an action for a breach of contract, the damages to be recovered are such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties when they made it. Under this rule the damages which may be recovered in an action for the breach of a contract are sometimes more remote and far-reaching than those recoverable for a tort.

In the case of Richardson v. Chynoweth, 26 Wis. 656, is an illustration of the rule. In that case the court say: "In such cases, where the controlling party is advised of the special purpose of the thing to be completed, and of the damage that would naturally accrue from failure to complete it at the specified time, and in view of this expressly stipulates to finish it at a given time, there is no reason why he should not be responsible for such damage as is the direct natural result of his failure, even though beyond the mere difference between the contract and market price." See Shepherd v. Milwaukee Gas-light Co., 15 Wis. 318; Flick v. Wetherbee, 20 Wis. 392.

In many cases of breach of contract the courts have by their decisions established a rule of damages which is applicable to all of a class. In an action for a breach of contract to pay money at a fixed time, the damages are the lawful interest on the money withheld, from the time it was payable to the date of the judgment, unless the contract expressly stipulates for other damages. So, in actions for a breach of a covenant of warranty of title, the damages are limited, ordinarily, to the purchase money paid and interest. In these and other classes of cases the damages are fixed by arbitrary rules; but still the general rule above stated, that the damages are such as "would reasonably be supposed to have been contemplated that the party injured by the breach of the contract would sustain, would apply to such cases; for, in contracts of the classes above mentioned, the parties would enter into them knowing the law fixing the damages for the breach, and so they would be supposed to have contemplated the payment of such damages in a case of breach and no other.

In the case of Hobbs v. Ry. Co., supra, the learned justices state the rule in case of breach of contract in more concise language. They say: "Such damages are recoverable as a man when making the contract would contemplate would flow from a breach of it.' Under this rule it was held in the Hobbs Case, and by this court in the Walsh Case, that in an action for a breach of contract in failing to carry a passenger to his destination damages could not be recovered for injury to the health, annoyance, and vexation of mind and mental distress, on the ground that such damages were not such as the parties making the contract would contemplate as likely to result from its breach.

We are not disposed now to question the correctness of the decision made by this court in the case of Walsh v. Ry. Co., supra,

limited as that case was to an action solely for a breach of contract. In such cases the wilfulness of the party in refusing to fulfil the contract does not in any way change the rule of damages. The rule as to the damages in actions upon contract is the same whether the breach be by mistake, pure accident, inability to perform it, or whether it be wilful and malicious. The motives of the party breaking the contract are not to be inquired into. 1 Sedgw. Meas. Dam. 439, et seq., and cases cited.

The rules which limit the damages in actions of tort, so far as any general rules can be established, are in many respects different from those in actions on contract. The general rule is that the party who commits a trespass or other wrongful act is liable for all the direct injury resulting from such act, although such resulting injury could not have been contemplated as a probable result of the act done. 1 Sedgw. Meas. Dam. 130, note; Eten v. Luyster, 60 N. Y. 252; Hill v. Winsor, 118 Mass. 251; Lane v. Atlantic Works, 111 Mass. 136; Keenan v. Cavanaugh, 44 Vt. 268; Little v. R. R. Co., 66 Me. 239; Callard v. Ry. Co., 7 H. & N. 79; Hart v. R. R. Co., 13 Metc. 99, 104; Wellington v. Dawner Kerosene Oil Co., 104 Mass. 64; Metallic Compression Casting Co. v. R. R. Co., 109 Mass. 277; Salisbury v. Herchinroder, 106 Mass. 458; Perley v. R. R. Co., 98 Mass. 414; Kellogg v. Ry. Co., 26 Wis. 223; Patten v. Ry. Co., 32 Wis. 524, and 36 Wis. 413; Williams v. Vanderbilt, 28 Ñ. Y. 217; Ward v. Vanderbilt, 34 How. Pr. R. 144; Bowas v. Pioneer Tow Line, 2 Sawy. (U. S. C. C.) 21. These cases, and many more which might be cited, clearly establish the doctrine that one who commits a trespass or other wrong is liable for all the damage which legitimately flows directly from such trespass or wrong, whether such damages might have been foreseen by the wrong-doer or not.

