It probably would be profitable at this time to discuss the whole concept of the so-called Ready Reserve and Stand-by Reserve which this bill would bring into being if it is enacted, and even thoughts of the Department of the Army to further divide the Ready Reserve into an early Ready Reserve and later Ready Reserve, but it is believed that to do so would only serve to further confuse the issue when it is already sufficiently confused; and, furthermore, it is believed that the committee is thoroughly conversant with this phase of the bill. The National Guard Association submits that merely calling a reserve a Ready Reserve will not make it ready, and that there is no point whatever in establishing a Stand-by Reserve. The bill contemplates that the Ready and Stand-by Reserve will be identical in that they will consist of both individuals and units and will only differ as to vulnerability for active Federal service. If, however, a Stand-by Reserve should be established, then thought should be given to the idea that it should consist of individuals only, and that in the event of an emergency or state of war declared by the Congress, they should be integrated into the Armed Forces by a process of selectivity by the Selective Service System, to the end that there be maintained some semblance of balance necessary to maintain not only the strength of the Armed Forces but to meet the needs of the civilian economy.

DIFFICULT FOR GUARD TO MAINTAIN AUTHORIZED STRENGTH

It is desired at this point to invite the attention of the committee to the fact that because of a variety of circumstances the Army and Air National Guard are finding it extremely difficult to maintain the strength authorized by Congress and in spite of most intensive recruiting efforts are fighting a losing battle. Unless this situation is remedied in some manner by the Congres, the position of the Army and Air National Guard will become more and more untenable, and this bill does nothing to remedy that situation. We are told that notwithstanding the provisions of Public Law 51, Eigthy-second Congress, with its restrictions and all, there are more men now available than under the provisions of the Selective Service Act of 1948, and that our inability to obtain the required number to maintain our authorized strength is due to circumstances. Whether it is due to law or to circumstances, the fact remains that the guard is fighting a losing battle in the matter of maintainng its strength, and that the application of some remedy by Congress is imperative if the Congress is to subscribe to its own policy pertaining to the integrity of the National Guard and the maintenance of its units. The remedy would lie in striking out the date of February 1, 1951, in Public Law 51, . Eighty-second Congress.

ACTION ON RESERVE BILL SHOULD BE DEFERRED UNTIL EIGHTY-THIRD

CONGRESS

There is much more that could be said concerning the provisions of this proposed measure, but I do not desire to further impose on the time of the committee and prefer that as much time as possible be given to General Reckord for his presentation. Some thought might well be given to the so-called Reserve Officers Personnel Act and the so-called equalization of benefits bill which, initially, were to

be a part of this measure but are now contained in separate measures, but which, nevertheless, should be considered simultaneously with H. R. 5426. Because of the foregoing and the further evidence which General Reckord will present, the several States, Territories, District of Columbia, the Army National Guard, the Air National Guard, the National Guard Association, and the Adjutants General Association of the United States earnestly recommends to your committee that action on this proposed Armed Forces Reserve Act be deferred until the convening of the Eighty-third Congress, in order to afford further time for study and consideration of the three important measures which I have mentioned, and base this recommendation, among other things, on the fact that the nonestablishment of a system of universal military training and service has so completely changed the situation that a complete reexamination of the entire matter is in order.

And, Mr. Chairman, I have been requested and instructed by the States, Territories, District of Columbia, the Army National Guard, the Air National Guard, and the two associations, the National Guard Association and, the Adjutants General Association to express to you and the committee our profound appreciation for being afforded this opportunity of appearing and expressing our views in connection with this very important matter.

Senator LONG. General Walsh, you have given some very illuminating testimony here today.

As chairman of this subcommittee I have given considerable thought to that same question as to whether we should attempt at all to pass a Reserve Act at this time. The most persuasive reason that has occurred to me for having a Reserve bill at this time has been that it is not a matter of comparing what we would have under this bill as -compared to what we would have if we had the opportunity to work out what we needed and wanted, but comparing what we have to what we would have if this bill becomes law.

