"This was a strike in Bridgeport, with the iron-ore men, I said. It was not accidental. He tried to kill me, all right. The bullet went right into the fleshy part of my leg and cut through about four inches into my flesh in the right leg. I was all right and perfect after that. He put the first bullet through the top of my hat. I was stooping down to get him by the legs and it went through my hat." Thereupon his counsel admonished him, "Wait; Mr. Condon objects to it." The evidence was incompetent and the statement of counsel inexcusable. It was proper crossexamination to inquire of the plaintiff as to the nature and extent of any other injury he might have received, and the cross-examination was confined to this injury. It was proper, on re-direct examination, to inquire all about the effect of the injury upon the plaintiff. It was not proper to go into the circumstances under which the injury was received, the merits of the parties involved in it or the position of the plaintiff in any dispute. There was no occasion to inject into this trial any reference to the plaintiff as a union or non-union man, or to submit to the jury the question of the propriety of his conduct at the time. he was shot. This was the object of the testimony, and it was error to admit it.

Objection is made to the action of the court in giving plaintiff's instructions Nos. 8 and 9 and in refusing defendant's instruction No. 35. The plaintiff's instructions were both on the measure of damages. No. 8 was given and is approved in North Chicago Street Railroad Co. v. Brown, 178 Ill. 187. We think it limits the jury to disabilities and damages resulting from the street car accident and shown by the evidence. No. 9 has been given, in substance, in many cases. The same criticism made upon it here was made in the case of Chicago City Railway Co. v. Gemmill, 209 Ill. 638, and it is there said that it would have been more accurate had it limited the jury to the consideration of the facts and circumstances attending the

injury. On another trial it can be so limited. Instruction No. 35 was sufficiently covered by No. 24, which was given.

The judgments of the Appellate Court and of the circuit court will be reversed and the cause will be remanded to the circuit court for a new trial.

Reversed and remanded.

ROBERT J. WILSON, Admr., Appellee, vs. ROBERT J. Cook,

Appellant.

Opinion filed December 17, 1912.

1. MARRIAGE-power of State to regulate marriages of its citizens in other States. Every State has power to declare that marriages between its citizens in foreign States in disregard of the statutes of the State of their domicile will not be recognized by the courts of the latter State though valid where celebrated.

2. SAME-exceptions to rule that a marriage valid where celebrated is valid everywhere. Marriages which are contrary to the law of nature, as generally recognized by christian nations, and marriages which are declared by positive law to have no validity, are exceptions to the general rule that marriages valid where celebrated are valid everywhere.

3. SAME-marriage in violation of section 1a of Divorce act is void wherever celebrated. Section 1a of the Divorce act, (Laws of 1905, p. 194,) which prohibits either party from marrying another person within one year from the time the divorce was obtained, is not merely penal in character, but is a statute lawfully imposing upon citizens of this State, as a positive policy of the State for the protection of the morals and good order of society against serious social evils, an incapacity to contract marriage, and a marriage contracted in disregard of its prohibition is void wherever celebrated.

4. SAME-when there can be no presumption of a common law marriage. The amendment of section 4 of the Marriage act, which declares common law marriages thereafter entered into to be null and void, went into effect July 1, 1905, and no presumption of a common law marriage can arise from the fact that parties who attempted marriage, after such date, in violation of section 1a of the Divorce act, continued to live together as man and wife until the death of one of them.

APPEAL from the Probate Court of Madison county; the Hon. J. P. STREUBER, Judge, presiding.

B. R. BURROUGHS, and BURROUGHS & RYDER, for appellant:

In the absence of evidence our courts presume that the common law obtains in a foreign State. Schlee v. Guckenheimer, 179 Ill. 593.

Where the celebration of the marriage is once shown, everything essential to its validity will be presumed until the contrary is shown. Cartwright v. McGown, 121 Ill. 388; Barber v. People, 203 id. 543; Potter v. Clapp, 203 id. 592; Schmisseur v. Beatrie, 147 id. 210.

