Mr. CARNEY. I can appreciate that. You did say something in essence, and I did not get the quote down fast enough, but you said that when you went to visit with General Somoza you explained to him the military's position in this situation. Is it the normal process for the U.S. Army to take sides in international politics? General MCAULIFFE. No, sir.

Mr. CARNEY. Then why would you explain the military's position?

General MCAULIFFE. The military has had such a long involvement in Nicaragua, the U.S. military, and with General Somoza, that we thought, since President Somoza, General and President Somoza, had raised many questions at that time about the plebiscite process, and appeared to indicate to some people who had heard him talk that the U.S. military really was not supporting the plebiscite, when we heard those kind of comments, and I believe there was at least one, maybe more news articles written to that effect, coming out of Nicaragua at that time, then it was thought advisable to let him know that we on the military side, on the Defense Department side, also supported the concept of a plebiscite as a means of trying to salvage a moderate alternative to the Sandinistas. I will have to tell you that I do not want to see a Sandinista victory, and a Communist victory in Nicaragua, any more than any other individual who is familiar with that region. I believe that it would have been possible if that plebiscite or something like that was permitted to go forward to where you would have emerging something between Somoza and the Sandinistas, but unfortunately it did not occur.

Mr. CARNEY. When you say "we in the military," are you referring to the Joint Chiefs?

General MCAULIFFE. Yes.

Mr. CARNEY. And they briefed you prior to your going down there?

General MCAULIFF. No, sir. If there is any briefing, it is usually I am briefing them.

Mr. CARNEY. And yet you made the assumption that that is how the Joint Chiefs felt?

General MCAULIFFE. This matter was fully reviewed prior to my going-adequately reviewed within the Defense Department before I went to Nicaragua.

Mr. CARNEY. Do you think that the Panama Canal would be destroyed by the Panamanian Government if we do not implement the legislation?

General MCAULIFFE. No, sir, I do not, because I think that I have force enough, and I could call on more forces to keep it from being destroyed. I do believe that there will be rather extensive civil disturbances, perhaps leading to attempts at sabotage and the like against the canal, to disrupt its operation, and to let us know, and perhaps the world know, that Panama is not at all happy with the outcome.

Mr. CARNEY. Do we train, in any way, shape or form, the Guardia Nacional?

General MCAULIFFE. Yes; we do.

Mr. CARNEY. Does the Guardia Nacional get involved in the training of these so-called civilian groups that are being put together to go into Nicaragua?

General MCAULIFFE. Yes. I touched on that in my statement, Mr. Congressman. As a matter of fact, the group, I guess soon after its formation, went to one of the training bases in Panama, and was there, to the best of my recollection, for several weeks, if not a couple of months, presumably in training.

Mr. CARNEY. Were they in there training in the humanitarian nature of the Panamanian support for FSLN, or moral support? Do you think that is the type of training they took?

General MCAULIFFE. I think I would put that in the category of moral support because, as I have indicated, I believe the brigade itself, it never has been very large in number, from what I have been able to judge from reports emanating from individuals who were in the brigade and others familiar with it, has never been what I would call a competent military force. So it becomes a symbol, I think, of support to the FSLN.

Mr. CARNEY. You did say in your testimony that four members of the Brigade were killed in Nicaragua?

General MCAULIFFE. Correct.

Mr. CARNEY. And that those members, I could assume, might have been trained by the Guardia Nacional, since they are training the brigade, and we in turn trained the Guardia Nacional?

General MCAULIFFE. We have trained many Guardia Nacional individuals. We do not train the entire force. Please let me explain that many officers of the Guardia Nacional have gone to our schools in the Canal Zone. We used to, and we fortunately have been able to pick this up again, have military training exercises with the Guardia Nacional, which in itself is a means of training the units. But I am talking about the tactical side of the Guardia Nacional, which is about one-quarter of the force. The other threequarters is a police force, and we do not train that.

Mr. CARNEY. I think what I was trying to pick up is the word that my colleague from California was concerned about, and that was linkage. I think we just built a link with the U.S. military training the Panamanian military, who in turn have been training the brigade, who in turn lost men in Nicaragua. That is the linkage I would like to establish, and I thank you for your answer. I have a question of Mr. Grove. Mr. Grove, have representatives of the American State Department ever met with representatives of the Sandinista movement?

