December, 1836. Pryor V mons Green H. Pryor to appear before some two Justices of NASHVILLE. the peace for the said county, to answer the complaint of Mary Ann Hays, in a plea of damages, under fifty dollars, occa sioned by beating and wounding her, herein fail not &c." The magistrates rendered a judgment against defendant, which was affirmed upon appeal to the circuit court. H. L. Turney, for plaintiff in error. J. Campbell, for defendant. REESE J. delivered the opinion of the court. It is objected to this warrant, that it does not state the form of the action, and the case of Paris v. Brown, 5 Yer. R. 268 is referred to as sustaining the objection. That case determines that the warrant must state every thing necessary to give the defendant a proper knowledge of the charge against him, so that he may prepare himself for his defence. This is the principle of the case: It is true, that the able Judge who gave the opinion of the court in that case, in reply to the argument of counsel, that the magistracy as a body, were not sufficiently enlightened to carry that principle into effect, enquires, "if it be possible to believe that any man in the commission of the peace is so very ignorant, as not to be capable of stating on the face of the warrant, not in set form, but in substance, plainly and briefly that the defendant is summoned to answer the plaintiff of a plea of trespass for taking and carrying his colt, or for killing his cow or his ox, or for throwing down his fence, or for breaking open his house." That the court in that case attached no importance to the form of the action, is shown in the above example, in which it is not stated what that form should be, whether trespass or case, or trespass with force and arms, except as indicated by the nature of the injury. A plea of "damages occasioned by beating and wounding the plaintiff," is just and good and is sustained by the principle and the entire scope of reasoning, in the case of Parris v. Brown. It is said that the statute extending the jurisdiction of magistrates in matters of tort and damages from twenty to fifty Hays. NASHVILLE certaining the balance of assets unadministered. December, 1336. Pryor V Hays. This is unquestionably bad, for no judgment for any particular sum can be entered on such a finding; this has been settled for so great a length of time, and by so well adjudged cases, that it is not deemed necessary to enter into an investigation of the reasons therefor. See 2 Washington's Rep. 301. 5 Cranch Rept. 19, and the authorities there referred to. But in answer to this, it is said, that the plea of fully administered is badly pleaded that it is an immaterial plea, and having been found against the defendants, they are barred thereby, and cannot have a repleader. If this were an immaterial plea, this position is most cleaaly sustained by the authorities referred to by the counsel for the defendants in error. But we think the plea, though informal, is good, especially after verdict, and that it does not tender an immaterial issue. It is a general plea, that they the defendants have fully administered all the goods and chattels rights and credits, of their intestate, which have come to their hands to be administered. This shall be intended to speak, as to the time, when the plea is filed. The judgment will therefore be reversed, and the case re manded for further proceedings. Judgment reversed. GREEN H. PRYOR US. MARY ANN HAYS. A. warranted B. for an assault and battery, the warrant was as follows; "To any lawful officer of the said county to execute and return; summons B to appear before some two justices of the peace for the said county to answer the complaint of A, on a plea of damages under fifty dollars, occasioned by beating and wounding her herein fail not &c;" Held, that this was sufficiently certain. The statute of 1813 increasing the jurisdiction of magistrates in matters of tort and damage from twenty to fifty doliars is not unconstitutional. This suit commenced before a justice. The warrant is as follows; "State of Tennessee, Marion County. To any lawful officer of the said county, to execute and return; sum December, 1836. Pryor V Hays. mons Green H. Pryor to appear before some two Justices of NASHVILLE.. the peace for the said county, to answer the complaint of Mary Ann Hays, in a plea of damages, under fifty dollars, occa sioned by beating and wounding her, herein fail not &c." The magistrates rendered a judgment against defendant, which was affirmed upon appeal to the circuit court. H. L. Turney, for plaintiff in error. J. Campbell, for defendant. REESE J. delivered the opinion of the court. It is objected to this warrant, that it does not state the form of the action, and the case of Paris v. Brown, 5 Yer. R. 268 is referred to as sustaining the objection. That case determines that the warrant must state every thing necessary to give the defendant a proper knowledge of the charge against him, so that he may prepare himself for his defence. This is the principle of the case. It is true, that the able Judge who gave the opinion of the court in that case, in reply to the argument of counsel, that the magistracy as a body, were not sufficiently enlightened to carry that principle into effect, enquires, "if it be possible to believe that any man in the commission