the finding satisfies us that there was no such contract or undertaking. The defendant received the cotton without executing bills of lading therefor. It had never given bills of lading for goods shipped by the Erie and Pacific Despatch. Its custom was to make a waybill only over its own road. That course was pursued in this case, and defendant only collected and received pay for carrying to Indianapolis. It is true the way-bills, upon their face, indicated that the cotton was consigned to C. G. Meir & Co., London. But that circumstance is not, of itself, controlling or conclusive. The reference in the way-bill to the consignees was mere description to show the ultimate destination of the cotton. Each way-bill, executed by defendant, purported to be nothing more than a "manifest of freight from St. Louis to Indianapolis," and fails to show an undertaking by defendant to transport beyond the latter city.

Nor, in our judgment, can a special undertaking to carry beyond its terminus be implied, against defendant, from the arrangement already referred to, between the Despatch Co. and sundry railroad companies whose lines terminated at New York, whereby the latter, separately, agreed to carry all goods for the transportation of which the former should contract, at the established tariff rates, or at any special rates furnished by the railroad companies.

Such an arrangement did not in our opinion, involve joint liability upon the part of the railroad companies, or make them partners either inter sese or as to third persons. Each company bore the general expenses of its own route and of all transportation over it. The division, upon the basis merely of distance, of the aggregate pay for the entire route covered by the roads of these companies gave each one no greater amount than, perhaps, it would have earned had the Despatch contracted with each, separately, for the transportation of the cotton. The arrangement in question was one simply of convenience both for the shipper and carrier. Under it Meir & Co. were enabled to contract, at St. Louis, for a through rate for the transportation of the cotton by the Despatch Co. The latter, in order to meet its obligations to the owners of the cotton, used the road of defendant, receiving from the latter nothing more than its way-bill to Indianapolis, which showed upon its face the proportion of the aggregate pay to which defendant would be entitled. The defendant received compensation only for transportation over its road, and settled separately with the Despatch. It undertook, and was only bound, to transport over its own line and deliver to the succeeding carrier. That duty was discharged, and the loss occurred while the cotton was held by another carrier. The mere fact that it joined with other companies in establishing a through rate from St. Louis to New York, to be divided between themselves, upon the basis, not of expenses incurred, or investment made, but of distance simply, although competent as evidence, does not, of itself, imply an undertaking to transport be

yond its line, or to become bound for any default or negligence of other carriers.

In view of the conclusion thus indicated, it is unnecessary to determine the rights of the plaintiff in error as against the Despatch, or to inquire whether the detention of the cotton in Jersey City, under the circumstances disclosed in the record, was negligence upon the part either of the Despatch or of the Erie Ry. Co., or of both. Nor need we inquire whether the destruction of the cotton, by an accidental fire, was, in a legal sense, the result of its detention, in Jersey City, for an unreasonable length of time without delivery to the ocean steamer. Those questions are not material upon the present issues.

Upon the whole case the law is for the defendant, and the judgment is affirmed.

The legal questions involved in the above case are of great interest, but are unfortunately so far obscured by the peculiar attendant circumstances that the case can never have any great value attached to it as a precedent. The aim of the writer of this note will be to give a synopsis of the law on those subjects of which the principal case treats.

