*539 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 617; Barden v. Northern P. | in what was then the territory of WashingR. Co. 154 U. S. 288, 38 L. ed. 992, 14 Sup. ton. After the delivery of the wheat Clark Ct. Rep. 1030, and Nelson v. Northern P. R. demanded a deed for the land. Ankeny, after Co. 188 U. S. 108, 47 L. ed. 406, 23 Sup. Ct. some delay on one pretext or another, inRep. 302, are urged to support the conten- formed Clark that he could have a warranty tion. A comparison of those cases with Des- deed to a part of the land, and a quitclaim eret Salt Co. v. Tarpey becomes necessary. deed to the part which was called railroad Deseret Salt Co. v. Tarpey was an action | land, and informed him, as to the latter part, of ejectment. Tarpey was the plaintiff in that if the Northern Pacific Railroad Comthe trial court. He relied for his title upon pany could not get title he would be obliged a lease from the Central Pacific Railroad to procure title from the government. AnCompany, and it became necessary to con- keny promised to pay the necessary expenses sider the nature of the congressional grant of obtaining title in that way. Clark refused to that company. The issue made was direct the offer, and gave notice that, unless a good and unmistakable, and the decision was title was conveyed to him for the whole of equally so. The plaintiff contended that the the land within five days, he would abandon grant vested in the company the legal title. possession, and claim compensation for the It was asserted on the other hand that the violation of the contract. Ankeny paid no title to the land was retained until the cost attention to the notice, and Clark brought of selecting, surveying, and conveying all the suit for the value of the wheat, and recovgranted lands was paid, and, also, that by ered. The case came to this court from the other provisions of the granting act the title supreme court of the territory. In passing remained in the government until patent is on the case this court said there were three sued. Both contentions were rejected. The principal matters of contention in the trial court said that the terms of the grant "im- court. We are concerned with only one of port the transfer of a present title, not one them, and that is, "Did Ankeny have a good to be made in the future. They are that title to the northeast quarter of section 19, 'there be and is hereby granted' to the com- being part and parcel of the lands which he pany every alternate section of the lands. agreed to sell to Clark?" Clark asserted the No partial or limited interest is designated, negative of the question; Ankeny contended but the lands themselves are granted, as they for the affirmative, and cited Deseret Salt Co. are described by the sections mentioned. v. Tarpey. The court did not find it necesWhatever interest the United States pos- sary to decide the issue thus accurately presessed in the lands was covered by those sented. It followed Descret Salt Co. v. Tarterms, unless they were qualified by subse-pey, to the effect that the government could quent provisions, a position to be presently considered." Those provisions were considered, and it was determined that they did not qualify the terms of the grant conveying the title, or essentially limit them. Anticipating the question that, if such be the import of the act, what was the necessity of patents, it was said, there were many reasons why the issue of patents would be of great service to the patentees. "While not essential to transfer the legal right, the patents would be evidence that the grantee had complied with the conditions of the grant, and to that extent the grant was relieved from the possibility of forfeiture for breach of its conditions, .. they would thus be in the grantee's hands deeds of further assurance of his title, and therefore a source of quiet and peace to him in his possession." And the conclusión was that "the title transferred was a legal title, as distinguished from an equitable and inchoate interest." The distinction expressed the completeness of the title conveyed. Ankeny v. Clark was an action for the recovery of the value of 12,767 bushels of wheat, which had been delivered by Clark to Ankeny in pursuance of a contract by which Ankeny agreed to sell and deliver to Clark two sections of land in Walla Walla county, enforce the payment of the costs, and could withhold the patents until they were paid; and this, it was said, "gave the government a lien for said costs." And it was hence held that Ankeny "did not hold such a title as it was obligatory on the plaintiff [Clark] to accept." But Deseret Salt Co. v. Tarpey was not questioned. It was only decided that the land was subject to a lien, and, so burdened, Clark was not compelled to receive it. Barden v. Northern P. R. Co. 154 U. S. 288, 38 L. ed. 992, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1030, was an action by the railroad company for the recovery of certain lands containing veins or lodes of rock in place bearing gold, silver, and other precious metals. The plaintiff relied for title upon its grant. The defendant contended that the lands were excepted by express words from the grant. This contention was sustained. It is manifest, therefore, that the case in no way militates with the decision in Deseret Salt Co. v. Tarpey, and the court said so. Mr. Justice Field was the organ of the court in both cases, and he expressed the inapplicability of the Tarpey Case and left it unimpaired. What was there said was affirmed,-that the title passed at the date of the grant. Of what lands? Of those, it