NON-INTERVENTION PROVISION

Whether or not a particular act would violate the non-intervention provisions of the OAS Charter depends largely upon the factual context in which that act takes place. However, as a general matter, we believe that official government action to provide arms to a group endeavoring to overthrow a foreign government through violence would violate the principle of non-intervention stated in Article 18 of the OAS Charter. Purely private action toward the same end would not violate the Charter.

Mr. O'BRIEN. Would you also provide us a list of those actions our Government has heard rumors of that constitute a violation of that provision of the charter?

Mr. GROVE. Yes, sir.

Mr. O'BRIEN. Thank you very much.

Mr. HUBBARD. The chief of staff of the full committee, Carl Perian.

Mr. PERIAN. Chairman Murphy requested that I point out that as a result of allegations made against the Nicaraguan Government by unnamed "sources" in the State Department who were referred to on the front page of the Washington Post in the last week of July 1978, he called the Department of State and asked for examples, evidence, or documents proving human rights violations in Nicaragua as they were determined to be found by the State Department.

In response to that call on August 1, 1978, at 4 p.m. in the afternoon, Chairman Murphy was visited by Sally Shelton, Mark Schneider, and Curtis Cutter, I believe, from the State Department, Nicaragua desk, in the human rights section. I was also present at that meeting.

At that time they brought approximately 15 telexes from the State Department which they had received from the Embassy in Nicaragua. We were told that they were classified and that we could not have them. They were top secret documents.

Mr. Murphy then asked if he could read them. Five allegedly "worst cases" were selected and given to the chairman to read, none of which had anything to do with any human rights violations on the part of the Nicaraguan Government or the national guard against anyone in the city of Managua or the country of Nicaragua.

He then subsequently requested a CIA briefing on this same subject, and the CIA similarly had no such information to impart to the chairman.

In reference to the letter that Mr. O'Brien discussed, I think it should be inserted in the record at this point-and the chairman asked that I do that—a seven-page letter dated January 31, 1977. It was addressed to President Carter.

I am surprised that General McAuliffe or Mr. Grove are unfamiliar with Manuel Pinero, because in this letter the chairman pointed out he was the chief of intelligence responsible for guerrilla activities in the Caribbean.

The letter went into great detail about human rights violations on the part of the Panamanian Government and the Panamanian National Guard. And as an enclosure he provided a document which is part I of the three-part document that you have on that

table that Mr. O'Brien introduced into the record of the Panama Committee for Human Rights.

It was quite a lengthy letter, and we received a written reply from Mr. Brzezinski, thanking Mr. Murphy for the receipt of the letter and the documents, that they would both be studied by the State and Defense Departments, and that Mr. Murphy would then receive a written report.

He never received a written report on the human rights violations in Panama. He did receive a phone call from the State Department acknowledging that all of the events which had been fairly well documented in the report were accurate, including acts of murder and violence and brutality, but that they had occurred 4, 5, or 6 years previously, and that therefore they were not being taken into consideration by the State Department or the Department of Defense in consideration of the Panama Canal treaties at that time.

Mr. Murphy's only response was, in effect, when did the statute of limitations run out on murder? I think that would help answer the questions of Mr. Bauman concerning the response of the State Department to human rights violations in Panama.

For the record, I would like to submit Mr. Murphy's January 31, 1977, letter.

Thank you.

Mr. HUBBARD. Thank you. That letter will be entered into the record.

[The following was received for the record:]

The PRESIDENT,

The White House,

Washington, D.C.

JANUARY 31, 1977.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have read with great interest and with some alarm press reports concerning your day-long meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and your national security advisors on Thursday, January 13, 1977.