Where a railroad company receives goods to transport to a distant point beyond its own line, there is a great conflict of authority as to the responsibility which it assumes. The English cases are unanimous to the effect that a liability is incurred for any damage which may be done on the whole line of transit, even beyond the limits of the company's own road. Musthamp v. Lancaster & Prest. Junct. Ry. Co., 8 M. & W. 421; Collins v. B. & E. Ry. Co., 11 Exch. 790; Bristol Ry. Co. v. Collins, 7 H. L. Cases, 191; Coxon . Gt. Western R. R. Co., 5 H. & N. 274; Gt. West. R. R. Co. v. Crouch, 3 H. & N. 183. And for this course of decision good reasons are assigned. It is but fair that recourse should be had to that company with whom the original contract of transportation has been made rather than that the plaintiff should be forced to seek his remedy against a corporation of which he knows nothing, and whom he may only be enabled to sue by serving process at a great distance, and perhaps before a foreign tribunal. But however cogent this reasoning it has not obtained generally in this country. The vast weight of authority is to the effect that the liability is limited to damages occurring on the line of the company's own road. Nutting v. Connecticut Railroad, I Gray, 502; Penna, R. R. v. Schwarzenber, 45 Penna. St. 408; Van Santvoord v. St. John, 6 Hill, 157; F. and M. Bank v. Champlain Tr. Co., 18 Vt. 140; 23 id. 209; Sprague v. Smith, 29 Vt. 426; Hood v. N. Y. & N. H. Ry. Co., 25 Conn. 1; Elmore v. N. Ry. Co., 23 id. 457; Barclay v. Clyde, 2 E. D. Smith, 96; Stratton v. N. Y. Ry., id. 186; Ellsworth v. Tart, 26 Ala. 736; Quimby v. Vanderbilt, 17 N. J. 306; Fitchburg v. Hanna, 6 Gray, 339; Burroughs v. Norwich, etc., R. R. Co., 100 Mass. 26; Babcock v. Lake Shore, etc., R. R. Co., 49 N. Y. 291; Root v. Gt. Western R. R. Co., 45 N. Y. 524; Reed v. U. S. Express Co., 48 N. Y. 462; F. and M. Bank . Champlain Trans. Co., 16 Vt. 52; Cutts v. Brainerd, 42 Vt. 566; Condict v. Grand Trunk R. R. Co., 59 N. Y. 500; Converse v. Norwich, etc., R. R. Co., 33 Conn. 166; Darling v. Boston, etc., R. R. Co., 11 Allen, 295; Phillips v. N. C. Ry. Co., 78 N. C. 294; Hood v. N. Y., etc., R. R. Co., 22 Conn. 502; R. R. Co. v. Pratt, 22 Wall. 123; R. R. Co. v. Mfg. Co., 16 Wall. 318; Irish . Milwaukee R. R. Co., 19 Minn. 376; Baltimore R. R. Co. v. Schumacher, 29 Md. 168; Perkins v. Portland R. R. Co., 47 Me. 573. The English rule is, however, adhered to in Illinois, Erie R. R. Co. v. Wilcox, 84 III.

239; in Tennessee, East Tennessee, etc., Ry. Co. v. Nelson, 1 Coldw. 272; in Iowa, Mulligan v. Illinois Cent. R. R. Co. v. Nelson, 36 Iowa, 181; in Florida, Bennett v. Filyaw, 1 Fla. 403; in New Hampshire, Gray v. Jackson, 51 N. H. 9; and in Georgia, Cohen v. Southern Express Co., 45 Ga. 158. If, however, a railroad company expressly contracts to be liable beyond its own line, such contract will be without doubt enforced (Noyes v. R. & B. Ry. Co., 1 Williams, 110), and is not deemed ultra vires. Green's Brice's Ultra Vires, App. III., p. 673; Redfield on Carriers, §§ 190, 197.

Such a contract may likewise be implied from a variety of circumstances. 1. From the naming of the destination in the bill of lading. Cutts v. Brainerd, 42 Vt. 566; Toledo, etc., R. R. Co. v. Merriman, 52 Ill. 123; Schroeder v. Hudson River R. R. Co., 5 Duer, 55. Though this of course is liable to be rebutted by other circumstances or stipulations in the bill. East Tenn. R. R. Co. v. Montgomery, 44 Ga. 278; St. John v. Express Co., 1 Woods, 612; American Ex. Co. v. Second Nat. Bk. 69 Pa. St. 394; Pendergast v. Adams Express Co., 101 Mass. 120; Witbeck v. Holland, 55 Barb. 443; Coates v. U. S. Exp. Co., 45 Mo. 238; Reed v. U. S. Exp. Co., 48 N. Y. 462; Oakey v. Gordon, 7 La. Ann. 235; Penna. R. R. Co. v. Schaarzenberger, 45 Pa. St. 208; Collender v. Dinsmore, 55 N. Y. 200; Converse v. Norwich, etc., R. R. Co., 33 Conn. 166.

