Rev. Stat. 362 (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 208). The 4th, 6th, 7th, and 8th sections of the act are as follows: " 4. The several circuit courts of the United States are hereby invested with jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violations of this act; and it shall be the duty of the several district attorneys of the United States, in their respective districts, under the direction of the Attorney General, to institute proceedings in equity to prevent and restrain such violations. Such proceedings may be by way of petition setting forth the case and praying that such violation shall be enjoined or otherwise prohibited. When the parties complained of shall have been duly notified of such petition the court shall proceed, as soon as may be, to the hearing and determination of the case; and, pending such petition, and before final decree, the court may at any time make such temporary restraining order or prohibition as shall be deemed just in the premises." "§ 6. Any property owned under any contract or by any combination or pursuant to any conspiracy (and being the subject thereof) mentioned in section one of this act, and being in the course of transportation from one state to another, or to a foreign country, shall be forfeited to the United States, and It thus appears that the act specifies four modes in which effect may be given to its provisions. It is clear that the present suit does not belong to either of those classes. It is not a criminal proceeding (§§ 1, 2, 3), nor a suit in equity in the name of the United States to restrain violations of the anti-trust act (§ 4), nor a proceeding in the name of the United States for the forfeiture of property being in the course of transportation (§ 6), nor an action by any person or corporation for the recovery of threefold damages for injury done to business or property by some other person or corpora tion. (§§ 7, 8.) But it is said that as the act of Congress was for the benefit of all the states and all the people, this case is to be deemed one arising under the laws of the United States, and, therefore, cognizable by the circuit court, because one of the objects of the state of Minnesota by its suit is to protect certain of its proprietary interests, which, it is alleged, would be injured by violations, on the part of the defendants, of the act of Congress. Let us see what, in that view, is the case as presented by the complaint. The complaint alleged that the state is the owner of more than three million acres of land, of the value of more than fifteen millions of dollars, obtained, by donation, fim the United States, and that "the value of said lands, and the salability thereof, depends, in very large measure, upon having free, uninterrupted, and open competition in passenger and freight rates over the lines of railway owned and operated by said Great Northern and Northern Pacific Railway Companies." |