The two disturbing reports concerned issues with which I have been involved for many years as a Member of Congress. As the former Chairman of the Panama Canal Subcommittee on the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee and as the present Chairman of that Full Committee, I have been watching closely your statements concerning future treaty negotiations with the Republic of Panama. Recent reports, including the one emanating from the January 13th meeting would indicate that you may be altering your campaign position wherein you indicated your resolve to maintain U.S. control over the Canal and the Canal Zone. I point out that there is a wealth of legal evidence to sustain the position that the Canal Zone and the Canal are United States property. Much of this evidence was presented during hearings conducted by myself during the 92nd Congress. As a result of these hearings, the State Department conceded that enabling legislation approved by a vote of the Full House would be required in order to transfer any property to the Republic of Panama that was originally purchased with monies appropriated by the House of Representatives.

I am sure you are aware of the importance of the Panama Canal and the Canal Zone to our national defense. The Russians know this also, which is the reason they are so eagerly attempting to establish a Moscow-Havana-Panama Axis in the Caribbean. Panama is only the top of the iceberg.

Communist ties with Panama are not a recent innovation, nor are they unknown to our negotiators. In the State Department Bulletin, the official record of U.S. foreign policy, dated February 24, 1964, just after violent anti-American riots which led to a 4-month break in diplomatic relations with Panama, we read:

"If an investigation is made. . . it will show that violent mobs, infiltrated and led by extremists, including persons trained in Communist countries for political action of the kind that took place, assulted the zone on a wide perimeter, setting fire to buildings inside the zone and attacking with incendiary bombs . . . It will show that

the Government of Panama, instead of attempting to restore order, was, through a controlled press, television and radio, inciting the people to attack and to violence." The speaker was the U.S. representative to the Council of the Organization of American States, Ellsworth Bunker-our current Panama Canal Treaty negotiator. Later, Joseph Califano, counsel for the United States at the OAS hearings, outlined some of the findings:

"We know that some of the leaders in the rioting were known and identifiable Communists-members of the P.D.P., the Communist Party of Panama-and people who belonged to the Vanguard of National Action, which is openly and proudly the Castro Community Party in Panama.'

There is absolutely no question as to the increasing ties between the current military dictatorship of Gen. Omar Torrijos in Panama and the Castro regime. The commercial air route between Havana and Panama City is traveled constantly by the likes of foreign minister Fabian Valerde. In his June meeting with Castro, his vice minister Carlos Rodriquez, known as the "Moscow man in Havana," and Commandante Manuel Pineiro, the chief of intelligence responsible for guerrilla activities abroad, Valerde spoke at length about Cuban-Panamanian relations and about anti-U.S. tactics in connection with the future of the canal. When this was reported in the Panamanian Government's officials organ, El Matutino, Valerde praised Castro for his "wisdom" in the Panama Canal case.

Valerde said Castro offered Communist Cuba's most emphatic support on the canal question. At the same time, another Panamanian group headed by Carlos Lopez Nunez, the militant head of the National Committee for Panama's Defense, was in Hanoi to discuss the canal question with the Vietnamese Communists. Later, in a July interview with, the "Mexico_City excelsior" General Torrijos expressed the belief that the return of the Canal Zone to Panama, and the removal of the U.S. military bases, was imminent. In response to the question, "what if that does not ocur?", Torrijos said:

"Then we would have to walk the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The Ho Chi Minh Trail is long and it exerts a heavy toll in blood."

How many more positive indications must we accumulate before we see the course of the Panamanian dictator?

Yet, at a recent briefing by CINCPAC in Hawaii, I was told that in the event of any hostilities in the Pacific in the future, the Panama Canal would be absolutely essential for the defense of American commitments in the far Pacific. In making his point, the Commander-in-Chief Pacific stated that if he were guaranteed carte blance use of every boxcar and every East/West railway line in the United States absent the Canal he couldn't say with any degree of certainty that he could successfully carry out a defensive war.

I would certainly hope that before any hard decisions are formed concerning future U.S.-Panama treaty negotiations, you would take into account the findings of those of us in the House who have had years of experience with the Panama Canal in terms of its use both in maritime commerce and as an important integral part of our defense establishment.

