they are frequently compelled to stay in court half or possibly all the day watching their cases, not knowing what minute the case on call may be continued or go off on demurrer. Furthermore, when the cases were called on exception day the court could ascertain those which it was known by both parties would not be ready for trial and could exclude them from the setting. With such cases out of the way and the questions of law disposed of and the issues of fact clearly defined in the others it would not be necessary to set as many cases for each day as we are now compelled to set. Under the present system we are compelled to set from ten to twelve cases per day because we cannot tell in advance how many will go off on demurrer or how many of them are put on the jury docket for delay and really involve no issues of fact to be tried by the jury. With all these eliminated it would not be necessary to set more than three or four cases a day, thereby saving the necessity of bringing to court the attorneys and witnesses in so many cases at the same time.

If it be contended that such an amendment would work a hardship, or would be impracticable, in the smaller counties where the court only sits two or three weeks at a time, then let it be confined to those courts which sit all, or a greater portion, of the time in one county. It can work no hardship there, because I dare say that in these counties a case would rarely ever be set down for hearing on the exceptions within less than six months from the time it is filed. A judicious amendment along the lines suggested, instead of being burdensome to any one, would be a benefit to all parties concerned. It would give the attorneys and the trial judge an opportunity to carefully consider the exceptions to pleadings unembarrassed by the fact that the jury and a host of witnesses as well as attorneys in other cases are being held in waiting during the consideration thereof. It would be conducive to clearer and better pleading more distinctly defining the issues of fact to be passed upon by the jury.

2. Suits on Written Instruments:

I pass from the question of amendments to a class of suits that are usually placed on the jury docket only for delay and that really involve no disputed questions of fact. It should be borne in mind that it is the jury docket that becomes over-crowded and it is the jury cases it takes so long to reach for trial. I do not suppose there are any of the courts but that can dispose of the non-jury docket in one or two weeks of each term. In view of this fact it is necessary that all cases which do not really involve questions of fact to be passed on by the jury should be kept off the jury docket, and

therefore I suggest the law should be so amended that where suits are on promissory notes or other written obligations fixing the amount due, the defendant should be required to file an answer under oath setting up a defense involving some question of fact before the case is allowed to be placed on the jury docket.

As the law now stands a defendant may file a general denial to a suit on a promissory note, demand a jury and have the case placed on the jury docket and thereby stay off a judgment from ten to fifteen months, although he has not a shadow of a defense. The delay caused the plaintiffs in securing judgment is not the only evil effect that flows from this, but in the meantime such cases take their regular place on the jury docket, crowding other cases out of a setting and sometimes causing the court to lose a day because they fill up the day's settings and the plaintiffs take judgment as soon as they are reached simply by offering the notes in evidence.

I do not desire to be understood as in any way seeking to abridge the right of trial by jury. My experience on the bench has confirmed rather than shaken my belief in that sacred right, but I do say that parties ought not to be permitted to place cases on the jury docket simply for delay, thereby helping to clog that docket, when they know there is not and cannot be any issue of fact in them to submit to a jury.

3. I belive the statute should specifically require the payment of the jury fee at the time it is demanded, or the filing at that time of an affidavit of inability to pay. Juries are demanded in many cases when the parties never intend to pay the fee, or to use the jury when the case is reached for trial. If they were required to pay the fee at the time of the demand many cases would never reach the jury docket, that are put there under the present rule. 4. Continuances:

There seems to be a difference of opinion among good lawyers as to whether the trial judge has any option but to enter a continuance where both sides agree to it, and so far as I have been able to find there has been no decision of the appellate courts on the question. Many able lawyers contend that where both sides agree to a continuance the district judge has no discretion in the matter, but must enter the continuance as agreed on. This seems to me to be an erroneous view of the law. The trial judge ought to have such control of his docket as to be able to require a showing, although both parties agree to the continuance. This is a power he would seldom care to exercise, except where the cases have gotten

so old that all parties have lost interest in them and there is little or no prospect of their ever being tried.