As stated by Justice Colt in the case of Hill v. Winsor, 118 Mass. 251: "It cannot be said, as a matter of law, that the jury might not properly find it obviously probable that injury in some form would be caused to those who were at work on the fender by the act of the defendants in running against it. This constitutes negligence, and it is not necessary that the injury, in the precise form in which it in fact resulted, should have been foreseen. It is enough that it now appears to have been a natural and probable consequence."

In the case of Bowas v. Pioneer Tow Line, supra, Judge Hoffman, speaking of the rule in relation to damages on a breach of contract, as contrasted with the rule in case of wrongs, says: "The effect of this rule is more often to limit than to extend the liability for a breach of contract, although sometimes, when the special circumstances under which the contract was made have been communicated, damages consequential upon a breach made under those circumstances will be deemed to have been contemplated by the parties,

and may be recovered by the defendant. But this rule, as Mr. Sedgwick remarks, has no application to torts. He who commits a trespass must be held to contemplate all the damage which may legitimately flow from his illegal act, whether he may have foreseen them or not; and so far as it is plainly traceable he must make compensation for it."

The justice and propriety of this rule are manifest, when applied to cases of direct injury to the person. If one man strike another, with a weapon or with his hand, he is clearly liable for all the direct injury the party struck sustains therefrom. The fact that the result of the blow is unexpected and unusual can make no difference. If the wrong-doer should in fact intend but slight injury, and deal a blow which in ninety-nine cases in a hundred would result in a trifling injury, and yet by accident produce a very grave one to the person receiving it, owing either to the state of health or other accidental circumstances of the party, such fact would not relieve the wrong-doer from the consequences of his act. The real question in these cases is, did the wrongful act produce the injury complained of? and not whether the party committing the act would have anticipated the result. The fact that the act of the party giving the blow is unlawful renders him liable for all its direct evil consequences.

This was the substance of the decision in the old and often-cited squib case of Scott v. Shepherd, 2 W. Bl. 892. Justice Nares there says that "the act of throwing the squib being unlawful, the defendant was liable to answer for the consequences, be the injury mediate or immediate ;" and in this view of the case all the judges agreed, although they differed upon the question as to the form of

the action.

In the case at bar the question to be determined is whether the negligent act of the defendant's employees in putting the plaintiffs and their child off the train in the night time, at the place where they did, was the direct cause of the injury complained of by the plaintiffs, or whether it was only a remote cause for which no action lies. We must in considering this case take it for granted that the walk from the place where they left the cars to Mauston was the immediate cause of the injury complained of, and the negligence of the defendant in putting them off the cars was the mediate cause. We think the question, whether there was any negligence on the part of the plaintiffs in taking the walk, was properly left to the jury, as a question of fact, and they found that they were guilty of no negligence on their part. They found themselves placed by the wrongful act of the defendant where it became necessary for their protection to make the journey.

The fact that there was a station-house near by, at which they might have found shelter until another train came by, is not conclusive that the plaintiffs were negligent in the matter. They were

landed at a place where they could not see it, and the jury have found that under the circumstances they were not guilty of negligence in not finding it. The defendant must, therefore, be held to have caused the plaintiffs to make the journey as the most prudent thing for them to do under the circumstances. And, we think, under the rules of law, the defendant must be liable for the direct consequence of the journey. Had the defendant wrongfully placed the plaintiffs off the train in the open country, where there was no shelter, in a cold and stormy night, and, on account of the state of health of the parties, in their attempts to find shelter they had become exhausted and perished, it would seem quite clear that the defendant ought to be liable. The wrongful act of the defendant would be the natural and direct cause of their deaths, and it would seem to be a lame excuse for the defendants, that if the plaintiffs had been of more robust health they would not have perished or have suffered any material injury.