was held, which were not reserved *541 *540 *542 Judgment affirmed. Mr. Justice Brewer concurs in the judg ment. as mineral. In other words, mineral lands | lands they covered,—to all that was not rewere not conveyed, whether known or un- served from them. known to be such at the time of the grant. This was the main question decided. It was also held that the issue of patent would constitute a determination of the character of the land by reason of the power of the Land Department to determine and establish it. But it was not intimated, nor does it follow, TOLTEC RANCH COMPANY, Plff. in Err., that the conveyance of the title to the com บ. (191 U. S. 542) pany was by the patent, and not by the WILLIAM BABCOCK and Louisa Babcock. granting act. There was, therefore, nothing decided which detracts from Deseret Salt Co. Adverse possession of lands within conv. Tarpey. gressional land grant. Nelson v. Northern P. R. Co. was an action brought by the railway company to recover the possession of a quarter section of land claimed to be within the land grant of Northern Pacific Railroad, and the company held a patent. Nelson claimed to have settled upon the land three years before the definite location of the road. He claimed, therefore, to be within the exceptions of the grant. The This case is governed by the decision in Tolteo [No. 49.] Argued and submitted November 3, 1903. IN ERROR to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah to review a judgment which affirmed a judgment of the District Court of the First Judicial District, Box Elder County, of that State, entered upon a verdict for defendants in a suit to recover the possession of certain lands. Affirmed. See same case below, 24 Utah, 183, 66 Påč. 876. Messrs. Maxwell Evarts, Lindsay R. Rogers, and T. D. Johnson for plaintiff in error. Mr. B. H. Jones for defendants in error. *Mr. Justice McKenna delivered the opinion of the court: land, when he settled upon it, was unsurveyed, and the effect of this constituted one of the questions in the case. Upon the filing of a map by the railroad company of its general route, an order was made by the Land Department withdrawing from settlement the lands within the limits of the grant. The effect of this order was another question in the case. It was held "that the railroad company did not acquire any vested interest in the land in dispute in virtue of its map of general route, or the withdrawal order based on such map," and it was further held that Nelson's settlement upon, and occupancy of, the land was valid, and constituted a claim upon the land within the meaning of the Plaintiff in error is a corporation, and Northern Pacific Act of 1864. In other brought this action in 1899 in the district words, it was held that the land was ex-court of the first judicial district of the state cluded from the grant by express words. The A operative words which produced that effect were expressed in the following provision of § 3 of the act: "And whenever prior to said time [of definite location] any of said sections or parts of sections shall have been granted, sold, reserved, occupied by home-isa Babcock, who settled upon it as a homestead settlers, or pre-empted, or otherwise disposed of, other lands shall be selected by said company in lieu thereof," etc. [13 Stat. at L. 368, chap. 217.] This view was established in an elaborate opinion. The case, therefore, like Barden v. Northern P. R. Co., decided only that lands did not pass by the grant which were reserved from it. An evi-mitted Louisa Babcock had been in exclusive dent proposition, whatever might have been the difficulties in determining what lands were reserved. And there were difficulties. This court in consequence divided in opinion. But those difficulties do not confront us in the case at bar. They are settled, and in their settlement no doubts were cast upon the efficacy of the grants to convey title to all the of Utah, county of Box Elder, for the recovery of the possession of 64 acres of land in section 17, township 11, north of range 2 west. The plaintiff alleged title in fee. The answer alleged that defendant, William Babcock, held the land as agent of his wife, Lou steader, having the qualifications thereof, in 1867, erected improvements of the value of $1,500, and that the land was reserved from the grant of the Central Pacific Railroad Company. The answer also alleged continuous adverse possession for thirty years under the statutes of Utah. The replication ad possession for thirty years, neither admitted nor denied that the land was within the grant to the railroad company, denied the value of the improvements, and denied also that the action was barred by the sections of the statute of limitations cited by the defendant's answer. Louisa Babcock intervened. She denied 543 the allegations of the plaintiff, set up her | dated November 4, 1897. Against this title settlement as a homesteader and the rights adverse possession was claimed as we have acquired by exclusive and adverse possession seen. defendants and against the plaintiff, ‘no cause of action.'" Judgment was entered for defendants. It was affirmed by the supreme court of the state on appeal. 