Of course, this does not preclude further legislation.

General WALSH. No.

Senator LONG. Your statement here is addressed to some of the problems that would arise in the event a Korean type of emergency broke out again. Of course, under the present law we would not be any better off than under this bill as far as I can see.

It does seem to me in some measure that it would improve the situation. I just wonder what your comment on that is.

General WALSH. I do not think there is any question about it, Senator. We certainly cannot go on indefinitely or continuously working on the basis that you are going to put the veteran in jeopardy while hundreds of thousands of others do nothing.

Now, I have no desire to start an argument here with reference to universal military training and service. We have always supported it and we know of no other way-in answer to your question of how we are going to bring trained men into the various Reserve groups to the end that they will be ready much sooner than otherwise would be the case.

On the other hand, if we retain the volunteer system and as we had it, and you are only permitted by Congress to be maintained at half strength, obviously when the chips are down, the selective service has to fill up those units by another 50 percent in order to bring them

up to 100 percent and thus it is that that 50 percent brought in by selective service, being throughly untrained, has to be trained and that takes anywhere from 6 to 9 months.

Then, you get the second situation that has happened now in connection with Korea. Among other things, the Department of the Army ordered into the active military service eight infantry divisions of the Guard, all of which were maintained at about half strength, which was the authorized strength.

In addition to being filled up with filler replacements from selective service, roughly, about 8,500 in each division, there was also taken out of those divisions an average of 6,000 trained men-the men that went in for rotation and replacements in Korea.

Well, it certainly must be disheartening to a field commander and it must have a most adverse effect on esprit and morale when, on the one hand, they see themselves filled up with untrained men, knowing it is going to take 6 to 9 months to train them, but even more disheartening when they see their 6,000 trained men being taken out for rotation and replacement.

Senator LONG. It would seem that insofar as possible the National Guard units should be kept together. That is the understanding the men have when they sign up in the National Guard-that they are going to fight with units from their own State and areas—and it would seem to me that that expectation should be fulfilled as much as possible.

UMT AS A SOURCE OF RESERVE MANPOWER

General WALSH. Now, I am not being critical and, as I say, I have no desire to start the argument all over again, but it seems so clear that if you had universal military training and service, you would have some 700,000 or 800,000 a year who would receive their basic training, and if the Congress made the proper provisions you could first fill up your Reserves from it, but since the Reserve elements will probably never exceed in strength about 1,000,000 men-what is called a Ready Reserve under this bill-you would still have a vast reservoir that can go into a pool-call it what you will-and that pool could be used to fill up our strength if it were not maintained up to war strength and, besides, would provide replacements when the casualties start. We do not have that.

Senator LONG. Of course, I am not unfamiliar with the practical problems involved. I have appeared on network programs in the past urging universal military training and service, and I have received favorable mail and unfavorable mail.

The impression I have gained is that, although the majority of the people agree that we should have universal military training, their agreement is more or less passive, while some mother or in some instances a father who has an 18-year-old boy would disagree in a very violent way, with the result that they tend to be much more vociferous-and they have much more memory, as far as resentment is concerned, than the proponents.

Now, there are many people who oppose universal military training, and we might as well face it, and that has been the majority in the House of Representatives, who urge in the alternative that we should continue selective service as it is necessary.

Now, that does present the probability of filling your Reserves with men who have not been called upon to actually step on the field of battle against an enemy previously.

WILL MEN JOIN GUARD RATHER THAN BE DRAFTED?

It does also present a possibility of encouraging additional young men to join the National Guard as an alternative rather than going into the ordinary units of selective-service training.

Can you give any thoughts to the possibility of using that method to acquire sufficient reservists so we will not have a repetition of what happened when the reservists were called up unexpectedly in the Korean emergency?