The defendant is not excused because it did not know the state of health of Mrs. Brown, and is equally responsible for the consequence of the walk as though its employees had full knowledge of that fact. This court expressly so held in the case of Stewart v. Ripon, supra, and substantially in the case of Oliver v. Town of La Valle, 36 Wis. 392.

Upon the findings of the jury in this case it appears that the defendant was guilty of a wrong in putting the plaintiffs off the cars at the place they did; that in order to protect themselves from the effects of such wrong they made the walk to Mauston; that in making such walk they were guilty of no negligence, but were compelled to make it on account of the defendant's wrongful act; and that on account of the peculiar state of health of Mrs. Brown at the time she was injured by such walk. There was no intervening independent cause of the injury other than the act of the defendant. All the acts done by the plaintiffs, and from which the injury flowed, were rightful on their part,and compelled by the act of the defendant. We think, therefore, it must be held that the injury to Mrs. Brown was the direct result of the defendant's negligence, and that such negligence was the proximate and not the remote cause of the injury, within the decisions above quoted. We can see no reason why the defendant is not equally liable for an injury sustained by a person who is placed in a dangerous position, whether the injury is the immediate result of a wrongful act, or results from the act of the party in endeavoring to escape from the immediate danger.

When by the negligence of another a person is threatened with danger, and he attempts to escape such threatened danger by an act not culpable in itself under the circumstances, the person guilty of the negligence is liable for the injury received in such attempt to escape, even though no injury would have been sustained had there been no attempt to escape the threatened danger. This was so

held, and we think properly, in the case of a passenger riding upon a stage-coach, who, supposing the coach would be overturned, jumped therefrom and was injured, although the coach did not overturn, and would not have done so had the passenger remained in his seat. The passenger acted upon appearances, and, not having acted negligently, it was held he could recover; it being shown that the coach was driven negligently at the time, which negligence produce the appearance of danger. Jones v. Boyer, 1 Stark. 493. The ground of the decisions is very aptly and briefly stated by Lord Ellenborough in the case as follows: "If I place a man in such a situation that he must adopt a perilous alternative, I am responsible for the consequences.'

So in the case at bar the defendant, by its negligence, placed the plaintiffs in a position where it was necessary for them to act to avoid the consequences of the wrongful act of the defendant, and, acting with ordinary prudence and care to get themselves out of the difficulty in which they had been placed, they sustained injury. Such injury can be, and is, traced directly to the defendant's negligence as its cause, and it is its proximate cause, within the rules of law upon that subject. The true meaning of the maxim, causa proxima non remota spectatur, is probably as well defined by the late Chief Justice Dixon in the case of Kellogg v. Ry. Co., supra, as by any other judge of court. He states it as follows: "An efficient adequate cause being found, must be considered the true cause, unless some other cause not incident to it, but independent of it, is shown to have intervened between it and the result.

In the case of Ry. Co. v. Kellogg, 94 U. S. 175, the court say: "We do not say that even the natural and probable consequences of a wrongful act or omission are in all cases to be chargeable to the misfeasance or nonfeasance. They are not when there is a sufficient and independent cause operating between the wrong and injury. In such a case the resort of the sufferer must be to the originator of the intermediate cause. But when there is no intermediate efficient cause the original wrong must be considered as reaching to the effect, and proximate to it. The inquiry must, therefore, always be whether there was any intermediate cause disconnected from the primary fault, and self-operating, which produced the injury. * * * In the nature of things there is in every transaction a succession of events, more or less dependent upon those preceding, and it is the province of a jury to look at this succession of events or facts and ascertain whether they are naturally and probably connected with each other by a continuous sequence, or are dissevered by new and independent agencies, and this must be determined in view of the circumstances existing at the time."

Within this definition the negligence of the defendant was the proximate cause of the injury to Mrs. Brown, as there was no other