v Skelly, 1 Black, 436), given by the highest State tribunal as part of the law. (Lavin v. Emigrant Indust. Sav. Bank, 1 Fed. Rep. 690; Christy v. Pridgeon, 4 Wall. 196; see Leffingwell v. Warren, 2 Black, 603; Shelby v. Gay, 11 Wheat. 367.) It applies to the construction of a law providing for administration of estates (Lavin v. Emigrant Indust. Sav. Bank, 18 Blatchf. 11; S. C., 1 Fed. Rep. 641), or to the construction of devices creating estates in fee (Van Rensselaer v. Kearney, 11 How. 297; Carroll v. Lessee of Carroll, 16 How. 275); but the mere construction of a will by a State court does not, as the construction of a statute of the State, constitute a rule of decision for the courts of the United States, unless such construction had been so long acquiesced in as to become a rule of property. (Lane v. Vick, 3 How. 464.) It applies to principles establishing title to real property (Suydam v. Williamson, 24 How. 427; Chicago City v. Rob. bins, 2 Black. 418); and the construction by the State supreme court of the State statutes establishing the rule of property. (Green v. Neal, 6 Peters, 291; Ross v. Duval, 13 Peters, 45; Lauriat v. Stratton, 18 Blatchf. 11; S. C, 11 Fed Rep. 107; citing Polk's Lessee v. Wendel, 9 Cranch, 98; Jackson v. Chew, 12 Wheat. 162; Nichols v. Levy, 5 Wall. 433.) This rule of decision does not apply on the general principles of equity not controlled by local law or usage (Neves v. Scott, 13 How. 268; Montejo v. Owen, 14 Blatchf. 326), nor to remedies at common law or in equity (Robinson v. Campbell, 3 Wheat. 212); but a non-resident complainant can ask no greater relief than he could were he to resort to the State courts. (Ewing v. St. Louis, 4 Wall. 413.) The rule applies on questions of jurisdiction of inferior courts of the State under State laws (Jeter v. Hewitt, 22 How. 352), as on a question to sub-. ject legal and equitable interests in real estate to the claims of creditors (Nichols v. Levy, 5 Wall. 433); but not to the practice of allowing ejectments to be maintainel on equitable titles (Sheirburn v. Cordova, 24 How. 423; Fenn v. Holme, 21 How. 481), nor to State laws regulating proceedings on execution and other process in suits at common law (Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1; Ross v. Duval, 16 Peters, 45), nor to all rules governing procedure and practice (Brown v. Van Braam, 3 Dall. 344); but it

applies to rules of evidence (Haussknecht v. Claypool, 1 Black, 431), and to the statutes of limitations of the State (Leffingwell v. Warren, 2 Black, 599; Sayles v. Oregon Cent. R. Co., 6 Sawy. 31; Moores v. Citizens' Nat. Bank, 11 Fed. Rep. 624, note), as limitations of actions and executions on judgments (Sayles v. Oregon Cent. R. Co., 6 Sawy. 31; Sayles v. Louisville City R. Co., 9 Fed. Rep. 513), except where the laws of the United States otherwise provide, as in patent cases. (Sayles v. Oregon Cent. R. Co., 6 Sawy. 31; Leffingwell v. Warren, 2 Black, 599; Johnson v. Roe, 1 Fed. Rep. 695; Ross v. Duval, 13 Peters, 45; Sayles v. Louisville City R. Co. 9 Fed. Rep. 513.) The decision of State courts will be followed as to the construction of a contract declared by the State court void, on the general principles of public policy, unless the question was whether the legislation impairs the obligation of the contract. (Delmas v. Ins. Co., 14 Wall. 661; see Bridge Proprietors v. Hoboken Co., 1 Wall. 145.) It applies to the interpretation of contracts made by the State, as statutes authorizing municipal corporations to subscribe to aid railroads extending beyond the limits of the city or county, and to issue bonds accordingly (Gelpecke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175), and to the question as to the validity of municipal bonds issued under the State law (Mitchell v. Burlington, 4 Wall. 271); but not to a question of contract made by the State which violates the Constitution of the United States. (Bridge Prop. v. Hoboken Co., 1 Wall. 145; see Delmas v. Ins. Co., 14 Wall. 661.) So it applies to the construction of a State grant, as a ferry franchise. (Conway v. Taylor, 1 Black, 603.) To what extent the Federal courts adopt and follow the decisions of the State courts, determined. (Gage v. Pumpelly, 115 U. S. 454; Carroll County v. Smith, 111 U. S. 556; Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U. S. 425; Gibson v. Lyon, 115 U. S. 439; Louisville etc. R. R. Co. v. Palmes, 109 U. S. 244; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356; Anderson v. Santa Anna, 116 U. S. 356; Buford v. Holly, 28 Fed. Rep. 680; Woodward v. Gould, 28 Fed. Rep. 736; Dodd v. Ghiselin, 27 Fed. Rep. 405; Freund v. Yaegerman, 27 Fed. Rep. 248; Rice v. Frayser, 24 Fed. Rep. 460; Moulton v. Chafee, 22 Fed. Rep. 26; Venner v. Atchison etc. R. R. Co., 28 Fed. Rep. 581; Wilson v. Neal, 23 Fed. Rep. 129; Raymond v. Parish of Terrebonne, 28

