tion was taken to some rulings concerning the negligence of the railroad. There is no dispute about the cause of the injury. It was caused by Bangs jumping from the moving train, which was moving at six miles or upwards per hour. Bangs not only contributed to it but was an active cause of it, and the question is whether his action was negligent, or whether it was justifiable as not negligent. If there can be any doubt concerning the negligent character of such conduct he was entitled to go to the jury upon it. He claims that persons frequently with impunity get on and off from cars in that way while under motion, and that the failure to stop at the station, and his anxiety about the feelings of his mother in case of his failure to reach home, disturbed him and led to hasty action. We have reluctantly felt ourselves compelled to hold that in our judgment such conduct is beyond any question negligence, and that the jury should have been so instructed. The fact that many persons take the risks of leaving cars in motion does not make them any the less risks, which they have no right to lay at the door of the railroad companies. No company can use effectively coercive power to keep passengers from doing such things. All persons of sound mind must be held responsible for knowledge of the usual risks of such travelling. Every one is supposed to know that a fall beside a moving train is very likely to bring some part of the body or limbs in danger of being crushed. Every one is supposed to know that in jumping from a vehicle running six miles an hour, or much less, he stands a good many chances of falling or being unable to fully control his movements; and that falling near a train is always dangerous. No doubt every one who tries such an experiment persuades himself that he will escape, but it is impossible to suppose any one of common sense does not know there is danger. It is true that there are circumstances where it is not negligence to take a choice of risks, or where an act is done without freedom of choice. But the common sense of mankind teaches us that no one has a right to risk life or limb merely to avoid inconvenience. Upon the facts in this case no one can doubt that the railway agents were wrong in not stopping at the station. If put to any inconvenience by being carried further, Bangs had a legal remedy for it. No doubt the vexation and anxiety would lead to some trouble of mind, but they cannot be held sufficient to justify running into bodily danger. If it was negligent to do as Bangs did, the rule of the law deprives him of any redress, because there is here no doubt that it was the immediate occasion of the mischief. The case is a very hard one, and he probably did what some others might have done in his place. But the courts cannot allow hard cases to change the rules that they are compelled to administer. And we cannot see any possible ground for exempting this case from the rule which makes a plaintiff's negligent contribution to his own injury a defence to an action for damages. The judgment must be reversed with costs and a new trial granted. Getting on and off a vehicle in motion is almost always fatal to a recovery of damages for any injury which may be sustained thereby, although in part attributable to the negligence of the carrier at the time. Shear & Redf. Neg. § 283; Thomp. Car. & Pas. 267. Where a passenger jumps from the cars in rapid motion, or leaves it under circumstances which would necessarily, or probably, render such an act perilous, he cannot recover. It is carelessness in passengers to attempt to leave a train while in motion. Pa. R. R. Co. v. Aspell, 23 Pa. St. 147; Jeff. R. R. Co. v. Hendricks, 26 Ind. 232; Ill. Cent. R. R. v. Able, 59 Ill. 131; O. & M. R. R. v. Schiebe, 44 Ill. 460; Dougherty v. C. B. & Q. R. R. Co., 86 Ill. 467; Dumont v. N. O. R. R. Co., 9 La. An. 441; Knights v. P. R. R. Co., 23 La. 462; Hubner v. N. O. & C. R. R. Co., 23 La. 492; Doss v. M. K. & T. R. R. Co., 59 Mo. 37; Nelson v. A. & P. R. R. Co., 68 Mo. 593; P. C. & St. L. R. R. Co. v. Kroose, 30 Ohio St. 223. So also where a passenger attempts to jump on the cars when moving rapidly. Harvey v. East. R. R. Co., 116 Mass. 269; C. & N. W. Ry. v. Chambers, 71 Ill. 520; Phillips v. R. & S. R. R. Co., 49 N. Y. 177. It has been held that if a passenger leaps from the car on the suggestion of the conductor, where thel atter only gives his opinion that the passenger may do so in safety, and where the danger was so apparent that a prudent man similarly situated would not have made the attempt, the negligence of the passenger is such as to preclude recovery. C. & A. R. R. v. Randolph, 53 Ill. 510; C. B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Hazard, 26 Ill. 373; R. & D. R. R. Co. v. Morris, Va. Sup. Ct. Nov. 1878; Lambeth . N. C. R. R. Co., 66 N. C. 794; Columbus R. R. Co. v. Powell, 40 Ind. 37. Where a passenger leaps from the train under such a show of force from the conductor as might reasonably impress him with fear he may recover. Klene v. C. P. R. R. Co., 37 Cal. 400. See also, Ga. R. R. Co. v. McCurly, 45 Ga. 288. And if the train has started while the passenger is in the act of leaving it, and