(215 U. S. 33.) Mr. Justice Day delivered the opinion MRS. FRANCES E. WATERMAN, Wife of of the court: court. v. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Courts, Cent. Dig. §§ 1347, 1350; Dec. Dig. § 493.*] *38 This case presents a question of jurisdic tion concerning the right of the United CANAL-LOUISIANA BANK & TRUST States circuit court to entertain a certain COMPANY, Executor of the Last Will bill in equity. Frances E. Waterman, wife and Testament of Caroline Stannard of Charles A. Crane, a resident of Chicago, Tilton, Deceased, et al. in the state of Illinois, and a citizen of COURTS (493*)--FEDERAL COURTS-CON- that state, joined by her husband, also a FLICTING JURISDICTION - PROBATE AND citizen of Illinois, brought the suit in the ADMINISTRATION PROCEEDINGS. United States circuit court against the Ca1. A Federal court of chancery has ju nal-Louisiana Bank & Trust Company, execurisdiction, where the proper diversity of citizenship exists, to determine the inter- tor of the last will and testament of Caroest of an heir in an alleged lapsed legacy line Stannard Tilton, deceased, a citizen of and the consequent increase in the residu- the state of Louisiana and an inhabitant ary estate, although the bill also asks oth- of the eastern district of Louisiana, and al-** er relief which cannot be granted because so against the Charity Hospital of New Orit would interfere with the ordinary set-leans, St. Ann's Asylum, Protestant Episcotlement of the estate in the state probate pal Orphan Asylum, Home for Incurables, Christian Woman's Exchange, State Insane Asylum of Jackson, Louisiana, city of New Orleans, and Louisiana Retreat, conducted by the Society of the Daughters of St. Vincent de Paul, all and each of them being institutions established under the laws of Louisiana, and citizens of the state of Louisiana, and inhabitants of the eastern district of Louisiana; also against Robert Waterman and Frederick Waterman, citizens of the state of Louisiana, and inhabitants of the eastern district thereof. The bill set forth in substance: That Caroline Stannard Tilton, widow of Frederick W. Tilton, late of the city of New Orleans, duly made and published her last will and testament and codicils thereunto annexed, and by said will and codicils said Caroline Stannard Tilton gave and bequeathed to Robert Waterman the sum of $3,000; to the said Robert Waterman and his wife, fifteen premium bonds; to Frederick Waterman, $3,000; to Frederick Tilton Davis, $1,000, 2. A nonresident heir cannot be regarded as such an indispensable party defendant that his absence will defeat the jurisdiction of a Federal court of chancery over a suit brought by an heir against the executor and other heirs, to determine her interest in an alleged lapsed legacy and the consequent increase in the residuary estate, in view of the provisions of U. S. Rev. Stat. § 737, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 587, and of equity rule 47, which permit the court to proceed with the trial and adjudication of a suit as between the parties who are properly before it, and preserve the rights of parties not voluntarily appearing, providing their rights are not prejudiced by the decree to be rendered. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Equity, Cent. Dig. 256; Dec. Dig. § 96.*] [No. 306.] Submitted February 23, 1909. Decided No- and the whole series of No. 5,963 pre A vember 8, 1909. PPEAL from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Louisiana to review a decree dismissing, for want of jurisdiction, a bill filed by an heir against an executor and other heirs, for the determination of the former's interest in an alleged lapsed legacy and the consequent increase in the residuary estate. Reversed and remanded for further proceedings. The facts are stated in the opinion. Messrs. E. Howard McCaleb and E. Howard McCaleb, Jr., for appellant. on mium bonds. That the said Caroline The complainant further avers that she is the sole surviving niece, and that Robert and Frederick Waterman and Frederick Til Messrs. Edgar H. Farrar, James McConnell, Charles E. Fenner, George C. Walsh, George H. Terriberry, H. Gar-ton Davis are the sole surviving nephews, land Dupre, Walter Guion, Victor Leovy, William C. Dufour, S. McC. Lawrason, Pierre Crabites, and H. Generes Dufour for appellees. of said Caroline Stannard Tilton, and that there are no other persons within the nearest degree of kinship of the said testatrix; and that the said Frederick Tilton Davis For other cases see same topic & § NUMBER in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep'r Indexes 40 resides in the state of Alabama, outside of | situated at Jackson, Louisiana, the Louisithe court's jurisdiction. ana Retreat, conducted by the Society of the She avers that the said Robert Waterman, | Daughters of Charity of St. Vincent de