Ecuador's territory, I think they had a little reason to be concerned.

Our Government turned them down, they then asked us if we would consent to a sale by Israel of Kaffir aircraft, and we had to consent to that sale because of the fact that American engines are using that fighter, and we again turned them down.

The result, however, was not to prevent the introduction of super modern aircraft into that area, because they then went, and I cannot say I blame them, to France, and Mirage fighters. That is just one example of where, at least I think, our policy has been wrong headed with regard to armed sales to South America.

I hope the administration is going to reevaluate its position, because while I would agree with you and the others on the committee, who have said that no doubt the reason being was, or thewhat they were trying to do was right, their heads were in the-at least their hearts were in the right place, that is it has not worked, and I think we should recognize that.

The same thing is true with training of military officers in that region. Just this year the Defense Department proposed a brandnew military training program, limited to peacekeeping, and arms control, and excluded from that training program, by operation of the laws that you just mentioned a while ago, were such countries as Argentina, Chile, and Brazil. The very countries where there is the most likelihood of armed conflict, particularly between Chile and Argentina, perhaps between Chile and Peru. It just does not make any sense.

Some of us offered an amendment to allow the President-would not require him to do it, to allow the President to permit that kind of training, and then only on a reimbursable basis, no cost to the taxpayers whatsoever. The Latin American desk of the State Department supported it; the State Department human rights people came in and raised so much hell about it, that it was killed. We got no place, and have set the whole thing back that many more years.

I think we should be reexamining our entire policy, aside from the Panama Canal Treaty.

Colonel THOMAS. It is difficult to understand, Mr. Congressman, why the administration would not like to have more discretionary authority in the conduct of the affairs of any country, and that appears, to me, precisely what the administration was turning down.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Thank you.

Mr. HUBBARD. Thank you very much, Congressman Lagomarsino and special thanks to Col. James C. Thomas, who retired 38 days ago from active duty in the U.S. Air Force. We appreciate your helpful testimony, and your willingness and cooperation as to the questions posed you.

We next call Lt. Gen. Dennis P. McAuliffe, Commander in Chief, U.S. Southern Command, and the Honorable Brandon Grove, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, Department of State.

I realize there is a rollcall, but if you would, Lt. Gen. Dennis P. McAuliffe and Hon. Brandon Grove, of the State Department, would you please take your seats at the table, and understand that

at this point we need to take a break, and that would include you all.

I would suggest that we break for 30 minutes, to give each person a reasonable chance to at least get a sandwich, or a coke, and we will come back with Mr. Grove and General McAuliffe testifying, beginning at approximately 1:30, but hopefully you can all get a sandwich also.

Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 1:03 p.m., the subcommittee recessed, to reconvene at 1:30 p.m., the same day.]

Mr. HUBBARD. We are under the committee rules, and we are required to have a member of the minority on our subcommittee present. Congressman Hansen is not a member of our subcommittee, and we are very appreciative of his help to our committee. But we will have to wait for Congressman Bauman or Dornan, or Carney of New York.

I would ask the staff, if they would, to please contact the offices of Mr. Bauman, Mr. Carney, or any other minority member. [Brief pause.]

Mr. HUBBARD. Now we are ready.

Thank you for your patience.

Hopefully, you had time to eat lunch. We will now call on Lt. Gen. Dennis McAuliffe, Commander in Chief, U.S. Southern Command; and the Honorable Brandon Grove, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, Department of State.

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. DENNIS P. MCAULIFFE, COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND; AND HON. BRANDON GROVE JR., DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR INTERAMERICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, AND MICHAEL KOZACK

General MCAULIFFE. I am Lt. Gen. Dennis P. McAuliffe, Commander in Chief of the U.S. Southern Command, with headquarters in the Canal Zone-the unified command responsible for U.S. security interests in Central and South America and the defense of the Panama Canal.

In response to your request, I would like to outline the nature of the support provided by Panama to the Sandinista Liberation Front, FSLN, in conjunction with the unstable situation occurring in Nicaragua.

The outbreak of violence in Nicaragua last September, especially the seizure of the Legislative Palace in Managua by the FSLN, constituted the spark that started Panama's involvement.

This FSLN element requested and was granted political asylum in Panama after the palace raid and was brought to Panama aboard a Venezuelan military aircraft and a Panamanian civil airliner. General Torrijos, then head of government, personally met with their leader, Eden Pastora.

Fighting then broke out between the Nicaraguan National Guard and the FSLN along the Costa Rican-Nicaraguan border, persisting through the end of October 1978.

Costa Rica expressed concern over Nicaraguan violations of its sovereignty. This brought an immediate and positive response from leaders of both Panama and Venezuela. Both General Torrijos and

former Venezuelan President Perez made public statements concerning the violation of Costa Rican territory.

Both countries moved military aircraft to Costa Rica at the request of its president. Venezuela went so far as to sign a defense pact with Costa Rica at that time and joined with Panama in issuing public statements that any violations of Costa Rican territory would be met with support by their mutual defense forces, noting that Costa Rica has no standing military force.

Since then, public sympathy in Panama for the anti-Somoza forces has grown and has been duly noted. Concerned citizens, mostly university students and professors, formed the committee of solidarity with the Nicaraguan people, CSPN.

The CSPN offered moral support by issuing public statements that attacked President Somoza's administration while registering concern for the people living under the Somoza government.

In addition, that committee began fundraising activities in Panama and other countries in Latin America, including Colombia and Mexico and used these moneys to assist refugees arriving in Panama.

Beginning in mid-September, three separate attempts were made by individual student organizations to form "volunteer" brigades in Panama to join forces with the opposition forces in Nicaragua. Only one such unit, known as the Victoriano Lorenzo brigade, or the International Brigade, BIP, composed of some 75 to 100 volunteers, actually came into existence.

