amendments this provision has been retained in said section I just as originally enacted in 1885, showing clearly that it was the intent of the legislature that this expense should be borne by such cities as should adopt the City Election act. As was said in the Bolles case, supra, the legislature has the authority to make an apportionment of the cost among the county, the city and the township and require each to bear its burden. By said section 1 of article 7 of the City Election act the county is required to pay the salaries of the election commissioners and chief clerk. To equalize this and to make a just apportionment of the cost of holding elections the legislature undoubtedly deemed it proper to require cities adopting the act to pay all expenses incurred by the board of election commissioners.

In People v. Bowman, 253 Ill. 234, we affirmed the judgment of the county court overruling an objection to an item of a county tax "for warrants of the board of election commissioners, $7500," the objection being that the statute does not authorize the board of election commissioners to issue warrants against county funds. The conclusion there arrived at was correct, as the statute clearly authorizes the board of election commissioners to draw warrants upon the county treasury for certain specified expenses, but the language of that opinion, where it refers to the expenses to be borne by the county in all general county and State elections, must be limited to refer and apply to such expenses, only, as the City Elections act provides shall be paid by the county, such as claims for the services of the judges and clerks of elections. With this limitation the Bowman case is in harmony with the holding in the Bolles case and with the views herein expressed.

The county of Winnebago is not liable for the expenses sought to be recovered here, and the judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed. Judgment affirmed.

THE PEOPLE ex rel. Robert Hewitt, County Collector, Appellee, vs. THE CINCINNATI, LAFAYETTE AND CHICAGO RAILWAY COMPANY, Appellant.

Opinion filed December 17, 1912.

I. TAXES officers are presumed to have performed their dutics in matter of levying taxes. In the absence of proof to the contrary it must be presumed by the Supreme Court that the various officers entrusted with the levy of taxes performed the duties imposed upon them by law.

2. SAME when file-mark on certificate of highway commissioners is of no significance. The fact that the file-mark on the certificate of highway commissioners shows that the certificate was filed with the county clerk on the day preceding the meeting of the board of supervisors has no tendency to show that such certificate was not thereafter laid before the board and acted upon.

3. SAME how certificate of highway commissioners reached the board of supervisors is not material. The material thing in the levy of road and bridge taxes in a town under the labor system is that the certificate of the highway commissioners be laid before the board of supervisors and acted upon, and it is not material whether the certificate is laid before them by the supervisor of the town or reaches them by some other means.

4. SAME what does not show that the certificate was not acted upon by board of supervisors. The facts that neither the certificate of the highway commissioners nor the pages of the record of the action of the board of supervisors introduced in evidence by the objectors show affirmatively that the certificate was acted upon by the board do not show it was not acted upon, where several pages of the record between the first one and the last one introduced were not introduced in evidence at all and the last page introduced shows an adjournment of the meeting.

5. SAME when district road tax cannot be sustained. A district road tax cannot be sustained where the delinquent list of such district does not have attached thereto the affidavit required by section 110 of the Roads and Bridges act to be made by the overseer of the road district.

6. SAME-party seeking to amend objections must obtain ruling thereon. Where an objector asks leave, on the hearing, to amend its objections to a district road tax by changing the number of the district, but the court, upon an objection being made by the People to the amendment, reserves its ruling and does not

thereafter rule thereon, and the amendment is not made or a ruling insisted upon, the objector cannot complain, on appeal, concerning the district road tax to which its proposed amendment would have applied.

7. SAME proposition to build hard roads must receive a majority of all ballots cast. Under the statute, where the proposition to build hard roads is submitted at the regular election for town officers, the proposition must receive a majority of all the ballots cast at the election, and it is not sufficient that it receives a majority of the votes cast upon the proposition itself, if such number is less than a majority of the total number of ballots cast at the election.

APPEAL from the County Court of Kankakee county; the Hon. A. W. DESELM, Judge, presiding.