Paul, Frederick Waterman, and Frederick Tilton Davis, legatees in said will, became entitled to have and receive their said respective legacies, and did receive the same, and, accordingly, by receiving said bequests, have renounced the succession of said Caroline Stannard Tilton, deceased, and, by taking said legacies, have renounced all their rights as heirs at law, and are estopped and debarred from claiming any portion of the estate undisposed of, because of certain provisions of the will, which are set forth in the bill. It is further averred by the complainant that, by reason of the renunciation and estoppel of said legatees, the complainant remains the sole heir at law of Caroline Stannard Tilton, and, as such, is entitled to the shares which would have gone to Frederick and Robert Waterman and Frederick Tilton Davis, of the same degree and collateral line, by right of accretion. She further avers that said will bequeathed to the Charity Hospital of New Orleans, $2,000; St. Ann's Asylum, $2,000; Protestant Episcopal Orphan Asylum, $2,000; Home for Incurables, $2,000; Home for Insane, $3,000; and to the Christian Woman's Exchange, $1,000; and that after satisfaction of the foregoing special legacies and bequests, and after payment of all costs and expenses of settlement of the estate, if any remained thereof undisposed of, the testatrix willed and directed that such residue should be divided between the beneficiaries of the charitable bequests heretofore made to the various institutions, the divisions to be made pro rata, in proportion to the amount of special legacies already made to them, respectively. She avers that at the time of making said will, and at the time of the death of said testatrix, there was no such institution or corporation in existence known as Home for Insane, nor was the testatrix capable of incorporating any such institution under her will; and that said special legacy for $3,000, and the pro rata share of the residue, remained undisposed of because of the facts stated, and thereby the sum of $3,000 and the pro rata share of the proportion of the estate undisposed of devolved upon the complainant as sole legal heir and next of kin to said Caroline Stannard Tilton. And it was averred that the Christian Woman's Exchange was not entitled to share in the residue, because the bequest to it of $1,000 was not a charitable bequest, and the said Christian Woman's Exchange was not one of the institutions mentioned in the will to share in the residue. and the city of New Orleans, claim and as- is alone entitled to the amount of the cadu cous and lapsed special legacy bequeathed to the said so-called 'Home for Insane,' for the sum of three thousand dollars ($3,000), and to the proportionate share of said nonexisting and uncertain legatee in the residue of the estate of said Caroline Stannard Tilton, and that the Canal-Louisiana Bank & Trust Company, executor of said deceased, Caroline Stannard Tilton, be condemned to Complainant states that the insane asylum pay over and deliver to your oratrix the them jurisdiction over similar matters. This court has uniformly maintained the right of Federal courts of chancery to exercise orig citizenship existing) in favor of creditors, legatees, and heirs, to establish their claims and have a proper execution of the trust as to them. In various forms these principles have been asserted in the following, among other, cases: Suydam v. Broadnax, 14 Pet. 67, 10 L. ed. 357; Hyde v. Stone, 20 How. 170, 175, 15 L. ed. 874, 875; Green v. Creighton (Kendall v. Creighton) 23 How. 90, 16 L. ed. 419; Payne v. Hook, 7 Wall. 425, 19 L. ed. 260; Lawrence v. Nelson, 143 U. S. 215, 36 L. ed. 130, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 440; Hayes v. Pratt, 147 U. S. 557, 570, 37 L. ed. 279, 284, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 503; Byers v. McAuley, 149 U. S. 608, 37 L. ed. 867, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 906; Ingersoll v. Coram, 211 U. S. 335, 53 L. ed. 208, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 92. whole amount of said caducous special legacy, together with the proportionate share and interest to said so-called 'Home for Insane' in the residue of the estate of said de-inal jurisdiction (the proper diversity of ceased remaining after the payment of the particular legacies and the costs of administration of her estate, and for such further sum as the court may find to be justly due and owing unto your oratrix as legal heir and next of kin of the said Caroline Stannard Tilton; (4) and that it be further ordered and decreed that the Christian Woman's Exchange is not a charitable institution, or entitled, as such, under said will, to participate or receive any share or portion of the residue of the estate of said deceased; (5) and that an account be taken of the personal estate and effects