other company or corporation engaged in the conduct of an express business on the defendant's lines, and to afford the same facilities to plaintiff on all its passenger trains.

VIII. That the plaintiff keep and render monthly a true account of the services performed for it by defendant, and pay therefor at the rate hereinafter specified on or before the 15th of each month after the date hereof for the business of the month preceding, and that the defendant has no right to require prepayment for said express facilities, or pay therefor at the end of every train or in any other manner than as is herein provided; and that plaintiff execute and deliver to the defendant a bond in the sum of $150,000, conditioned well and faithfully to make such payments as is herein provided, with sureties to be approved by a judge of this court.

IX. That it is and was the duty of the said defendant to afford and to have afforded such facilities to the plaintiff as herein specified for a just and reasonable compensation.

X.-Whereas, it is alleged by complainant that, since the commencement of this suit and the service of the preliminary order of injunction herein, the defendant has, in violation of said injunction and of the rights of complainant, made unjust discriminations against complainant, and has charged complainant unjust and unreasonable rates for carrying express matter; therefore, it is ordered that complainant have leave hereafter to apply for an investigation of these and similar allegations, and for such order with respect thereto as the facts when ascertained may justify, and for the appointment of a master to take proof and report thereon. XI. That the defendant, its officers, agents, servants and employees, and all persons acting under their authority, be, and they hereby are, permanently and perpetually enjoined and rcstrained from interfering with or disturbing in any manner the enjoyment by the plaintiff of the facilities provided for in this decree to be accorded to it by the said defendant upon its lines of railway, or such as have been heretofore accorded to it for the transaction of the business of the plaintiff and of the express business of the public confided to its care, and from interfering with any of the express matter or messengers of the plaintiff, and from excluding or ejecting any of its express matter or messengers from the depots, trains, cars or lines of the said defendant as the same are by this decree directed to be permitted to be enjoyed and occupied by the said plaintiff, and from refusing to receive and transport in like manner as the said defendant is now transporting, or as it may hereafter transport for itself or for any other express company over its lines of railway, the express matter and messengers of the said plaintiff, and from interfering with, or disturbing the business of, the said plaintiff in any way or manner

whatsoever; the said plaintiff paying for the services performed for it by the defendant monthly as herein prescribed, at a rate not exceeding fifty per centum more than its prescribed rates for the transportation of ordinary freight, and not exceeding the rate at which it may itself transport express matter on its own account, or for any other express or other corporation, or for private individuals, reserving to either party the right at any time hereafter to apply to this Court, according to the rules in equity proceedings, for a modification of this decree, as to the measure of compensation herein prescribed.

It is further ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the defendant pay the costs to be taxed herein, and that an execution or a fee bill issue therefor.

We are chiefly indebted for the matter contained in the following note to the very exhaustive and elaborate brief presented by counsel for the Adams Express Company which has been kindly placed at our disposal.

The jurisdiction in the case was complete, the complainants and defendants being citizens of or incorporated by different States. Stoughton v. Hill, 3 Woods, 405; Shelton . Tiffin, 6 How. 185; Fargo v. Louisville R.R. Co., 6 Fed. Rep. 787.

At any rate no matters dehors he bill could be pleaded after an answer on the merits has been filed. Wickliffe v. Owings, 17 How. 47; Jones v. League, 18 How. 76; Coal Co. v. Blatchford, 11 Wall. 172; Pond v. Vermont, 19 Blatch. 280; Gause v. Clarksville, Fed. Rep. 353; Dodge v. Perkins, 4 Mas. 435; Webb v. Powers, 2 Wood & Min. 497; Whyte v. Gibbes, 20 How. 541; Wood v. Manus, 1 Sumn. 578; The Isaac Newton, Abb. Adm. 11.

The capacity of Dinsmore to sue as president, which he was permitted to do by the statutes of New York, where the principal office of his express company is situate, would seem to be clear on principles of state comity. Maltz o. American Express Co., 1 Flippin, 611; Westcott v. Fargo, 61 N. Y. 547; Liverpool v. Massachusetts, 10 Wail. 566; Chamberlain of London's Case, 3 Coke, 62 b; Skinner v. Lambert, 4 M. & G. 477; Cortis v. Kent, 7 B. & C. 330; Fargo . Louisville R. R. Co., 6 Fed. Rep. 787; Relfe v. Rundle, 103 U. S. 225.