without giving him sufficient time to alight, the company would be liable. J. R. R. Co. v. Hendricks, 26 Ind. 233; Pa. R. R. Co. v. Kilgore, 32 Pa. St. 232; Toledo R. R. Co. v. Baddeley, 54 Ill. 19. And so also if the train is moving so slowly that to step from it would not seem dangerous to a man of ordinary prudence. Ill. Cent. R. R. v. Able, 59 Ill. 131. But if a sufficient time has been given to alight, and the train has resumed motion, it is otherwise. Morrison v. Erie R. R. Co., 56 N. Y. 304; Phillips v. Rand S. R. R. Co., 49 N. Y. 177; Ill. Cent. R. R. Co. v. Statton, 54 Ill. 133; Lucas v. W. B. & T. R. R.Co., 6 Allen, 64. While it is the duty of the company to stop a sufficient length of time, yet a violation of this duty does not justify the plaintiff in exposing himself to danger by getting off when the train is in motion. Gavett v. M. & L. R. R. Co., 16 Gray, 501; Burrows v. Erie R. R. Co., 63 N. Y. 556; Dougherty v. C. B. & Q. R. R. Co., supra; Ginnon v. N. Y., etc., R. R. Co., 3 Robt. 25. senger is not justified in incurring risks unnecessarily, however rare the chances that he may suffer. Todd v. O. C. R. R. Co., 7 Allen, 207; Hickey v. B. & L. R. R. Co., 14 Allen, 429. Nor does the fact that the train is running at unusual speed relieve him from contributory negligence. Penn. R. R. Co. v. Sinclair, 62 Ind. 301. If the passenger jumps off before the train stops it is also inexcusable. O. & C. R. R. Co. v. Stratton, 78 Ill. 88; Bridges v. N. L. R. R. Co., L. R., 6 Q. B. 377; Gonzales v. H. R. R. Co., 33 N. Y. Super. 57; Ohio R. R. Co. v. Schiebe, 44 Ill. 460. When the train did not stop entirely, but was moving slowly, and plaintiff was directed by a brakeman to A pas get off, the question_of_negligence was held to be one of fact for a jury. Filer v. N. Y. Cent. R. R. Co., 49 N. Y. 47; Mulhado v. Brooklyn C. R. Ř. Co., 30 N. Y. 370; Ernst v. H. R. R. R. Co., 35 N. Y. 38. See also, Eppendorf v. B. & N. R. R. Co., 69 N. Y. 195; McIntyre v. N. Y. Cent. R. R. Co., 27 N. Y. 287; Nichols v. Sixth Ave. R. R. Co., 38 N. Y. 131. See Downie v. Hendrie (Mich.), 13 Cent. L. J. 371. A railroad company cannot shield itself from the consequences of negligence by showing that a person injured obeyed the specific instructions of the conductor instead of the general directions of which he had been informed. Pa. R. R. Co. v. McCloskey 23 Pa. St. 526. Where a passenger is placed in a perilous position he may be justified in leaping from the train, and may recover damages, although he might have escaped injury if he had not chosen that alternative. Jones v. Boyce, 1 Starkie, 493; Stokes v. Saltonstall, 13 Pet. 181; Frink v. Potter, 17 Ill. 406; Buel v. N. Y. R. R. Co., 31 N. Y. 314; S. W. R. R. Co. v. Parelk, 24 Ga. 356; Pa. R. R. Co. v. Weiner, 89 Pa. St. 59; Roll v. N. C. Ry. Co., 15 Hun, 496; Schultz v. C., etc., Ry. Co., 44 Wis. 638. The law has so high a regard for human life that it will not impute negligence to an effort to preserve it. Eckert v. L. I. R. R. Co., 43 N. Y. 721. When the uncontroverted facts of the case show contributory negligence it is proper for the court as a matter of law to rule that the plaintiff cannot recover. L. S. & M. S. R. R. Co. v. Miller, 25 Mich. 225; Kelley v. Hendrie, 26 Mich. 255; M. C. R. Ry. Co. v. Campan, 35 Mich. 468; M. C. R. R. Co. v. Austin, 40 Mich. 247; M. C. R. R. Co. v. Coleman, 28 Mich. 440; Downie v. Hendrie, Mich. October Term, 1881; Butterfield v. West. R. R. Co., 10 Allen, 534; Gavett v. M. & L. R. R. Co., supra; Warner v. Fitzhburgh R. R. Co., 8 Allen, 230; Lucas v. T. & N. B. R. R. Co., supra; Fernandes v. Sac. C. R. R. Co., 52 Cal. 45; Fleming v. W. R. R. Co., 49 ̊ Cal. 253; Morrison v. E. R. R. Co., 56 N. Y. 302; Harvey v. East. R. R. Co., 116 Mass. 269; C. & N. R. R. Co., 90 Ill. 586; L. S. & M. S. R. R. Co. v. Hart, 87 Ill. 529; R. R. Co. v. Houston, 95 U. S. 697; Steffin v. C. & N. W. R. R. Co., 46 Wis. 259; id. 404; Bonnell v. D. L. & W. R. R. Co., 10 Vroom, 300; 9 id. 525; Pa. R. R. Co. v. Righter, 42 N. J. 180; Donaldson v. M. & St. P. R. R. Co., 21 Minn. 293; Brown v. M. & St. P. R. R. Co., 22 Minn. 165; Smith v. M. & St. L. R. R. Co., 4 N. W. Rep. 782; Howard Exp. Co. v. Will, 64 Pa. St. 201; Hoag v. R. R. Co., 83 Pa. St. 293; Pa. R. R. Co. v. Fries, 85 Pa. St. 293; G. P. R. R. Co. v. Walling, (Penn.) Week Jur. March 24, 1881. FRANCIS CARPENTER v. GRAND TRUNK RY. Co. (72 Maine Reports, 388. June 27, 1881.) The stat. 1871, c. 223, which declares that the holder of a railroad ticket shall have the right to stop over at any of the stations along the line of the road, and that his ticket shall be good for a passage for six years from the time it is first used, applies only to transportation within the territorial limits of this State; the statute has no force beyond the limits of the State, and consequently does not apply to a ticket from Portland to Montreal, while the ticket is being used beyond the limits of the State. While such a ticket is being used in New Hampshire, Vermont, or Canada, the rights of the passenger will be governed and controlled by the laws of those places and not by the laws of Maine, but in the absence of proof to the contrary, the law of those places will be presumed to be the same as the common law of Maine, and not the same as the statute above cited. ON exceptions and motion for new trial. Case for forcibly ejecting the plaintiff from the cars of the defendant at Compton in Canada on the 30th day of March, 1875, while he was riding upon a ticket purchased of the defendant at Portland, on the day of its date, which read as follows: The opinion states the case presented to the law court. 