prohibitions of the Inter-State Commerce act and the Elkins act, and therefore could not be made the basis of an action in a court of justice, as decided in Ellison v. Adams Express Co. 245 Ill. 410. The suit in that case was by the consignor of two packages, consigned to different persons, to be delivered in Chicago, and, the right of action being in the party to the contract entered into in violation of law, it was held that there could be no recovery beyond the stipulated sum. If the right of action in this case had been in Juilliard & Co. the same rule would apply, but if the plaintiff was not directly or indirectly a party to any fraud or misrepresentation in connection with the shipment it would not be amenable to the criminal provisions of the Inter-State Commerce act. There was no express authority conferred by the plaintiff to make a contract limiting the common law liability of the defendant for the purpose of obtaining a lower rate of transportation or for any other purpose, and if, as held by this court, there was no implied authority, it cannot be said that the plaintiff knowingly and willfully, by any of the false means specified in the statute, obtained the transportation of its property for less than the regular rate. The last division of the argument against the judgment of the Appellate Court is that the liability of the defendant is to be determined by the law of the State of New York, where the contract was made. A witness for the defendant testified that by the law of New York the filling out and acceptance of the receipt, as a matter of law, made it the contract of shipment governing the rights of the parties. The shipper is under a duty to read the receipt, can not deny assent, is bound by its terms, and silence as to the value estops him from claiming that it is greater than that named. The circumstances amount, as a matter of law, to an agreement that the value of the shipment does not exceed $50. The limitation is valid and binding, and defendant's liability is limited to $50 even where the loss. is due to negligence. Even though the shipment be made and the receipt accepted by a person other than the owner without the authority of the owner, the owner cannot recover more than the amount of the agreed valuation from the carrier for the loss of the package if the carrier has no notice of the want of authority. The contract was to be partly performed in New York and partly in this State, where the goods were to be delivered, and in such a case the law of the State where the contract is made governs as to its validity, nature and interpretation, provided the law is of a nature to be enforced in the State where the suit is brought. (Merchants' Despatch Transportation Co. v. Furthmann, 149 Ill. 66; Coats v. Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway Co. 239 id. 154.) If a contract which is valid by the laws of another State is repugnant to the public policy, laws and institutions of this State and is expressly prohibited by its statutory enactments, it will not be enforced by our courts. (Pope v. Hanke, 155 Ill. 617.) Counsel in this case treat the whole instrument as a receipt and the limitation of liability as being expressed in the receipt given for the property, and our statute provides that it shall not be lawful for a carrier to limit his common law liability safely to deliver property at the place within or without this State to which the same is to be transported, by any stipulation or limitation expressed in the receipt given for the property. This court has held that a limitation of the amount of liability to a sum less than the actual value of the goods is a limitation of common law liability; that such a limitation cannot rest upon any provision in a receipt given for goods but must have the assent of the shipper, whether found in the receipt or a bill of lading, and that there is no implied authority of an agent to make such a contract for a citizen of this State. The defendant knew that Juilliard & Co. were merchants selling goods and shipping them to customers, and we can not regard the case as one where the carrier had no notice of the relation of the parties and what authority the law would imply. It would be contrary to the established public policy of this State to permit such a contract as this to be enforced. The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed. Judgment affirmed. THE NONOTUCK SILK COMPANY, Appellee, vs. THE ADAMS EXPRESS COMPANY, Appellant. Opinion filed October 26, 1912-Rehearing denied Dec. 5, 1912. This case is controlled by the decision in Nonotuck Silk Co. v. Adams Express Co. (ante, p. 66.) APPEAL from the Branch "B" Appellate Court for the First District;-heard in that court on writ of error to the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. JOHN H. HUME, Judge, presiding. CHARLES B. ELDER, for appellant. BRODE B. DAVIS, for appellee. Per CURIAM: This case is identical in its facts and the questions of law involved with the case of Nonotuck Silk Co. v. Adams Express Co. (ante, p. 66,) except that the value of the goods was $490.12, and the decision in that case is conclusive in this. The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed. Judgment affirmed. IDA THOMPSON, Defendant in Error, vs. THE NORTHERN HOTEL COMPANY, Plaintiff in Error. Opinion filed October 26, 1912-Rehearing denied Dec. 5, 1912. I. NEGLIGENCE what tends to show negligence in managing an elevator. Evidence that the operator of an elevator suddenly started the car upward without looking out to see that no more passengers were about to enter tends to show negligence, where there was no door to close before starting and where the person injured was just stepping into the car as it started. 2. SAME when question whether passenger was guilty of contributory negligence is for the jury. Whether the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence in attempting to enter an elevator without saying "going up," or otherwise calling the operator's attention, is a question for the jury, where the evidence shows that she was following closely another person whose presence was known to the elevator operator. 3. FELLOW-SERVANTS—the question of fellow-servants is mixed one of law and fact. Whether two servants of a common master are fellow-servants depends upon the facts of the particular relation and the application to those facts of the law defining fellowservants, and in that sense the question is a mixed question of law and fact. 4. SAME-elevator operator in hotel is not a fellow-servant of maid in charge of toilet room. An elevator operator in a hotel is not a fellow-servant of a maid in charge of the ladies' toilet room in the hotel, notwithstanding the maid's duties required her to make several daily trips on the elevator, as the two are neither co-operating in a particular work nor so habitually associated as to enable them to exercise a mutual influence upon each other promotive of proper caution. 5. INSTRUCTIONS—when instruction does not authorize jury to estimate damages not proved. An instruction stating that if the jury shall find that the plaintiff "has sustained damages as charged in the declaration, then, to enable the jury to estimate the amount of such damages, it is not necessary that any witnesses should have expressed an opinion as to the amount of such damages, but the jury may themselves make such estimate from the facts and circumstances in proof, relating to the subject of the extent of plaintiff's damages," does not permit the jury to go outside of the evidence and determine damages susceptible of exact determination by proof. 6. SAME when an instruction as to disregarding testimony is properly modified. An instruction authorizing the jury to disregard the uncorroborated testimony of any witness who they believe has "willfully and knowingly sworn falsely to any matter," etc., is properly modified by inserting the word "material" before the word "matter." CARTWRIGHT and HAND, JJ., dissenting. WRIT OF ERROR to the Branch "B" Appellate Court for the First District;--heard in that court on appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. BEN M. SMITH, Judge, presiding. F. J. CANTY, and ROBERT J. FOLONIE, for plaintiff in error. FRANCIS J. WOOLLEY, for defendant in error. Mr. JUSTICE VICKERS delivered the opinion of the court: This case comes to this court by writ of certiorari to the Appellate Court for the First District. Ida Thompson brought an action in case against the Northern Hotel Company for a personal injury and recovered a judgment in the superior court of Cook county for $5000, which judgment has been affirmed by the Appellate Court for the First District. Plaintiff in error insists that the judgment should be reversed for the following alleged errors: (1) The trial court erred in refusing to direct a verdict of not guilty at the close of all the evidence; (2) the trial court erred in entering judgment against defendant and in denying its motion for new trial; (3) the trial court erred in its ruling upon instructions; (4) the Appellate Court erred in affirming the judgment of the trial court. Of these assignments of error the first and third present the only questions necessary to be considered. |