The fact that express companies carry on a peculiar business is expressly recognized by various acts of Congress. The chief of which are as follows: Stat. July 1, 1862, 12 U. S. Statutes, 478; March 3, 1863, 12 U. S. Statutes, 722; June 30, 1864, 13 U. S. St. 276; July 13, 1866, 14 U. S. St. 121; March 8, 1879, 20 U. S. St. 478; June 10, 1880, 21 U. S. St. 175.

And both by the State and federal judiciary in a number of decided cases. See inter alia. Pensacola v. Western Co., 6 Otto, 9; Bank of Kentucky. Adams Express Co., 3 Otto, 184; Express Co. v. Caldwell, 21 Wall. 267; Liverpool Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 10 Wall. 574; Norwalk Bank v. Adams Express Co., 19 How. Pr. R. 462; Marshall v. American Express Co., 7 Wis. Rep. 1; Southern Express Co. v. Crook, 44 Alabama Rep. 486; Sullivan v. Thompson, 99 Mass. Rep. 259; Whitbeck v. Holland, 45 N. Y. Rep. 13; Stadecker v. Combs, 9 Richardson, 193.

The business done by express companies is of the greatest possible service to the community. On receiving goods to be transported to a distant point they become liable for loss or damage during the whole time they are in transitu.

Railway companies afford no such accommodation to the public. It is clear that they cannot be forced to receive goods for transit to a point beyond their own line. People v. Chicago, 55 Ill. 95; Vincent v. Chicago, 49 Ill. 33.

And it is at least doubtful under the authorities whether, if they please to receive such goods, they can bind themselves so as to be liable for loss or damage occurring beyond their line. This is substantially becoming surety for the faults or miscarriages of another company. Pearce v. Madison, 21 How. 441; State Bank v. Butler, 44 Vermont, 144; Smead v. Indianapolis, 11 Indiana, 104; Bank of Genesee v. Patchin Bank, 3 Kernan, 309; Bridgeport v. Empire Stone Co., 30 Barb. 421; Smith v. Alabama Ins. Co., 4 Alabama N. S. 558; Arnot v. Erie R. R. Co., 67 N. Y. 315; Railroad Co. v. Howard, 7 Wall. 392; Pearce v. Madison Co., 21 How. 440.

See further on this point Railway Co. v. McCarthy, 6 Otto, 266; Reed . Saratoga & C. R. Co., 19 Wen. 534 (1838); St. John v. Exp. Co., 1 Woods, 612 (1871); Berg v. Narragansett Steamship Co., 5 Daly, 394 (1874); Candee v. Pa. R. Co., 21 Wis. 582 (1867); R. R. Co. v. Androscoggin Mills, 22 Wall. 594 (1874). Contra, see Amer. Ex. Co. v. 2d Nat. Bk., 69 Pa. St. 394 (1871). Railroads are quasi public corporations, the consideration for the grant of their franchises being the accommodations they afford to the public. They are to be considered as engaged in a public service. Hannibal v. Swift, 12 Wall. 270; Messenger v. Penn. Co., 8 Vroom, 531; Chicago v. People, 56 Ill. 380; Coggs v. Barnard, Ld. Raymond, 909; McDuffee v. Railroad, 52 N. H. 447; Baxendale v. G. W. R. R. Co., 5 Scott N. S. 336; Sanford v. Railroad Co., 12 Harris, 380; Munn v. Illinois, 4 Otto, 130; Chicago v. Iowa, 4 Otto, 161; G. W. R. R. Co. v. Burns, 60 Ill. 284; Garton v. Bristol, 1 Best & Smith, 162; Peoria Co. v. Coal Co., 68 Ill. 489. It is therefore their clear duty to afford the public all reasonable facilities to carry on business. What reasonable facilities are is to be determined by usage and custom. Martel v. St. Louis, 94 Ill. 67; Society v. Lehigh, 32 N. J. Eq. 346; Hale v. Company, 32 N. H. 299; Wilder v. St. Paul, 12 Minn. 192; Blakemare v. Glamorganshire, 1 Myl. & K. 162. It seems to be settled by numerous authorities that these facilities must be impartially afforded, no individuals or corporations being specially preferred to others. Parker v. Bristol Co., 6 Exchq. 702; Chicago v. People, 56 Ill. 380; New Eng. Ex. Co. v. Maine, 57 Maine, 196; Bennett v. Dutton, 10 N. H. 481; Sanford v. Catawissa, infra, 24 Penn. St. 381.