of the said testatrix coming to the hands of the said executor, or of any person or persons by its order or for its use, and also of the said testatrix's funeral expenses, debts, legacies, and costs of administration, and especially showing the residue remaining in the hands of the said executor after making the aforesaid deduction, and that the same may be applied in due course of admininstration, and that, for these purposes, proper directions may be given. "And your oratrix further prays for all general and equitable relief, as well as all costs." *From an early period in the history of this court, cases have arisen requiring a consideration and determination of the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States to entertain suits against administrators and executors for the purpose of establishing claims against estates, and to have a determination of the rights of persons claiming an interest therein. And this court has had occasion to consider how far the jurisdiction in equity of the courts of the United States in such matters may be affected by the statutes of the states providing for courts of probate for the establishment of wills and the settlement of estates. We will not stop to analyze or review in detail all these cases, as they have been the subject of frequent and recent consideration in this court. The general rule to be deduced from them is that, inasmuch as the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States is derived from the Federal Constitution and statutes, that, in so far as controversies between citizens of different states arise which are within the established equity jurisdiction of the Federal courts, which is like unto the high court of chancery in England at the time of the adoption of the judiciary act of 1789 [1 Stat. at L. 73, chap. 20], the jurisdiction may be exercised, and is not subject to limitations or restraint by state legislation establishing courts of probate, and giving The rule stated in many cases in this court affirms the jurisdiction of the Federal courts to give relief of the nature stated, *notwithstanding the statutes of the state undertake to give to state probate courts exclusive jurisdiction over all matters concerning the settlement of accounts of executors and administrators in the distribution of estates. This rule is subject to certain qualifications, which we may now notice. The courts of the United States, while they may exercise the jurisdiction, and may make decrees binding upon the parties, cannot seize and control the property which is in the possession of the state court. In Byers v. McAuley, supra, the rule was thus tersely stated by Mr. Justice Brewer, delivering the opinion of the court: "A citizen of another state may establish a debt against the estate. Yonley v. Lavender, 21 Wall. 276, 22 L. ed. 536; Hess v. Reynolds, 113 U. S. 73, 28 L. ed. 927, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 377. But the debt thus established must take its place and share of the estate as administered by the probate court; and it cannot be enforced by process directly against the property of the decedent. Yonley v. Lavender, supra. In like manner, a distributee, citizen of another state, may establish his right to a share in the estate, and enforce such adjudication against the administrator personally, or his sureties (Payne v. Hock, 7 Wall. 425, 19 L. ed. 260); or against any other parties subject to liability (Borer v. Chapman, 119 U. S. 587, 30 L. ed. 532, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 342), or in any other way which does not disturb the pos session of the property by the state court. (See the many cases heretofore cited.)" In a late case, where the subject was giv. en consideration in this court (Farrell v. O'Brien [O'Callaghan v. O'Brien] 199 U. S. The United States circuit court, by grant 89, 50 L. ed. 101, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 727), | risdiction of the courts of the United States, while the rule of the earlier cases was stated as heretofore recognized in this court, and and their binding force admitted, it was laid such jurisdiction cannot be limited or in down that the circuit court of the United anywise curtailed by state legislation as to States could not entertain jurisdiction of a its own courts. The complainant, it is to bill to set aside the probate of a will in the be noted, does not seek to set aside the prostate of Washington, because, by the statutes bate of the will, which the bill alleges was of that state, the proceeding was one pure- duly established and admitted to probate ly in rem, and not a suit inter partes, sus- in the proper court of the state. tainable in a court of equity. That case recognized what previous cases had held,-ing this relief, need not interfere with the that, in proceedings purely of a probate character, there