My other major concern has to do with news reports emanating from your January 13 meeting concerning the Republic of Korea.

Your future policy was characterized as calling for a restoration of human rights on the part of the regime of President Park Chung Hee and a gradual U.S. troop withdrawal from South Korea. On the first point, I think it is ironic that we are aggressively criticizing a staunch and friendly ally for alleged human rights violations and threatening to punish them by withholding necessary arms supplies and the withdrawal of troops. On the other hand, it would appear that many in our government are ready to reward the dictatorship of General Omar Torrijos and his crushingly oppressive regime by giving him the Panama Canal which the United States by history, by treaty, and by purchase, legally owns.

I have recently been given a lengthy document put together by the Panamanian Committee for Human Rights which contains allegations of a far more serious nature, including assassinations, brutality and the like on the part of the Torrijos regime. Yet no one in this government has even acknowledged some of the more readily apparent violations of human freedoms in the Republic of Panama including total suppression of the press, total suppression of the people by the Guardia Nationale and the lack of observation of the constitutional rights of large numbers of Panamanian citizens.

As far as the United States is concerned, I would point out that during my tenure as Chairman of the Panama Canal Subcommittee, I saw an American firm, Fuerza y Luz, expropriated by armed troops who padlocked offices, conducted body searches

of the employees, and eventually "stole" the company with the concurrence of the U.S. State Department.

Subsequent to this incident, the Canal Zone Bus Service, Inc., had its buses hijacked by gun right under the watchful eyes of Dictator Torrijos' Guardia Nationale.

For the American press and the government to continually bleat about the suppression of human rights in South Korea which has been under constant threat of invasion from the North while overlooking the violation of human rights in Panama which has no such continuing pressure is indecent and should not be imitated by your new Administration.

The second part of your policy toward Korea-that is a withdrawal of American troops-concerns me as a Korean veteran who has maintained a close watch on the political/military events in the two Koreas since the 1950 war and as a Member of the U.S. Congressional Delegation of Korean War Veterans.

The defense of South Korea is first and foremost in the best interests of the United States of America. Our long-term goals of peace and stability in the Far East should transcend any transitory alleged imperfection in the Korean government as perceived by segments of the American press and some Members of Congress. I was in Korea in October/November 1975 when there was great fear on the part of South Korea and the Japanese as a result of our withdrawal from Vietnam that our defense commitments to South Korea and our will to stay there had been sorely weakened. By now it has been amply reported in the press that Japan would consider any premature or unilateral troop withdrawal as a direct threat to its territory and that there would be strong support on the part of the Japanese people and the government to re-arm, up to and including nuclear weapons. This in turn would raise the traditional fears in China over the existence of a large Japanese war machine across the Tanshima straits again threatening China as it has so disastrously in the past.

As the Chairman of the U.S. Congressional Delegation of Korean War Veterans, I submitted a report to the Speaker that clearly outlines the position of the then senior military commanders in the area including Admiral Noel Gaylor, General Richard G. Stilwell, Supreme Commander of U.N., U.S. and Korean forces, and the then "I" Corps Commander, Lt. General James F. Hollingsworth. The U.S. troops are desired in South Korea not only by the South Korean government and by those charged with the maintenance of our defense perimeter in the Pacific, but by the leaders of Japan and China as well.

In interviews published on January 13, 1977, the date of your meeting, Japanese leaders stated, "The presence of Communist troops in Pusan would accomplish, like nothing else, a national consensus to rearm." They further stated that if a “Communized" Korea were to go nuclear, so would Japan.

It is ironic that even President Park's strongest opponents support the continued presence of U.S. troops in South Korea. In the same report just referred to, Kim Dae Jung (the Korean opposition leader imprisoned by Park) told reporters that the Japanese would find it "psychologically and historically difficult" to accept the idea of a defense line at water's edge.

