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2. If the seizure is made on the high
seas, or within the territory of a
foreign power, the jurisdiction is
conferred on the Court of the dis-
trict where the property is carri-
ed and proceeded against. Id.

402

3. A municipal seizure, within the
territory of a foreign power, does
not oust the jurisdiction of the Dis-
trict Court, into whose district
the property is brought for adju-
dication. Id.
402, 403
4. Where Courts of equity have con-
current jurisdiction with Courts
of law, as in matters of fraud, if
the cause has already been tried
and determined by a Court of
law, a Court of equity cannot
take cognizance of it, unless there
be the addition of some equitable
circumstance to give jurisdiction.
The Court, which first has pos-
session of the subject, must deter-
mine it conclusively. Smith r.
McIver,
532, 534
5. T. such a case, some defect of tes-
timony, or other disability, which
a Court of law cannot remove,
must be shown, as a ground for
resorting to a Court of equity.
Id.
6. An endorsee of a promissory note,
who resides in a different State,
may sue, in the Circuit Court, his
immediate endorser, residing in
the State in which the suit is
brought, although that endorser
be a resident of the same, State
with the maker of the note. Mol-
lan v. Torrance,
537
7. But where the suit is brought
against a remote endorser, and
the plaintiff, in his declaration,
traces his title through an inter-
mediate endorser, he must show
that this intermediate endorser
could have sustained his action in
the Circuit Court. Id. 537
8. A plea to the jurisdiction of the
Circuit Court, must show that

534

10.

the parties were citizens of the
same State, at the time the action
was brought, and not merely at
the time of the plea pleaded. The
jurisdiction depends upon the
state of things at the time of the
action brought; and after it is
once vested, it cannot be ousted
by a subsequent change of resi-
dence of either of the parties. Id.
539
9. Quære, As to the authority of
this Court to interfere, by man-
damus, in the case of the removal
or suspension of an Attorney of
the District and Circuit Courts.
Ex parte Burr,
529
Whatever may be the authority of
this Court in that respect, it will
not be exercised, unless where the
conduct of the Court below has
been grossly irregular and unjust.
Id.
530
In a regular complaint against an
attorney, charges cannot be re-
ceived and acted on, unless made
on oath. But he may himself
waive the preliminary of an affi-
davit, and the Court may pro-
ceed, at his instance, to investi-
gate the charges upon testimony,
which must be on oath, and regu-
larly taken. Id.
In replevin, if it be of goods dis-
trained for rent, the amount for
which avowry is made, is the va-
lue of the matter in controversy;
and if the writ be issued to try the
title to property, it is in the na-
ture of detinue, and the value of
the article replevied is the value
of the matter in controversy, so as
to give jurisdiction to this Court
upon a writ of error. Peyton r.
Robertson,
527
13. The act incorporating the Bank of

11.

12.

530

the United States, gives the Cir-
cuit Courts of the United States
jurisdiction of suits by and against
the Bank, and this provision is
warranted by the constitution,

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LEX LOCI.

1. The disposition of real property,
by deed or will, is subject to the
laws of the country where it is si-
tuated. Kerr v. Moon, 565
2. Where the devisor was entitled to

warrants for land in the Virginia
Military District in the State of
Ohio, under the laws and ordinan-
ces of Virginia, on account of his
military services, and made a will
in Kentucky, devising the lands,
which was duly proved and re-
gistered, according to the laws of
the State: Held, that although
the title to the land was merely
equitable, and that not to any
specific tract of land, it could not
pass, unless by a will proved and
registered according to the laws
of Ohio. Id.
565
3. Even admitting it to have been
personal property, a person claim-
ing under a will proved in one
State, cannot intermeddle with,
or sue for, the effects of a testator
in another State, unless the will
be proved in the latter State, or it
is permitted by some law of that
State. Id.

