2. If the seizure is made on the high seas, or within the territory of a foreign power, the jurisdiction is conferred on the Court of the dis- trict where the property is carri- ed and proceeded against. Id.
3. A municipal seizure, within the territory of a foreign power, does not oust the jurisdiction of the Dis- trict Court, into whose district the property is brought for adju- dication. Id. 402, 403 4. Where Courts of equity have con- current jurisdiction with Courts of law, as in matters of fraud, if the cause has already been tried and determined by a Court of law, a Court of equity cannot take cognizance of it, unless there be the addition of some equitable circumstance to give jurisdiction. The Court, which first has pos- session of the subject, must deter- mine it conclusively. Smith r. McIver, 532, 534 5. T. such a case, some defect of tes- timony, or other disability, which a Court of law cannot remove, must be shown, as a ground for resorting to a Court of equity. Id. 6. An endorsee of a promissory note, who resides in a different State, may sue, in the Circuit Court, his immediate endorser, residing in the State in which the suit is brought, although that endorser be a resident of the same, State with the maker of the note. Mol- lan v. Torrance, 537 7. But where the suit is brought against a remote endorser, and the plaintiff, in his declaration, traces his title through an inter- mediate endorser, he must show that this intermediate endorser could have sustained his action in the Circuit Court. Id. 537 8. A plea to the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court, must show that
the parties were citizens of the same State, at the time the action was brought, and not merely at the time of the plea pleaded. The jurisdiction depends upon the state of things at the time of the action brought; and after it is once vested, it cannot be ousted by a subsequent change of resi- dence of either of the parties. Id. 539 9. Quære, As to the authority of this Court to interfere, by man- damus, in the case of the removal or suspension of an Attorney of the District and Circuit Courts. Ex parte Burr, 529 Whatever may be the authority of this Court in that respect, it will not be exercised, unless where the conduct of the Court below has been grossly irregular and unjust. Id. 530 In a regular complaint against an attorney, charges cannot be re- ceived and acted on, unless made on oath. But he may himself waive the preliminary of an affi- davit, and the Court may pro- ceed, at his instance, to investi- gate the charges upon testimony, which must be on oath, and regu- larly taken. Id. In replevin, if it be of goods dis- trained for rent, the amount for which avowry is made, is the va- lue of the matter in controversy; and if the writ be issued to try the title to property, it is in the na- ture of detinue, and the value of the article replevied is the value of the matter in controversy, so as to give jurisdiction to this Court upon a writ of error. Peyton r. Robertson, 527 13. The act incorporating the Bank of
the United States, gives the Cir- cuit Courts of the United States jurisdiction of suits by and against the Bank, and this provision is warranted by the constitution,
1. The disposition of real property, by deed or will, is subject to the laws of the country where it is si- tuated. Kerr v. Moon, 565 2. Where the devisor was entitled to
warrants for land in the Virginia Military District in the State of Ohio, under the laws and ordinan- ces of Virginia, on account of his military services, and made a will in Kentucky, devising the lands, which was duly proved and re- gistered, according to the laws of the State: Held, that although the title to the land was merely equitable, and that not to any specific tract of land, it could not pass, unless by a will proved and registered according to the laws of Ohio. Id. 565 3. Even admitting it to have been personal property, a person claim- ing under a will proved in one State, cannot intermeddle with, or sue for, the effects of a testator in another State, unless the will be proved in the latter State, or it is permitted by some law of that State. Id.
1. Where a mortgagor comes to re- deem, the Court of equity has, by analogy to the statute of limi tations, fixed upon 20 years as the period, after forfeiture, and possession taken by the mortgagee, no interest having been paid in the mean time, and no cireum- stances appearing to account for the neglect, beyond which a right of redemption shall not be favour- ed. Hughes v. Edwards,
489.497 2. Where the mortgagee brings his bill of foreclosure, the mortgage will, after the same length of time, be presumed to have been discharged, unless circumstances can be shown to repel the pre- sumption, as payment of interest, a promise to pay, an acknowledg- ment by the mortgagor that the mortgage is still subsisting, and the like. Id. 497, 498 3. A bonæ fidei purchaser under the mortgagor, with actual notice of the mortgage, or constructive no, tice by means of a registry, can only protect himself in equity by the lapse of time, under the same circumstances which would afford a protection to the mortgagor. Id:
4. Letters testamentary give to an executor no authority to sue for the personal estate of his testator, See LOCAL LAW, 2, 3. 12, 13.
1. The act of Pennsylvania, of 1779, "for vesting the estates of the late proprietaries of Pennsylva- nia, in this Commonwealth," did not confiscate lands of the pro- prietaries which were within the lines of manors; nor were the same confiscated by the act of 1781, for establishing a land of- fice. Kirk v. Smith, 241 2. The statute of limitations of Peun- sylvania, of 1705, is inapplicable to an action of ejectment, brought to enforce the unpaid purchase money, for lands of the proprie- taries within the manors, for which warrants had issued. Id. 286 3. Nor is the statute of limitations of 1785, a bar to such an action. Id. 299 4. The Vestry of the Episcopal Church of Alexandria, now known by the name of Christ's Church, is the regular Vestry, in succes- sion, of the parish of Fairfax, and, in connexion with the Minister, has the care and management of all the temporalities of the parish within the scope of their authori- ty. A sale by them of the Church lands, with the assent of the Min- ister, under the former decree of this Court, conveys a good title to the purchaser. Mason v. Mun- caster, 445 454 5. The parishioners have, individual- ly, no right or title to the glebe lands; they are the property of the parish in its aggregate or cor- porate capacity, to be disposed of, for parochial purposes, by the Vestry, who are the legal agents and representatives of the parish.. Id. 468 6. Under the reserve contained in the session act of Virginia, and under the acts of Congress of Au- gust 10th, 1790, ch. 67. [xl.] and of June 9th, 1794, ch. 238. [lxii.]