24 Utah, 183, 66 Pac. 876. under §§ 2858 to 2872, inclusive, of the Re- The cases were tried together and to a vised Statutes of Utah. She also alleged that | jury, which found "the issues in favor of the "on the 5th day of September, 1896, under a mistake, and entirely without authority of law, a patent of the United States was issued purporting to convey to the Central Pacific Railroad Company, under the acts of Congress granting lands to the Pacific railroads, the lands in controversy." And she prayed that "said patent be annulled and set aside, and for such other and further relief as may be just." The plaintiff, answering the complaint in intervention, admitted the issuance of the patent, but denied all other allegations. The court concluded its opinion as follows: "From the foregoing considerations, and from a careful examination of the proof, we are of the opinion that the intervenor is entitled to hold the land in controversy, and the crops raised thereon, by adverse possession, and that, as against the plaintiff, she has the absolute title thereto. We see nothing in the record which justifies a reversal. The judgment is affirmed, with costs." This writ of error was allowed by the There was also an action brought by the Toltec Company against Babcock for hay and alfalfa seed alleged to have been grown upon the land. The answer raised the issues pre-chief justice of Utah. It presents the same sented in the ejectment case. The plaintiff depended for title upon a patent issued to the Central Pacific Railroad Company the 5th of September, 1896, in pursuance of the acts of Congress of July 1, 1862, and July 2, 1864 (12 Stat. at L. 489, chap. 120; 13 Stat. at L. 356, chap. 216), and a conveyance from the company to it by deed questions which have been decided in Tolteo Ranch Co. v. Cook, 191 U. S. 532, 48 L. ed. 291, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 166. On the authority of that case, therefore, the judgment is affirmed. Mr. Justice Brewer concurs in the judg ment. Navy personnel act-credit of service for computing pay-prospective effect. A credit of service for the purpose of computing future pay only, and not for the readjustment of past compensation, must be deemed intended by the proviso in the Navy personnel act of March 3, 1899, § 13 (30 Stat. at L. 1004, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 1072), that all officers who have been or may be appointed to the Navy from civil life shall, on the date of appointment, be credited, "for computing their pay" with five years' service, in view of the declared purpose for which such credit is given, and of the provision in the first clause of the statute, which makes increased pay begin with the next fiscal year. [No. 75.] Argued November 12, 13, 1903. Decided APPEAL from the Court of Claims to re- See same case below, 37 Ct. Cl. 365. Assistant Attorney General Pradt and Mr. • Mr. Justice Day delivered the opinion of the court: The claim arises under the act of March 3, 1899, commonly known as the Navy personnel act. The act is entitled "Chapter 413. An Act to Reorganize and Increase the Efficiency of the Personnel of the Navy and Marine Corps of the United States." 30 Stat. at L. 1004 (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 1072). Section 13 of the act provides: “That after June thirtieth, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, commissioned officers of the line of the Navy and of the Medical and Pay Corps shall receive the same pay and allowances, except forage, as are or may be provided by or in pursuance of law for the officers of corresponding rank in the Army: Provided, That such officers when on shore shall receive the allowances, but fifteen per centum less pay than when on sea duty; but this provision shall not apply to warrant officers commissioned under section twelve of this act: Provided further, That when naval officers are detailed for shore duty beyond seas they shall receive the same This is an appeal from the judgment of pay and allowances as are or may be prothe court of claims dismissing the petition vided by or in pursuance of law for officers of the claimant. Upon hearing, that court of the Army detailed for duty in similar made the following findings of fact: places: Provided further, That naval chap"I. The claimant, Ulysses S. G. White,lains who do not possess relative rank shall was, on the 9th day of January, in the year 1877, appointed a civil engineer in the Navy from civil life. He remained such civil en gineer and was such at the time of the passage of the Navy personnel act of March 3, 1899. have the rank of lieutenant in the Navy; and that all officers, including warrant officers, who have been or may be appointed to the Navy from civil life shall, on the date of appointment, be credited, for computing their pay, with five years' service. And all “II. The claimant, by reason of service in provisions of law authorizing the distributhe Army, amounting to six years, seven tion among captors of the whole or any pormonths, and twenty-one days, previous to tion of the proceeds of vessels, or any prophis entry into the Navy, reached the maxi-erty hereafter captured, condemned as prize, mum pay of his grade, $3,500, May 19, 1885, under Revised Statutes, §§ 1478, 1556 (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, pp. 1033, 1067). Thus the amount of pay received by him between the 9th of January, 1877, and the 19th of May, 1885, was as follows: or providing for the payment of bounty for the sinking or destruction of vessels of the enemy hereafter occurring in time of war, And provided further, are hereby repealed: That no provision of this act shall operate to reduce the present pay of any commissioned officer now in the Navy; and in any case in which the pay of such an officer would otherwise be reduced he shall continue to receive pay according to existing law: And provided further, That nothing $24,061 64 in this act shall operate to increase or re Three years and 130 days, at $2,- Total *549 