Fed. Rep. 773; see Burlington C. R. & N. R. Co. v. Day (Iowa) 12 L. R. A. 436, 45 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 391, 9 Ry. & Corp. L. J. 282; Cook County v. Calumet & C. Canal & D. Co. 138 U. S. 635; Lo kout Mt. R. Co. v. Houston, 44 Fed. Rep. 449; Heath v. Wallace, 138 U. S. 573.) There is no distinction between the binding effect of decisions on commercial law and on statutes. (Forepaugh v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. (Pa.) 46 Phila. Leg. Int. 507, 24 W. N. C. 385.) Commercial law of a State stands upon the same basis as a decision upon any other branch of the common law. (Forepaugh v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. (Pa.) 46 Phila. Leg. Int. 507, 24 W. N. C. 385.) State laws and decisions govern United States courts, as to title and transfer of real estate by grant or devise. (Elmendorf v. Taylor, St. John v. Chew, Claiborne Co. v. Brooks, 111 U. S. 400; see Bucher v. Railroad Co., 125 U. S. 555; St. Louis v. Rutz, 138 U. S 226.) Where a local law or custom has been established by repeated decisions of the highest courts of a state, it becomes also the law governing the courts of the United States sitting in that State. (Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U. S. 20) It has been held, however, that rules of property and action in the State are always regarded by the Federal courts; but the Federal courts exercise their own judgment in reference to the doctrines of commercial law and general jurisprudence. (Pleasant Twp. v. Ætna L. Ins. Co. 138 U. S. 67.)

§ 242 (722). Proceedings, civil and criminal, in vindication of civil rights. The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred on the district and circuit court by the provisions of this title, and of title "Civil Rights," and of title "Crimes," for the protection of all persons in the United States in their civil rights, and for their vindication, shall be exercised and enforced in conformity with the laws of the United States, so far as such laws are suitable to carry the same into effect; but in all cases where they are not adapted to the object, or are deficient in the provi

sions necessary to furnish suitable remedies and punish offenses against law, the common law, as modified and changed by the constitution and statutes of the State wherein the court having jurisdiction of such civil or criminal cause is held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States, shall be extended to and govern the said courts in the trial and disposition of the cause, and, if it is of a criminal nature, in the infliction of punishment on the party found guilty. (Rev. Stats. sec. 722.)

Remedy at law. If the remedy at law is speedy and adequate, a remedy in equity, created by State statute, cannot be resorted to in the Federal courts, by reason of the provisions of this section, and of article 7 of the Constitutional Amendments, guaranteeing the right of trial by jury. (Whitehead v. Ent whistle, 27 Fed. Rep. 778) Federal courts will follow the procedure of the State courts regarding objections to the irregularities in the selection of the grand jury. (United States v. Eagan, 30 Fed. Rep. 608.)

Remedies in law and equity not blended.-The blending of remedies is not permissible in the United States courts. All actions which seek to recover specific property, with or without damages, or a money judgment for breach of a simple contract, or damages for injury to person or property, are legal actions, and can be brought in the Federal courts only on their law side, provisions in tate statutes to the contrary notwithstanding. (Scott v. Neely, 140 U. S. 106; Hipp v. Babin, 60 U. S. 278; Lewis v. Cocks, 23 Wa'l. 466; Killian v. Ebbinghaus, 110 U. S. 568; Buzard v. Houston, 119 U. S. 347; Thompson v. Railroad Cos., 6 Wall. 134; Robinson v. Campbell, 3 Wheat. 212; Fenn v. Holmes, 21 How. 481.)

§ 243 (723). When suits in equity may be maintained.-Suits in equity shall not be sustained in either of the courts of the United

States in any case where a plain, adequate, and complete remedy may be had at law. (Rev. Stats. sec. 723.)

This section is merely declaratory, making no alteration whatever in the rules of equity on the subject of legal remedy. (Boyce v. Grundy, 3 Peters, 210.)

Plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law. -This phrase refers to the common law and not to State statutes. (Dolge v. Woolsey, 18 How. 331; Cropper v. Coburn, 2 Curt. 465; Pratt v. Northam, 5 Mason, 95; Gordon v. Hobart, 2 Sum. 401; Kimball v. Mobile, 3 Woods, 555.) So whenever a court of law is competent to proceed to final judgment and afford a remedy plain, adequate, and complete, the plaintiff must pursue that remedy (Wright v. Ellison, 1 Wall. 16; Dade v. Irwin, 2 How. 383; Andrews v. Solomon, Peters C. C. 365; Magniac v. Thompson, 15 How. 281; Hungerford v. Ligerson, 20 Low. 156; Shapley v. Rangeley, 1 Wood. & M. 213); and the absence of a plain and adequate remedy is the only test. (Watson v. Southerland, 5 Wall. 74.) The objection that there is a plain and adequate remedy is jurisdictional, and may be enforced by the court of its own motion (Parker v. W. L. C. & W. Co. 1 Black, 545; Baker v. Biddle, Bald. 394; Post v. Corbin, 5 Bank. Reg. 11); but the remedy must be plain and adequate. (B›yc✈ v. Grundy, 3 Pete, 210; Watson v. Southerland, 5 Wall. 74; Morgan v. Beloit, 7 Wall. 613; Oelrichs v. Spain, 15 Wall. 211; Pierpont v. Fowle, 1 Wood. &. M. 23; Mayer v. Foulkrod, 4 Wash. C. C. 349.) So a party is not remitted to a court of law where the remedy is not effectual and complete. (Wylie v. Coxe, 15 How. 415; May v. Le Claire. 11 Wall. 217; Brown v. Pacific M. S. Co. 5 Blatchf. 525.) If a right is equitable, or if legal the remedy is only equitable, or both legal and equitable, the suit for its assertion may be equitable (Baker v. Bidle, Bald. 394); and it is then no objection that the remedy in that particular case might be adequate. (U. S. v. Myers, 2 Brock. 516; Pratt v. Northam, 5 Mason, 95.) If the remedy at law was partial, and would leave the party to renew the contest in a series of suits, he may have relief in