of the peace is so very ignorant, as not to be capable of stating on the face of the warrant, not in set form, but in substance, plainly and briefly that the defendant is summoned to answer the plaintiff of a plea of trespass for taking and carrying his colt, or for killing his cow or his ox, or for throwing down his fence, or for breaking open his house." That the court in that case attached no importance to the form of the action, is shown in the above example, in which it is not stated what that form should be, whether trespass or case, or trespass with force and arms, except as indicated by the nature of the injury. A plea of "damages occasioned by beating and wounding the plaintiff," is just and good and is sustained by the principle and the entire scope of reasoning, in the case of Parris v. Brown. It is said that the statute extending the jurisdiction of magistrates in matters of tort and damages from twenty to fifty December, 1836. NASHVILLE. dollars is unconstitutional. The contrary has in principle, been determined by this court in the case of Morford v. Barnes, 8 Yer. R. 444. Scott Carru:h, Let the judgment be affirmed. Judgment affirmed. SCOTT vs. CARRUTH. It is the duty of a guardian to collect the hire of his wards slaves annually; "to loan out the prooceds, and collect the interest annually, and to re-loan the amount, unless it is necessary to retain it for the education and support of the ward. Where a guardian failed for nine years to collect the hire of a slave owned by his ward, and no suit was brought by the ward after he arrived at full age, until the claim was barred by the act of limitations; Held, that the guardian was liable for the hire, notwithstanding it might have been collected by the ward, if he had sued before the claim was barred. Where a guardian is morally, though perhaps not legally bound to make good a loss which his ward has suffered, a promisory note executed by him to his ward for the amount of the loss, is founded on a sufficient consideration, and is binding upon him. This was an action of debt founded upon the following note, made by the defendant, and payable to the plaintiff. "Two years after date, I promise to pay William S. Scott one hundred and twenty-five dollars for his part of the hire of a negro man by the name of Jacob, the property of his father, which has been detained from said William S. Scott's estate, by the administrators from 1819, to 1828, given under my hand, this 27th day of September, 1831, bearing interest from the date." The negro in question was bequeathed by the will of plaintiffs grandfather, to his Mother and to her heirs for ever. Plaintiffs Father, the husband of the legatee, having died intestate, administration on his estate was granted to his widow, the mother of plaintiff, who afterwards intermarried with a certain James L. Vowell. In 1819 defendant Carruth was appointed guardian of plaintiff; the negro in question continued from that time till 1828, in the possession of Vowell who claimed him as the property for life of his wife. Carruth during this time collected no hire for the negro, nor made any annual or other report on the subject, a lawyer to whom December, 1836. Carruth and Vowell referred the matter, having erroneously NASHVILLE, determined that by the will of plaintiffs grandfather, the negro belonged to his mother, the wife of Vowell, for life. Upon this cause coming on, to be tried upon the plea of nil debit the court, among other matters charged the jury "that if Vowell was able to pay the hire of the negro in question at the time the plaintiff came of age, and resided still in Wilson county, he might have brought suit himself for his portion of said hire against Vowell and wife, and if he could then have collected the hire, he had no right to throw the ex-. pense and burthen of such a suit on the defendant, because he had been his guardian. The court is of opinion it would have been sufficient to say to the plaintiff, "my neglect has not occasioned you any loss, Vowell is now good, and you can recover yourself. But if a loss had been occasioned by insolvency of Vowell in the meantime, or if Vowell although good had removed out of the State, when the plaintiff became of age, then the defendant would be himself liable for such loss. You will then examine the proof, and if you think no loss has been occasioned by insolvency or removal, you ought to find for the defendant. But if a loss has happened by the insolvency or removal of Vowell, the defendant is liable and could not defend himself because plaintiffs claim was barred by the statute of limitations when defendant gave his note." R. M. Burton, for plaintiff in error. J. S. Yerger, for defendcnt in error. REESE, J. delivered the opinion of the court. We are of opinion that the charge of the circuit court is erroneous. It was the duty, by law, of this guardian not only to have collected annually the hire of the negro for the whole nine years, but also each year, to have lent out the proceeds, and annually to have collected the interest upon such loan, and to have reloaned it, if not necessary for the education and support of his ward. This was his duty by law, and this duty he entirely omitted. If he had been sued by his ward upon his guardian bond or a bill had been filed in chan Scott Carruth. |