HUNTER & SCHNEIDER, for appellant.

J. BERT. MILLER, State's Attorney, for appellee.

Mr. JUSTICE COOKE delivered the opinion of the court:

The county court of Kankakee county overruled appellant's objections to certain taxes extended against its property in the towns of Aroma and St. Anne, in the said county, and rendered judgment against the property for the alleged delinquent taxes. The taxes in controversy are the road and bridge taxes of the town of Aroma, the district road taxes of districts 3 and 5 of the town of Aroma and the hard road tax of the town of St. Anne.

The town of Aroma is operating under the labor system of taxation for roads and bridges. Taxes at the rate of fifty cents on each $100 valuation were extended against appellant's property in this town for road and bridge purposes. Appellant objected to these taxes on the ground. that the certificate of the highway commissioners showing the amount necessary to be raised for road and bridge purposes and the rate per cent of taxation was not delivered by the highway commissioners to the supervisor of the

town, nor was such certificate submitted to the board of supervisors of the county for its action at the September, 1911, meeting, and that in these particulars there was a failure to comply with the provisions of section 119 of the Road and Bridge act. The material part of the objection is the alleged failure to submit the certificate to the board of supervisors for its action at the September meeting. Whether the certificate reached the board through the supervisor of the town or by some other means is immaterial, so far as the validity of the tax is concerned. People v. Chicago and Eastern Illinois Railroad Co. 214 Ill. 190.

The certificate of the highway commissioners on which the tax was extended against appellant's property was introduced in evidence by appellant, and the file-mark thereon showed that it was filed with the county clerk on September 11, 1911. Appellant also offered pages 461, 469 and 470 of the record of the September, 1911, meeting of the board of supervisors of Kankakee county. Page 461 of this record showed the organization of the board on September 12, 1911, and page 470 showed the adjournment. of the September meeting. There was nothing on either of these pages, nor on page 469 of the record, showing that the certificate of the highway commissioners of the town of Aroma was submitted to or approved by the board of supervisors of the county at the September meeting, and appellant argues that it thereby established the ground of its objection to this tax. What appears on the record of the September meeting of the board from pages 462 to 468, inclusive, was not disclosed by any of the evidence introduced in the county court. There is no direct evidence that the certificate of the highway commissioners was not delivered to the supervisor of the town and by him presented to the board of supervisors, nor is there any direct. evidence that the board did not, at the September meeting, approve the levy made by the highway commissioners, as shown by their certificate. We must presume, in the ab

sence of proof to the contrary, that the various officers entrusted with the levy of these taxes performed the duties imposed upon them by law, and that the record of the action of the board of supervisors approving the levy made by the highway commissioners is contained on some one or more of the pages of the record of the September meeting of the board which were not offered in evidence in this case. The fact that the file-mark on the certificate shows that the certificate was filed with the county clerk on the day preceding that on which the board convened is without significance. The county clerk is clerk of the board of supervisors, and the fact that the certificate was filed with the clerk of the board before the board convened can furnish no basis for a presumption that the certificate was not thereafter presented to the board and acted upon at the September meeting. After the People had made a prima facie case it was incumbent upon appellant to establish the ground of its objection by proof. Having failed to do so, the court properly overruled the objection to the road and bridge tax of the town of Aroma.

The objections to the district road tax of district No. 3 of the town of Aroma were, in effect, that the certificate upon which the county clerk extended this tax was the original road labor and tax list made by the commissioners of highways; that no list sworn to by the overseer of highways of the road district showing the taxes assessed against appellant's property to be delinquent was presented to the board of supervisors at the September, 1911, meeting, and that the board of supervisors did not levy or cause to be levied said tax. To sustain these objections appellant offered in evidence a certificate which it was stipulated was the certificate upon which the county clerk extended the district road tax against appellant's property. This certificate was subscribed by the highway commissioners, and contained a list of appellant's property in said road district, the valuation thereof and the tax assessed thereon,