1832. WILSON v. COLLINS. the jury, it must be considered as a confidential communication. Mr. Justice BOSANQUET, in summing up, said-It is suggested in this case, that, notwithstanding the words have been proved, the plaintiff is not entitled to a verdict, because they were uttered under circumstances which sufficiently justify the utterance. If a person has to make a communication to an inquest, he is bound to do it in such a manner as to satisfy a jury, if he is afterwards charged with slander, that he was only stating the fact for the information of the inquest when assembled, and was doing it in a proper manner. In the first place, there is very imperfect evidence of the assembling of the inquest; but it seems that some of the conversation was addressed to the plaintiff himself in the back part of the premises, and in such a tone as to call the attention of the passers-by to it. It does not appear that any of the inquest asked any questions about the matter, and the defendant had no right to act officiously in making the communication. If you think that the act was not done by him in the discharge of his official duty, then you will say to what damages you think the plaintiff is entitled. Verdict for the plaintiff-Damages 201. Wilde, Serjt., and Steer, for the plaintiff. Andrews, Serjt., and Comyn, for the defendant. [Attornies-E. W. Smith, and W. Richardson.] First Sitting in London in Trinity Term, 1832. BEFORE MR. JUSTICE ALDERSON. 1832. PLUCKWELL v. WILSON, Bart. ACTION for an injury done to the plaintiff's chaise by a carriage of the defendant's, driven by his servant. There was contradictory evidence as to the cause of the injury, and also as to whether the defendant's carriage was in the centre, or on its proper side, of the road. Mr. Justice ALDERSON left it to the jury to say whether the injury to the plaintiff's chaise was occasioned by negligence on the part of the defendant's servant, without any negligence on the part of the plaintiff himself; for that, if the plaintiff's negligence in any way concurred in producing the injury, the defendant would be entitled to the verdict. Also, they would have to say, whether it was altogether an accident; in which case also the defendant would be entitled to the verdict. His Lordship also observed, that a person was not bound to keep on the ordinary side of the road; but that, if he did not do So, he was bound to use more care and diligence, and keep a better look-out, that he might avoid any concussion, than would be requisite if he were to confine himself to his proper side of the road. Verdict for the plaintiff-Damages, 251. Andrews, Serjt., and Thesiger, for the plaintiff. [Attornies-Wilks, and Liddon.] See the cases of Wakemanv. Robinson, 8 J. B. Moore, 63, and 1 Bing. 213; Chaplin v. Hawes and others, Vol. 3 of these Reports, p. 554; and Lack v. Seward, Vol. May 31st. A person drivnot bound to keep on the re ing a carriage is gular side of the road; but, if he does not, he must use more care, and keep a better look-out, to avoid concussion, than would he were on the proper part of the road. 1832. Sitting in London after Trinity Term, 1832. BEFORE LORD CHIEF JUSTICE TINDAL. June 19th. debtor knows, at his schedule, PUGH v. HOOKHAM. If an insolvent ASSUMPSIT by the plaintiff, as holder of a bill of exthe time of filing change, drawn by one Kedge, on, and accepted by, the defendant, and made payable to the order of the drawer. There was no plea of the general issue, but only a plea of a discharge, under the Insolvent Debtors' Act, on which issue was taken. that a bill of ex change had been indorsed to a particular person some time before, he is bound to give notice to that person, although he cannot tell whether he continues to be holder at the schedule. The bill was inserted in the defendant's schedule as held by the drawer himself. No evidence was given by the defendant (who began, as the affirmative of the issue was on him) to shew, under the 46th section of the Insoltime of filing the vent Debtors' Act (a), that the plaintiff was not known to the defendant, as the holder of the bill, at the time when he made out his schedule. But, on the part of the plaintiff, it was proved, that on the arrest of a person for whom the defendant proposed to become bail, a conversation took place, in the presence of the defendant, in the course of which Pugh's name was several times mentioned as the holder of the bill in question. This was at a time when the bill had several months to run, and some time before the filing of the schedule. Bompas, Serjt., for the plaintiff, submitted that, as the defendant once knew the fact, he ought not to have neglected to insert it at the proper time. He contended, (a) 7 Geo. 4, c 57; that section declares, inter alia, that a prisoner shall be discharged, as to the debts of creditors named in the schedule, and as to the claims of all other persons not known to such prisoner at the time of adjudication, who may be indorsees,or holders for value of any negotiable se curity set forth in his schedule. also, that the defendant was bound to give some evidence to shew that he was not aware of the plaintiff's being the holder of the bill at the time when he made out his schedule. TINDAL, C. J., said he would reserve the point as to whether the defendant was bound to give affirmative evidence; but added, that, in his opinion, if it was proved that he knew at one time that the plaintiff was the holder of the bill, he ought to have inserted his name in the schedule. Andrews, Serjt., for the defendant.—Although the bill was once in Pugh's hands, yet it had some months to run, and there was no knowing into whose hands it might get before it came to maturity. I submit that it could not be the intention of the legislature that a man in prison should be obliged to make inquiries after a bill. The only object was to procure an insertion of the name of the person who was the creditor at the time of filing the schedule. The 40th section requires, that the prisoner shall give a list of such creditors as were within his knowledge at the time he filed his petition (a). But the 46th section seems to provide expressly for this very case, as the bill may have passed through many hands after the time when it was known to be in the hands of the plaintiff. There is no fraud in this case on the part of the defendant. TINDAL, C. J., (to the jury).—The only question for you is, whether the defendant has given that notice which, by the Insolvent Debtors' Act, he was required to give? It seems to me that the whole scheme of the Insolvent (a) The words are-" a full and true description of all debts due, or growing due, from such prisoner, at the time of filing such petition; and of all and every per VOL. V. C C son and persons to whom such pri- 1832. PUGH บ. HOOKHAM. 1832. PUGH ย. HOOKHAM. Debtors' Act is, that notice should be given to the parties, and the world, of the names of the creditors, and the amounts of the debts. But there are cases of outstanding securities, as to which a party may not know in whose hands they are. The 46th section says, "shall be discharged as to the claims of all other persons not known to such prisoner," &c. The question is, whether the defendant knew at the time that Pugh was an indorsee of the bill? If he did, then he was bound to give notice to him. Andrews, Serjt., submitted, that the 46th section must be referable to the holder at the time when the schedule was filed. TINDAL, C. J.-On the construction of that section, I think, that, if a man knows, at the time of filing his schedule, that a bill has been indorsed to a particular person, he is bound to give notice to that person, although he cannot tell whether he continues to be the holder at the time of the filing of the schedule. This appears to me to be the proper construction of the act. Verdict for the plaintiff. Bompas, Serjt., and Manning, for the plaintiff. Andrews, Serjt., and Hutchinson, for the defendant. [Attornies-Dover & L., and Walls.] See the case of Nias v. Nicholson, Vol. 2 of these Reports, p. 120, and the cases there referred to. |