was no jurisdiction in the Federal courts. This was in harmony with the rule theretofore laid down in Byers v. McAuley, supra, in which it was held that the Federal court could not exercise original jurisdiction to draw to itself the entire settlement of the estate of the decedent and the accounts of administration, or the power to determine all claims against the estate. But it was there decided that a circuit court of the United States could entertain jurisdiction in favor of citizens of other states, to determine and award by decrees binding in personam their shares in the estates. In view of the cases cited, and the rules thus established, it is evident that the bill in this case goes too far in asking to have an accounting of the estate, such as can only be had in the probate court having jurisdiction of the matter; for it is the result of the cases that, in so far as the probate administration of the estate is concerned in the payment of debts, and the settlement of the accounts by the executor or administrator, the jurisdiction of the probate court may not be interfered with. It is also true, as was held in the court below in the case at bar, that the prior possession of the state probate court cannot be interfered with by the decree of the Federal court. Still, we think there is an aspect of this case within the Federal jurisdiction, and for which relief may be granted to the complainant, if she makes out the allegations of her bill under the other prayers, and the prayer for general relief therein contained. Under such prayer, a court of equity will shape its decree according to the equity of the case. Walden v. Bodley, 14 Pet. 164, 10 L. ed. 401. The complainant, a citizen of a different state, brings her bill against the executor and certain legatees named, who are likewise citizens of another state, and are all citizens of Louisiana, where the bill was filed, except one, who was beyond the jurisdiction of the court; and, for the reasons stated in her bill, she asks to have her interest in the legacy alleged to be lapsed and the residuary portion of the estate established. ordinary settlement of the estate, the payment of the debts and special legacies, and the determination of the accounts of funds in the hands of the executor, but it may, and we think has the right to, determine, as between the parties before the court, the interest of the complainant in the alleged lapsed legacy and residuary estate, because of the facts presented in the bill. The decree to be granted cannot interfere with the possession of the estate in the hands of the executor, while being administered in the probate court, but it will be binding upon the executor, and may be enforced against it personally. If the Federal court finds that the complainant is entitled to the alleged lapsed legacy and the residue of the estate, while it cannot interfere with the probate court in determining the amount of the resi due arising from the settlement of the estate in the court of probate, the decree can find the amount of the residue, as determined by the administration in the probate court in the hands of the executor, to belong to the complainant, and to be held in trust for her, thus binding the executor personally, as was the case in Payne v. Hook and Ingersoll v. Coram, supra. It is to be presumed that the probate court will respect any adjudication which might be made in settling the rights of parties in this suit in the Federal court. It has been frequently held in this court that a judgment of a Federal court awarding property or rights, when set up in a state court, if its effect is denied, presents a claim of Federal right which may be protected in this court. The circuit court in this case construed the bill, in view of its broad prayer for relief, as one which undertook to take the*entire settlement of the estate from the hands of the probate court, and denied the jurisdiction of the circuit court of the United States in the premises. We are of opinion that, to the extent stated, the bill set up a valid ground for relief; and, while all that it asks cannot be granted, enough was stated in it to make a case within the jurisdiction of the Federal courts within the principles we have stated. At the last term of the court, counsel in This controversy is within the equity ju- this case were invited to file, on or before 97. *47 or even necessary, parties, for neither the absence of formal, nor such as are commonly termed necessary, parties, will defeat the jurisdiction of the court; provided, in the case of necessary parties, their interests are such and so far separable from those of parties before the court, that the decree can be so shaped that the rights of those actually before the court may be determined without necessarily affecting other persons not within the jurisdiction. After pointing out