for non-performance as in the case of individuals or purely private corporations. It would be a peculiar condition of affairs if a State could exact obedience from its citizens, fine and imprison them for violations of law, and at the same time be powerless to secure obedience to the same laws by the entity which derived its being from the State itself. To obtain this result there is no weapon so effective as criminal procedure by way of indictment. The Woman's Ten-hour law prohibits the employment of females in any "public institution, incorporated or unincorporated, in this State, more than ten hours during any one day." The act contains no exception that would exempt from its operation such institutions as the Isolation Hospital, owned and operated by the city of Chicago. The language of the act, we think, clearly embraces such an institution, and as the danger to the health of females from requiring them to work therein more than ten hours a day is as great, so far as we are able to see, as requiring or permitting them to work in other prohibited lines more than ten hours, no reason is apparent for holding that the legislature did not intend the act to apply to public institutions of municipalities. If it would have been competent to have exempted municipalities the legislature has not seen fit to do so, and it only remains to be determined whether a municipal corporation may be prosecuted criminally. That it can be, is sustained by the weight of authority. (Hill v. Boston, 122 Mass. 344; 23 Am. Rep. 332; Eastman v. Town of Meredith, 36 N. H. 284; Freeholders of Sussex v. Strader, 3 Harr. 108; 35 Am. Dec. 530; People v. Corporation of Albany, 11 Wend. 539; 27 Am. Dec. 95; State v. City of Portland, 74 Me. 268; 43 Am. Rep. 586; Commonwealth v. Bredin, 165 Pa. St. 224; State v. Barksdale, 24 Tenn. 154; Allen v. City of Decatur, 23 Ill. 332; Browning v. City of Springfield, 17 id. 143; 28 Cyc. 125, 1775; 20 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 1231.) In some of the above cases the action was civil, by an individual, but in all of them the rule was rec

ognized that an indictment or information would lie against the municipality to redress a public grievance.

The power "to regulate" hospitals, conferred upon municipalities, does not authorize regulation in violation of law. The power to regulate hospitals is limited by the law prohibiting the employment of females therein more than ten hours in any one day.

We find no error in the records, and the judgment in each case is affirmed.

Judgments affirmed.

THE PEOPLE ex rel. Charles M. Myers, County Collector, Appellee, vs. THE CHICAGO GREAT WESTERN Railroad COMPANY, Appellant.

Opinion filed December 17, 1912.

TAXES-additional levy under amended section 14 of the Roads and Bridges act need not be for some unusual purpose. Since the amendment of section 14 of the Roads and Bridges act, in 1911, it is not necessary to the validity of an additional road and bridge tax that it be levied on account of some unusual, unforeseen or unexpected event.

APPEAL from the County Court of Ogle county; the Hon. FRANK E. REED, Judge, presiding.

FAISSLER & FULTON, for appellant.

W. J. EMERSON, State's Attorney, (H. A. SMITH, of counsel,) for appellee.

Mr. JUSTICE FARMER delivered the opinion of the court:

Appellant filed objections in the county court of Ogle county to the entry of judgment against its property for delinquent road and bridge taxes in four townships of said county. The objections present the validity of road and bridge taxes levied in each of the townships of Lynnville,

White Rock, Marion and Byron under section 14 of the Road and Bridge law in addition to the thirty-six cents authorized by section 13. The county court overruled the objections, rendered judgment for the taxes, and this appeal is prosecuted to reverse that judgment.

