Walker and Wife v. Smith. estate to the payment of such charge, must show that she holds that estate under a deed which allows her to charge it, and must contain a prayer for the specific relief sought. In both these particulars, this bill is fatally defective: it contains no specific prayer for relief against the wife's separate estate, but asks only a personal decree against the defendants; nor does it show that she has the power to charge her separate estate. Dan. Ch. Pr. 194, 198, and cases cited; Strange v. Watson, 11 Ala. 324; 2 Story's Equity, $$ 1399 to 1401; 2 Kent's Com. 164, 166; Jacques v. M. E. Church, 17 Johns. 518; Gardiner v. Gardiner, 22 Wend. 528; Ewing v. Smith, 3 Dess. 417; N. A. Coal Co. v. Dyett, 7 Paige, 27; Magwood & Patterson v. Johnston, 1 Hill's (S. C.) Ch. 228; Cumming & Pollock v. Williamson, 1 Sandf. Ch. 17; Curtis v. Engel, 2 ib. 287; Rogers v. Ludlow, 3 ib. 104; Lyne's Executor v. Crouse, 1 Barr, 111; Williamson v. Beckham, 8 Leigh, 20; Montgomery v. Agricultural Bank, 10 Sm. & Mar. 567; Doty v. Mitchell, 9 ib. 435; Morgan v. Elam, 4 Yerg. 375; Marshall v. Stephens, 8 Humph. 159; 9 Watts, 137; 1 Bro. C. C. 16; 2 Roper on Husband and Wife, 241, note; Francis v. Wigzell, 1 Madd. 145. 4. The demurrer for multifariousness should have been sustained. The negro hire and jail fees are separate and distinct items, having no necessary connection. As asserted in the bill, the first is a joint demand, and the other a sepa rate demand.-Story's Equity Plead. 280; Dan. Ch. Pr. 393; 6 Johns. Ch. 163; McIntosh v. Alexander, 16 Ala. 87. 5. The payment of the jail fees by complainant did not constitute defendants his debtors.-Kenan v. Holloway, 16 Ala. 53; Wray v. Cox, 24 ib. 337. 6. The case is with the appellants on the merits. WILLIS & WILLIAMS, and CLOPTON & LIGON, contra: 1. The bill sets forth a good equitable cause of action, and the husband and wife are properly joined as defendants. The demands sought be enforced are proper charges against Mrs. Walker's separate estate.-Collins v. Rudolph, 19 Ala. 616; Hooper v. Smith and Wife, 23 ib. 639; N. A. Coal Co. v. Dyett, 7 Paige, 9; same case, 20 Wend. 570. If the deed" under which she held her separate estate restricted her power Walker and Wife v. Smith. to charge it, that was matter of defense, and should have been shown in her answer. 2. It was Mrs. Walker's duty, at the expiration of the term of hiring, to return the slaves to their owner. This she failed to do, but suffered them to remain in jail; and complainant was compelled, in order to regain possession of them, to pay the necessary jail fees. For this payment he is entitled to reimbursement out of her separate estate. The claim for the hire of the slaves, and the claim for reimbursement on account of the jail fees, grow out of the same contract, and may be enforced in the same suit. 3. The prayer of the bill, though not formal, is sufficiently specific; and, even if the special prayer were defective, the appropriate relief would be granted under the general prayer. 4. The return of the sheriff shows, in legal effect, a service on both the defendants. RICE, C. J.-When a married woman, owning a steam saw-mill as part of her separate estate, hires slaves of another to work in and about it, at a specified price and for a specified term, and receives them into her service, her separate estate may be subjected by a court of equity to the payment of such price, although no note was given for it; and the bill for that purpose may be filed against her and her husband.Ozley v. Ikleheimer, 26 Ala. 332; Calvert on Parties, 269; Dyett v. N. A. Coal Co., 20 Wend. 570; Waldron, Isley & Co. v. Simmons, at the present term. If, during the term of hire, the slaves run away from her, and are taken up and committed to jail as runaways in this State; and, with notice of this, she permits them to remain in jail until the expiration of the term; and the owner, to regain possession of them, is compelled to pay their jail fees, -he thereby acquires a right to reimbursement of the sum thus paid, out of her separate estate. It was her duty to pay these fees, and to restore the slaves to their owner at the expiration of the term of hire.-Story on Bail. § 397. As she disregarded her obligation in this respect, the owner, at the expiration of the term, had the right to pay such fees, in order to regain the possession of his slaves, and to obtain reimbursement out of her separate estate. The jailer had a Walker and Wife v. Smith. right to detain the slaves until the fees were paid. The owner has been compelled to pay a debt, which, in equity and good conscience, she should have paid, and therefore his right to reimbursement rests upon sound principle.-Plummer v. Sherman, 29 Maine Rep. 555; Ticonic Bank v. Smiley, 27 ib. 225; Mix v. Hotchkiss, 14 Conn. 32. The bill in this case asserts no liability against the husband. It shows nothing for which either the husband or wife can be charged personally. It sets forth a demand for which her separate estate is liable, if the allegations of the bill are established. The frame of the bill is such, that if a decree cannot be rendered against her separate estate, no relief whatever can be granted under it. It is clearly a bill to subject her separate estate to the payment of the demand therein set forth. There is no "misjoinder of defendants," nor of "accounts."