7101 The only question in this case not settled by Dryden v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 60 Maine, 512, arises from the fact that the expulsion from the cars in this case occurred in Canada instead of in this State. 2 The contract was made in Portland, it was valid and must be governed by the laws of this State regulating such contracts. Kent Com. 454, 462. The contract was made here in accordance with the laws of this State. There was a breach of this contract on the part of the defendant; for this breach action is brought to the bar of this court, and there is no principle of law or justice that can be invoked to exonerate the company from its liability voluntarily incurred. J. and E. M. Rand, for the defendant, cited: Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168; Henderson v. Mayor, N. Y., 92 U. S. 259; LeForest v. Tolman, 117 Mass. 109; Milwaukee R. Co. v. Armes, 91 U. S. 489. WALTON, J.-The plaintiff claims to recover damages for having been, as he says, wrongfully ejected from the defendants' cars. The facts, briefly stated, are these: The plaintiff purchased a ticket of the Grand Trunk Ry. Co., of Canada, entitling him to a passage from Portland to Montreal. The ticket had these words printed upon it: "Good only for continuous trip within two days from date." The ticket was dated March 3, 1875. It was purchased at the company's office in Portland. The plaintiff started on his journey, and having stopped over at various places along the route, reached Coatacook in Canada. several days before March 30, 1875. On that day he took the train 3 A. & E. R. Cas.-28 for Montreal, but the conductor refused to allow him to ride on the ticket of March 3, 1875, and forcibly ejected him from the cars. For this act he commenced an action against the company in this State, and has obtained a verdict for two hundred dollars damages. The defendants claim a new trial upon the ground that the rulings of the presiding judge were erroneous. A statute of this State (Act 1871, c. 223) declares that the holder of a railroad ticket shall have the right to stop over at any of the stations along the line of the road, and that his ticket shall be good for a passage for six years from the time it is first used. The presiding judge ruled that if the plaintiff was put off the train for no other reason than because he was travelling on the 30th of March on a ticket dated on the 3d of the same month (there being no evidence in the case of any local law or statute of Canada in conflict with the law of Maine) the defendants would be liable. The question is whether this ruling can be sustained. We think it cannot. The act of 1871 applies only to transportation within the territorial limits of this State, and cannot be applied to an entire passage from Portland to Montreal. To hold otherwise would render the act unconstitutional. Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U. S. 485. In that case the courts of Louisiana had construed a statute of that State, intended to secure equality of rights to colored passengers, as applicable to the entire voyage of a steamboat carrying passengers from New Orleans, in the State of Louisiana, to Vicksburg, in the State of Mississippi; and, because of this construction, which gave an extra territorial force to the statute, the federal Supreme Court held the act unconstitutional, as an attempt to regulate inter-State commerce, in violation of that article of the federal constitution which confers that power upon congress. There is nothing in the decision to indicate that the constitutionality of the act would not have been sustained, if the State courts had held that it applied only to transportation within the State of Louisiana. It is clear, therefore, that we cannot give our statute extra territorial force without rendering it unconstitutional, unless there is a distinction between a voyage by water upon the Mississippi river, and a passage by land over the Grand Trunk R. R.; and it is the opinion of the court that no such distinction can be maintained. This brings us to the inquiry whether the ruling at the trial can be sustained upon the ground that there was no evidence of what the law of Canada was. We think not. Undoubtedly the case was to be tried in accordance with the law of this State, in the absence of proof of any other law. "It is a well settled rule," say the court of appeals of New York, "founded on reason and authority, that the lex fori, or, in other words, the laws of the country to whose courts a party appeals for redress, furnish in all cases, prima facie, the rule of decision; and if either party wants the benefit of a different rule or law (as, for instance, the lex domicilii, lex loci con |