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subject to the same rule applied to natural persons in the cases above referred to.

A municipal corporation, in the absence of an enabling statute, has no authority to become the purchaser of lands or lots at a tax sale and acquire a title by complying with the statute in respect to such sales. The general power to buy and hold real estate does not authorize such purchase. (City of Champaign v. Harmon, 98 Ill. 491.) Section 72 of the Local Improvement act authorizes any city, village or town interested in the collection of any tax or special assessment, in default of other bidders, to become a purchaser at any sale of property to enforce the collection of such tax or special assessment, and to make it the duty, by ordinance, of one or more of the municipal officers to attend such sales and bid in behalf of the corporation. Under this section appellant acquired the tax titles in question. The statute under which the city purchased at the tax sales does not make any provision as to the steps to be taken by the city subsequent to the sale in order to entitle it to a deed. The city would have to proceed the same as any other purchaser under the general Revenue law. If the status of appellant is any different from an individual purchaser at a tax sale such difference does not depend upon the statute. So far as we can see, the only effect of section 72 of the Local Improvement act is to permit municipal corporations to purchase real estate, at a sale for taxes or special assessments, in which such municipality is interested. It enables the municipality to acquire title to real estate through a sale for delinquent taxes which it would not have without this statute.

As we understand appellant's argument, it is that the city has a lien upon the lots for the unpaid special assessments and that such lien is not merged in an invalid tax title. This cannot be true, because the city has no lien for taxes or special assessments levied upon property within its corporate limits. Taxes are not a lien unless they

are expressly made so by statute, (2 Cooley on Taxation, 865,) and special assessments stand upon the same footing. (Eagle Manf. Co. v. Davenport, 101 Iowa, 493.) To authorize a sale of land for taxes or special assessments the lien must exist by the terms of the statute itself or be established by some official proceeding under the statute. (Cooley on Taxation, supra.) Municipal corporations have no power to create liens, by ordinance or otherwise, unless such power has been expressly conferred upon them. (Philadelphia v. Greble, 38 Pa. St. 339.) Section 253 of the Revenue law provides that taxes upon real property shall be a lien from and including the first day of May in the year in which the taxes are levied until the same are paid, and that said lien may be foreclosed in equity in the name of the People of the State of Illinois. Section 56 of the Local Improvement act provides that the judgment of confirmation shall be a lien upon the property assessed from the date thereof, "to the same extent and of equal force and validity as a lien for general taxes, for a period of five years," etc. The liens provided for in these statutes are liens in favor of the people of the State, and not to the various municipalities that may be interested in the taxes. Appellant having no lien upon the premises and no right of subrogation to the lien of the State, its position is not different from that of any other purchaser at a tax sale. In Cooley on Taxation (vol. 2, p. 977,) it is said: "It is not an uncommon provision that if no bidders offer to take the land and pay the tax it shall be bid in for the whole county. In the absence of express statutory authority a city or other municipality could not, however, buy land at a tax sale. A purchase on a bid by the State or county would give the State or county the usual rights of a purchaser and no more." The above text is supported by numerous decisions cited in the note. The effect of a sale of lands for taxes is to extinguish the lien if the property brings the amount of the taxes. The lien only

exists in favor of the people and is discharged when the tax is paid by the sale. There is no way by which the purchaser at a tax sale can avail himself of the extinguished lien of the State when his tax title fails. We see no reason for distinguishing between municipalities which may exercise the privilege of bidding at a tax sale and other purchasers. This case is controlled in all of its essential features by the Pick and Sanford cases.

The decree of the circuit court of Cook county will be affirmed. Decree affirmed.

DUNN, C. J., and CARTWRIGHT and HAND, JJ., dissenting.

THE NONOTUCK SILK COMPANY, Appellee, vs. THE ADAMS EXPRESS COMPANY, Appellant.

Opinion filed October 26, 1912-Rehearing denied Dec. 5, 1912.

1. PRACTICE―inquiry where Appellate Court reverses because of its finding of facts. Where the Appellate Court reverses a judgment of the trial court as a result of finding the facts in controversy different from the finding of the trial court and recites in the final judgment the facts so found, such finding is by the statute made conclusive, and the Supreme Court can only inquire whether the law was properly applied to the facts so found.