099. duce the pay of any officer now on the re-hibited in the appendix to their brief, that tired list of the Navy." in this statute as originally reported, § 16 The part of the statute particularly under of the Navy personnel act (H. R. 10,403, 53d consideration in this case, and upon the in- Congress, 3d session), there was no such terpretation of which the right of the claim- proviso. As reported in the Senate, Januant depends, is contained in the 3d para-ary 1, 1899, the first proviso was added. graph: "And that all officers, including The other provisos were added as the bill warrant officers, who have been or may be appointed to the Navy from civil life, shall, on the date of appointment, be credited, for computing their pay, with five years' service." was reported to the Senate, February 2, 1899, and included the one now under consideration; and it is argued that not only does this proviso contain independent matter, but that it was introduced into the bill 1 It is the contention of the claimant that and intended to be enacted as such. It is he comes within the terms of this proviso, undoubtedly true that in congressional legand, as an officer appointed to the Navy islation provisos have been included in statfrom civil life, is entitled, as of the date of utes which are really independent pieces of his appointment, to be credited with five legislation; but this is a misuse of the usual years' service, having been appointed Janu-purpose and effect of a proviso, which is to ary 9, 1877, and by previous service in the make exception from the enacting clause to Army entitled, under another statute (22 restrain generality, and to prevent misinterStat. at L. 473, chap. 97, U. S. Comp. Stat.pretation. Minis v. United States, 15 Pet. 1901, p. 1071), to a credit of six years, seven months, and twenty-one days, reaching the maximum pay of $3,500.00 on May 19, 1885. 423, 10 L. ed. 791. If possible, the act is to be given such construction as will permit both the enacting clause and the proviso to stand and be construed together with a view The reading of the statute is not altogether to carry into effect the whole purpose of the clear, and we are to arrive at the meaning law. 1 Kent, Com. 463. The purview of of Congress by such aids as may be legiti- the act and the words of the proviso must mately resorted to in order to determine the be reconciled if may be, and the operation of effect and purpose of the lawmaking power the proviso may be limited by the scope of in the language used. The statute is part the enacting clause. The object of interpreof a voluminous act to reorganize and in-tation being to ascertain the purpose of the crease the efficiency of the personnel of the lawmakers as expressed in the terms used in Navy and Marine Corps of the United the law, we have a right to look to other States. In the title, the language used laws upon the same subject-matter, and to looks to the future; it contemplates a read-consider the purpose intended to be carried justment of rank and pay. It is true that into effect by the operation of the new law the title of the act may not control the plain considered with the old, and as a part of a language of the enacting clauses, but, never-general provision. It is true that if the lantheless, we may look to the declared scope and purpose of the act as evidenced by its title whenever it becomes necessary, in view of the use of language incapable by itself of exact construction. Church of Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U. S. 457, 462, 36 L. ed. 226-229, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 511. Chief Justice Marshall, in United States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch, 358-386, 2 L. ed. 304313, said: "Where the intent is plain, nothing is left to construction. Where the mind labors to discover the design of the legislature, it seizes everything from which aid can be derived; and, in such case, the title claims a degree of notice, and will have its due share of consideration." Coosaw Min. Co. v. South Carolina, 144 U. S. 563, 36 L. ed. 542, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 689; Church of Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U. S. 462, 36 L. ed. 229, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 511. *The part of the statute relied upon by the claimant is incorporated by means of a proviso. Through the diligence of the learned counsel representing the claimant, it is ex guage used is free from ambiguity it is the best evidence of the thing intended, and it is the duty of the courts to find, if possible, within the four corners of the act, and from the language used, the scope and meaning of the law. Lake County v. Rollins, 130 U. S. 671, 32 L. ed. 1063, Sup. Ct. Rep. 651. It is equally true that it is the business of courts to decide what the law is, and not, by consideration or surmises as to the policy of the government, have the effect to adjudge that to be law which has not been so enacted by the legislature. Dewey v. United States, 178 U. S. 521, 44 L. ed. 1174, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 981. But, after all, the main purpose of interpretation is to ascertain and carry into effect the object and purpose of the legislature in making the given law as expressed in the language used. Where it is claimed that a law is to have a retrospective operation, such must be clearly the intention, evidenced in the law and its purposes, or the court will presume that the lawmaking pow er is acting for the future only, and not for the past; that it is enacting a rule of con *552 |