v. Bell Telephone Co., 1 Fed. Rep. 698; 1 McCrary, 175); so the circuit court has no jurisdiction of a writ of certiorari to a State court for the removal of proceedings by the State against a railroad company under the statute of the State. (State v. Chicago & A. R. Co., 6 Biss. 107.)

Effect of removal.-The removal transfers the res with the cause, as a necessary part of the proceedings (Osgood v. Chicago, D. & V. R. Co., 6 Biss. 330; Scott v. Clinton & S. R. Co., 6 Biss. 527; Kern v. Huidekoper, 2 Morr. Trans. 597); and the fact that a collateral issue with respect to the res has sprung up cannot destroy the right of removal. (Osgood v. Chicago D. & V. R. Co., 6 Biss. 330.) So if a receiver has been appointed in the State court, he may be compelled to account in the circuit court after hearing. (Hinckley v. G. C. & S. R. Co., 12 Chic. L. N. 176.) The removal does not render a delivery bond imperative, nor change the obligations of the sureties (Ramsay v. Coolbaugh, 13 Iowa, 164); nor is the action of the State court stayed pending the decision of the Federal court as to the right of removal (Nat. Union Bank v. Dodge, 11 The Reporter, 641.) It does not change the nature of the issue, or the judgment to be rendered. (West v. Aurora City. 6 Wall. 139; Patridge v. Ins. Co., 15 Wall. 573; DuVivier v. Hopkins, 116 Mass. 128.) If the cause was at issue in the State court, no other pleadings are necessary in the circuit court (Merch. & Manuf. Nat. Bank v. Wheeler, 13 Blatchf. 218); and if a declaration has been filed, no new declaration is needed. (Bills v. New Orleans, St. L. & C. R. Co., 13 Blatchf. 227; West v. Smith, 101 U. S. 263.) And if complainant amends his bill, the circuit court will not lose Its jurisdiction, although the amended bill does not show the jurisdiction. (Bridges v. Sperry, 95 U. S. 401.)

Practice and procedure.-The case comes into the ircuit court in the same condition in which it was in the State court. (Werthein v. Contin. R. & T. Co., 11 Fed. Rep. 689; 20 Blatchf. 508.) So where defendant has lost y his inaction the right to object to defective service of ummons in the State court, he cannot be permitted to lead it in abatement in the circuit court. (Werthein v. ontin. R. & T. Co., 11 Fed. Rep. 689; 20 Blatchf. 508.)

DESTY REMOVALS. -34.

On removal in law cases pure and simple no repleader is necessary (Merchants' etc. Nat. Bank v. Wheeler, 13 Blatchf. 218; Bills v. New Orleans etc. R. Co., 13 Blatchf. 227; Dart v. McKinney, 9 Blatchf. 359; see as to former practice Martin v. Kanouse, 1 Blatchf. 149; S. C., 15 How. 198); but when the relief sought is both legal and equitable, plaintiff must replead in the Federal court. (La Mothe Manuf. Co. v. Nat. Tube Works, 15 Blatchf 432.) So where a suit in a State court unites legal and equitable matters, a repleader is necessary to frame the pleadings anew, so as to make it distinctively a suit at law or one in equity, or to divide it into two suits, one at law and the other in equity (Green v. Custard, 23 How. 184; Thompson v. Railroad Cos., 6 Wall. 134; Partridge v. Insurance Co., 15 Wall. 573; Hurt v. Hollingsworth, 100 U. S. 100; Akerley v. Vilas, 2 Biss. 110; Fisk v. Union P. R. Co., 8 Blatchf. 299; Dart v. McKinney, 9 Blatchf. 359; Sands v. Smith, 1 Dill. 290); and the Federal court is competent to make all orders necessary to mold it into a legal or equitable case, or recast it into two cases, one at law and the other in equity. (La Mothe Manuf. Co. v. Nat. Tube Wks., 15 Blatchf. 432; Sands v. Smith, 1 Dill. 290.) A law action must proceed as such, although brought in the name of the real party in interest, instead of the party holding the bare legal title. (Thompson v. Railroad Cos., 6 Wall. 134; Weed Sew. Mach. Co. v. Wicks, 3 Dill. 261; Bushnell v. Kennedy, 9 Wall. 391; (Knapp v. Railroad Co., 20 Wall. 117; Wood v. Davis, 18 How. 467; see Suydam v. Ewing, 2 Blatchf. 359.) The practice after removal is to be the same as if the cause had originally been brought in the Federal court (Suydam v. Ewing, 2 Blatchf. 350; Akerly v. Vilas, 2 Biss. 110), including the allowance of amendments which may be made in furtherance of justice, and within the scope of the original cause of action. (Toucey v. Bowen, 1 Biss. 81; Suydam v. Ewing, 2 Blatchf. 359; Barclay v. Levee Comm'rs, 1 Woods, 254; Dart v. McKinney, 9 Blatch. 350; Houser v. Clayton, 3 Woods, 373; see Parker v. Overman, 18 How. 137.) The petition may be amended either by curing defective averments, or by substituting additional or new allegations (Woolridge v. McKenna, S Fed. Rep. 650); and where by mistake the plaintiff de

