March, 1836 NASHVILLE, from the terms of the agreement, but from existing inability to pay, which nothing is likely to obviate but success in the suit. ore Campbell Ac 2. Does the statute make a contingency of this sort champerty? To say so, would be to give a most extended operation to the statute. But it is contended for the defendants that it should be liberally and largely expounded in advancement of the remedy. The nature of the remedy is shown in the decree which was rendered; the cases at bar were ordered to be stricken from the docket at the costs of the plaintiff, and the attorney was ordered to pay the costs in chancery; and to that, by the provisions of the act, might have been annexed, that he be stricken from the roll, and deprived of his privileges of attorney and counsellor. The statute therefore, is not only summary in its course of procedure, but highly penal in its sanction. It cannot therefore, on obvious and long settled principles, have the liberal and extended construction claimed for it. It is true, that nothing is more pernicious to the security of the community, nor any thing more injurious to that character, for dignity, integrity, and purity, so indispensable in members of the bar, than the indulgence of a gambling spirit which would lead them, for contingent and possible advantage, to agitate society in the prosecution of doubtful, pretended or obsolete claims. And, therefore, champerty where it exists, and is distinctly made out, deserves severe reprobation. On the other hand, to investigate the claims or redress the wrongs of the indigent and the injured, is no quixotism, but a grave and highly honorable duty of the profession, the performance of which, if not voluntarily assumed, may be enforced by the And we are not prepared to say, that if an indigent man, who in the opinion of the attorney has probable cause of action, employ him, instead of applying to the court to have him assigned as counsel, by himself suing as a pauper, that such employment, although the ability of the party to pay will depend upon his success, shall be construed to amount to champerty. court. Let the decree rendered in this case be reversed, and the bill be dismissed, and let the trustees of Campbell academy March, 1836. The State pay all the costs, except the costs of defendants, Mary Ann NASHVILLE, Moore, Henry Wilson Williamson, and John H. Martin, incurred up to the time of filing their answers, which, up to that time let them pay. Decree reversed. V Union Bank. THE STATE vs. UNION Bank. By the act of the legislature incorporating the Union Bank of Tennessee, the State reserved to herself the right of subscribiug for a certain amonnt of its stock; accordingly the governor, in obedience to the directions of the charter, subscribed stock to the amount of five hundred thousand dollars, in the name of the State. The seventh section of the charter enacts, that the profits which may arise from the stock owned by the State in the Union Bank of the State of Tennessee, after the bonds of the State shall have been paid, and also the bonus agreed to be paid by the bank to the State for the privileges conferred by the charter; and also the interes. which may from time to time accrue upon the deposites of public money by the treasuser of the State, shall be, and they are hereby appropriated to the use of common schools: Held, that said seventh section did not by necessary implication create a trust in favor of the bank, and authorize it to retain the bonus and dividends until the State bonds were paid; that the State had not parted with the power to control the fund, and that the words, "after the State bouds shall have been paid," only indicated and fixed positively the time when the right of the schools to the fund shall take effect. It is a rule, that what a man does not expressly part with, he retains; there fore, unless the above section contains an express relinquishment of the right of the State to control the fund, or, unless this relinquishment arises by necessary implication from the language used, the State still has the right to their control, "Necessary implication" means not natural necessity, but so strong a probability of intention, that an intention contrary to that which is imputed cannot be supposed. Supposing the language of the seventh section to be susceptible of two meanings, one that the words "after the State bonds are paid," mean only a designation of the time when the fand shall be appropriated, the State reserving her control of the fund until then; the other, that the State surrendered her right to control it; it cannot follow from "necessary implication," that the latter was intended, because as neither meaning can be necessarily implied," the funds are unaffected by the language used, and remain with the legal owner. If the fund mentioned in the seventh section had been expressly appropriated to the payment of the bonds, it would not therefore follow, that a trust was created: the State would still have the power to control and manage it. If the seventh section had created a trust, the bank as trustee, would have been bound to perform the trust by investing the fund so that it would be plainly beneficial to the cestue que trust. NASHVILLE, The State V Union Bank. Where a trust is not expressly declared, or where there is a doubt as to the proper disposition of the trust fund, by application to a court of chancery, the trusts will be declared and proper directions as to its investment given. It matters not what may be the discretionary power given to a trustee, yet, if he omit doing what would be plainly beneficial to the cestue que trust, he will be answerable, and the cestue que trust may apply to a court of chancery to compel him to do his duty, Where a trust fund is placed in the hands of a trustee for accumulation, and he permits it to remain unproductive, he is accountable for the profits it should have made, or to pay interest, with