cretion of the Court, with penal servitude for any term not exceeding seven years and not less than three years; or to be imprisoned for any term not exceeding two years, with or without hard labour and solitary confinement. XI. What offences in connection with wills and codicils are inade punishable by any and what statute? ANS.-By the Larceny Act, 24 & 25 Vic. c. 96, s. 29, to destroy a will for any fraudulent purpose, either during the life or after the death of the testator, is a felony. By the Forgery Act, 24 & 25 Vic. c. 98, ss. 21, 49); to forge a will is also felony with the same punishment; by s. 38, demanding, &c., property, &c., upon a will, &c., known to be forged, is a felony. XII. Can a person indicted for embezzlement be convicted of any other, and what offence? ANS.-By the Larceny Act, 24 & 25 Vic. c. 96, s. 72, if it be proved that the party accused of embezzlement took the property in such a way as to amount to larceny, the jury may find him not guilty of embezzlement, but guilty of simple larceny or larceny as a clerk, or as the case may be, and thereupon he may be punished in the same manner as if he had been convicted upon an indictment for such larceny, and so vice versa. XIII. In what manner is the offence of destroying fences punishable ? ANS. By the Malicious Injuries to Property Act, 24 & 25 Vic. c. 97, s. 25, for the first offence the offender forfeits over and above the amount of the injury, not exceeding £5; and on a second conviction he may be imprisoned, with hard labour, for not exceeding twelve months: XIV. Is it any, and what offence, to make, accept, or indorse a bill or note as by procuration without authority? ANS. By the Forgery Act, 24 & 25 Vic. c. 98, s. 24, such making, accepting, or indorsing is a felony. XV. In what cases have justices jurisdiction to deal with the civil claims of persons whose lands are about to be taken or injuriously affected under the compulsory powers of an act with which the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845, is incorporated? ANS.-Under s. 22 of the Lands Clauses Act, 8 Vic. c. 18, two justices have power to settle claims for compensation which do not exceed the amount of £50. They may, s. 59, nominate a surveyor where the party interested is out of the kingdom or cannot be found. TO CORRESPONDENTS. R. O. S.-The best course is to advertise; but we should have thought you would be content to be in a branch of the profession the most likely to afford scope to any abilities you may possess. The situation you seek is almost a menial one. BINDING VOL. II.-With the present number an index to vol. ii is furnished, and that volume may now be bound. The index contains references to the covers, so that the latter should bebound up with the volume; the best place for them is at the end of the volume. We have no covers for binding, neither can we procure the volume to be bound. This must be done by each subscriber in his own or neighbouring town. To Quo.-Bacon's "Use of the Law" is a small work, and some parts of it are very useful, but there is, of course, a considerable portion now obsolete. It is a specimen of what may be termed a popular law book of some two centuries ago. The author was the celebrated Lord Bacon. It is much more readable and less technical than his Maxims. S. E.-You had better procure Mr. Williams' two works on Real and Personal Property, Mr. Smith's Manuals of Equity, Common Law, and Bankruptcy, Hunter's Suit in Equity, and Smith's Action at Law. These works will form a good ground-work, and afterwards you can read other larger works with profit. A SUBSCRIBER.-The intermediate examination is for clerks "under articles of clerkship executed after the 1st of January, 1861" and as your service under articles must be considered as having commenced in 1857, we think there can be no doubt that you are not bound to undergo an intermediate examination, though if you wish to do so, we dare say no objection would be made. For greater certainty in the matter we would advise you to write to the Secretary of the Incorporated Law Society. ADVERTISEMENTS GRATIS.-It has occurred to us that we might. extend the utility of the publication by permitting the free insertion of advertisements by subscribers, in respect to matters likely to be advantageous to the advertisers and advertisees. For instance, respecting books for sale, exchange, or purchase, and other similar matters affecting or interesting to articled clerks. We beg, therefore, to state that we are ready to devote a page of the cover of each number to such kinds of advertisements without any charge whatever; but we cannot undertake to forward answers, nor must they be directed to be left at or sent to our office except postage stamps are sent to cover the expense of forwarding the answers. The best way in such case will be to enclose communications (stamped, in an envelope) addressed to us. DOWER TRUSTEE. MOST, if not all, of our readers are aware of the case of Collard v. Roe (7 Week. Rep. 623; 4 Jur., N. S., 431; 27 L. Jour., Ch., 295), where a purchaser was held entitled to the concurrence of a dower trustee, and the objection that the trustee was a necessary party to the conveyance was allowed; but a suit for that purpose was deemed frivolous. This matter being one of some practical importance, we here give a case and opinion of counsel on the