2. From the receipt of the entire freight, unless there be a stipulation limiting the liability. Reed v. Saratoga, etc., Ry. Co., 19 Wend. 534; St. John v. Express Co., 1 Woods, 612; Berg v. Narragansett Steamship Co., 5 Daly, 394; Candee v. Pa. R. R. Co., 21 Wisc. 582; R. R. Co. v. Androscoggin Mills, 22 Wall. 594.

3. From various expressions or phrases, more or less definite, contained in the bill of lading or verbally agreed on between the parties. Robinson v. Merchants' Despatch Co., 45 Iowa, 470; Root v. Gt. West. R. R. Co., 45 N. Y. 524; R. R. Co. v. Pratt, 22 Wall. 123; Hill Mfg. Co. v. B., etc., Ry. Co., 104 Mass. 122; Quimby v. Vanderbilt, 17 N. Y. 306.

And see as to the effect of contracts made with express companies or with other railroad companies. Schulter v. Adams Express Co., 6 Cent. L. I. 175; Wilson v. Chesapeake, etc., R. R. Co., 21 Gratt. 654; Carter v. Peck, 4 Sneed, 203; Ellsworth v. Yartt, 26 Ala. 733; Briggs v. Vanderbilt, 19 Barb. 222; Gass v. N. Y., etc., Co., 99 Mass. 220; Cobb v. Allot. 14 Pick. 289.

The power of a common carrier to stipulate for exemption from liability in case of damage to goods in course of transportation by him was formerly much doubted. In England the courts were at first unwilling to allow him such a privilege on grounds of public policy. In course of time, however, the rigor of the ancient law became relaxed, and the legality of such contracts is now settled beyond the possibility of a doubt. Nicholson v. Willard, 5 East. 507; Covington v. Willan, Gow. 115; Clay v. Willan, 1 Henry Bl. 198; Clarke v. Gray, 6 East. 564; Riley v. Home, 5 Bing. 217; Leeson v. Holt, 1 Stark. 186; Lowe v. Booth, 13 Price, 329; Carr v. Lancashire Ry. Co., 7 Exch. 707. There have been many regrets expressed at the abandonment of the ancient rule, but the law as settled in the above mentioned cases has been recognized as sound by numerous recent authorities. Macauley v. Furness Ry. Co., 27 L. T. (N. S.) 485; Taubman v. Pacific Steam Nav. Co., 26 L. T. (N. S.) 704; Gt. Western R. R. v. Glenistor, 29 L. T. (N. S.) 422.

In the United States it is generally held that the carrier may by special contract limit his responsibility as insurer. The following are the leading authorities: R. R. Co. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357; R. R. Co. v. Pratt, 22 Wall. 123; Grey v. Mobile Trade Co., 55 Ala. 387; Merchants' Dispatch Co. v. Comforth, 3 Col. 280; Welch v. Boston, etc., R. R. Co., 41 Conn. 333; Flinn v. Phila., etc., R. R. Co., 1 Houst. 469; Southern Express Co. v. Newby, 36 Ga. 635; Ill. Cent. R. R. Co. v. Frankenberg, 54 Ill. 88; St. Louis, etc., R. R. Co. v. Smuck, 49 Ind. 302; St. Louis, etc., R. R. Co. v. Piper, 13

