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a trust company in New York was within the taxing power of the latter state, even though the depositor intended to withdraw the money for further investment, and although the deposit had been subjected to taxation in Illinois as a part of an estate to which it belonged.

exempt from taxation, and that exemption | 439, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 277, in which it was depends alone on a true construction of a held that a deposit by a citizen of Illinois in statute of the state, the Federal courts should be slow to declare an exemption in advance of any decision by the courts of the state. The rule in such a case is that the Federal courts follow the construction placed upon the statute by the state courts, and in advance of such construction they should not declare property beyond the scope of the statute, and exempt from taxation, unless it is clear that such is the fact. In other words, they should not release any property within the state from its liability to state taxation unless it is obvious that the statutes of the state warrant such exemption, or unless the mandates of the Federal Constitution compel it."

From these cases it may be taken as the settled law of this court that there is no inhibition in the Federal Constitution against the right of the state to tax property in the shape of credits, where the same are evidenced by notes or obligations held within the state, in the hands of an agent of the owner for the purpose of collection or renewal, with a view to new loans and carrying on such transactions as a permanent business.

The maxim, Mobilia sequuntur personam, which was applied in the court below as forbidding taxation of the checks in the hands of the agent in New Orleans, has been frequently held to be but a fiction of law, having its origin in considerations of general convenience and public policy, and not to be applied to limit and control the right of the state to tax property within the jurisdiction, it being intended to permit the own

the law of his domicil, and to make testamentary disposition of it according to the law where he is rather than that of the situs of the property. It was intended for convenience, and not to be controlling where justice does not demand it.

Applying these principles to the facts in the case, we have no doubt that these checks, secured in the manner stated, and given for the purpose of evidencing an interest-bearing debt, were the evidences of credits for money loaned, localized in Louisiana, protected by its laws, and properly taxable there.

It may be taken as a general rule of the law of taxation of personal property that such property can only be taxed at the residence of the owner, or at such place as it has acquired a situs, which will subject it to the taxing power of the state where found. In its application to tangible property, there is little difficulty in applying this principle. The difficulty arises in determining whether a credit or chose in action has acquired a local situs in contemplation of law at a place other than the domicil of the owner in such sense as will permit the state to tax iter to deal with his personalty according to in the place of its localization. The cases are numerous, both state and Federal, which recognize the right of the state, in view of the protection and remedial rights which its laws give to the owner of intangible property, such as notes and bills, to require from such property a contribution to the funds of the state, to be collected by taxation, for the purpose of maintaining and enforcing the laws which give force and effect to such obligations. This right has been the subject of such recent adjudication in this court that we will only notice some of the later decisions. We have already referred to New The Comptoir was a foreign corporation; Orleans v. Stempel. The question came be- its business in Louisiana was in the hands fore the court in Bristol v. Washington of an agent; it furnished to the customer a County, 177 U. S. 133, 44 L. ed. 701, 20 Sup. sum of money and took from him a collateral Ct. Rep. 585, in which case it was held that security; for reasons satisfactory to the parthe personal property of a nonresident of the ties, instead of taking the ordinary evidence state of Minnesota, in the shape of notes of indebtedness, the customer drew a check, payable at the oflice of the agent in Minne- never intended to be paid in the ordinary sota, where the mortgages securing the way, but intended by the parties to be held notes were retained by the agents, and the as evidence of the amount of money actually notes were returned from time to time when loaned; this loan could be satisfied by parrequired for renewal, collection, or foreclo- tial payments from time to time, interest besure, the agents collecting the money and ing charged upon the outstanding amounts, making loans in the name of the principal, and if not paid at maturity the collateral generally on their own judgment, remitting was subject to sale; when paid, the money to the principal the collections when re- might be again loaned by the agent to other quired, or investing them in new loans, was parties, or remitted to the home office, and properly taxable in Minnesota. Still later the business was continuing in its character. the subject was under consideration in It is true the money to be paid to the cusBlackstone v. Miller, 188 U. S. 189, 47 L. ed. 'tomer was generally obtained by the Comp

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toir drawing its draft upon New York or up- | the jury in condemnation proceedings. Afon its home office, and a large part of the firmed. business of the Comptoir was in selling foreign exchange, but we cannot perceive that the transaction between the parties was any the less a loan because of the source from which the money was obtained.