half yearly rests. The bank having refused to pay the bonus and dividends half yearly in this case, interest was directed to be paid on the balances due to the State. This bill was filed by the State of Tennessee against the Union Bank of the State, to recover the bonus agreed by the eleventh section of the charter to be paid by the bank, and also the dividends which have accrued upon the stock owned by the State in that institution. The bill alleges that, on the 18th day of October, 1832, the legislature of Tennessee, passed an act entitled "an act to charter the Union Bank of the State of Tennessee"; that the subscribers and stockholders, their successors and assigns were created by said act a body corporate in law and in fact by the name and style of the president, directors and company of the Union Bank of the State of Tennessee; that the sixth section of said act provided, that whenever there shall have been five thousand shares of the capital stock of said bank subscribed, and the commissioners appointed in Nashville shall certify that fact to the governor of the State for the time being, he was authorized and required to subscribe on the part of the State for five thousand shares of the capital stock of the bank; and he was further required to execute on behalf of the State, bonds to the amount of five hundred thousand dollars, which bonds were to be signed by him officially, and to be countersigned by the Secretary of State, and were to bear five per cent interest per annum; that said bonds were to be paid in four instalments, of one hundred and twenty-five thousand dollars each, the first instalment to be paid in fifteen years; the second, in twenty years; the third, in twenty-five years; and the fourth and last instalment, in thirty years from and after the date of said bonds, and the interest on said bonds was to be paid half yearly; that said bonds, by the terms of March, 1836. said charter, were to be handed over by the governor to the NASHVILLE, president and directors of said bank, in full payment and satisfaction for said stock so subscribed in behalf of the State as aforesaid. The bill further alledges that said bank, shortly after the passage of said act, went into operation, and the commissioners at Nashville having certified in writing to the governor, that five thousand shares of the capital stock was subscribed by individuals; the said governor thereupon executed the bonds aforesaid, in the manner prescribed by said charter, and delivered them to the president and directors of said Union Bank, who received them in full satisfaction and discharge for the stock subscribed by and in behalf of the State. The bill also charged, that the State reserved the right at any subsequent time to increase the State stock to any amount not exceeding one million of dollars; that the said Union Bank by the acceptance of the charter, and in consideration of the privileges granted by said charter, agreed, as stipulated in the eleventh section of said act, to pay the State annually one half of one per cent, on the amount of the capital stock paid by stockholders other than the State; and that by the terms of said charter, the said bank is to declare half yearly dividends of so much of the profits as shall appear advisable to the directors; that the said bank, by the eighteenth section of said act, also agreed to pay to the State, interest upon public deposites made by and in the name of the State in said bank; the rate of which interest was to be agreed upon by the treasurer of the State and said bank; that no part of the bonus agreed to be paid by said bank, or the dividends which have been half yearly declared by said bank, as due and payable to its stockholders, nor any interest upon the public deposites, although often demanded, had been paid to the State, and that said bank wholly refused to pay any portion of the same, pretending, as will be seen by its answer to a resolution of the legislature of 1833, that by the seventh section of said charter, the said bank was not compelable to pay either the bonus or the dividends, or the interest upon the public deposites until after the bonds of the State shall have been paid, and the said bank claims the right and privilege of retaining and using the The State V Union Bank. 120 NASHVILLE, The State Union Bank. PREME COURT. ..d said bank refused to render ermit the same to be invested erected by the act of IS. c. 73. bank may be decreed to render an the State for said bonus particuis unknown, what part of the capital ne has been paid in) and also, what is dividends upon the State stock, and for olic deposites placed in said bank; that the wh interest thereon, (after deducting the ine bonds of the State) be decreed to be paid the State, or to the treasurer of the State of that if the court should be of opinion said late for the benefit of the State, and cannot Foon said bank until said bonds shall be paid; Sakay be compelled by decree to permit cros, bonus and interest now due, and as they 1 time to time become due, to be invested Sark, as provided for by the sixth section of dhe said act of 1833, c. 73. ... of the bank admitted all the material allega, but insisted that upon a just construction of con of the charter, the State agreed not to » bonus or dividends from the bank, but that the we temain as a security for the payment of the secs, and the interest upon the same; that the fund caderon pledged for that purpose, and whatever at Diy years was due the State, after payment of Cs, was appropriated by said section to the use of over particularly sets forth the amount of stock from e paid in, and what dividends were from time to ne seventh section of the charter is as follows: “the proca may arise from the stock owned by the State in Rask of Tennessee, after the bonds of the State be paid, and also the bonus agreed to be paid to the State for the privileges conferred by this also the interest which may from time to |