SELECTIVE SERVICE DIRECTORS AND STAFFS Col. Donald A. MacGrath, deputy State director of selective service, New Jersey Lt. Col. J. L. Brause, chief medical director, District of Columbia selective service system Brig. Gen. S. H. Mitchell, adjutant general of Montana Brig. Gen. George M. Carter, adjutant general and director of selective service, Maine Col. L. E. Lilygren, director of selective service, Minnesota Lt Col. Leo W. Davis, chief, manpower division, selective service, Louisiana Brig. Gen. John E. Walsh, adjutant general and director of selective service, Col. Francis H. Mason, headquarters, selective service, Oregon Brig. Gen. R. L. Esmay, adjutant general and director of selective service, Wyoming Brig. Gen. James May, adjutant general, Nevada Brig. Gen. Charles R. Fox, adjutant general and director of selective service, West Virginia Col. John P. McFarland, assistant adjutant general, New Mexico Col. Robert E. White, deputy director of selective service, Delaware Maj. William J. Hatcher, chief, manpower division, selective service headquarters, Georgia Col. J. T. Johnson, Jr., director of selective service, Alabama Col. Howard E. Reed, director of selective service, Colorado Brig. Gen. H. L. Edwards, adjutant general and director of selective service, North Dakota Brig. Gen. Ernest Novey, director of selective service, Connecticut Col. Henry C. Stanwood, director of selective service, Maryland Lt. Col. Arthur A. Holmes, director of selective service, Michigan Brig. Gen. Guy N. Henninger, adjutant General and director of selective service, Nebraska Brig. Gen. Theodore Arndt, adjutant General and director of selective service, South Dakota Brig. Gen. Robinson Hitchcock, adjutant General and director of selective service, Indiana General WALSH. Mr. Chairman, with your permission, I will proceed. I have prepared a rather brief statement and by giving this statement which is essentially an oultine of what would be said, I believe we can conserve the time of the subcommittee. Senator LONG. We hope to expedite these hearings just as much as possible, General Walsh, feeling that unless these hearings are concluded at a very early date it will be impossible to have any consideration of this legislation during this Congress. That is the reason we are asking everyone to make their statements as brief as possible. BACKGROUND OF PRESENT BILL General WALSH. In January of 1951, the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee directed the Secretary of Defense to submit to the Congress, on or before March 1, 1951, a bill relating to the Reserve components of the Armed Forces which would have for its over-all purpose the establishment and maintenance of a more effective Reserve system, and which, in the opinion of reservists and others, was long overdue. The task of preparing such a measure was delegated to the Reserve Forces Policy Board in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. At the time this was done the Reserve organizations were afforded an opportunity then and subsequently to appear before the Board and express their views as to just what the proposed measure should contain. Before such a bill could be drafted, it would be necessary to promulgate over-all policies relating to the Reserve components. This naturally required time, and it was not until April 6, 1951, that the Department of Defense policies relating to the Reserve forces were approved by the Secretary of Defense, and then the Board took up, in earnest, the preparation of a proposed Armed Forces Reserve Act. It was not until June 29, 1951, that a bill, H. R. 4667, to implement these policies was introduced in the House of Representatives, known as the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1951. During the time the Board was engaged in preparing this measure, the several Reserve organizations met with the Board and its working staff from time to time for the purpose of expressing their views relative to the proposed measure. At that time, and subsequently, the National Guard Association took the position that it did not desire any radical changes where the Army and Air National Guard were concerned and advised the Board that these components were well satisfied with the existing laws and policies, namely, the National Defense Act of 1916, as amended, the approved War Department policies of October 13, 1945, affecting the National Guard of the United States, and the congressional statements of policy of 1940 and 1948 by which they were governed, and as a result of which the Guard had prospered immeasurably, greatly increased in size and stature, and had become a most effective instrumentality in the national defense system as disclosed by the performance of the Guard in two world wars. In support of this position, the National Guard Association, as the authorized representative of the Army and Air National Guard, pointed out that after the cessation of hostilities incident to World War II, and notably during the period July 1, 1946, to June 30, 1949, the States, Territories, and the District of Columbia had, starting from zero, brought into being an Army and Air National Guard of 399,500, the maximum strength authorized by Congress, and all of which was organized into tactical units. The Army National Guard at that time consisted of 6,000 units contained in 25 infantry divisions, 2 armored divisions, 21 regimental combat teams and several thousand combat and service-support type units with an aggregate