It would perhaps be well to put the question at rest by amending the statute so as to limit the number of continuances that may be made by consent. In the meantime I find that by refusing to re-set cases continued by consent until all the cases on file at the time the continuance is made have had a call for trial, the live cases can be kept to the front and that the old cases are not continually recurring on the settings only to be continued by consent again.

In this connection it seems that since the courts confined to one county must all have official stenographers the court instead of being compelled to wait for parties to prepare an application for a continuance should be permitted to require the party or his attorney, unless he has a written application prepared, to state the grounds in open court and show the diligence used. The statement to be taken down by the stenographer and should be permitted to be used on appeal as though it had been presented in writing. This could be done in much less time than is necessary to prepare the written application. On the first application perhaps he should not be subject to cross-examination, but the statement should be treated as it would have been had he presented it in writing.

5. There is one other question. I desired to discuss, but the length of this paper forbids that I should trespass further upon your time than to call attention to it. I refer to the admissions in a defendant's answer. I am not prepared to say that our pleadings should go as far as the equity rules in requiring the defendant to confess or deny each and every allegation in the plaintiff's pleading, but there are some amendments we need in that direction. Take a case for example where the plaintiff is required to establish a number of different facts in order to recover. If the defendant files a general denial the plaintiff is required to prove his facts, although the defendant may further on in his answer distinctly and positively admit them. The result is that the plaintiff is put to the proof and the defendant, notwithstanding the solemn admission in his answer of the truth of fact sought to be established, can stand by and make all manner of objections to the proof offered by the plaintiff on that point, thereby causing further delay in the trial.

It seems only just that a statute should be passed dispensing with the proof of any fact admitted in the pleadings of the opposite party, regardless of whether there is a general denial or not. If this cannot be done without interfering with our doctrine of inconsistent pleading, then such pleading ought to be abolished.

These suggestions have been hurriedly made and are submitted not as perfect models to be followed, but with hope that they may direct the thought and attention of this Association to the necessity of changes along these lines and that the proper committee may at its next session bring forward a more perfect plan to be submitted to the Legislature.

I believe that it is to the interest of attorneys, litigants and the public, and that with the proper changes made in the Practice Act the crowded dockets in the cities can be much more rapidly disposed of at less expense to the counties.

I respectfully submit these matters for your consideration.

A BILL

TO BE ENTITLED AN ACT TO PROVIDE FOR REGISTERING AND CONFIRMING TITLES TO LAND IN THIS STATE.

Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Texas:

SECTION 1. This act may be cited as the Land Registration Act. SEC. 2. The district courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction of all suits for the registration of titles to land within this State, with power to hear and determine all issues arising in such suits, and shall have also jurisdiction over all such other questions as may come before said courts under this act, subject to appeal as in other cases. Suits arising under this act, to be commenced by petition, shall be proceedings in rem against the land, and the decree shall operate directly on the land and vest and establish title thereto. The Supreme Court shall make such rules of procedure and forms, and forms of pleading, for the government of parties, the district courts, district clerks, county clerks and all officers of court as said court may from time to time consider necessary.

SEC. 3. Suits for the registration of title to land may be brought in the county where the land or a part thereof is situated by the following persons, to-wit:

First. The person or persons claiming to own the legal or equitable estate in fee simple.

Second. The person or persons claiming to have the power of selling, conveying, mortgaging, or disposing of the legal or equitable estate in fee simple.

Third. Infants, and all other persons under disability may institute suit by their legally appointed guardian, or by next friend, or if feme covert, in her own name or joined by her husband; but the person in whose behalf the suit is brought shall be named as the plaintiff.

Fourth. Corporations may sue under this act as in other cases. SEC. 4. All parties natural or artificial known or appearing to have any interest in the land described in plaintiff's petition shall be made parties defendant.

SEC. 5. Plaintiff's petition shall be in writing, signed and sworn to by him, or by some person duly authorized in his behalf. If there is more than one plaintiff, the petition shall be signed and sworn to by or in behalf of each. It shall contain a description