constitutional questions, the cause was afterward transferred to this court.

The order recited above is the whole record in the case. The clerk, in making up the transcript, has included a copy of a certain petition, (being probably the complaint referred to in the order,) and a transcript of certain proceedings purporting to have been had in the county court, but these constitute no part of the record. These proceedings were not against the plaintiff in error and he was not concerned in them except as a witness. His first appearance is in the order sentencing him to jail. The commitment having been for an alleged contempt committed in open court, without charge, plea, issue or trial, the only record required to be made is the order of commitment. That order should set out the facts constituting the offense so fully and certainly as to show that the court was authorized to make the order, and the facts stated must be taken to be true. Whitten v. State, 36 Ind. 196; Ex parte Ferry, 128 U. S. 289.

It appears from the record that the court had no jurisdiction to make this order. The hearing in which the false testimony is found to have been given was not a charge of a crime against the plaintiff in error or any individual, but a general charge that "divers uncertainties and illegalities had been committed relative to lodging-house affidavits purporting to have been filed under the statute in that case made and provided." The statute referred to is paragraph 193 of chapter 46 of Hurd's Statutes. Under that section lodging-house keepers are required to file with the election commissioners, not less than twenty-eight nor more than thirty days before any election, affidavits containing certain information as to their lodgers. A failure to comply with this requirement is declared to be a misdemeanor and is punishable by a fine. The next section provides that the person required to file such statement who fails to do so. may be cited by the election commissioners to appear before them and furnish such sworn statement and make such

oral statements under oath as the commissioners may require. The commissioners are required to sit to hear such citations on Friday of the fourth week before the election. The hearing is by the commissioners. The statute confers no authority upon the county judge or the county court in connection with this hearing. If he sits with the commissioners or takes part in the hearing it is as a volunteer. The board of election commissioners is not a court, and the board and county judge, acting together, are not a court. The county court had no jurisdiction of the investigation of the supposed "uncertainties and illegalities" in the lodginghouse affidavits.

From the transcript, aside from the order heretofore set forth, it appears that the complaint mentioned in the order was a petition filed November 2, 1911, addressed to the judge of the county court and the board of election commissioners. Neither the county court nor the county judge had any jurisdiction in the matter or authority to make any order on that subject, yet an order was entered that citations and subpoenas issue commanding all proprietors of lodging houses, and all persons signing lodginghouse affidavits, to appear before the bar of the county court to answer questions and give information to the court in all matters pertaining to the petition. Next, the transcript shows a hearing, on November 6, upon the petition, in which it is stated that the court found the allegations set forth in the petition are founded upon facts and in a large measure true; that the affidavits are not in compliance with the statute, and many of the signers of them. furnished sufficient cause for further examination to determine the question whether or not they shall be held to await the action of the grand jury upon charges of perjury, the court being convinced that perjury has been committed. The affidavits are ordered stricken from the files of the election board, various directions are given to the board of election commissioners, and all rules upon lodg

ing-house affidavit signers to show cause why they should not be punished for contempt of court are continued until November 9. All this was without any warrant in the law. The county judge had no authority to hear the matter, to sit with the board of election commissioners or to make any order in the premises. The next order was that of November 15, and it, like all the others, was without jurisdiction.

Other valid objections to this order are apparent on its face, but the lack of jurisdiction is sufficient. It is not to be inferred because the question is not discussed, that we think a court can in any case, upon its own knowledge of the facts, punish summarily as for a contempt against the dignity of the court, a witness who has testified falsely in Order reversed.

a cause.

THE PEOPLE ex rel. O. B. Wysong, County Collector, Appellee, vs. THE CLEVELAND, CINCINNATI, CHICAGO AND ST. LOUIS RAILWAY COMPANY, Appellant.

Opinion filed December 17, 1912.

1. TAXES—when reasons for an additional road and bridge tax are sufficient. If the reasons certified by the highway commissioners to the board of town auditors and the assessor for an additional road and bridge tax are deemed sufficient by such board and the assessor to justify their consent to the levy, the reasons so certified will be regarded as sufficient by the courts.

2. SAME when a levy for contingent and general expenses is too large. An inconsiderable amount may be levied by a town under the general designation of "contingent and general expenses," but an item of $260 for contingent and general expenses out of a total levy of $1600 for all town purposes is too large and will not be sustained.

APPEAL from the County Court of Vermilion county; the Hon. LAWRENCE T. ALLEN, Judge, presiding.

GEORGE B. GILLESPIE, (R. J. CARY, REARICK & MEEKS, HILL & BULLINGTON, and GILLESPIE & FITZGERALD, of counsel,) for appellant.

JOHN H. LEWMAN, State's Attorney, (H. A. SWALLow, and C. M. CRAYTON, of counsel,) for appellee.

Mr. JUSTICE HAND delivered the opinion of the court:

This was an application for judgment and order of sale against the property of the appellant for the following taxes levied against its property for the year 1911, viz.: Road and bridge tax in the town of Danville, $78.65; road and bridge tax in the town of Oakwood, $238.34; road and bridge tax in the town of Catlin, $19.67, and town tax of the town of Oakwood, $15.25. The appellant appeared and filed objections to the rendition of judgment and order of sale against its property, which were overruled and judgment was rendered, and it has prosecuted this appeal.

The objections to the road and bridge taxes in the towns of Danville, Oakwood and Catlin are, that in the town of Danville an additional levy of five cents on the $100, in the town of Oakwood an additional levy of twenty-five cents on the $100 and in the town of Catlin an additional levy of twenty-five cents on the $100 were made under section 14 of the Road and Bridge act, in addition to a levy of thirty-six cents on the $100 made under section 13 of said act in each of said towns, and that the reasons certified by the highway commissioners for the needs of such additional levies were not sufficient. The reasons assigned in the town of Danville were as follows: "For opening a new road at Atherton cemetery, $1000; a new bridge on Georgetown road, $1000; a new bridge on Jones road, $1000; a new bridge on Hungry Hollow road, $1000; a new bridge on Batestown road, $500, and a new bridge on Leverich road, $300.' The reason assigned in

the town of Oakwood was, "for the purpose of constructing a bridge and approaches at Chaney ford, on Salt creek," and the reason assigned in the town of Catlin was, "for building a bridge at Sugar Grove school house and Butler branch, and for liquidating ditch damages." The several reasons specified for an additional levy under section. 14 of the Road and Bridge act, as amended, were sufficient, and the county court did not err in overruling the objections to the road and bridge taxes in the towns of Danville, Oakwood and Catlin. People v. Cairo, Vincennes and Chicago Railway Co. (ante, p. 286;) People v. Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago and St. Louis Railway Co. (ante, P. 423.)

The objection urged against the town tax in the town of Oakwood was, that out of a total tax levy for that township of $1600, a levy of $260 was made for contingent and general purposes. In People v. Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Co. 253 Ill. 100, it was said that under the former decisions of this court a tax levy for contingent and general expenses was invalid, but that under the later decisions of this court an inconsiderable amount could be levied for contingent and general expenses under such general designation; that to permit a taxing body to levy one-eighth or one-ninth of the entire tax levied in the municipality for a year for contingent and general expenses would be to permit a taxing body to include matters in a tax levy which were not authorized by law, and that the courts should only approve such general tax levies for a small amount when compared with the entire tax levy. In this case the amount levied for contingent and general expenses is sixteen per cent of the entire tax levy. We are of the opinion, therefore, that the amount levied for contingent and general expenses was far too large an amount and that such tax levy cannot be sustained.