Mr. GROVE. No.

Mr. CARNEY. Is there any evidence that the Sandinista movement is a Marxist-Leninist, or Communist group?

Mr. GROVE. Yes, I think there is. It has at least three main factions to it. There are considerable differences, as best we can ascertain, as between the factions. Two of them have been mentioned already earlier, that are very distinctly Marxist-Leninist, and I would say quite far on the left. The largest of the three factions, the Terciario, is to some extent perhaps even strongly influenced by Marxist thought, although I think there is a degree of variation, and when you look at the three, the larger one is less Marxist-oriented than the two smaller ones.

Mr. CARNEY. Were you ever in the accompaniment of Ambassador Moss when he perhaps sought to dissuade General Torrijos from breaking relations with Nicaragua?

Mr. GROVE. No, sir.

Mr. HUBBARD. Congressman, I will pass over Congressman Lowry for a question by Congressman Bowen.

Mr. BOWEN. Before we go, I would like to pursue a line of questioning that the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Hughes, had taken up, in which you described the immediate chaos and disorder that would ensue if we do not pass the implementing legislation. I am sure that you also realize there is a possibility, in fact, a likelihood, in diplomatic and legal channels that Panama would conclude as a result of the nonimplementation on our part of the treaties, that they would then take the step of declaring the treaties to be terminated. Then our President would have to make the decision at that point whether or not he would ask you to bring the troops home.

He would have to make a decision to withdraw American military and civilian personnel, or actually face the possibility of a military confrontation with Panama. I am sure you are aware of that logical conclusion of nonimplementation of the legislation. General MCAULIFFE. Yes, sir. That is an entirely possible scenario that could ensue.

Mr. BOWEN. And in fact leaders of Panama have indicated that to be the case, that they would ask for termination if we do not pass the implementing legislation. As you pointed out, after October 1 we would have to have the treaties to remain in Panama, and if they are terminated, there is a grave likelihood we will have to bring our forces home. I think that will be very tragic. But I think it is a real likelihood if we do not pass the implementing legislation.

I gather you agree with that?

General MCAULIFFE. That is certainly very possible, and there are perhaps even some variations on that scenario that one could speculate about.

Mr. HUBBARD. Excuse me, General. Forgive me. Those of us without tennis shoes have to go to the House floor, and we have only 5 minutes left. We will come right back and pick up where we left off.

We are in recess for a vote.

[Short recess.]

Mr. HUBBARD. The subcommittee will now come to order.

In all fairness to General McAuliffe, we interrupted you during your statement, for the vote.

Mr. BOWEN. Let me restate it. We will finish this up quickly. I had asked you if you agreed with my observation that if we failed to perform certain obligations spelled out in the treaties, for example, if we fail to pass the implementing legislation, therefore failing to establish the Panama Canal Commission, or failing to make the property transfer, or some other commitment that we had, that Panama would then, going beyond that initial period of disorder, chaos, and possible violence that you have described, would be justified under international law in declaring the treaties terminated, null and void, and we would then face the very diffi

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cult decision, one to be made by the President, of exactly how we would respond to that. Am I correct in stating that? Do you agree with that premise?

General MCAULIFFE. Yes, sir, I do. I would like to relate that a little bit to the answer I gave to Congressman Hughes. I do believe that the turbulence and possible violence accompanied by a possible closedown of the canal, would occur right at the beginning. But then, as you suggest, sir, if the Panamanians determine that we are not delivering on certain of the provisions of the treaties, the transfer of their railroad, and the port, and many other things, then of course they would have ample right to declare the treaties null and void, and there would have to be some very basic decisions made on the part of the U.S. Government as to what we would do with respect to our American citizen employees there, what we do with our military forces, and also the equipment, and facilities that we have. I will have to say that the reason for the uncertainty at that stage would be that we could not fall back on the provisions of the original 1903 treaty because it ceases to exist when this new treaty goes into effect.

Mr. BOWEN. On October 1?