scribed himself in the original petition as a citizen of the State where suit was brought, he will be allowed to amend and state his true citizenship. (Barclay v. Levee Comm'rs, 1 Woods, 354; Houser v. Clayton, 3 Woods, 373; and see record amended by consent: Parker v. Overman, 18 How. 137.) The equity practice and procedure of the Federal courts is regulated by the rules promulgated by the Supreme Court of the United States. (Martindale v. Waas, 12 Fed. Rep. 551; 3 McCrary, 637.) State laws will be enforced after the removal of the cause (Taylor v. Ypsilanti, 4 Morr. Trans. 326; Ouachita Co. v. Wolcott, 2 Morr. Trans. 548; S. C., 11 Fed. Rep. 623; Soustiby v. Keeley, 11 Fed. Rep. 578, and note); so State laws as a rule of property will be followed. (Burt v. Keyes, 1 Flippin, 61; see Talcott v. Pine Grove, 1 Flippin, 120; King v. Worthington, 3 Morr. Trans. 101; Potter v. Nat. Bank, 102 U. S. 163; Railroad Co. v. Koontz, 3 Morr. Trans. 34.)

Jurisdiction.-To give the United States courts jurisdiction on the ground of citizenship, the controversy must be wholly between citizens of different States (Walsh v. Memphis C. & N. W. R. Co., 6 Fed. Rep. 797; 2 McCrary, 156); and unless the circuit court can take jurisdiction of the whole cause, it cannot be removed. (State v. Babcock, 4 Wash. C. C. 345; Beardsley v. Torrey, 1 Wash. C. C. 286; Smith v. Rines, 2 Sum. 338.) Mere temporary residence will not confer citizenship. (Prentiss v. Barton, 1 Brock. 389.) It will not be presumed that a party was a citizen at the institution of the suit merely because he was such at the time of the transaction out of which it grew. (Mining & Manuf. Co. v. Bradley, 4 Morr. Trans. 384.) If the order of bail obtained on the oath of plaintiff states that the defendant is not a citizen of the State, there is no need of any further proof of that fact. (Brown v. Crippen, 4 Hen. & M. 173.) The decision of the State court is not conclusive as to the right of removal. (Hunter v. Royal Canadian Ins. Co., 3 Hughes, 234; Cobb v. Globe Mut. L. Ins. Co., 3 Hughes, 452.) The circuit court is not preluded thereby from determining for itself whether the emoval was made in time. (Trader's Bk. v. Tallmadge, Fed. Rep. 363; 20 Blatchf. 39.) Whether the cause

