there is no statutory maximum on the size of the Reserves, and incentives are offered to induce persons to remain in the Reserves after the 8-year period of obligated service. Eventually a very large percentage of all able-bodied men under 30 years of age and a large number of older men will be members of the Reserve force.

It must be borne in mind that members of the military reserves will have dual characteristics; they will have military skills acquired in their military service and they will have, in addition, civilian skills acquired through training and experience. Both types of skills may be urgently needed simultaneously by the Armed Forces and by essential defense-supporting activities. How these requirements are reconciled will vitally affect our national strength at a time in which maximum strength may be essential to our survival.

Establishment of this policy would in no way impede the rapid and efficient call-up of reserves for military duty. Less than 10 percent of the reservists will possess technical skills of such importance to defense-supporting activities that their recall should be given special consideration. This relatively small number of reservists, however, will in many cases be of far greater service creating the weapons of war than in using them. Scientists and engineers are vivid examples of individuals whose essential contribution to national security in civilian life is often far greater than it could possibly be in the Armed Forces. While reservists have a particular responsibility for defending the Nation against attack, it would be extremely unwise to insist that the responsibility in every case be discharged as a member of the Armed Forces. A time of national emergency, more than any other time, demands that each individual serve in the capacity in which he can make the greatest contribution to the common security.

MANPOWER SELECTIVITY NEEDED IN MODERN WARFARE

The National Manpower Mobilization Policy recommended by the National Security Council and approved by the President on January 17, 1951, declares that in modern warfare adequate manpower for the Armed Forces, war production and essential civilian activities must be regarded as "integral parts of a balanced program." Otherwise, the military effort may fail through lack of effective industrial support. Decisions as to where men's skills can best serve the Nation in time of peril requires intelligent consideration of both military and industrial requirements.

Our national policy has been to follow the principle of selectivity in manpower mobilization; World War II experience proved that service in the Armed Forces is not in every case more essential than service elsewhere. Since our military reserves were very small at the beginning of World War II, and the bulk of our military manpower was inducted directly from civilian life, this principle was given effect through the Selective Service System. With the shift to large military reserves subject to call-up by the armed services, it is important that the principle of selectivity which has served this Nation so well in the past be preserved.

It has further been our national policy that the decision as to where each individual can serve most effectively should take full account of the needs of the Armed Forces, defense production and essential civilian activities. Objective consideration of military and industrial

needs for professional and highly skilled manpower can be achieved only though participation of both civilian and military manpower agencies in development and application of reserve call-up policies.

RESERVISTS RECALL BOARD WITH MILITARY AND CIVILIAN MEMBERSHIP

This would probably require the establishment of a Board within the Department of Defense upon which both military and civilian manpower agencies are represented, with provisions for consultation by groups having special competence in the various branches of specialized manpower.

H. R. 5426 as now written makes no provision for postponement of recall of reservists on occupational or other grounds. The absence of such a provision in the law would make necessary continuation of the makeshift machinery for handling this problem which has been employed by the several branches of the Armed Forces since Korea. Whatever the machinery which might be determined to be the most effective, it is essential that there be objective consideration of the needs of both the Armed Forces and industry, and intelligent allocation of specialized manpower to meet the needs of both. Our goal in the development of all manpower policies and programs is the realization of our maximum national strength. Just as we cannot afford to sacrifice military manpower requirements to industrial needs, we cannot afford to give military requirements an overriding claim on manpower having critical skills.

In summary, under UMTS the Reserve forces will include a large segment of the manpower needed to meet both military and industrial requirements. A proper balance between these competing requirements necessitates the application of the selective principle to members of the Reserve as well as to all other elements of the Nation's manpower. Sound administration requires further that the determination of where reservists having critical skills can best serve the national security be shared by both military and civilian manpower agencies.

I strongly urge that the Congress incorporate in the legislation under consideration the principle of selectivity in the recall of reservists and provide the machinery necessary to insure the objective application of this principle in order that each individual may make his maximum contribution to the total strength of the Nation.

Senator LONG. Mr. Secretary, I am in accord with the general tenor of your statement here.

USE OF MEN WITH CRITICAL SKILLS

It has distressed some of us when we found a person of a very critical skill, and attempted to have that person deferred for a while because he was badly needed, only to find that on occasion he got no consideration, and then found that person being used in something where no skill was necessary.

For example, a very well-qualified petroleum engineer some time back asked me to intervene in his behalf-at least his employer wanted it done and I found that although his skill was described as being absolutely of an imperative nature, in short order he was taken overseas and not assigned to any combat unit or any unit that needed an

engineer but, I understand, he headed a reception committee to show visitors around. Almost anyone could have done that. It did not require a skilled technician to do it, but to show someone the sights of Japan, and that sort of thing.

We do not mind technicians taken if they are actually needed for the tasks that they are taken for.

I was told a short time ago that some highly competent man was taken from an essential calling, and then found that he was assigned to distributing golf clubs at an officers' golf course, and that sort of thing. That is the type of thing I believe we should strive to avoid.

SHOULD WE USE SAME RECALL STANDARDS IN READY AND STANDBY RESERVE?

However, there is a feeling on behalf of many that the Ready Reserve should be a group that is available to go on short notice, and that if they are not ready to be sent, they should not be in the Ready Reserve. Do you feel that the same principle should apply to the Ready Reserve that would apply to the Standby Reserve?

Secretary TOBIN. I hope that in determining the Ready Reserve that you will not find a man with a critical skill in the Ready Reserve unless in the Ready Reserve it was intended that his highest skill should be used, and that it was needed by the military. I think the same principle should apply there.