"The Japanese still have the bushido (samurai) spirit in their hearts," Kim said. "They are westernized only on the surface. If all Korea is communized, the Japanese altogether, especially the zaibatsu (economic groups) and the right will go for rearmament, and go nuclear. Even if America says it will defend Japan at the straits, they won't believe it. For a thousand years Korea has been a bridge to Japan-for the Mongols, and in the Russo-Japanese war. They have a vivid remembrance of (those events)."

It does not take very long for anyone to be in Korea in a position of command without realizing the obvious fact of the need for an American presence there. For example, General John W. Vessey, who replaced General Richard G. Stilwell as commander-in-chief of United Nations and American forces in Korea last October, recently stated, "a withdrawal of forces from South Korea would increase considerably" the risk of conflict with the north. "Our presence is very important in the deterrence of war. It is the one clear signal to Kim (Il Sung) that if he starts a war, he will fight both the U.S. and Korean armies.

It is a well-documented fact that only the continued American presence in Korea deters Kim Il Sung from an immediate invasion of South Korea. Kim has specifically stated that publicly on many occasions, and it has been confirmed by other international sources time and time again. Yet press reports of your recent statements unfortunately indicate that it is your intention to pull American forces out of the south, perhaps prematurely. I view that as an extremely ill-advised approach to

our military commitments in the Far East and our need for an Asian defense perimeter.

Finally, Eugene V. Rostow wrote a letter to me on January 3, 1977, in which he stated:

"About Korea, we simply must keep conventional forces there for the same reasons which require our strong conventional presence in Europe. The independence of Korea and Taiwan is vital to the defense of Japan, and we do not want the President in a crisis to face the ghastly choice between yielding and using the nuclear weapon. It is this feature of nuclear logic which makes conventional deterrence so important today."

I have enclosed for your information the Report of the Panama Canal Subcommittee based on my tenure as Chairman briefly outlining some of the events I have mentioned above, a copy of the Report of the Panamanian Committee for Human Rights, and a copy of my report to the Speaker of the House of Representatives relative to the visit to the Republic of Korea by the U.S. Congressional Delegation of Korean War Veterans.

I would be happy to discuss the above with you at your convenience.
With kind personal regards, I remain,

Sincerely,

JOHN M. MURPHY,
Member of Congress.

Mr. HUBBARD. Does any other Congressman have a question of Mr. Grove or General McAuliffe?

Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Grove, in turning to your testimony, sir, on page 8 you state that, in a simple three-line paragraph, the treaties will be approved in accordance with our constitutional process. This will enter into force on October 1 of this year.

The following paragraph you try to point out, I think, to us what the State Department feels is our impending legislative role.

I would argue with that paragraph as it stands alone. I think we are back to the constitutional crisis that the Supreme Court did not have the will to face up to, article IV, section 3. If something involves the transfer of taxpayers' money or property, even property held in lease, and I was not a Ronald Reagan that said we own the Canal Zone down to the bottom of the ocean, I think this is going to go on until next week when the President and his administration and the State Department find themselves at a big loss on the rule for the treaty implementation.

It only won by two votes. Anyone observing this House for 21⁄2 years will tell you that in a rule, if you are within two votes of losing, you will lose by a lot more on the floor.

Our minority leader, Mr. Rhodes, told the President, don't bring this up on the floor. It will lose.

I do not think this analysis is something that can be black and white. Maybe honest men can disagree. But I would like to analyze some other circumstances. If we asked for a vote as to which country has the most stable Government, not in terms of democratic processes, just stable, staying power, Iran or Panama, Iran would have won by 440 votes to 1.

So things can change very quickly anywhere in the world. The strategic importance of the canal as a great water artery is as important as the Persian Gulf's $50 billion oil that we are becoming dependent on..

What would happen if there was an overthrow of the Panama Government, but our canal was respected, no one lobbed any mortar? General McAuliffe would go on red alert, but it would be over swiftly.