Where persons who are incapable of contracting marriage because of some statutory inhibition leave the State of their domicile, go into another State and there contract marriage according to the laws of that State, such marriage is valid in the State of their domicile upon their return thereto. VanVoorhis v. Brintnall, 86 N. Y. 18; Thorp v. Thorp, 90 id. 602; Putnam v. Putnam, 25 Mass. 433; Commonwealth v. Lane, 113 id. 458; Dickson v. Dickson, I Yerg. 26.

A divorce statute which forbids the re-marriage of the guilty person does not operate against the re-marriage in another State, although the parties go there for the purpose of evading the law of the domicile. 14 Cyc. 729; Medway v. Needham, 16 Mass. 157.

If parties to a formal marriage, in the beginning, desire and intend marriage in good faith as a matter of fact, but an impediment exists preventing such marriage, and the desire and intention continue after the impediment is removed, and the parties continue in the relation of husband and wife and cohabit as such, it is sufficient proof of a marriage. Manning v. Spurck, 199 Ill. 447; Land v. Land, 206 id. 288.

E. G. HILL, for appellee:

Section 1a of chapter 40 of the statutes of Illinois is an enactment or declaration of a public policy, which applies to those of its residents and citizens who are subject to its provisions, without exception, no matter where they are, and operates as a disqualification to re-marry within the prohibited period. Lanham v. Lanham, 17 L. R. A. 804; Pennegar v. State, 87 Tenn. 244; McLennan v. McLennan, 31 Ore. 480; Stull's Estate, 183 Pa. 625.

Marriage, as between the parties and the State, is not technically a contract which must be measured and construed in accordance with the laws and rules applicable to contracts generally, but it is a status whereof the rights, obligations, preservation and dissolution are controlled by the State, which is a party interested in it and its dissolution, and laws enacted by the State to govern the same are declarations of a public policy to control all those of its residents and citizens who come within their scope. 19 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, (2d ed.) 1159, 1160; Brand v. Brand, 252 Ill. 134; Decker v. Decker, 193 id. 285.

A common law marriage does not arise by mere continued cohabitation following a void marriage, after the impediment has been removed. Cartwright v. McGown, 121 Ill. 388; Lanham v. Lanham, 17 L. R. A. 804.

Mr. CHIEF JUSTICE DUNN delivered the opinion of the

court:

On November 13, 1906, the appellant, Robert J. Cook, obtained a divorce from his wife in Clinton county, in this State, and on February 13, 1907, was married in St. Louis, Missouri, to Mary A. Moore, who resided in Madison county, in this State. Thereafter, until her death, on January 4, 1912, they resided together as husband and wife on certain premises owned by her in Madison county. Robert J. Wilson was appointed administrator of her estate and

filed a petition in the probate court to sell the real estate on which they had lived, to pay debts, making the appellant a defendant, and alleging that the appellant claimed to have been the husband of the deceased at the time of her death and was in possession of the real estate described in the petition, claiming to be entitled to homestead and dower therein. The appellant answered, alleging his marriage to Mary A. Moore as above stated; that they resided on the premises in question at the time of her death and that he was entitled to homestead and dower therein. Upon a hearing the court found that appellant was not the husband of the deceased and was not entitled to homestead and dower in the premises, and entered a decree of sale, from which this appeal is prosecuted.

*

The first question in the case is whether or not the marriage of the appellant and the deceased was valid. Section 1a of chapter 40 (Hurd's Stat. 1911, p. 862,) provides: "That in every case in which a divorce has been granted * neither party shall marry again within one year from the time the decree was granted; * and every person marrying contrary to the provisions of this section shall be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary for not less than one year, nor more than three years, and said marriage shall be held absolutely void." The marriage of the appellant was within one year from the time the decree of divorce was granted. It is undoubtedly the general rule of law that a marriage valid where it is celebrated is valid everywhere, but there are two well recognized exceptions, viz., marriages which are contrary to the law of nature, as generally recognized by christian nations, and those which are declared by positive law to have no validity. Every State has the power to enact laws which will personally bind its citizens while sojourning in a foreign jurisdiction provided such laws profess to so bind them, and to declare that marriages contracted between its citizens in foreign States in disregard of the statutes of