For example, we have, from the best figures available, the information that Russia is now turning out more engineers than we are per year. They are turning out about 30,000.

We have had a decline in the number of engineers, and the lowest year in recent years will be 1954, when we will turn out only 17,000, so that we are going to have a critical shortage of engineers.

We should make sure that every trained engineer is used in his particular field, either in the civilian service or in the military. If the military needs the man, they should get him, but he should be used as an engineer. If there is a desperate need for him in civilian life. that factor ought to be weighed. That is why I feel that there should be a board within the framework of the Military Establishment for this selective process which would involve no more than 10 percent of all your reservists who would come into this highly skilled category. The boards should be of equal balance, civilian and military, and should be within the Military Establishment itself to lay down policy, and probably act as a board of appeals.

RECALL BOARD WITHIN FRAMEWORK OF MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT

Senator LONG. Have you given any thought to the proposal that the selective service group should operate through their local boards to determine who will be called and in what order the reservists would be called up?

Secretary TOBIN. Well, the reservists are properly the property of the Military Establishment, and you then would be placing an agency between the Secretary of Defense and the President, and probably it would be better to have the set-up within the framework of the military department, with representation from the civilian agencies and, I think, in that way you would get proper consideration and intelligent, sound allocation of your skilled people to the civilian and to your military needs.

Senator LONG. In other words, you feel that the best answer is to have civilian representation within the military?

Secretary TOBIN. That is right; and with a balanced board, with equal power for policy making in the civilian members you should keep in mind that 90 percent of these cases will go through without any reference to such a board. They would not come within the framework of the policy. It would be the remaining 10 percent of the people with high skills.

Senator LONG. I notice that you gave us some figures, that it was estimated that there would be 2 million men available for entry into the Reserves in 1953, and that there would be a steady increase until 1960; there would be 42 million men available to the Reserve. Was that based on an assumption that universal military training would become law?

Secretary TOBIN. Well, your intake at the present time would result in that number of men.

Senator LONG. Do you have any other specific recommendations to make with regard to this problem, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary TOBIN. No; I have not, Mr. Chairman. I think that covers it; and I cannot impress upon you too strongly the importance of having a balanced approach to the utilization of these people with high skills in their occupations, and where they can best serve the country.

Senator LONG. The testimony of the American Federation of Labor and the CIO before this committee was in favor of selective service boards screening those reservists who are called up. Now, the suggestion that there be civilian representation within the military was not proposed to them at that time, so we have no way of knowing their views on that.

I assume that it might be just as appealing to them, but I am curious to know what their views would be on that subject.

Secretary TOBIN. Well, I think a board with a power to make this policy within the framework of the Military Establishment would probably be a very effective machine.

Senator LONG. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. I know you have many responsibilities, and we will excuse you at this time. Secretary TOBIN. Thank you, sir.

Senator LONG. Our next witness is General Hershey.

General, it is certainly a pleasure to have you with us again today. General HERSHEY. Thank you, sir.

Senator LONG. Do you have a prepared statement?

General HERSHEY. I have a prepared statement; yes, sir.

Senator LONG. Fine. Suppose you proceed just as you desire.

STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. LEWIS B. HERSHEY, DIRECTOR, SELECTIVE SERVICE

NATURE OF THE PROBLEM WE ARE FACING

General HERSHEY. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, the purpose of H. R. 5426 is to provide trained units and qualified individuals which will be available when necessary to supplement the Regular components of the Armed Forces of the United States.

It is impossible to consider the problems of the Reserve components separately. They are an indivisible portion of the entire problem of national security which, in turn, exists for the purpose of providing reasonable hope of national survival and, in the case of the majority of our citizens, of individual survival.

Some basic assumptions must be made in any survey. I have assumed that we, as a Nation, are in jeopardy; that the danger is great enough in size and in duration to make a quick and simple solution impossible. It is further assumed that to contain the danger and prevent its spread is a project which will require a great deal of effort over an indefinite period of time.

NUMBERS OF RESERVES READY TO SERVE

The magnitude of the forces required to accomplish this purpose in maintaining the precarious status we now occupy I shall not attempt to discuss. It is pertinent for this survey to note that the numbers of reserves who are ready to serve at any given time will vitally affect the numbers which must be maintained on active duty. In this connection, we are confronted with the unfortunate fact that the nature our our present emergency is expensive in the use of manpower due to the system of rotation made inevitable by the long duration of the period of stress.

The individuals returning from the 24-months' period of service can and must be used as members of our Reserve components. Yet the very fact that they have been recently on active duty will tend to prevent any recall short of an emergency which requires the maximum effort. This situation, in terms of the present, makes difficult the formation and maintenance of Reserve forces which are trained and yet have not been used for the purpose of meeting the situation in which we now find ourselves.

It is an uncomfortable fact that the Reserve forces we are building by inducting or enlisting men for certain periods of active service, followed by additional time in the Reserves, provide a Reserve force available only in the circumstances we should be using a Reserve force to avoid. Any system which is to be established and maintained must take into account the limiting factors provided by the men available for all types of military service and the financial means which can be made available to support the entire defense force.

RESTRICTED SUPPLY OF MEN

The supply of men is restricted by an unusual number of factors. The Nation in 1945 completed a mobilization which had involved a large majority of men between 18 and 38. The nature of the emergency makes the compulsory use of any of these individuals most controversial. The term of service of 24 months will absorb all available manpower as the men reach military age if forces between 3 and 4 million are to be maintained on active duty.

Senator LONG. That is a rather profound statement that you made that the Reserve force we are making available here is the type that should be used only in the situation that we seek to avoid.

General HERSHEY. That is right.