-Calvert on Parties, 269-273; Gerald and Wife v. McKenzie, 27 Ala. 166. As the defendants filed a joint and several answer, embracing a demurrer specifying five distinct grounds, and did not by demurrer or otherwise, in the court below, raise the objection, that the bill contains no special prayer for a decree against the separate estate of the wife, and that under the general prayer no such decree can be made, we will not even consider that objection. By failing to raise such an objection in the court below, where, if it be a sound one, it might and ought to have been remedied by an amendment, the party loses the benefit of it in the appellate court.Code, & 2900. The subpoena issued in this case embraced both husband and wife, and was returned by the sheriff, "executed." This return means that he served both husband and wife, and shows that she was made a defendant in compliance with our 4th rule of practice in chancery.-Hollinger v. Bank, 8 Ala. 605. The evidence convinces us that the substantial allegations of the bill are true, and that the slaves of the complainant were not hired upon the mere credit and personal liability of the husband.-Dyett v. N. A. Coal Co., supra. Two depositions of Thomas B. Jones, and two depositions of Bython Smith, appear in the record. The deposition of Beeson v. Wiley, Banks & Co. Jones last taken, and the deposition of Smith last taken, were taken by the defendants, and certainly contain nothing which would authorize either of the defendants to ask for their suppression; yet the record shows that Mrs. Walker moved "to suppress the depositions of Thomas B. Jones and Bython Smith as evidence against her", and that the motion was overruled. This motion to suppress is general. It specifies no ground on which the suppression was asked: It does not even show that it sought to suppress only one of the depositions of Jones, and only one of the depositions of Smith. Its language is broad enough to admit of the construction that it sought to suppress both depositions of Jones, and both depositions of Smith. Thus construed, it is clearly not sustainable; and if such general motions can be considered at all on an appeal, the strongest construction which they reasonably admit of, against the party making them, will be placed upon them. There is no error in the decree, and it is affirmed, at the costs of the appellants. BEESON vs. WILEY, BANKS & CO. [TRIAL OF RIGHT OF PROPERTY IN SLAVE.] 1. Insolvency of defendant in execution, when admissible evidence, and how proved.—On a trial of the right of property in a slave, where the claimant derives title under a conveyance from the defendant in execution, which is attacked on the ground of fraud, the plaintiff may show that, at the time of the execution of the conveyance, the defendant in execution was insolvent; and evidence of notes outstanding against him at that time, and of a judgment rendered on one of such notes, is admissible as tending to prove the fact of insolvency. 2. Error without injury in rendering judgment for costs against surety on claim bond.—The rendition of a joint judgment for costs against the claimant and his surety on the claim bond, even if erroneous, is not prejudicial to the claimant, and for that reason is not available on error. APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Blount. Tried before the Hon. EDMUND W. PETTUS. Beeson v. Wiley, Banks & Co. This was a trial of the right of property in a slave, between the appellees, plaintiffs in execution against Vestal Beeson and another, and Clayton G. Beeson, the appellant, who was the brother of said Vestal, as claimant. On the trial, as appears from the bill of exceptions, the claimant offered evidence tending to show that, several months before the plaintiffs' execution was levied, he purchased said slave from said Vestal Beeson, and paid full value for him; and that the plaintiffs then introduced evidence to impeach said sale on the ground of fraud. "For the purpose of showing that said Vestal Beeson was insolvent at the time of said sale to claimant, the plaintiffs offered in evidence the original papers, judgment entry, and notes, (on which the suit was instituted,) in the case of said Wiley, Banks & Co. against said Lewis & Beeson, after proving by the clerk that said case had never been recorded; also, the execution of said notes, and that said Vestal Beeson was a member of said firm of Lewis & Beeson; also, the execution of a promissory note by said Lewis & Beeson, whilst partners, to Courtney & Tennent, and offered said note in evidence. To the introduction of said original papers, judgment entry and notes, and also of said note to Courtney & Tennent, the claimant objected; but the court overruled his objection, and he excepted." The admission of this evidence, and the rendition of a joint judgment for costs against the claimant and his surety on the claim bond, are now assigned as error, D. C. HUMPHREYS, and ROBINSON & JONES, for appellant. LOUIS WYETH and J. W. SHEPHERD, contra. WALKER, J.-On a trial of the right of property, in which is involved the question of fraud in a conveyance by the defendant in execution to the claimant, the plaintiffs may show that the defendant, at the time of the conveyance, was insolvent. Proof of notes outstanding at the time of the conveyance, and of a judgment rendered on one of such notes, would be admissible evidence, as tending to prove the insolvency. The claimant, in a trial of the right of property, is not injured by the fact that a joint judgment for costs is rendered |