2. SAME-presumption as to facts not recited in the Appellate Court's judgment. Where the Appellate Court reverses a judgment and recites certain facts in its judgment, it will be presumed that all facts not so recited were found by the Appellate Court the same as they were found by the trial court.

3. SAME-inquiry where Appellate Court's reversal is based on its conclusion of law. Where the facts recited by the Appellate Court were not controverted but were admitted in the trial court but the judgment is reversed because the Appellate Court's conclusion of law as to the defendant's liability differs from that of the trial court, the inquiry in the Supreme Court is whether the Appellate Court was correct in its conclusion of law, and if so, its judgment should be affirmed.

4. CARRIERS-what provision in receipt is an attempt to limit common law liability. A provision in an express company's receipt limiting the amount of liability to a certain sum less than the value of the goods, in case no valuation is given, is an attempt by the express company to limit its common law liability.

5. SAME―a shipper has no implied authority to bind consignee by contract limiting liability. A shipper has no implied authority to bind the consignee by a contract which limits the amount of the carrier's liability to a fixed sum, unless the value is stated in the receipt, even though the goods are of greater value.

6. SAME when shipper acts as agent for consignee in taking a receipt. Where goods are ordered from a dealer to be shipped by express, without naming any particular carrier, and the dealer separates the goods from his stock and packs them in a bundle marked with the consignee's address and delivers the bundle to the express company, the title to the goods passes to the consignee, and in taking the carrier's receipt the shipper acts as consignee's agent.

7. SAME shipper has no implied authority to make an unlawful contract for consignee. A shipper has no implied authority to bind the consignee by entering into an unlawful contract limiting the carrier's common law liability, for the purpose of obtaining a lower rate of transportation than would otherwise be chargeable under the Inter-State Commerce act and the Elkins law.

8. SAME a contract repugnant to public policy will not be enforced. A contract which is valid in the State where it is made but which is to be performed partly in that State and partly in Illinois, will not be enforced in Illinois if it is repugnant to the public policy, laws and institutions of this State and is expressly prohibited by our statutes.

9. SAME-limitation upon common law liability cannot rest on provision in receipt for goods. A limitation upon the common law liability of a carrier cannot rest upon any provision in a receipt given for the goods but must have the assent of the shipper, whether found in the receipt or in a bill of lading, and an agent has no implied authority to make such a contract for a citizen of this State.

APPEAL from the Branch Appellate Court for the First District;-heard in that court on writ of error to the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. JOHN H. HUME, Judge, presiding.

CHARLES B. ELDER, for appellant.

BRODE B. DAVIS, for appellee.

Mr. JUSTICE CARTWRIGHT delivered the opinion of the

court:

This suit was brought in the municipa! court of Chicago by appellee as a case of the fourth class, against appellant, to recover for the loss of goods of the plaintiff which were delivered by A. D. Juilliard & Co. to the defendant in New York City, consigned to the plaintiff at Chicago, and were never delivered. The case was tried

by the court without a jury on an agreed statement of facts and the testimony of a witness as to the law in New York. The defense was that by the contract of shipment the defendant's liability was limited to $50, and that amount was tendered to the plaintiff. The court refused to hold, at the request of the plaintiff, that the contract made in New York was not enforceable in this State and the defendant's liability was not thereby limited to $50, and that the shipper did not commit a fraud upon the defendant. The court found the plaintiff entitled to recover $50 and no more, and entered judgment for that amount, without costs. On a writ of error from the Appellate Court for the First District a branch of that court reversed the judgment with the following finding of facts: "That the defendant in error, Adams Express Company, negligently lost the goods of the plaintiff in error, Nonotuck Silk Company, theretofore delivered to said Adams Express Company to be transported by it as a common carrier; that the value of said goods was $170.97, for which amount the said defendant in error, Adams Express Company, is liable to said plaintiff in error, Nonotuck Silk Company." A certificate of importance was granted and an appeal to this court.

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