The weight of English authority is, however, the other way. Packford v. G. J. R. Co., 10 M. & W. 399, 538; Parker v. G. W. R. Co., 7 M. & G. 253; Crouch v. L. & N. W. R. Co., 2 C. & K. 789; Parker v. G. W. R. Co., 11 C. B. 545; Edwards v. G. W. R. Co., 11 C. B. 588; Crouch v. L. & N. W. R. Co., 14 C. B. 255; Crouch v. G. N. R. Co., 9 W. H. & G. 556; Finnie v. G. & S. W. R., 2 Macqueen, H. of L. Cas. 177; S. C., 34 Eng. L. & Eq. 11; Crouch v. G. N. R. Co., 11 H. & G. 742; Barker v. M. R. Co., 18 C. B. 46; Parker v. G. W. R. Co., 6 E. & R. 77; Caterham R. Co. v. L. B. & S. C. R. Co., 1 C. B. N. S. 410; Barret v. G. N. R. Co., id. 423; Ransome v. E. C. R. Co., id. 437; Oxlade v. N. E. R. Co., id. 454; Marriott v. L. & S. R. Co., id. 499; Beadell v. E. C. R. Co.. 2 C. B. N. S. 509; Painter v. L. B. & S. C. R. Co., id. 702; Baxendale v. N. D. R. Co., 3 C. B. N. 8. 324; Harris v. C. & W. R. Co., id. 693; Jones v. E. C. R. Co., id. 718; Baxendale v. E. C. R. Co.. 4 C. B. N. S. 63; Ransome v. E. C. R. Co., id. 185; Cooper v. L. & S. W. R. Co.. id. 738; Piddington v. S. E. R. Co., 5 C. B. N. S. 111; Baxendale v. G. W. R. Co., id. 309; Baxendale v. G. W. R. Co., id. 336; Nicholson v. G. W. R. Co., id. 366; Garton v. G. W. R. Co., id. 669; Garton v. B. & E. R. Co., 4 H. & M. 33; Garton v. B. & E. R. Co., 6 C. B. N. S. 639; Bennett v. M. 8. & L. R. Co., id. 707; Nicholson v. G. W. R

Co., 7 C. B. N. 8. 755; Ransome v. E. C. R. Co., 8 C. B. N. S. 709; Garton v. B. & E. R. Co., 1 B. & S. 112; Baxendale v. B. & E. R. Co., 11 C. B. N. S. 787; Branley v. S. E. R. Co., 12 C. B. N. S. 63; Baxendale v. L. & S. W. R. Co., id. 758; Baxendale v. G. W. R. Co., 14 C. B. N. S. 1; Baxendale v. G. W. R. Co., 16 C. B. N. S. 137; Sutton v. G. W. R. Co., 3 H. & C. 800; Baxendale v. L. & S. W. R. Co., L. R. 1 Exchq. 137; S. C., 4 H. & C., 130; Palmer v. L. & S. W. R. Co., L. R. 1 C. P. 588; West v. L. & N. W. R. Co., L. R. 5 C. P. 622; Palmer v. L. B. & S. C. R. Co., L. R. 6 C. P. 194; Parkinson v. G. W. R. Co., id. 554.

These cases seem to be based on statutes general. Legislative and constitutional provisions are common in the United States prohibiting discrimination, but are usually regarded as simply declaratory of the common law. Munn v. Illinois, 4 Otto, 126; Sinking Fund Cases, 9 Otto, 719; Chicago v. Iowa, 4 Otto, 161; Olcott v. Supervisors, 16 Wall. 694; Beckman v. Saratoga, 3 Paige, 45; Commissioners v. P. & O. R. R. Co., 63 Maine, 279; Railroad v. Richmond, 19 Wall. 584; Commissioners v. P. & O. R. R. Co., 63 Maine, 285; Stat. 17 & 18 Vict. c. 31, §2; Shipper v. Pennsylvania, 11 Wright, 340; Sanford v. Catawissa, 12 Harris, 378; Attorney General v. Railroads, 35 Wisconsin, 525, 526; Winona v. Blake, 4 Otto, 180; Peoria Co. v. Coal Co., 68 Ill. 489; Olcott v. The Supervisors, 16 Wall. 694; Perrine v. Chesepeake Co., 9 How. 184; Munn v. Illinois, 4 Otto, 133.