that there may be formal parties, of whose omission the court takes no account, Mr. Jus tice Miller, in delivering the opinion in Barney v. Baltimore, 6 Wall. 280, 18 L. ed. 825, went on to say: the first day of the present term of court,, cited. This rule does not permit a Federal briefs upon the question whether Frederick court to proceed to a decree in that class Tilton Davis, averred in the bill to be a of cases in which there is an absence of inresident of the state of Alabama, and out-dispensable, as distinguished from proper, side of the jurisdiction of the court, is an indispensable party to the suit, and, in his absence, a dismissal of the cause required for want of jurisdiction in the court to proceed without him. These briefs have been filed and we come now to consider this branch of the case. In so doing, it is essential to remember that the complainant's cause of action is primarily against the executor of the estate for a decree against it concerning the right of the complainant to recover because of the alleged lapse of the legacy to the Home for the Insane, and the consequent increase in the residuary portion of the estate to be distributed to the heirs of Mrs. Tilton because of the allegations contained in the bill. The Watermans "There is another class of persons whose and Davis are made parties to the bill, and relations to the suit are such that, if their asked to be excluded from a participation interest and their absence are formally in the recovery because of the alleged re- brought to the attention of the court, it nunciation of their rights in the succession will require them to be made parties, if to Mrs. Tilton. If it shall be found that within its jurisdiction, before deciding the they have not thus renounced their inter- case; but, if this cannot be done, it will est, and a decree be rendered in complain-proceed to administer such relief as may be ** ant's favor, they are entitled to participate in its power between the parties before it. in the recovery. They have no interest in And there is a third class whose interests common, however, with the complainant, in the subject-matter of the suit and in the and the shares of the complainant and other heirs are separate and distinct. The question is, therefore, Is Davis an indispensable party to this suit, his absence creating a want of jurisdiction in the Federal court to proceed without him? Section 737 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 587) provides: "When there are several defendants in any suit at law or in equity, and one or more of them are neither inhabitants of nor found within the district in which the suit is brought, and do not voluntarily appear, the court may entertain jurisdiction, and proceed to the trial and adjudication of the suit between the parties who are properly before it; but the judgment or decree rendered therein shall not conclude or prejudice other parties not regularly served with process nor voluntarily appearing to answer." relief sought are so bound up with that of the other parties that their legal presence as parties to the proceeding is an absolute necessity, without which the court cannot proceed. In such cases the court refuses to entertain the suit when these parties cannot be subjected to its jurisdiction." The relation of an indispensable party to the suit must be such that no decree can be entered in the case which will do justice between the parties actually before the court without injuriously affecting the rights of such absent party. 1 Street, Fed. Eq. Pr. § 519. If the court can do justice to the parties before it without injuring absent persons, it will do so, and shape its relief in such a manner as to preserve the rights of the persons not before the court. If necessary, the court may require that the bill be dismissed as to such absent parties, and may generally shape its decrees so as to do justice to those made parties, without prejudice to such absent persons. Payne v. Hook, 7 Wall. 425, 19 L. ed. 260. To the same effect is the 47th equity rule. This statute and rule permit the court to proceed with the trial and adjudication of the suit, as between parties who are properly before it, and preserves the Applying these principles to the case at rights of parties not voluntarily appearing, bar, we are of opinion that the presence of providing their rights are not prejudiced by Frederick T. Davis as a party to the suit the decree to be rendered in the case. This is not essential to the jurisdiction of the rule has been said to be declaratory of the Federal court to proceed to determine the already-established equity practice. Shields case as to the parties actually before it. In v. Barrow, 17 How. 130; 15 L. ed. 158; 1 other words, that, while Davis is a necesStreet, Fed. Eq. Pr. § 533, and cases there Isary party, in the sense that he has an in |