the whole country lying between the Sciota and Little Miami ri- vers, was subjected to the milita- ry warrants, to satisfy which the reserve was made. Doddridge v. Thompson, 469 7. The territory lying between two rivers is the whole country from their sources to their mouths; and if no branch of either of them has acquired the name, exclusive of another, the main branch, to its source, must be considered as the true river. Id. 473 8. The act of June 26th, 1812, ch. 432. [cis.] to ascertain the west- ern boundary of the tract reserv- ed for the military warrants, and which provisionally designate Ludlow's line as the western boun- dary, did not invalidate the title to land between that line and Ro- bert's line, acquired under a Vir- ginia military warrant, previous to the passage of that act. Id. 478 9. The land between Ludlow's and Robert's line was not withdrawn from the territory liable to be sur- veyed for military warrants, by any act of Congress passed before the act of June 26th, 1812, ch. 432. [cix.] Id. 480 10. The land law of Virginia, of 1779,
makes a pre-emption warrant su- perior to a treasury warrant, when- ever they interfere with each other, unless the holder of the pre-emp- tion warrant has forfeited that su- periority, by failing to enter his warrant with the surveyor of the county, within twelve months af- ter the end of the session at which the land law was enacted; and on that period having expired, and being prolonged by successive acts, during which time there was one interval between the expiration of the law and the act of revival, the original right of the holder of the pre-emption warrant was preser-
ved, notwithstanding that interval, the entry of the holder of the trea- sury warrant not having been made during the same interval. Stevens v. M'Cargo, 11. A question, under the registry acts of Tennessee, whether a junior conveyance registered, should take precedence of a prior unregister- ed deed: Held, that the registry
did not, under the circumstances, vest the title against the elder deed. Love v. Simms, 515 12. By the statute of limitations of Tennessee, of 1797, a possession of seven years is a protection, on- ly when held under a grant, or un- der mesne conveyances which con- nect it with a grant. Walker v. Turner, 541 13. A Sheriff's deed, which is void for want of jurisdiction in the Court under whose judgment the sale took place, is not such a convey- ance as that a possession under it will be protected by the statute of limitations. Id. 545
14. Secondary evidence of the con- tents of written instruments is not admissible, when the originals are within the control or custody of the party and this rule of evi- dence is not dispensed with by the local statutes of Kentucky, which provide that no person shall be permitted to deny his signature, as maker or assignor of a note, in a suit against him, unless he will make an affidavit denying the exe- cution or assignment. These sta- tutes do not dispense with proof of the existence of the instrument, or of the right of the party to hold it by assignment. Sebree v. Dorr,
15. Under the following entry, "H. R. enters 2000 acres in Kentucky, by virtue of a warrant for milita-
In such a case, the entry could be explained, and the survey su ported, by oral testimony. The notoriety and names of places may be shown by such testimony, bu the words of an entry are to ' the Court as any
other written instrument. Id. 575 The acts of Assembly of North Carolina, passed between the years 1783 and 1789, invalidate all en- tries, surveys, and grants of land within the Indian territory, which now forms a part of the territory of the State of Tennessee. But they do not avoid entries cominen- cing without the Indian boundary, and running into it, so far as re- spects that portion of the land situate without their territory. Danforth v. Wear, 673 The act of North Carolina, of 1784, authorizing the removing of warrants which had been located upon lands previously taken up, so as to place them upon vacant lands, did not repeal, by implica- tion, the previously existing laws, which prohibited surveys of land within the Indian boundary. The lands to which such removals are made, must be lands previously subjected to entry and survey. Id.
ry services performed by him in See CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTE, 13, the last war, in the fork of the first fork of Licking, running VOL. IX.
payment of a promissory note is demandable on the fourth day of grace, in order to charge the en- dorser, the declaration against the endorser must lay the demand on the fourth, and not on the third day. Renner v. Bank of Colum- bia, 581.594 3. Quære, Whether a declaration, in such a case, not averring the local usage, would be good upon de- murrer? Id.
594 4. To admit secondary evidence of a lost note, it is not necessary that there should be a count in the de- claration as upon a lost note. Id.
1. A certiorari, upon a suggestion of diminution in the record, may be
made by the clerk, ang need not be made by the Judge of the Court below. Stewart v. Ingle,
526 2. Under the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20. s. 22. the security to be taken from the plaintiff in error, by the Judge signing a citation on a writ of error, must be sufficient to secure the whole amount of the judgment, and is not to be con- fined to such damages as the ap- pellate Court may adjudge for the delay. Catlett v. Brodte, 553 3. In ejectment, an amendment, so
as to enlarge the term laid in the declaration, will be permitted, in the discretion of the Court. Wal- den v. Craig, 576 4. But a writ of error will not lie, in a case where the Court below has denied a motion for this purpose. Id. 578 5. The discharge of the jury from giving a verdict in a capital case, without the consent of the pri- soner, the jury being unable to agree, is not a bar to a subsequent trial for the same offence. Uni- ted States v. Perez,
579 6. The Court is invested with the
discretionary authority of dis- charging the jury from giving any verdict, in cases of this nature, whenever, in their opinion, there is a manifest necessity for such an act, or the ends of public jus- tice would otherwise be defeated. Id. 580 7. Under the 10th section of the Pa- tent Act of the 21st of February, 1793, ch. 11. upon granting a rule, by the Judge of the District Court, upon the patentee, to show cause why process should not issue to repeal the patent, the pa- tent is not repealed, de facto, by making the rule absolute; but the process to be awarded is in the
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