Courts may, by appropriate process, enforce the duties and obligations imposed upon railroad companies either by legislation or by common law. Chicago v. Smith, 62 Ill. 274; U. S. v. U. P. Ř. R. Co., 4 Dillon, 479; affirmed, 1 Otto, 343; State v. Hartford, 29 Conn. 538; Rex v. Severn, 2 Barn. & Ald. 646; Mobile v. Wisdom, 5 Heiskell, 125; Indianapolis v. State, 37 Ind. 489; Rex v. Severn, supra; People v. Rochester, 14 Hun, 371; People v. Troy, 37 How. Pr. Rep. 427; Chicago v. People, 56 Ill. 365; People v. New York, MS.; Rutherford . Grand Trunk, 18 "Lower Canada Jurist," 11. And where the forms of common law procedure are insufficient, equitable jurisdiction attaches to secure the full rights of the public on the premises. Corning v. Troy R. R. Co., 40 N. Y. 191; Boston v. Boston, 16 Pick. 525; Gardner v. Newburgh, 2 Johns. Ch. 162; Belknap v. Belknap, id. 473; Sandford v. R. R. Co., 12 Harris, 380; McDuffee v. R. R., 52 N. H. 451; Agar v. Regents Co., Cooper, 221; 19 Vesey, 379; River Co. v. North Co., 1 Rail. Cas. 135; 1 Story Eq. Sec. 64 k; Taylor v. Merchants Co., 9 How. 890; Rathbone v. Warren, 10 Johns. 587; McCalmont v. Lawrence, 1 Blatch. 232; Foster v. Swazey, 2 W. & M. 217; Perkins v. Washington, 4 Cow. 645; Stevens v. Gladding, 17 How. 447; Miller v. McCan, 7 Paige, 451; Frost v. Myrick, 1 Barb. 362; High on Injunctions, p. 23, sec. 1; City v. Mayor, 1 Hughes, 90.

Mandatory injunctions have been employed to accomplish this purpose. G. N. R. R. Co. v. Clarence R. R. Co., 1 Coll. 507; Earl v. G. N. R. R. Co., 10 Hare, 664; Corning v. Troy R. R. Co., 40 N. Y. 191; Storer v. G. W. Co., 2 Y. & C. 48; Wilson v. Furness Co., L. R. 9 Eq. 28; Sanderson v. Cockermouth Co., 11 Beav. 497; G. N. Co. v. Manch. Co., 5 De G. & S. 138; Greene v. West C. Co., L. R. 13 Eq. 44; Hood v. N. E. Co., L. R. 8 Eq. 666, on appeal, 5 Ch. App. 525; Commonwealth v. Eastern, 103 Mass. 259; Harris v. Cockermouth Co., 3 C. B. N. S. 693; Mariott v. London Co., 1 C. B. N. S. 498; Vincent v. C. & A. R. R. Co., 49 Ill. 37; Chicago v. Chicago, 6 Bissel, 219; 2 Red. on Rail. § 205; Taylor v. Salmon, 4 My. & Cr. 141; Marc v. Malachy, 1 Id. 559; Walworth v. Holt, 4 Id. 619, 635.

Some authorities are to be found to the effect that railway companies have no exclusive right to conduct the express business on their roads. Lake Superior v. United States, 93 U. S. 443; Southern Express Co. v. Memphis and Little Rock R. R. Co., 13 Cent. L. Journ. 68. Nor to give themselves preferential facilities therefor. Sanford v. Catawissa, 24 Penn. St. Rep. 380;

McDuffee v. R. R. Co., 52 N. H. Rep. 430; New England Express Co. v. Maine R. R. Co., 9 Am. L. R. N. S. 728; Marriott v. London Co., 1 C. B. N. S. 87; Parkinson v. Great Western Co., L. R. 6 C. P. 554; Gaston v. Bristol R. Co., 6 C. B. N. S. 639; Baxendale v. North Deven Co., 3 C. B. N. S. 324; Baxendale v. Great Western Co., 5 C. B. N. S. 345; Palmer v. London, L. R. 6 C. P. 194; Southern Express Co. v. Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co., 4 Fed. Rep. 481. See, however, to the contrary, The D. B. Marton, 11 Blatch. 233; Jenks v. Coleman, 2 Sumn. 221; Burgess v. Clemens, 1 Maull & Schurzh, 306; Tell v. Knight, S. M. & W. 269; Barney v. Oyster Bay & H. Steamboat Co., 67 N. Y. 302; N. E. Express Co. v. Me. Cent. R. R. Co., 57 Me. 194; Cambloss v. P. & R. R. R., 4 Brewst. 563; Sargent v. Boston & Mc. R. R. Co., 115 Mass. 416. All of which defendants in the principal cases cited as showing that they were not bound to furnish to the complainants the special facilities to carry on their business prayed for.