Argued October 29, 30, 1903. Decided No- all, the sum of $20,875-is a just and equi

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the above-mentioned tract is taken, and its | at most, a species of indirect evidence of the issues, and which the parties in interest will opinion of the person making such offer as sustain by reason of the premises, amount to the value of the land. He may have so to the sum of $12,953, and if not, what is a slight a knowledge on the subject as to renjust and equitable estimate or appraisement der his opinion of no value, and inadmissible of the value of same, and an assessment of for that reason. He may have wanted the damages to be paid by the said the United land for some particular purpose disconnectStates of America, for such lands or mate ed from its value. Pure speculation may rials and damages aforesaid?” have induced it, a willingness to take chances that some new use of the land might, in the end, prove profitable. There is no op

It was also ordered that a jury should be struck, and a view of the premises and property described in the report of the commis-portunity to cross-examine the person maksioners and in the petition should be had by the jury. This was done and a trial subsequently had. Testimony was taken upon the trial, and by consent of counsel it was agreed that the jury might bring in a verdict stating such a lump sum for the value of the lands and the damages to the adjacent property as they thought was fairly proven from the testimony produced before them.

ing the offer, to show these various facts. Again, it is of a nature entirely too uncertain, shadowy, and speculative to form any solid foundation for determining the value of the land which is sought to be taken in condemnation proceedings. If the offer were admissible, not only is it almost impossible to prove (if it exist) the lack of good faith in the person making the offer, but the circumstances of the parties at the time the offer was made as bearing upon the value of such offer may be very difficult, if not al

The jury found and assessed the value of the lands and the damages sustained at the sum of $12,000, to be paid the plaintiff in error by the United States. Judgment hav-most impossible, to show. To be of the slight ing been duly entered upon the award of the jury, an appeal was taken to the circuit court of appeals, where the judgment was affirmed (57 L. R. A. 932, 50 C. C. A. 597, 112 Fed. 893), and the case is now before us on writ of error sued out by the owner of the land.

Mr. David J. Pancoast for plaintiff in

error.

Assistant Attorney General Purdy for defendant in error.

Mr. Justice Peckham, after making the foregoing statement of facts, delivered the opinion of the court:

The questions to be reviewed by this court arise upon exception appearing in the record taken upon the decisions of the court in relation to the admissibility of evidence, and also to the charge of the court as to the proper items to be considered by the jury in arriving at their verdict.

The errors assigned and upon which the argument was had in the circuit court of appeals were twelve in number. They are in substance the same here. The first seven refer to the rejection of evidence in regard to offers to purchase the lands from the plaintiff in error. It was held by the trial court, in response to the proposal to give such evidence, that the plaintiff in error could not testify to different offers he had received to purchase the property for hotel, residential, or amusement purposes, or for a ferry, or a railroad terminal, or to lease the property for hotel purposes.

Upon principle, we think the trial court was right in rejecting the evidence. It is,

est value as evidence in any court, an offer must, of course, be an honest offer, made by an individual capable of forming a fair and intelligent judgment, really desirous of purchasing, entirely able to do so, and to give the amount of money mentioned in the offer, for otherwise the offer would be but a vain thing. Whether the owner himself, while declining the offer, really believed in the good faith of the party making it, and in his ability and desire to pay the amount offered, if such offer should be accepted, or whether the offer was regarded as a mere idle remark, not intended for acceptance, would also be material upon the question of the bona fides of the refusal. Oral and not binding offers are so easily made and refused in a mere passing conversation, and under circumstances involving no responsibility on either side, as to cast no light upon the question of value. It is frequently very difficult to show precisely the situation under which these offers were made. In our judgment they do not tend to show value, and they are unsatisfactory, easy of fabrication, and even dangerous in their character as evidence upon this subject. Especially is this the case when the offers are proved only by the party to whom they are alleged to have been made, and not by the party making them. There is no chance to cross-examine as to the circumstances of the party making the offer in regard to good faith, etc. Evidence of this character is entirely different from evidence as to the price offered and accepted or rejected for articles which have a known and ready sale in the market. The price at the stock exchange of shares of stock in corporations which are there offered for sale or dealt in

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is some evidence of the value of such shares. | a jury under the direction of the judge. For So evidence of prices current among dealers this purpose an issue is to be prepared by in those commodities which are the subject the judge in the presence of counsel for trial of frequent sales by them would also be before the jury. Pursuant to that practice proper to show value. This evidence is un- the court did present to the jury an issue for like that of offers to purchase real estate, it to decide, which is set forth in the foregoand affords no ground for the admissibility ing statement of facts. Counsel for the ownof the latter. er, therefore, contend that, under that issue, the court should have received all evidence offered by the land owner tending to show the damages sustained by him not only by the taking of the land in question, but also damages to the remaining tracts of land by reason of the use which the government would probably make of the land taken.