This brigade was headed by Hugo Spadafora, the Panamanian Vice Minister of Health, who resigned his position to organize the unit. In public communiques, the leaders of this "brigade" stated that they did not take orders from any government, nor did they expect to receive any economic compensation from any govern

ment.

Volunteers from diverse backgrounds were reportedly united basically in a desire to remove the government of President Somoza. Many of the young people were attracted by a sense of adventurism.

While various communiques and news releases by the International brigade have praised the spirit and fighting ability of its members, we believe the brigade is more a propaganda tool than an effective military fighting force.

Despite the media play on the battles in which the brigade has become involved, by their own accounts only four Panamanians have been killed in the fighting in Nicaragua. It is unknown if the brigade was ever committed as a unit in support of the FSLN and the limited training of its members would make it doubtful that it could achieve significant military impact.

Over the past month, the International Brigade has placed notices in the newspapers and over the radio asking for volunteers who are ready to fight immediately, which may indicate that they continue to register sympathy for the causes of the Nicaraguan people as they perceive them.

The involvement of the Government of Panama in the Nicaraguan affair can be summarized as follows:

First, they have provided materiel support to the Government of Costa Rica in the form of two helicopters to be used for medical evacuation purposes in the event of an invasion from Nicaragua; Second, they have provided moral support to the anti-Somoza elements in Nicaragua through the news media and through diplomatic channels;

Third, the Panamanian Government permitted the formation of the International Brigade in Panama and provided it some support in the way of training, use of government lands, and transportation;

Finally, consistent with its long-standing policy of providing asylum and aid to refugees from all Latin American countries, the Government of Panama has accepted refugees from Nicaragua, as well as FSLN members who had fled Nicaragua into Costa Rica and Honduras.

Generally, refugees have been provided with food and shelter, and FSLN members have been assisted in onward travel to third countries such as Venezuela, Mexico, and Cuba.

Furthermore, the Governments of Panama, Costa Rica, Venezuela, and more recently, Mexico, have continued a public condemnation of President Somoza.

The Panamanian involvement appears directed more against the Somoza regime, which is perceived by Panama as repressive, than toward advancement of the Sandinista cause. General Torrijos and President Somoza have made no secret of their hostility toward each other.

Since the FSLN is dedicated to the removal of Somoza, Panamanian sympathy supports that group. Within the Government of Panama, spokesmen have stressed the humanitarian nature of Panama's support to the FSLN. This has manifested itself in helping refugees and maintaining an embassy in Managua so that those who believe they are politically persecuted can find immediate refuge.

It is also worthy of note that, within the Central American region, there is a lingering hostility toward the Somoza family by those who have felt harassed as far back as the original Somoza regime of 1936.

Some Panamanians have been instrumental in the transfer of some arms and personnel into Nicaragua. Concerning the specific charge of the illegal transfer of arms from Florida to Panama for eventual use by the FSLN in Nicaragua, the case is now in the U.S. courts and several individuals, including Mr. Carlos Wittgreen of Panama, have been indicted.

Obviously, any public discussion of the case would be imprudent until the judicial process has been completed.

With regard to the Florida case, President Royo has assured the United States that a full investigation would be made to determine if a crime had been committed. It should be noted, however, that due to its geographical location, Panama is a natural crossroads for commerce and contraband as well.

We fully expect public statements by officials of various Central and South American countries to be supportive of anti-Somoza elements in Nicaragua. Undoubtedly, civilian volunteer groups

from Panama and other Latin American countries will continue their support to the forces that oppose the Somoza regime.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I will now pass to Mr. Brandon Grove.

Mr. HUBBARD. Thank you very much, General McAuliffe.

Now we have Hon. Brandon Grove, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, Department of State.

Mr. GROVE. Mr. Chairman, I welcome the opportunity to appear before this committee. My areas of responsibility include Mexico, Central America, Panama, and the Caribbean.

I shall be testifying on the question of Panama's relationship to the Nicaraguan crisis, on the foreign policy and other issues that exist as a result of the polarization in Nicaragua, and on the bearing of those factors upon the Panama Canal Treaty implementing legislation now under consideration in the House of Representatives.

Panama, together with Costa Rica, Venezuela, Mexico and a number of other democratic countries, has not hidden its dislike for the regime of President Somoza.

Mexico and Costa Rica have gone to the extreme of breaking diplomatic relations with Nicaragua.

The Chiefs of State from Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela, attending the Andean Pact Summit in Cartagena, Colombia, on May 27 through 28, 1979, called for an end to the systematic violation of human rights in Nicaragua and expressed their deepest concern that the political situation in that country could represent a threat to peace in America.

The attitudes of various countries toward the Somoza government have led to charges of intervention in the Nicaraguan conflict. There have been charges of Panamanian involvement in Nicaragua, arising in particular from the recent seizure in Miami of a shipment of arms and ammunition, and the resultant indictment handed down in Florida implicating five persons in a conspiracy to export arms illegally to Panama.

The facts of this case are contained in the indictment and an accompanying affidavit, both of which have received wide publicity. A representative of the Treasury Department has testified here on this case, and I will not expand further except to set forth our understanding of the case and of Panamanian reactions.

On October 27, 1978, Treasury's Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms informed the Department of State that it had initiated an investigation of allegations of illegal arms purchases in Miami. In a subsequent conversation on November 7 between officers of the State Department and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, the latter were told that the Department favored a thorough investigation, and prosecution, of all persons concerned if our laws had been broken.

In December 1978, the Panamanian Embassy protested in writing the seizure of a number of small arms. The Embassy assured the U.S. Government that arms purchased were for the exclusive use of the Panamanian National Guard, and that those weapons purchased which had arrived in Panama were, and would remain, under the control of the national guard.