XII. What is the limitation of time within which an action must be brought to recover a debt on simple contract, and what on a specialty, or a contract under seal?

ANS.-Actions to recover simple contract debts must be brought within six years from the time the causes of action accrued, except in case of disability. In respect of a contract under seal or a specialty debt, an action must be brought within twenty years after the cause of action accrued, except in case of disability. By the 19 & 20 Vic. c. 96, the causes of disability are reduced to infancy, coverture, being non compos mentis, and a defendant beyond seas (3 L. C. 89, 91; F. Bk. 268, 269).

XIII. In the case of an assignment of a mortgage, can the assignee of the mortgagee, in his own name, sue the mortgagor at common law?

ANS.-A mortgage debt being a chose in action, and therefore not assignable at common law, the assignee of the mortgagee cannot sue at law for it in his own name (F. Bk. 197, 203, 209). He must sue in the name of the mortgagee under the power of attorney which was or ought to have been contained in the assignment of the mortgage. Where the mortgagor concurs in the transfer of the mortgage, it is best to make him enter into a fresh covenant for payment of principal and interest to the assignee, so as to enable the latter to sue in his own name at common law (2 Dav. Conv. 694, 695, 2nd ed.).

XIV. What is the meaning of the maxim "actio personalis moritur cum personá?” Has the effect of this maxim been recently altered by statute, and, if so, by what statute? ANS.-The meaning of the maxim "actio personalis moritur cum persona" is, that a personal right of action dies with the person (3 Steph. Com. 455, 4th ed.). The maxim has been modified by various statutes, and by the 9 & 10 Vic. c. 93, s. 1, whenever the death of a person shall be caused by such wrongful act, neglect, or default, as would (if death had not ensued) have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof, then the person who would have been liable to such action shall be liable (within twelve months) to an action for damages. And every such action shall be for the benefit of the wife, husband, parent, and child of the person whose death shall have been so caused, and be brought by and in the name of the executor or administrator of the deceased person (3 Steph. Com. 456, 4th ed.: F. Bk. 245, 246).

B

XV. What are the usual quarter days of the year? How is a tenancy from year to year determined on either side?

ANS.-The usual quarter days of the year are Ladyday, Midsummer day, Michaelmas day, and Christmas day. A tenancy from. year to year is determined by six months' notice, expiring with the current year of the tenancy (1 Steph. Com. 292, 4th ed.; F. Bk. 134: Rosc. Evid. 643, et seq., 9th ed.).

CONVEYANCING.

I. Within what period must an estate vest when limited by way of future use or executory devise?

ANS.-An estate limited by way of future or executory devise, and not being immediately preceded by an estate tail, must vest in possession within the period of a life or any fixed number of existing lives and an additional term of twenty-one years; an additional period being allowed for the time of gestation, should gestation actually exist, but not being provided for as a term in gross (Burt. Comp. Pl., 784, 786, and note by Cooper; F. Bk. 151, 152).

II. What are the chief alterations in the law of descent effected by 3rd & 4th Will. 4, c. 106?

ANS.-By the above statute descent is to be traced from the purchaser, that is the last person entitled who did not inherit, whereas before the Act it was traced from the person last seised. On the failure of descendants of the purchaser an estate may go to his lineal ancestors, which it could not formerly have done, the maxim having been "Hæreditas nunquam ascendit" (See Maxims, p. 78). The half-blood are now allowed to inherit next after persons of the the same degree of the whole blood, and their descendants where the common ancestor is a male, and next after the common ancestor where she is a female, whereas formerly the half-blood were excluded (See Maxims, pp. 116, 119; F. Bk. 160).

III. An estate is limited to A. for life, with the remainder to the first and other sons of B. in tail, with remainder to C. in fee. A. dies leaving B. and C. surviving, but B. being unmarried to whom does the estate devolve?

ANS.-Inasmuch as every contingent remainder must vest or become an actual estate during the continuance of the particular estate which supports it, or eo instanti that such particular estate

determines (except where the determination is occasioned prematurely, 8 & 9 Vic. c. 106, s. 8; F. Bk. 151), C. will be entitled to the estate, there being no son of B. in esse (F. Bk. 151).

IV. Land is devised to such uses as A., who is a married woman, should appoint, and in default to her in fee. Can a good title be made without the concurrence of the husband, and what further is necessary to complete the conveyance?

ANS.-A good title can be made by the married woman, as she can appoint without the concurrence or consent of her husband: as a power of appointment to any woman, whether given to her when married or when single, may be exercised without the consent of any husband to whom she may then or thereafter be married (Wms. Real Prop. p. 260, 5th ed.). Where, however, a married woman, besides exercising her power of appointment, conveys, as an appointor is very commonly made to do (2 Dav. Conv. 155, 2nd ed.), by way of further assurance, such conveyance will be ineffectual unless made with the concurrence of her husband, and with the formalities required by the 3 & 4 Wm. 4, c. 74 (F. Bk. 111, 185, 186; Prid. Conv. 130, 2nd ed.; 2 Jur., N. S., 484; 1 Sug. Pow. 185, 6th ed.; Dart. 367, 3rd ed.).

V. A man has one son B. and two daughters. B. purchases an
estate in fee and dies intestate and without issue, leaving his
two sisters and his father him surviving.
What becomes of

his estate?