A reference to the authorities shows them to be almost unanimous against receiving evidence of this kind. Counsel have cited many cases on this subject and they are contained in the margin. Most of them are clearly against the admissibility of the evidence, while some, which at first sight might be regarded as exceptional, will be found upon closer examination to recognize the general rule as already stated.

The next four assignments of error relate to the proper items of damage to be included in the award.

The owner offered to prove the probable use the government would make of the land for military purposes for which it was taken;

also, that the use of the land for such military purposes would damage and depreciate the remaining and adjoining land; also, that if the land to be taken was used by the government for military purposes it would endanger the adjoining land of the owner for a long distance and make the removal of his buildings necessary. These offers were rejected, and the court held that the jury should not take into account prospective damages to the remaining and adjoining land of the owner, arising from the future use of the land sought to be taken from him for military purposes, although at the same time the court charged, if the evidence showed that by reason of the severance of the farms those which remained were made so small that it would be unprofitable to work them, whatever damage resulted therefrom should be given the owner.

We are of opinion that the court was not bound to receive evidence upon any subject which it held to be not a proper item to make up the award to the owner. Evidence of some damage to the remaining farms was permitted, as already seen, which might arise by reason of those farms being made so small that they might not be profitably worked, but what particular items of damage were proper to be considered in relation to the remaining tracts were questions primarily for the trial judge, subject to review in due course of procedure.

The important question is as to the admissibility of evidence of damages to the remaining lands of the owner which would probably flow from any particular and probable use by the government of the land to be taken. It is said by the plaintiff in error that just compensation consists not only in an award of the value of the lands which are taken, but also of*any damage that may result to the portion of the tract which remains, on account of such taking and on account of the uses to which the land taken may, or probably will, be put, and he cites many cases to show the correctness of the rule which he asserts.

Its correctness may be conceded, but what The question in this case arises in a some- we have to decide is whether the facts in what peculiar way. Under the procedure this case bring it within the rule itself. We provided for in the statute of New Jersey must see, therefore, what those facts are in upon appeal to the court from the award order to intelligently determine the applicamade by the commissioners, there is to be ability of the rule asserted by the plaintiff in new trial of the question as to the amount of damages to which the land owner shall be entitled, and that trial is to be had before

Fowler v. Middlesex County, 6 Allen, 92, 96; Wood v. Firemen's F. Ins. Co. 126 Mass. 316, 319 Thompson v. Boston, 148 Mass. 387, 19 N. E. 406; Anthony v. New York, P. & B. R. Co. 162 Mass. 60, 37 N. E. 780; Cochrane v. Com. 175 Mass. 299, 56 N. E. 610; Hine v. Manhattan R. Co. 132 N. Y. 477, 15 L. R. A. 591, 30 N. E. 985; Keller v. Paine, 34 Hun, 167; Lawrence v. Metropolitan Elev. R. Co. 15 Daly, 502; Young v. Atwood, 5 Hun, 234; Parke v. Seattle, 8 Wash. 78, 35 Pac. 594; Santa Ana v. Harlin, 99 Cal. 538, 34 Fac. 224; St. Joseph & D. C. R. Co. v. Orr. 8 Kan. 419, 424; Minnesota Belt

error.

It appears that long before the commencement of these proceedings there was a govLine R. & Transfer Co. v. Gluck, 45 Minn. 463, 48 N. W. 194; Louisville, N. O. & T. R. Co. v. Ryan, 64 Miss. 399, 8 So. 173.

As distinguished from the general rule, see Whitney v. Thacher, 117 Mass. 523; Cliquot's Champagne, 3 Wall. 114, 141, sub nom. 125 Baskets of Champagne v. United States, 18 L ed. 116, 120; Chaffee v. United States, 18 Wall. 516, 542, 21 L. ed. 908, 912, explaining Cliquot's Champagne; Muller v. Southern Pacific Branch R. Co. 83 Cal. 240, 23 Pac. 265, overruled by Santa Ana v. Harlin, 99 Cal. 538, 34 Pac. 224; Harrison v. Glover. 72 N. Y. 451.