There are at any rate certain serious obstacles to railway companies carrying on such business. They cannot lawfully, according to some authorities, undertake the transport of goods to and from stores or residences, or guarantee them safety beyond their own line. Am. Ex. v. Wolf, 79 Ill. 430; Am. Ex. v. Robinson, 72 Penn. St. 274; Thomas v. Boston, 10 Met. 477; Whitbeck v. Holland, 45 N. Y. 17; id. 55 Barb. 443; Hoagland v. Hannibal, 39 Mo. 451; St. Joseph v. Saville, 39 Mo. 460; People v. Chicago, 55 Ill. 95; Mayor . Macon, 7 Georgia, 221; Abbott v. Baltimore, 1 Md. Ch. 542. (See also authorities collected supra on this point.) But see Cahn v. Mich. & C. R. R. Co.

71 III. 96.

Nor is it perfectly clear that they have a right to transport and make themselves liable for the safe transportation of money, though the weight of authority is that they have such a right. Bank v. Adams Express Co., 93 U. S. 185; New Jersey Co. v. Merchants' Bank, 6 How. 722. Nor that they have power to forward goods, collect the price thereof, and remit to the sender. Collender v. Dinsmore et al., 55 N. Y. 200; Bland v. Southern Express Co., 1 Hughes, 345. But see King v. Coughtry, 4 Johnson, 107. Nor can railway companies indorse or protest negotiable paper. Knapp v. Express Co., 55 N. H. 348; Whitney v. Merchants' Ex., 104 Mass. 152; Palmer v. Am. Éx., 51 N. Y. 416; Am. Ex. Co. v. Havre, 21 Md. 41; Bateman v. Md. Walls R. R. Co., L. R. 1 C. P. 499; Byles on Bills, 62.

A railroad company has of course no right to accomplish indirectly what it has no power to accomplish directly. It cannot, therefore, discriminate in its own favor by fixing enormous rates of freight. The rates must be moderate and reasonable in amount. 13 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 189; Winona v. Blake, 4 Otto, 180; Olcott v. Banfill, 4 N. H. 537, 546; Story on Bailments, § 508; Holford v. Adams, 2 Duer, 480; Crouch v. G. N. Co., 11 Ex. 752; New Eng. Co. v. Maine, 57 Maine, 188, 194; Vincent v. Chicago, 49 Ill. 33, 43; 19 Am. Law Reg. O. S. 593; 2 Redfield on Railways, 95; Pickford . Grand Co., 10 M. & W. 399, 422, 424; Harris v. Packwood, 3 Taunt. 264; 9 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 728; Browne's Law of Carriers, 82; Sanford. Catawissa, 24 Pa. St. 378, 381; McDuffee v. R. R. Co., 52 N. H. 430; Shipper v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 47 Penn. St. 338, 340; Messenger v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 36 N. J. Law Reps. 407, 412; Lord Hale, De Partibus Maris, 1 Harg. Law Tracts, 78; Bolt v. Stennett, 8 Term Rep. 606; Allnutt v. Inglis, 12 East, 527; Munn ⚫. Illinois, 4 Otto, 113, 126; Camden v. Briggs, 22 N. J. Law Reps. 647; Barrett v. Darlington, 2 M. & G. 134; L. C. 7 M. & G. 870; Gildart v. Gladstone, 11 East, 675; Proprietors v. Hustler, 1 B. & C. 424; Carr v. R. R. Co., 7 Exch. 707; Harmony v. Bingham, 2 Kern. 99; Parker v. Rig. Co., 6 Exch. 702.

The reason why they must be reasonable is that the right to demand them at all is a delegated sovereign power, and will be deemed to extend only so far as to demand reasonable amounts. Messenger v. Pennsylvania Co., 36 N.