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of the employees, and eventually “stole” the company with the concurrence of the U.S. State Department.

Subsequent to this incident, the Canal Zone Bus Service, Inc., had its buses hijacked by gun right under the watchful eyes of Dictator Torrijos' Guardia Nationale.

For the American press and the government to continually bleat about the suppression of human rights in South Korea which has been under constant threat of invasion from the North while overlooking the violation of human rights in Panama which has no such continuing pressure is indecent and should not be imitated by your new Administration.

The second part of your policy toward Korea—that is a withdrawal of American troops—concerns me as a Korean veteran who has maintained a close watch on the political/military events in the two Koreas since the 1950 war and as a Member of the U.S. Congressional Delegation of Korean War Veterans.

The defense of South Korea is first and foremost in the best interests of the United States of America. Our long-term goals of peace and stability in the Far East should transcend any transitory alleged imperfection in the Korean government as perceived by segments of the American press and some Members of Congress.

I was in Korea in October/November 1975 when there was great fear on the part of South Korea and the Japanese as a result of our withdrawal from Vietnam that our defense commitments to South Korea and our will to stay there had been sorely weakened. By now it has been amply reported in the press that Japan would consider any premature or unilateral troop withdrawal as a direct threat to its territory and that there would be strong support on the part of the Japanese people and the government to re-arm, up to and including nuclear weapons. This in turn would raise the traditional fears in China over the existence of a large Japanese war machine across the Tanshima straits again threatening China as it has so disastrously in the past.

As the Chairman of the U.S. Congressional Delegation of Korean War Veterans, I submitted a report to the Speaker that clearly outlines the position of the then senior military commanders in the area including Admiral Noel Gaylor, General Richard G. Stilwell, Supreme Commander of U.N., U.S. and Korean forces, and the then “I” Corps Commander, Lt. General James F. Hollingsworth. The U.S. troops are desired in South Korea not only by the South Korean government and by those charged with the maintenance of our defense perimeter in the Pacific, but by the leaders of Japan and China as well.

In interviews published on January 13, 1977, the date of your meeting, Japanese leaders stated, “The presence of Communist troops in Pusan would accomplish, like nothing else, a national consensus to rearm.” They further stated that if a “Communized” Korea were to go nuclear, so would Japan.

It is ironic that even President Park's strongest opponents support the continued presence of U.S. troops in South Korea. In the same report just referred to, Kim Dae Jung (the Korean opposition leader imprisoned by Park) told reporters that the Japanese would find it “psychologically and historically difficult” to accept the idea of a defense line at water's edge.

“The Japanese still have the bushido (samurai) spirit in their hearts,” Kim said. “They are westernized only on the surface. If all Korea is communized, the Japanese altogether, especially the zaibatsu (economic groups) and the right will go for rearmament, and go nuclear. Even if America says it will defend Japan at the straits, they won't believe it. For a thousand years Korea has been a bridge to Japan-for the Mongols, and in the Russo-Japanese war. They have a vivid remembrance of (those events).'

It does not take very long for anyone to be in Korea in a position of command without realizing the obvious fact of the need for an American presence there.

For example, General John W. Vessey, who replaced General Richard G. Stilwell as commander-in-chief of United Nations and American forces in Korea last October, recently stated, “a withdrawal of forces from South Korea would increase considerably” the risk of conflict with the north. “Our presence is very important in the deterrence of war. It is the one clear signal to Kim (Il Sung) that if he starts a war, he will fight both the U.S. and Korean armies.

It is a well-documented fact that only the continued American presence in Korea deters Kim Il Sung from an immediate invasion of South Korea. Kim has specifically stated that publicly on many occasions, and it has been confirmed by other international sources time and time again. Yet press reports of your recent statements unfortunately indicate that it is your intention to pull American forces out of the south, perhaps prematurely. I view that as an extremely ill-advised approach to our military commitments in the Far East and our need for an Asian defense perimeter.

Finally, Eugene V. Rostow wrote a letter to me on January 3, 1977, in which he stated:

“About Korea, we simply must keep conventional forces there for the same reasons which require our strong conventional presence in Europe. The independence of Korea and Taiwan is vital to the defense of Japan, and we do not want the President in a crisis to face the ghastly choice between yielding and using the nuclear weapon. It is this feature of nuclear logic which makes conventional deterrence so important today.”

I have enclosed for your information the Report of the Panama Canal Subcommittee based on my tenure as Chairman briefly outlining some of the events I have mentioned above, a copy of the Report of the Panamanian Committee for Human Rights, and a copy of my report to the Speaker of the House of Representatives relative to the visit to the Republic of Korea by the U.S. Congressional Delegation of Korean War Veterans.