571

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1. Where a mortgagor comes to re-
deem, the Court of equity has,
by analogy to the statute of limi
tations, fixed upon 20 years as
the period, after forfeiture, and
possession taken by the mortgagee,
no interest having been paid in
the mean time, and no cireum-
stances appearing to account for
the neglect, beyond which a right
of redemption shall not be favour-
ed. Hughes v. Edwards,

489.497
2. Where the mortgagee brings his
bill of foreclosure, the mortgage
will, after the same length of
time, be presumed to have been
discharged, unless circumstances
can be shown to repel the pre-
sumption, as payment of interest,
a promise to pay, an acknowledg-
ment by the mortgagor that the
mortgage is still subsisting, and
the like. Id.
497, 498
3. A bonæ fidei purchaser under the
mortgagor, with actual notice of
the mortgage, or constructive no,
tice by means of a registry, can
only protect himself in equity by
the lapse of time, under the same
circumstances which would afford
a protection to the mortgagor. Id:

4. Letters testamentary give to an
executor no authority to sue for
the personal estate of his testator, See LOCAL LAW, 2, 3. 12, 13.

99

LOCAL LAW.

1. The act of Pennsylvania, of 1779,
"for vesting the estates of the
late proprietaries of Pennsylva-
nia, in this Commonwealth," did
not confiscate lands of the pro-
prietaries which were within the
lines of manors; nor were the
same confiscated by the act of
1781, for establishing a land of-
fice. Kirk v. Smith,
241
2. The statute of limitations of Peun-
sylvania, of 1705, is inapplicable
to an action of ejectment, brought
to enforce the unpaid purchase
money, for lands of the proprie-
taries within the manors, for which
warrants had issued. Id. 286
3. Nor is the statute of limitations of
1785, a bar to such an action.
Id.
299
4. The Vestry of the Episcopal
Church of Alexandria, now known
by the name of Christ's Church,
is the regular Vestry, in succes-
sion, of the parish of Fairfax, and,
in connexion with the Minister,
has the care and management of
all the temporalities of the parish
within the scope of their authori-
ty. A sale by them of the Church
lands, with the assent of the Min-
ister, under the former decree of
this Court, conveys a good title to
the purchaser.
Mason v. Mun-
caster,
445 454
5. The parishioners have, individual-
ly, no right or title to the glebe
lands; they are the property of
the parish in its aggregate or cor-
porate capacity, to be disposed of,
for parochial purposes, by the
Vestry, who are the legal agents
and representatives of the parish..
Id.
468
6. Under the reserve contained in
the session act of Virginia, and
under the acts of Congress of Au-
gust 10th, 1790, ch. 67. [xl.] and
of June 9th, 1794, ch. 238. [lxii.]

the whole country lying between
the Sciota and Little Miami ri-
vers, was subjected to the milita-
ry warrants, to satisfy which the
reserve was made. Doddridge v.
Thompson,
469
7. The territory lying between two
rivers is the whole country from
their sources to their mouths; and
if no branch of either of them has
acquired the name, exclusive of
another, the main branch, to its
source, must be considered as the
true river. Id.
473
8. The act of June 26th, 1812, ch.
432. [cis.] to ascertain the west-
ern boundary of the tract reserv-
ed for the military warrants, and
which provisionally designate
Ludlow's line as the western boun-
dary, did not invalidate the title to
land between that line and Ro-
bert's line, acquired under a Vir-
ginia military warrant, previous
to the passage of that act. Id.
478
9. The land between Ludlow's and
Robert's line was not withdrawn
from the territory liable to be sur-
veyed for military warrants, by
any act of Congress passed before
the act of June 26th, 1812, ch.
432. [cix.] Id.
480
10. The land law of Virginia, of 1779,

makes a pre-emption warrant su-
perior to a treasury warrant, when-
ever they interfere with each other,
unless the holder of the pre-emp-
tion warrant has forfeited that su-
periority, by failing to enter his
warrant with the surveyor of the
county, within twelve months af-
ter the end of the session at which
the land law was enacted; and on
that period having expired, and
being prolonged by successive acts,
during which time there was one
interval between the expiration of
the law and the act of revival, the
original right of the holder of the
pre-emption warrant was preser-