strength of 350,000— the precise strength authorized by Congress. The Air National Guard consisted of 27 combat wings and supporting elements, 84 light bombardment and fighter squadrons and 12 aircraft control and warning groups with an aggregate strength of 49,500-the precise strength authorized by Congress. All of this was done on a purely voluntary basis without aid or assistance from the Federal Government in the matter of recruitment or providing of housing, including armories. Currently in excess of one-third of the Army National Guard and approximately 90 percent of the Air National Guard are in the active military service of the United States as a result of the conflict in Korea. Senator LONG. Could I ask you at this point, General Walsh, if you have any understanding of the readiness of those forces in the event they are called up? How long would it take to have them ready, that is to operate in the field? General WALSH. Well, course, there we get into a realm that is speculative. I am covering that in a moment, Senator. Senator LONG. Very well, I will wait until you get to that in your statement. General WALSH. And if I don't, I will then answer your question. Senator LONG. All right. General WALSH. Since the Department of Defense had received a directive from a congressional committee to submit to the Congress what is now known as the Armed Forces Reserve Act, the Department had no choice but to proceed with the preparation of a bill and, as has been indicated, such a bill, H. R. 4667, was introduced in the House of Representatives on June 29, 1951, and hearings opened in connection with this bill shortly thereafter. The bill prepared by the Department of Defense was drafted too hurriedly and found to be so unsatisfactory that it had to be amended very generally, and, all told, approximately 150 amendments were submitted by the Reserve organizations and others and adopted by the committee. The original bill, H. R. 1667, was superseded by H. R. 4860, which was in turn superseded by H. R. 5277, and finally by H. R. 5426, which bill passed the House on October 15, 1951. The amendments which were proposed, and notably those proposed by the National Guard Association to the number of 97, of which 96 were accepted and adopted, were in the main drafted under duress and strain, and although many weeks were spent in doing so, yet, nevertheless, they could not be always properly evaluated as to their effect, and no doubt left much to be desired. Since the passage of the bill last October, it has been possible for the National Guard Association to further study the provisions of the bill and determine just what the ultimate effect will be where the Army and Air National Guard are concerned. As the committee will note from committee print No. 4 to H. R. 5426, many additional amendments have been proposed, and it would require more time than has been available to determine their precise effect. It is not my intention, in this presentation, to deal with any of the specific provisions of the bill, controversial, unsatisfactory and detrimental as they may be in respect to the Army and Air National Guard. The National Guard Association, however, deems it to be highly advisable that some of these sections be discussed for the benefit of the committee. This phase of our testimony will be submitted by Maj. Gen. Milton A. Reckord, the adjutant general of the State of Maryland and chairman of the Committee on Legislation of the National Guard Association and the Adjutants General Association of the United States, and who is a recognized authority on military law, military policy, and military legislation pertaining to the Reserve components of the Army and the Air Force, and notably the Army and Air National Guard. I might add that General Reckord who was then the provost marshal general of the European theater, was brought back by General Marshall as the over-all chairman of the General Staff Committee which drafted the provisions which later became the approved War Department policies of October 13, 1945, affecting the National Guard of the United States and the Organized Reserve Corps, and which policies were approved by General Marshall, while still Chief of Staff of the Army, and subsequently approved by General Eisenhower when he succeeded General Marshall. 20261-52- 8 H. R. 5426 WITHOUT UMT A NONREALITY The Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1951 which passed the House of Representatives on October 15, 1951, was predicated on the assumption that there would be established, speedily, a system of universal military training and service, and when the House of Representatives on March 4, 1951, failed to act favorably on the establishment of such a system, this bill, H. R. 5426, now before your committee, became a complete nonreality. There are those who will contend that this proposed measure will operate with or without universal military training and service, but the National Guard Association submits that this contention cannot be supported by logic or reason. Thus, if for no other reason, the States, Territories, District of Columbia, the Army National Guard, the Air National Guard and the National Guard Association contend that no action should be taken on the bill at this time and thus afford an opportunity for further study to determine what can be done in this connection with the subject matter of the proposed act. As the National Guard sees it, this proposed measure, if