I would be happy to discuss the above with you at your convenience.
With kind personal regards, I remain,
Sincerely,

John M. MURPHY,

Member of Congress. Mr. HUBBARD. Does any other Congressman have a question of Mr. Grove or General McAuliffe?

Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Grove, in turning to your testimony, sir, on page 8 you state that, in a simple three-line paragraph, the treaties will be approved in accordance with our constitutional process. This will enter into force on October 1 of this year.

The following paragraph you try to point out, I think, to us what the State Department feels is our impending legislative role.

I would argue with that paragraph as it stands alone. I think we are back to the constitutional crisis that the Supreme Court did not have the will to face up to, article IV, section 3. If something involves the transfer of taxpayers' money or property, even property held in lease, and I was not a Ronald Reagan that said we own the Canal Zone down to the bottom of the ocean, I think this is going to go on until next week when the President and his administration and the State Department find themselves at a big loss on the rule for the treaty implementation.

It only won by two votes. Anyone observing this House for 242 years will tell you that in a rule, if you are within two votes of losing, you will lose by a lot more on the floor.

Our minority leader, Mr. Rhodes, told the President, don't bring this up on the floor. It will lose.

I do not think this analysis is something that can be black and white. Maybe honest men can disagree. But I would like to analyze some other circumstances. If we asked for a vote as to which country has the most stable Government, not in terms of democratic processes, just stable, staying power, Iran or Panama, Iran would have won by 440 votes to 1.

So things can change very quickly anywhere in the world. The strategic importance of the canal as a great water artery is as important as the Persian Gulf's $50 billion oil that we are becoming dependent on.

What would happen if there was an overthrow of the Panama Government, but our canal was respected, no one lobbed any mortar? General McAuliffe would go on red alert, but it would be over swiftly

Your Guardia Nationale is supposed to be small. But what if there was a government that declared itself Marxist-Leninist, loval to the great revolution of Fidel Castro, and they abrogated the neutrality treaty?

It is a new ball game, as Mao and Hitler declared. What would be the status of the United States then? Would it not be similar to Guantanamo and Cuba?

Mr. GROVE. You posit a major assumption in the question with Panama in a hypothetical way. One would have to look at that very specific legal action of the successor government to see precisely what it was they had done with respect to the agreements between us, and where that left the coming into force of the treaties as scheduled for October 1.

We obviously would have to come to an assessment of what the possibilities would be with that government, and how our interests might be affected by such a drastic and unwelcome change.

We would have to, I have no doubt, seek to enter into discussions with such a new government to find out what was really on their minds, or what was in the realm of the possible.

We would secure the advice of General McAuliffe and Ambassador Moss and others on the scene whose assessments would be fundamental.

Mr. DORNAN. But isn't it possible that we could go into a mold, as we did with Cuba, don't breathe, don't move?

We recognized that Guantanamo Bay 9-year treaty; don't touch that. Castro decided to go low key and let it sit that way for several decades.

Isn't that true that could happen?

Mr. GROVE. I am sure there are a number of possibilities. This is so complex. It is hard to say yes or no. I should think the possibilities are many, and I would think, again on this question, because we are talking about the treaty, it does have legal aspects to it.

We would have to examine what occurred step by step, and analyze its implications for us in that fashion.

Mr. DORNAN. But you both, General McAuliffe and you, have given this deep thought, and before the debate comes on the House floor, I will have to ask the help of some constitutional and international lawyers as to exactly how to accept this.

We are, in the House, either going to like it or lump it, or let the money go up to $5 billion, $6 billion or $7 billion. It is not a deliberate misrepresentation, but bad bookkeeping.

Suppose this goes to $8 billion. You should have a break point. So we find out next week on the House floor.

Mr GROVE. I appreciate the difficulties. They are certainly real.

Mr. HUGHES. Just one thing: I know the hour is late, but I cannot resist the temptation.

Who was the one vote? Was that our chairman, Carroll Hubbard?

Mr. DORNAN. When Pearl Harbor was destroyed, there was one vote that we would not declare war. In this case, it was a woman. There is always one person who will say, I vote against the rule.

I-
Mr. HUGHES. I am sorry I asked.

I do have a couple of serious questions. First of all, I am not familiar with the manual that was introduced into evidence. Can you tell me a little bit about the manual?

Mr. GROVE. I can try to describe it to you. I am not familiar with it. It has a red cover. It is called, Panama Committee for Human Rights, Panama, November 1976. It has no attribution.

Mr. HUGHES. I was trying to determine the nature of it.