General WALSH. We have, of course, stood fast on the proposition, Mr. Chairman, that if there was a system of universal military training and service, that it will operate simultaneously with the Selective Service System, because in our opinion that is the only agency that is in the position with the necessary set-up and know-how to funnel these men into the Reserve components; and that irrespective of what system may come to be in the future if there is to be any compulsion with reference to that system, I mean that you are going to arbitrarily place men in various Reserve components, then in our opinion that should be done by selective service to the end that you will have some process of selectivity.

AGES OF UNION AND CONFEDERATE SOLDIERS

Now, for the life of me, I have never been able to understand this agitation about taking these youngsters in the 17- or 18-year bracket or even the 19-year-old bracket.

I would like to submit some statistics here, Senator, which I think will prove extremely interesting.

As the gentlemen assembled here will recall, we fought a war in this country many years ago. Sometimes they call it the Civil War and sometimes they call it the War Between the States and sometimes they call it the war between the North and the South.

Now, there cannot be any argument about these statistics because they were taken from the Congressional Record, volume 55, part 2, Sixty-fifth Congress, page 1131, under date of April 25, 1917. This is the official record of the Adjutant General of the Army, and it applied only to the Northern Army, and they show the ages of the men who fought that war-if you want to call them "men."

Those 10 years and under, 25; those 11 years and under, 38; those 12 years and under, 225; those 13 years and under, 300; those 14 years and under, 1,523; those 15 years and under, 104,987; those 16 years and under, 231,051; those 17 years and under, 844,891; those 18 years and under, 1,151,438; those 21 years and under, 2,159,798; those 22 years and over, 618,511; those 25 years and over, 46,626; those 44 years and over, 16.071.

Senator LONG. May I see those statistics?

General WALSH. Yes. Now, it is regrettable that there are no statistics available for the Armies of the Confederacy, but I would hazard the guess, Senator, that in the Army of the Confederacy the ages were even younger.

Senator LONG. We had testimony from the Universal Military Training Commission, and they presented statistics showing that the average was 1 year younger in the Confererate Army than in the Northern Army. I believe their figures were that the average age of the soldier in the Northern Army was 19 and the average age of the soldier in the Southern Army was 18 at the close of the war.

But, these figures that you give here show that there were three times as many men 15 years and under as there were over 25. General WALSH. Yes.

Senator LONG. At that time.

General WALSH. Well, that certainly can leave no doubt, Mr. Chairman, in the minds of anybody that that war was fought on both sides by boys, not by men as is commonly understood.

Senator LONG. According to your statistics, I see that there were more men 17 years and younger than there were 22 years and over. General WALSH. Yes, sir. And, as I say, those were taken from the Congressional Record.

Now, if you please, Mr. Chairman, I will defer now or yield to General Reckord.

Senator LONG. It does seem that we must find some way other than a voluntary means of obtaining trained reservists or a trained National Guard.

If we are going to expect a voluntary system to supply men, I believe we are going to be disappointed because Americans feel that fighting a war is a cruel necessity that they are willing to face on the basis of equality of sacrifice, but there are very few men that feel they should volunteer and be sent around the world to fight in a war while other men at the same time are enjoying themselves back home.

General WALSH. Colonel Stevenson, as you know, has been cited as a witness here this morning from New York, and I believe from the meaning of these charts which he has prepared and which are over there [indicating], that he will give you the outline of the plan in line with the observation which you have just made, Senator Long.

Senator LONG. If we are going to have any approach to equality, there must be some compulsion to it. I see no way you could avoid that.

Very well, General Reckord, we will be very pleased to hear your views on this subject now.

STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. MILTON A. RECKORD, THE ADJUTANT GENERAL OF MARYLAND, CHAIRMAN OF THE LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEES OF THE NATIONAL GUARD ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE ADJUTANTS GENERAL ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES

General RECKORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Walsh, president of the National Guard Association of the United States, has indicated the three principal reasons for the opposition of the National Guard to this legislation as now under consideration, these three principal reasons for our opposition to the bill being: (1) That this measure was killed in the House; (2) that the bill places in double jeopardy all reservists who serve; and (3) the bill as written is one more attempt to federalize the National Guard.