enacted, would establish a Reserve system whereby the whole burden for national defense would fall upon the veterans of the country who have already been placed in jeopardy as the result of war or emergency, and who would again be placed in jeopardy if another emergency, comparable to the Korean emergency, should arise. Senator LONG. If you will permit the interruption, I must say that I had great concern over the description of the bill as the magna carta of the reservists. I fear that if we had another situation such as Korea the reservists would not regard this as the great benefit that they anticipated it might be. The problem is, where are we going to get the men to meet these emergencies if total war comes on us? General WALSH. I think I will come to that, Senator. KOREAN VETERANS LIABLE FOR FURTHER SERVICE General WALSH. In view of the threatening state of world affairs, it is conceivable that there might be several such emergencies, and thus the veteran would be placed in further jeopardy. Irrespective of the crying need for trained manpower and the necessity of doing what was done to obtain such manpower in connection with Korea, the fact remains that it was the veterans of World War II, who were members of Reserve components and notably members of the Inactive and Volunteer Reserve, who were recalled for service, and thus placed in jeopardy for the second time, to say nothing of the interruption to their civilian pursuits which ensued. Such a state of affairs should be the compelling reason for the establishment of a sound system of universal military training and service based on the proposition of military training and service for all and equal jeopardy for all. The Army and Air National Guard cannot in all conscience be a party to any proposal which places the major burden for national defense on a comparative few, notably the veterans, while thousands and hundreds of thousands of others render no military service whatIt is the firm conviction of the National Guard, as a whole, soever. that if this bill is enacted, as it now stands, the Reserve system which it provides would prove to be completely ineffective and would be rejected by the overwhelming mass of public opinion and utterly prove to be unenforceable. Neither does the National Guard Association subscribe to the proposition that there should be imposed on the veterans a total military obligation, active and Reserve of 8 years, for it is far too long a time. To us the conclusion is inescapable that if such a system is established for the Reserves, the returning veterans will have the fixed conviction that they have been sold down the river by those who should have protected their interests. Certain it is that there is something inherently wrong about a military system which places veterans in jeopardy more than once except in the event of a state of emergency or of war declared by the Congress, for in that event all concerned, within the age limits prescribed by the Congress, would be liable for service irrespective of whether they had prior emergency service. The proposed measure is further defective in our opinion for, in addition to establishing a Reserve system composed primarily of veterans, it would create in the minds of the country and of the Congress the idea that it would establish a sound Reserve system, when as a matter of fact it would establish nothing of the sort. As the bill stands, and as we see it, it would prove to be a delusion, and the awakening would be bitter indeed. The proposal can be compared to the imposing facade of a house with nothing but emptiness beyond that facade, and thus instead of reality we would have nonreality and national defense in a vacuum. Seemingly, to date, nobody has been able to, or at least willing to, answer our question as to what will be the situation in the event there is another emergency comparable to that of Korea. Will the Congress again authorize the recall of veterans who have been in jeopardy once or more than once, or will the Pentagon recall them on some flimsy pretext that they are still a part of the Armed Forces, while at the same time thousands of others are permitted to escape service? WHERE WILL RESERVISTS COME FROM AFTER DRAFT EXPIRES The National Guard would like to propound a further question at this point, as to what will be the situation some 6 or 8 years hence when the Korean situation has been resolved one way or another, and there are no more emergencies or prospect thereof and selective service has passed from the picture? Since each of those now serving, whether as a result of selective service or by voluntary enlistment, will owe a 6-, 5-, or 4-year Reserve service obligation, depending, in the Ready or Stand-by Reserve, or both, of the Reserve of their particular Armed Force, the time must ultimately come when the last member or veteran will have discharged that obligation, and then what? If no system of universal military training and service is established in the future, and in the event that an era of peace should prevail, it is unlikely that such a system would be established, and in that event the Nation would have to rely on a Reserve system whereby individuals voluntarily enlist in the Army or Air National Guard or a unit of an Organized Reserve as has been the case in the past. There is no need to speculate on the readiness of such a force in contrast to the readiness of a Reserve force based on a system of universal military training and service. |