ANS.-The father will take the estate, for by 3 & 4 Wm. 4, c. 106, s. 6, on failure of issue of the purchaser, the inheritance goes to the nearest lineal ancestor living in the preferable line, supposing no descendants of a nearer lineal ancestor exist (F. Bk. 160).

VI. What is meant by a voluntary settlement, and when can it be supported against purchasers for valuable consideration or creditors?

ANS.-A settlement is voluntary where it is made without a valuable consideration, that is, not grounded on a pecuniary consideration or on an intended marriage (F. Bk. 167, 204; 7 Sol. Journ., 84), and, by 27 Eliz. c. 4, a voluntary settlement of lands, or interest in lands, is void as against a subsequent bona fide purchaser for valuable consideration, although he has notice of it (except it be to a charity); and, by 13 Eliz., c. 5, all voluntary settlements are void against the creditors of a party, if he was indebted at the time of making the settlement, and the effect of the settle

ment is to delay the creditors. In the case of purchasers the property must be other than chattels; but in the case of creditors it may be chattels. (F. Bk. 167, 204; 2 L. C. 405; 3 ib. 220, 242, 317, 344, 369; 30 Law Journ. Ch. 612.)

VII. A purchaser of an estate in fee simple dies intestate, leaving two daughters. One daughter then dies leaving a son. To what portion of the estate, is this son entitled ? ANS.-Notwithstanding the 3 & 4 Wm. 4, c. 106, s. 2 directs that descents shall be traced from the purchaser (who is in this case the father of the two daughters) yet if the daughter die intestate, her son will be entitled to one half of the estate, he taking his mother's share by representation (See Cooper v. France, 14 Jur. 214; F. Bk. 155).

VIII. When a condition is annexed to a grant of an estate in

fee simple, what is the result of the breach of the condition; 1st when it is precedent, 2nd when it is subsequent ? ANS.-On nonperformance of a condition precedent, the estate fails even if the performance be impossible or illegal; on breach of a condition subsequent, the estate will devest if there be a gift over, but if not, or the condition become impossible or illegal, the estate will be absolute (Hayes and Jarm. Wills, 394, 5th ed.; F. Bk. 146).

IX.-Distinguish between dower and jointure, and say to what extent has a widow's right to dower been affected by the 3rd and 4th Wm. 4, c. 105?

ANS.-Dower at the common law is an estate for the life of the wife in a third part of the real estate of which the husband was seised in fee in possession during the coverture, and of which any other issue might, by possibility, have been heir: it arises by operation of law. Jointure is an estate for the life of the wife in the real estate of the husband, to take effect immediately after her husband's death, and arises by express contract of the parties, and is in lieu of dower. It may be either legal or equitable (See F. Bk. 129; Watk. Conv. by White, 92, 93; 2 L. C. 62, 892, 267; 16 Jur. 939). By 3 & 4 Wm. 4 c. 105, as to women married since 1st January, 1834, the widow is entitled to dower out of equitable estates and out of lands to which the husband had a mere right of entry or action without seisin. Such women are not entitled to dower out of lands absolutely disposed of by her husband; and all partial estates and interests, and all charges created by the husband and all debts, incumbrances, contracts, and engagements to which his lands may be liable, are effectual as against his widow's dower. The husband may

also deprive his wife of dower by any declaration for that purpose made by him by any deed or by his will. Where the husband devises any lands to his wife out of which she would have been dowable, she is not entitled to dower out of any land unless a contrary intention appear (F. Bk. 128; 4 L. C. 209).

X. A purchaser buys an estate free from incumbrance, and it turns out on his investigating the title that there is a rent charge due to a jointress upon it. How is the defect to be remedied so as to make a title to an unwilling purchaser? ANS.-The vendor must obtain the concurrence of the jointress and her trustee in the conveyance.

XI. A testator gives an annuity, and directs a sufficient principal sum to be appropriated by his executors wherewith to purchase the annuity, but the intended annuitant demands the principal of the executors, claiming an option to do so. Can this demand be resisted? and, if not, what precaution should be taken in the will to prevent the possibility of this occurring?

ANS.-Where by will a sum of money is directed to be laid out in the purchase of an annuity, the annuitant can elect to take the price or value instead of the annuity, and the executors cannot resist this demand. A testator desiring to prevent the annuitant taking the principal fund should either expressly provide that the annuitant shall not be entitled to elect, or should direct his executors to invest an adequate sum to meet the annuity in the purchase of stock or other security yielding income until the decease of the annuitant, and then direct the fund to fall into his residuary estate (Stokes v. Cheek, 29 L. J., Ch. 922; Hayes and Jarm. Wills, p. 114; 11 Jarm. Conv. by Sweet, 468 and Notes; 1 Russ. and Myl. 606).

XII. An annuity of £600 a year was bequeathed by a testator to his son F. out of a certain stock, and the annuity was directed not to be sold until after F. and his wife's death, nor until F.'s son should attain twenty-one-was the annuity so given limited to F.'s life, or did he take a perpetual annuity by the bequest? Give the reason for your answer. ANS.-There is great difficulty in deciding whether, where an annuity is given by will without limiting its duration, it is or not a perpetual one; it is said that an annuity is perpetual when it is given out of, or the gift is coupled with, or has reference to, a particular fund, the pointing to the fund being such an indication of intention as amounts to a dedication of so much of the fund as will