Kansas, 505; Adams Exp. Co. v. Guthrie, 9 Bush. 78; Roberts v. Riley, 15 La. Ann. 113; Willis v. Grand Trunk R. R. Co., 62 Me. 488; McCoy v. Erie Trans. Co., 42 Ind. 498; School Dist. v. Boston, etc., R. R. Co., 100 Mass. 505; Gordon v. Ward, 16 Mich. 360; Christenson v. Am. Express Co., 15 Minn. 270; Mobile, etc., Ry. Co. v. Werner, 49 Miss. 725; Ketchum v. American Express Co., 52 Mo. 390; Moses v. Boston, etc., R. R. Co., 24 N. H. 71; Kenney v. Cent. R. R. Co., 32 N. J. Law, 407; Westcott v. Fargo, 61 N. Y. 542; Smith v. N. C. R. R. Co., 64 N. C. 235; Union Express Co. v. Graham, 26 Ohio St. 295; Farnham v. Camden, etc., R. R. Co., 55 Pa. St. 53; Levy v. S. Express Co., 4 S. C. 234; Olwell v. Adams Ex. Co., 1 Cent. L. J. 186; Mann v. Berchard, 40 Vt. 326; Virginia, etc., Ry. Co. v. Sayers, 26 Gratt. 328; Balt. & Ohio R. R. Co. v. Skeels, 3 West Va. 556. But it is also almost universally held that this must be by express agreement of the parties. Hence a mere notice either posted up or endorsed on the bill of lading has been held insufficient to relieve the carrier from responsibility, unless proved to be expressly assented to. Railroad Co. v. Mfg. Co., 16 Wall. 318; Pecks v. Weeks, 34 Conn.145; Western Trans. Co. v. Newhall, 24 Ill. 466; Indianapolis, etc., R. R. Co. v. Cox, 29 Ind. 360; Louisville, etc., R. R. Co. v. Hedges, 9 Bush. 645; Buckland v. Adams Express Co., 97 Mass. 124; Gt. Western R. R. Co. v. Hawkins, 18 Mich. 427; Levering v. Union Trans. Co., 42 Mo. 88; Moses v. Boston, etc., Ry. Co., 24 N. H. 71; Rawson v. Penna. R. R. Co., 48 N. Y. 212; Gaines v. Union Trans. Co., 28 Ohio St. 418; Camden, etc., Ry. Co. v. Baldauf, 16 Pa. St. 67; Walker v. Skipwith Meigs, 502; and in no case is it competent for the carrier to stipulate for an exemption from liability for the negligent acts of his agents or servants. To allow such a contract would clearly be opposed to well established principles of public policy. R. R. Co. v. Pratt, 22 Wall. 123; Earnest v. Express Co., 1 Woods, 123; Hooper v. Wells, 27 Cal. 11; West. Union Tel. Co. v. Graham, 1 Col. 230; Berry v. Cooper, 28 Ga. 543; Adams Express Co. v. Stettaners, 61 Ill. 184; Leavenworth R. R. Co. v. Mans, 16 Kansas, 333; Higgins v. N. O., etc., R. R. Co., 28 La. Ann. 133; Little v. Boston, etc., R. R. Co., 66 Me. 239; School District . Boston, etc., R. R. Co., 102 Mass. 552; Southern Express Co. v. Hunnicutt, 54 Miss. 566; Lupe v. Atlantic, etc., R. R. Co., 3 Mo. App. 77; Levering. Union Trans., etc., Co., 42 Mo. 88; Lee v. Raleigh, etc., R. R. Co., 72 Ñ. C. 236; Adams Express Co. v. Sharpless, 77 Pa. St. 516; Swindler v. Hilliard, 2 Rich. (S. C.), 216; Virginia, etc., R. R. Co. v. Sayers, 26 Gratt. 328. In New York, indeed, the contrary is the law and carriers may there by express contract limit their liability even for negligence. Nicholas v. N. Y. Central R. R. Co., 4 Hun. 327; Nelson v. Hudson River R. R. Co., 48 N. Y. 498. But it is difficult to see on what ground such a rule rests.