subject, remarking that there was no power of appointment. It appeared that upon the paying off a mortgage on certain freehold estates, a reconveyance was taken in June, 1862, to the mortgagor and trustee to bar dower as follows :-" To be held by A. B. (the mortgagor) and his heirs, freed and absolutely discharged from the mortgage debt and charge created by the said mortgage, to the use of the said A. B. during his life, without impeachment of waste. And after the determination of that estate, to the use of C. D. during the life of and in trust for A. B.; and after the determination of that estate, to the use of the said A. B. and his heirs and assigns for ever." At the time of the reconveyance A. B. had contracted for the absolute sale of the estate to a purchaser, whose solicitor insisted on the trustee to bar dower, C. D. joining in and executing the conveyance to the purchaser, and he relied on the above case of Collard v. Roe (4 Jur., N. S., 431, and 27 L. Jour., Ch., 295). It was contended on the behalf of A. B., the vendor, that the facts of the case scarcely warranted the view taken by the purchaser's solicitor, for on reference to the report of Collard v. Roe, it would be seen that the conveyance limiting the uses out of which the question arose was executed in December, 1841, prior to 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, and the Vice-Chancellor Stuart makes this the foundation of his decision. He says: "There might, therefore, have been a forfeiture before the Act was passed," &c. But he goes on to say that he yields most reluctantly; adding, that the objection was of a character most frivolous and vexatious, and one with as slight a foundation as any he had ever known to succeed, &c. Now, as in the present case, the conveyance was executed subsequently to 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, it is hardly possible that any particle of an interest can have vested in the trustee C. D. There would be no difficulty in the matter if C. D. would join, but he positively refuses to concur in the conveyance, and it has, therefore, become a serious question how far his concurrence can really be insisted on. Counsel's opinion was to the effect that, having regard to the case of Collard v. Roe, which has never been appealed from (except on a question of costs, see 7 Week. Rep. 623), he certainly could not advise that A. B. would be safe in resisting the contention of the purchaser in the present case; and he did not think that the strict right of the purchaser to insist on the concurrence of the dower trustee was affected, or, at all events, extinguished by anything contained in the 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106. With respect to the trustee himself, he was of opinion that as between himself and the vendor he was bound to concur in the conveyance; unless, indeed, the trust was created without his consent, and he had done nothing since to testify his acceptance of it, in which case he might disclaim the trust, and with this the purchaser should be satisfied. If, however, the trustee refused to do either, and the purchaser should still insist on the objection, he was afraid that the only course the vendor could take would be to obtain a vesting order under the Trustee Act; or, if he could show that the trust had been accepted, to file a bill against the trustee to compel him to concur. MOOT POINTS. No. 1.-Fee simple or tail.-By a fine and an indenture declaring the uses thereof, certain property was limited to such uses as husband and wife should appoint. In default to husband and wife for lives and the life of the survivor with remainder. To the use and behoof of all and every the child and children of the body of the said husband on the body of Alice his wife, lawfully begotten or to be begotten, his and their heirs, and for default of such issue, To the use and behoof of the said husband and wife, their heirs and assigns for ever. No joint appointment was made by husband and wife. There were eight children of the marriage. four of whom died in the lifetime of their mother (three in their infancy, and one after attaining her majority and unmarried). Another child died in the mother's lifetime, leaving two sons and three daughters. The mother survived her husband, and died on the 21st June, 1833, having made her will, dated in 1827, whereby she gave and devised the property (with other property in Luda) to her son J. P. S., his heirs and assigns for ever. The daughter, who died in the lifetime of the mother, unmarried, having attained the age of 21 years, died on the 16th February, 1833, having made a will, by which she bequeathed personal property only. There are now living two sons, J. P. S. (the devisee in the mother's will), and S. S., and one daughter, Mrs. Smith. The five children of R. S. (one of the children who died in the mother's lifetime) are also living. R. S. made a will, by which he devised his real property to his brother, J. P. S, in trust for sale for the benefit of his children. The existence of the fine and the deed declaring its uses was not discovered to the family till after the mother's death. Are the parties entitled under the will, seised of the above-mentioned premises, as joint tenants in fee simple? Or are the words to be construed as creating estates tail?-THOMAS JOHNSON MASON, 19. Bridge-street, Louth. |