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has been removed may be decided by either court, but in case of conflict the decision of the Federal court will prevail. (National Union Bank v. Dodge, 11 The Reporter, 641.) The jurisdiction of the State court is not dislodged except by full compliance with the requirements of the statute. (Burdick v. Hale, 7 Biss. 96.) The statute contemplates such cases only as are liable to removal. (Smith v. Rines, 2 Sum. 338.) So if a party is not strictly entitled to remove, the State court is bound to maintain its jurisdiction. (Gaughran v. W. F. Ins. Co., 3 Biss. 485; Kingsbury v. Kingsbury, 3 Biss. 570; State v. C. & A. R. Co., 6 Biss. 107; Yulee v. Vose, 94 U. S. 539; Robinson v. Potter, 43 N. H. 188; Short v. Wilson, 1 Bush, 350; Amory v. Amory, 96 U. S. 186; Cooley v. Lawrence, 5 Duer, 605; Brian v. Ponder, 23 Ga. 480; Redmond v. Russell, 12 Johns. 153; Fish v. Fish, 4 Martin N. S. 676; Darst v. Bates, 51 Ill. 439.) For although a suit might have been brought in the circuit court, it cannot be removed unless provision is made for its removal by statute. (Dennistoun v. N. Y. & N. H. R. Co., 2 Abb. Pr. 415.) Where there is a Federal question involved in the suit, the circuit court has jurisdiction without regard to the citizenship of the parties. (Crescent City L. S. Co. v. Butchers' Union Co., 12 Fed. Rep. 225.) The questions involved need not be all of a Federal character; if a single one exists it is sufficient. (Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 379.) A controversy between a maker of certain notes secured by trust deed and a national bank attempting to enforce such deed, is a Federal question. (Swope v. Leffing well, 3 Morr. Trans. 602.) The dissolution of an injunction involves no Federal question (Fasnacht v. Frank, 23 Wall. 416); nor a suit to recover State taxes. (Berger v. Douglas Co., 5 Fed. Rep. 23; 2 McCrary, 483.) So a suit to declare the right of a candidate elected under a State law involves no Federal question. (Dubuelet v. State, 2 Morr. Trans. 559.) The question whether the title of the true owner of lands is extinguished by adverse possession is not a Federal question. (Poppe v. Langford, 3 Morr. Trans. 762.) Where it appears at the trial that there is no question involved in the case which it is competent for the court to decide, the case will be dismissed. (Blanchard v. Sprague, 1 Cliff. 288.)

Procedure. The procedure in the circuit court is as of original cognizance (Werthein v. Continental R. & T. Co., 12 Fed. Rep. 690; Karns v. Atlantic & O. R. Co., 10 Fed. Rep. 309), and as in all cases originally brought therein. (Bills v. N. O., St. L. etc. R. Co., 13 Blatchf. 227; see Howe S. M. Co. v. Edwards, 15 Blatchf. 403; Kelly v. Virginia P. Ins. Co., 3 Hughes, 449.) The jurisdiction of the circuit court is in no sense appellate (Bushnell v. Kennedy, 9 Wall. 387), and questions passed upon in the State court cannot be reviewed. (Brooks v. Farwell, 4 Fed. Rep. 166; 2 McCrary, 220.) It will not review the orders and rulings made by the State court. (Smith v. Schwed, 11 The Reporter, 730.) If the State court refused to set aside a summons when the party is exempt from service, the decision on a plea in abatement cannot be reviewed or reversed. (Brooks v. Farwell, 4 Fed. Rep. 166; 2 McCrary, 220.) The res is transferred with the case (Osgood v. Chicago etc. R. Co., 7 Chic. L. N. 241; 2 Cent. L. J. 275, 283); but funds in the hands of a sheriff are no part of the subject-matter, and the court has no control over them (Smith v. Schwed, 9 Fed. Rep. 483); but it may require, after removal, the receiver appointed by the State court to account for funds in his hands, and make him chargeable with interest. (Hinckley v. Railroad Co., 100 U. S. 153.) Property in custody in a replevin suit should be sold, and the proceeds brought into court. (Dennistoun v. Draper, 5 Blatchf. 336.) The suit brings along with it as an incident all the costs which accrued or attached under the State law. The acts of Congress apply only to subsequent costs. (Warren v. Ives, 1 Flippin, 356; Scupps v. Campbell, 3 Cent. L. J. 521; contra, Coggill v. Lawrence, 2 Blatchf. 304.) If the amount recovered is less than five hundred dollars, the plaintiff cannot recover costs. (Brooks v. Phoenix Mut. L. Ins. Co., 16 Blatchf. 182.) If the petitioner has complied with the requirements of the act, he may, by answer, raise the question of loss of jurisdiction by reason of the proceedings for removal (Shaft v. Phoenix M. L. Ins. Co., 67 N. C. 544; De Camp v. N. J. M. L. Ins. Co., 2 Sweeney, 481); and it is not necessary for him to plead the proceedings to the jurisliction. (Kanouse v. Martin, 15 How. 198.) So a nonresident filing a petition and bond for removal is not a