Where goods are to be transported over a number of connecting lines, a contract entered into by the carrier receiving the goods stipulating for exemption from liability in general terms will enure to the benefit of all the various carriers over whose roads the goods may be carried. U. S. Express Co. v. Harris, 51 Md. 127; Levy v. Southern Express Co., 4 S. C. 234; Maghee v. Camden, etc., R. R. Co., 45 N. Y. 514; Manhattan Oil Co. v. Camden, etc., R. R. Co., 54 N. Y. 197; Lamb v. Camden, etc., R. R. Co., 2 Daly, 454; S. C. 46 N. Y. 271; Hall v. N. E. R. R. Co., L. R., 10 Q. B. 437. Unless, indeed, the contract expressly stipulates that the immunity shall extend only to the single company entering into it. Bancroft v. Mchts'. Dispatch Trans. Co., 47 Iowa, 262; Babcock v. Lake Shore, etc., R. R. Co., 49 N. Y. 491; Martin v. Am. Express Co., 19 Wisc. 336; Camden, etc., R. R. Co. v. Forsyth, 61 Pa. St. 81; Mchts'. Dispatch Trans. Co. v. Bolles, 80 Ill. 473; R. R. Co. v. Pratt, 22 Wail. 123; Etna Ins. Co. v. Wheeler, 49 N. Y. 616.

On the question of the liability of a railroad company for the loss of goods in transitu by fire occurring during a detention. Cf. Sherman, Hall & Co. v. Penna. R. R. Co., 8 Weekly Notes of Cases (Phila.), 268.

3 A. & E. R. Cas.-18

SHERMAN, HALL & Co.

v.

PENNSYLVANIA R. R. Co.

(Advance Case, U. 8. C. C. Pennsylvania.)

Plaintiffs shipped goods from Chicago to Philadelphia by rail, and took a bill of lading from the company defendant exempting the defendant, inter alia, from liability for loss or damage on any article or property whatever by fire or other casualty while in transit or while in depots or places of transshipment." The goods, owing The goods, owing to a general strike of defendant's employees, were stopped en route outside of, but near, the company's depot at Pittsburgh, an intermediate point. During this detention the defendant's property, including these goods, was threatened by a mob, and finding it impossible to maintain their property in security they called upon the proper county and State authorities for their aid, which having proved ineffectual, the goods were burnt up by the mob. The detention lasted three days, during which the defendants were forcibly dispossessed of their property, including the plaintiffs', by the superior force of the mob. Trains continued to arrive during the time, which were stopped at Pittsburgh by the mob. At the time the mob obtained possession, a train of petroleum cars was standing braked at some distance from the plaintiffs' property, and at or before the fire, these cars were moved to those which contained the plaintiffs' property, and all were burnt up together. In a suit to recover the value of the goods: Held, That the defendants were not liable, as the facts disclosed no negligence on their part that had contributed to or caused the loss. The loss of the goods occurred while they were in transit, and was caused by fire within the meaning of the exception in the bill of lading, protecting the defendants.

It is the duty of common carriers to convey the goods shipped to the point of delivery without unavoidable delay, and apart from the conditions in the bill of lading, they are liable for loss from any cause, save the act of God or a public enemy. The defendants continued subject to all the liabilities of common carriers, except for losses happening from causes named in the exception, in which there had been no negligence of defendant's servants, while in the discharge of their duty. The defendant, as a common carrier, is liable for any interruption to the transit, caused by the refusal of its servants to perform their duty, which occasioned loss to the plaintiffs.

The loss here was not caused by the strike of the defendant's employees, nor was there any permissive allowance by the defendant that the plaintiffs' goods should be stopped in transit. The defendant's default was merely technical, and did not cause, or contribute to the loss. The defendant, under the condition in the bill of lading, was exempt from liability for loss by fire while the goods were in transit, unless occasioned by its default, and its inability to resist the superior force of a mob; and the consequent involuntary relinquishment of possession of the goods and the forced detention of them by the mob was not such default; nor is there any evidence of defendant's default in permitting the arrival of freight trains at Pittsburgh on three consecutive days, during which the mob took and retained possession of the defendant's property, or in their leaving under the circumstances a large number of cars loaded with petroleum in their yard near the plaintiffs' property. The transit of the plaintiffs'