Mr. O'BRIEN. That was submitted to the subcommittee approximately 2 years ago, Congressman. It was purportedly a payroll-a copy of a payroll record. What I was trying to confirm was whether or not in fact

Mr. HUGHES. Who prepared it?

Mr. O'BRIEN. A citizen group that identifies itself as the Panama Human Rights group.

Mr. HUGHES. I wonder if the Secretary mentioned is the same Lopez that was the Panama consul?

Mr. GROVE. I am unable to answer that question. I would be glad to take the question. It is not all that uncommon a name, and I just do not know how we could pursue that.

[The following information was supplied in response to the above:]

PANAMANIAN CONSUL PURCHASE OF AMMUNITION AND GUNS

I have no information indicating that it is or is not the same Lopez, i.e., the one who was Panama's Consul in Miami.

Mr. HUGHES. On the assumption it is the same individual, is there any suggestion, or do you have any evidence, that he was indeed acting on behalf of the Panama Government?

Mr. GROVE. No, nor is this comprehensible. I don't know what this matrix is, looking at it. I am just having difficulty.

[The following information was supplied in response to the above:)

Yes. On December 11, 1978, the Panamanian Embassy in Washington informed us by diplomatic note that "the Panamanian Consul in the City of Miami, Mr. Edgardo Lopez Grimaldo, was given official instructions to acquire through purchase and sale the ammunition and guns referred to hereinabove”. The note stated further that “the said weapons and ammunition have been received by the National Guard of Panama . (and) are for the exclusive use of the National Guard . and the same are within the territory of Panama . .

Mr. HUBBARD. Mr. O'Brien would like to introduce this booklet for the record. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. O'BRIEN. On page 6 of the document, there is a narrative, and it refers to the government payroll of the G2, which includes Edgardo Lopez, an employee of the Government of Panama, G2. It is worthy to note that his salary is B/447.00, when another employee had a salary of B/16.79.

It goes on to say, Mr. Lopez holds now the post of Panama consul in the city of Miami, Fla., to cover the large Panamanian community there.

There is a narrative that complements the name that gave staff reason to believe that perhaps it is the same man.

Mr. HUGHES. I would just repeat my question, whether there is any evidence that he was acting on behalf of the Panamanian Government at the time he involved himself?

Mr. GROVE. I am sorry, I will have to ask for your understanding. Because there is an indictment, I cannot be responsive. I cannot go beyond the perception that we have of this as a Department and the Panamanian response.

So those are the two considerations I have addressed.

Mr. HUBBARD. Thank you, Congressman Hughes, for your questions.

Are there any other Members of Congress? I hate to cut this off.

I would like to say, I know Mr. Grove and General McAuliffe have earned their pay this afternoon. I want to call on Congressman Carney, and then Carl Perian, chief of staff of our full committee, and then we will conclude.

Mr. CARNEY. Would it be fair to say that you are prepared for a rejection of H.R. 111?

General MCAULIFFE. Yes, I think we are prepared for any contingency. It raises many questions as to how we will handle some of the issues.

But in terms of trying to protect U.S. lives and property, and to keep that canal at least protected, yes, we would be prepared.

Mr. PERIAN. General, in negotiations during the day with our staff I understand that for you to be more forthcoming in terms of some of the classified material relating to alleged gunrunning into Nicaragua, that only a few of the paragraphs of your DOT briefing would be top secret, and that the rest of your briefing would be at a higher S-1 level?

General MCAULIFFE. Yes.

Mr. PERIAN. And while staff is not cleared at that level, you would be able to make a presentation to the members of the committee?

General MCAULIFFE. That is correct.

Mr. PERIAN. We would ask you to begin the preparation for such a briefing. We can inform you perhaps tomorrow of time, place and date.

Mr. HUBBARD. Thank you very much, again, to General McAuliffe and Brandon Grove of the State Department.

You have been cooperative and patient and it has been an effort to answer the complex questions. As chairman of this subcommittee, I express my appreciation to you for being with us and for your presentation, though at times we did not all agree.

We try to reach the right conclusions in the best interests of our country

Thank you both.

At this point we have one Member of Congress and one witness under subpena who will testify.

The Member of Congress, incidentally, will be testifying eagerly, voluntarily, and again, we do have one witness under subpena.

I predict we can be through by 6 o'clock.

If you could be patient, those of you who are with us and those who are interested, we now will call on Congressman Hansen.

Mr. Hansen says he will wait.
Can we ask Mr. Armando Selva to come to the witness stand?

Mr. Selva is here under subpena to our committee. It is the choice of his as to whether or not any photographs are taken or television came

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