The validity of the tax in each case depends upon the sufficiency of the certificates of the commissioners of highways to the board of town auditors and assessor and the reasons therein stated why the consent of said board of auditors and assessor was desired for levying the additional tax. In Lynnville township the certificate stated the additional levy was desired "for the construction of bridges;" in White Rock township it merely stated it was desired for "bridges;" in Marion township for the "purpose of building concrete culverts and bridges," and in Byron township for "extra bridge work." Appellant contends that section. 13 of the Road and Bridge act is a limitation on the power of the commissioners to levy road and bridge taxes exceeding thirty-six cents on the $100 valuation for road and bridge purposes and for the payment of outstanding orders. and that section 14 does not authorize an additional levy for ordinary road and bridge purposes specified in section 13, but only authorizes an additional levy on account of some unusual, unforeseen or unexpected event. The construction to be given section 14 and the purposes for which it authorizes an additional levy have had the consideration of the court in People v. DeKalb and Great Western Railroad Co. (ante, p. 290,) People v. Cairo, Vincennes and Chicago Railway Co. (ante, p. 286,) and People v. Wabash Railroad Co. (ante, p. 394,) and need not be again discussed. Under the authority of those cases the taxes objected to were legally levied, and the county court properly overruled appellant's objections and rendered judgment therefor.

The judgment is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

THE PEOPLE ex rel. Thomas Frole, Petitioner, vs. ANTHONY CZARNECKI et al. Defendants.

Opinion filed December 17, 1912.

1. ELECTIONS will of the voter must be allowed to govern, if possible. The intent and will of the voter, when it is expressed in accordance with the provisions of the law and can be ascertained, will govern.

2. SAME—when candidate cannot claim place on official ballot. Where all candidates for vacancies in the municipal court of Chicago consent to the grouping arrangement made on the primary ballot by the election commissioners, by which some forty names are printed as the candidates for the nine regular six-year-term vacancies and two are printed as candidates, in accordance with their petitions, for a six-year term newly created by ordinance, the defeated one of such two candidates is not entitled to a place on the official ballot as a candidate for one of the other six-yearterm vacancies, even though his vote was higher than the lowest successful candidate therefor.

ORIGINAL petition for mandamus.

I. T. GREENACRE, for petitioner.

CHARLES H. MITCHELL, (THOMAS J. O'HARE, of counsel,) for defendants.

Mr. JUSTICE CARTER delivered the opinion of the court:

This is an original petition filed in this court for a writ of mandamus to require the board of election commissioners of the city of Chicago to cause to be printed on the ballots for the November 5, 1912, election, the names of certain persons as candidates for judges of the municipal court of Chicago. An oral announcement refusing to grant. the writ was made at the October, 1912, term of this court, with the statement that an opinion would be filed later.

In April, 1912, a primary election was held in the city of Chicago under the Primary Election law for the selec

tion of candidates of the various political parties for the offices to be filled at said November election. The terms of nine associate judges of the municipal court of Chicago, then holding office for six-year terms, expired on the first Monday of December, 1912. At this primary petitions were filed on behalf of a large number of candidates who desired to become the regular democratic candidates for associate judges of said court to succeed the nine judges whose terms were to expire. February 27, 1912, the city council of the city of Chicago passed an ordinance under section 12 of the Municipal Court act, (Hurd's Stat. 1911, p. 711,) reciting that two-thirds of the judges of the municipal court had certified that the business of said court was such as to require an increase in the number of said judges, and said ordinance provided that the said number should be increased from twenty-seven to thirty, and that there should be elected at the November 5, 1912, election three additional judges, for the respective terms of two, four and six years. After the passage of this ordinance a petition was filed on behalf of Edward J. Queeny as a democratic candidate, which petition, under the caption "Office," stated: "Associate justice municipal court under ordinance of the city council of February 19, 1912.-For six-year term." Another petition with like designation was filed by Hugh J. Kearns, also as a democratic candidate. In preparing the primary ballots the board of election commissioners of the city of Chicago had before it forty petitions for democratic candidates for justices for the six-year terms which made no reference to said ordinance, the petition of John J. Sullivan being one of this number. It also had before it the petitions of Queeny and Kearns, which stated, as above indicated, that they were candidates for the six-year term for associate justice created by the ordiThat board, after consideration, reached a decision. that all of the forty democratic candidates for associate justices to fill the six-year terms of the nine sitting judges