General MCAULIFFE. On October 1.

Mr. BowEN. And therefore, although you did——

General MCAULIFFE. So in effect we are denied the legal basis for staying there.

Mr. BOWEN. And you stated that you would do your best to defend the canal, if instructed to do so, but you have agreed really if Panama took that action based upon noncompliance with the treaty on our part, the President then would have to make a decision as to whether to withdraw American personnel, or whether to attempt to confront Panama, which would undoubtedly bring about very tragic resort to violence, I rather suspect.

As you pointed out, that would create the worst of all worlds for us, because we would then face the shutdown of the canal.

I talked with one or two members as we were going to the floor to vote on this issue, and there was some doubt as to whether or not there was a capability of shutting down the operations in the canal. You said you could defend it physically from conquest, but if someone were to sit back in the hill and lob mortars in to scatter the personnel, or if they wanted to sink ships in the approaches, it could conceivably be years before you get the thing going.

Would you comment again on what is likely to happen to the actual operation of the canal in a situation of military confrontation?

General MCAULIFFE. I think that the operation of the canal itself would be jeopardized under such a scenario, because for one thing, we could never be sure as to whether the Panamanian employees, on which the operation depends, whether they would be, let us say, permitted to come in and continue to run the canal. Many employees, American and Panamanian, would elect not to stay there if they thought that there was some physical danger involved.

If there were some acts of terrorism, an occasional bomb going off, an occasional mortar round being thrown in some of these areas where there are high concentrations of employees, you would

only need to do that a few times a week and you would keep that canal in a state of stagnation indefinitely.

Mr. BOWEN. Am I correct, or perhaps I should ask Mr. Grove, is there is a linkage between the two treaties, if we violate one of the treaties-if one of the treaties is terminated, is the other one terminated also? What is the linkage between the two treaties? Mr. GROVE. We have an expert witness in the room, in the person of Michael Kosak, who can answer precisely those questions, and may I ask him to reply to that?

Mr. HUBBARD. I have no objection, except I would remind Congressman Bowen-

Mr. BOWEN. Just one question.

Mr. HUBBARD. We were on somebody else's time, right before we went for the rollcall.

Please state your name?

Mr. KOZAK. Michael Kozak. I am the State Department Legal Adviser for Inter-American Affairs, and I will try to keep it brief. The answer, as regards the two treaties, is that we are linked with respect to their entry into force. One is not entered into force without the other. So they would both go into force together. The termination of the Panama Canal Treaty would not affect the termination of the Neutrality Treaty, unless the breach that was in question was one that went to our obligations under both treaties. It would depend on the particular nature and circumstances, but you certainly would have the type of scenario that has been discussed, that would involve primarily a violation of the Panama Canal Treaty, which would be the basis for right to operate the canal, and the basis for our right to remain in Panama.

Mr. HUBBARD. Thank you for that answer.

Congressman Wyatt?

Mr. WYATT. Did I understand you to say that there were, in essence, two treaties, the Neutrality Treaty and the Treaty of the Panama Canal? If those became effective on October 1 are the other treaties abrogated at that point, or terminated?

Mr. Kozak. There are two new treaties, the Panama Canal Treaty of 1977 and the Neutrality treaty of 1977. Those are the two that enter into force together on October 1. At that time the Panama Canal Treaty in force there will terminate the past treaties, the treaty of 1903, the treaty of 1936, and the treaty of 1955. So you will lose those old treaties, and then the two new ones come into force together, and continue on from October 1.

Mr. WYATT. You lose the 1903, the 1936, and the treaty of 1955? Mr. KOZACK. Yes.

Mr. WYATT. The treaty of 1903, 1936, and 1955 are abrogated? Mr. Kozak. Yes, and terminated and superseded are the words used. That means as a result that moment they are gone. They are no longer in existence, and it is as if they had never been in effect. Mr. WYATT. Thank you.

Mr. HUBBARD. We are skipping around out of line. I will call on Congressman Bauman and then Congressman Hansen.

Mr. BAUMAN. I want to direct a question to you. I listened to your statement very carefully, as I listened to Mr. Atwood's statement yesterday.