502

ved, notwithstanding that interval,
the entry of the holder of the trea-
sury warrant not having been
made during the same interval.
Stevens v. M'Cargo,
11. A question, under the registry acts
of Tennessee, whether a junior
conveyance registered, should take
precedence of a prior unregister-
ed deed: Held, that the registry

did not, under the circumstances,
vest the title against the elder
deed. Love v. Simms, 515
12. By the statute of limitations of
Tennessee, of 1797, a possession
of seven years is a protection, on-
ly when held under a grant, or un-
der mesne conveyances which con-
nect it with a grant.
Walker v.
Turner,
541
13. A Sheriff's deed, which is void for
want of jurisdiction in the Court
under whose judgment the sale
took place, is not such a convey-
ance as that a possession under it
will be protected by the statute of
limitations. Id.
545

14. Secondary evidence of the con-
tents of written instruments is not
admissible, when the originals are
within the control or custody of
the party and this rule of evi-
dence is not dispensed with by the
local statutes of Kentucky, which
provide that no person shall be
permitted to deny his signature,
as maker or assignor of a note, in
a suit against him, unless he will
make an affidavit denying the exe-
cution or assignment. These sta-
tutes do not dispense with proof
of the existence of the instrument,
or of the right of the party to hold
it by assignment. Sebree v. Dorr,

558

15. Under the following entry, "H. R.
enters 2000 acres in Kentucky,
by virtue of a warrant for milita-

16.

17.

18.

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In such a case, the entry could
be explained, and the survey su
ported, by oral testimony. The
notoriety and names of places may
be shown by such testimony, bu
the words of an entry are to '
the Court as any

construe

other written instrument. Id. 575
The acts of Assembly of North
Carolina, passed between the years
1783 and 1789, invalidate all en-
tries, surveys, and grants of land
within the Indian territory, which
now forms a part of the territory
of the State of Tennessee. But
they do not avoid entries cominen-
cing without the Indian boundary,
and running into it, so far as re-
spects that portion of the land
situate without their territory.
Danforth v. Wear,
673
The act of North Carolina, of
1784, authorizing the removing of
warrants which had been located
upon lands previously taken up,
so as to place them upon vacant
lands, did not repeal, by implica-
tion, the previously existing laws,
which prohibited surveys of land
within the Indian boundary. The
lands to which such removals are
made, must be lands previously
subjected to entry and survey. Id.

678

ry services performed by him in See CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTE, 13,
the last war, in the fork of the
first fork of Licking, running
VOL. IX.

14.

LEX LOCI

117

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payment of a promissory note is
demandable on the fourth day of
grace, in order to charge the en-
dorser, the declaration against the
endorser must lay the demand on
the fourth, and not on the third
day. Renner v. Bank of Colum-
bia,
581.594
3. Quære, Whether a declaration, in
such a case, not averring the local
usage, would be good upon de-
murrer? Id.

594
4. To admit secondary evidence of a
lost note, it is not necessary that
there should be a count in the de-
claration as upon a lost note. Id.

PRACTICE.

597

1. A certiorari, upon a suggestion of
diminution in the record, may be

made by the clerk, ang need not
be made by the Judge of the
Court below. Stewart v. Ingle,

526
2. Under the Judiciary Act of 1789,
ch. 20. s. 22. the security to be
taken from the plaintiff in error,
by the Judge signing a citation on
a writ of error, must be sufficient
to secure the whole amount of the
judgment, and is not to be con-
fined to such damages as the ap-
pellate Court may adjudge for the
delay. Catlett v. Brodte, 553
3. In ejectment, an amendment, so

as to enlarge the term laid in the
declaration, will be permitted, in
the discretion of the Court. Wal-
den v. Craig,
576
4. But a writ of error will not lie, in
a case where the Court below has
denied a motion for this purpose.
Id.
578
5. The discharge of the jury from
giving a verdict in a capital case,
without the consent of the pri-
soner, the jury being unable to
agree, is not a bar to a subsequent
trial for the same offence. Uni-
ted States v. Perez,

579
6. The Court is invested with the

discretionary authority of dis-
charging the jury from giving any
verdict, in cases of this nature,
whenever, in their opinion, there
is a manifest necessity for such
an act, or the ends of public jus-
tice would otherwise be defeated.
Id.
580
7. Under the 10th section of the Pa-
tent Act of the 21st of February,
1793, ch. 11. upon granting a
rule, by the Judge of the District
Court, upon the patentee, to show
cause why process should not
issue to repeal the patent, the pa-
tent is not repealed, de facto, by
making the rule absolute; but the
process to be awarded is in the

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