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ernment would put the land it proposed to take. If the remaining land had been part of the same tract which the government seeks to condemn, then the damage to the remaining portion of the tract taken, arising from the probable use thereof by the government, would be a proper subject of award in these condemnation proceedings. But the government takes the whole of one tract. If the evidence were such as to leave it a matter of some doubt whether the land owned by the plaintiff in error were one tract or sepa

ernment reservation at this point on the Del- | If not, the bill of exceptions should have aware river, upon which Fort Mott had been shown it, and some question made at the erected. This reservation had a frontage on time in regard to the erroneous character of that river, and ran back quite a number of the charge upon the facts. Error must apfeet, in some places nearly two thousand. pear in the record, and cannot be presumed. Permanent fortifications had already been The map contained in the record shows a erected, and placements for heavy ordnance highway between these tracts. From all the already built on this reservation, together evidence which can be gathered from the recwith magazines and other appurtenances for | ord it plainly appears to us that these tracts the firing of large guns. The particular of land were absolutely separate and indetract to be taken, namely, all of the Gibbons pendent farms, having no necessary relation farm of 41.75 acres, lies on parts of three with each other, and the farming on each sides of the government reservation, and a had been conducted separately, and each portion of it fronts on the Delaware river, farm had its own house and outbuildings. the same as the reservation itself. It was It is these facts which form the foundation purchased in 1891 for $6,000. The Dunham of the charge of the court to the jury. farm, of 80 acres, was purchased in 1880 We are, therefore, not only permitted but for $5,800, by the wife of, and subsequently bound to regard the evidence in the record conveyed by her to, the plaintiff in error; as supplemented by the statement of the evithe White farm, also of 80 acres, was pur-dence by the court. chased in 1899, a little over a month before Upon the facts which we have detailed, we the commencement of these proceedings, for think the plaintiff in error was not entitled $5,200. These three tracts of adjoining to recover damages to the land not taken beland, one of which only was taken, thus ap-cause of the probable use to which the govpear to have come to the present owner by three separate titles at three distinct times, running over a period of about twenty years. The evidence returned in the bill of exceptions, which does not purport to contain all the evidence given on the trial, does not show very clearly the exact condition of these various tracts at the time of their purchase by the plaintiff in error, but the judge, in his charge to the jury, evidently referred to evidence on this subject which does not appear in the bill, and was not corrected by counsel, and no exception was taken to the state-rated into three separate and distinct tracts, ment. We may, therefore, properly regard his references to the testimony actually given, but part of which does not appear, as correct recitals of the same. The judge stat-might be awarded, and refused if they were ed that the Dunham farm, which adjoins the one taken, has 80 acres in it and 600 feet front on the river. The farm had on it a dwelling house and barns and such buildings as ordinarily and, perhaps, necessarily go with a farm of that size and character in that neighborhood. The land that was purchased in 1891 (the farm to be taken) then had a dwelling house, a barn, a carriage house, and such outbuildings as ordinarily go with a farm of that size and character. Then the White farm consisted of 80 acres, and had a farm house on it and buildings but no water front, and one had to go through a lane of some kind to get to it. The testimony was, as stated in the judge's charge, that these farms, including the White farm up to 1899, when it was purchased by the plaintiff in error, were always worked separately, each having its separate dwelling house and outbuildings. It must be assumed that the statements of the court were correct statements of the testimony.

it would be proper to leave that question to the jury, with the instruction that if they found that it was one tract, then damages

separate and independent tracts. Upon this subject it was well stated by Judge Gray, delivering the opinion of the circuit court of appeals, as follows:

"Depreciation in the value of the residue of such a tract may properly be considered as allowable damages, in adjusting the compensation to be given to the owner for the land taken. It is often difficult, when part of a tract is taken, to determine what is a distinct and independent tract; but the character of the holding, and the distinction between the residue of a tract whose integrity is destroyed by the taking, and what are merely other parcels or holdings of the same owner, must be kept in mind in the practical application of the requirement to render just compensation for property taken for public uses. How it is applied must largely depend upon the facts of the particular case, and the sound discretion of the court. All the testimony in this case tends to show the separateness of this tract, which was the